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Summary 
The quasi-marketisation of England and Wales' education system undertaken by 
the Conservative Government during the 1980s has not only been consolidated 
but also extended by 'New' Labour. New Managerialist restructuring has now 
reached its zenith in national target setting, 'Education Action Zones' and the 
primacy of OFSTED (Office for Standards in Education). Using Archer's 
(1995) morphogenetic approach, this thesis provides a useful contribution to the 
development of critical realism in organisation theory and the sociology of 
education. It also adds to the international debate on school effectiveness, 
assessment and the generic contradiction between New Managerialism and 
child-centred philosophy and practice. One of the key arguments of the thesis is 
that there is an objective constraining contradiction between New 
Managerialism and child-centred philosophy, which predisposes cultural agents 
to act in specific ways. 
Part One establishes the theoretical framework, counterposing Archer's 
morphogenesis to Giddens' structuration theory. Here it is argued that the 
interplay of structure, culture and agency can be theorised via the 
methodological device of analytical dualism. Part Two utilises the 
morphogenetic approach's three-part sequential schema of Socio-Cultural 
Conditioning 4 Socio-Cultural Interaction 4 Socio-Cultural Elaboration/Stasis 
in providing an historical account of the demise of child-centred philosophy and 
concurrent elaboration of the New Managerialism. The Preface to Part Three 
critically appraises the school effectiveness movement and the managerialist co- 
option of Robin Alexander and others. It delineates the background to the two 
primary schools analysed in Part Three. Part Three provides a contemporary 
ethnographic analysis of how teaching staffs in two primary schools mediate the 
contradiction between child-centred philosophy and practice and the New 
Managerialism. It draws upon nine months of participant observation, tape- 
recorded semi-structured interviews and the relevant academic literature. The 
concluding chapter discusses the implications of the findings for primary school 
practice and underscores the need for a critical realist approach. 
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Part One: Establishing the Theoretical Framework 
Introduction 
'And the one thing I hate is this thing with Value for Money... ' (Pat, headteacher, 
Westside primary school). This encapsulates the monumental changes that have 
occurred in education in England and Wales since the promulgation of the 1988 
Education Reform Act. At present, all primary schools are subject to 'market 
forces' and the commodification of those who work in them. Hence the head's 
invective against the monetary valorisation of education. In essence, the 
commodifying logic expunges child-centred philosophy and practice. However, the 
quasi-marketisation of England and Wales' education system undertaken by the 
Conservative Government during the 1980s has not only been consolidated but also 
extended by 'New' Labour. As Jenny Ozga puts it: 
In England and Wales, as elsewhere in Europe... we have seen the displacement 
of the old model of welfare state provision. In England and Wales, perhaps to a 
greater extent than elsewhere, that welfare state has been replaced by the 
operation of the market under the Conservative Governments of 1979-1997. 
The process of reformation continues in the modernizing agenda of New Labour 
(2000: 54). 
This modernizing agenda is pursued within the framework of economic 
competitiveness as the defining'aim of education. The New Managerialist 
philosophy that underpinned the 1988 Education Reforrn Act has now reached its 
zenith in national target setting, Education Action Zones and the primacy of 
OFSTED (Office for Standards in Education). The latter constitutes a key 
contradiction for primary schools teachers committed to child-centred learning. 
Using Archer's (1995) morphogenetic approach, this thesis examines the backdrop 
to the New Managerialist restructuring of education and provides an in-depth 
analysis of the ways in which two primary schools - one deemed 'failing' and the 
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other 'successful' by OFSTED - mediate the objective contradiction between child- 
centred philosophy and the New Managerialism as embodied in SATs (Standard 
Assessment Tasks), League Tables, the National Curriculum and national target 
setting. 
David Scott (2000) has recently underscored the increasing dominance of 
positivism and empiricism in the field of education. As he argues, this can, in part, 
be attributed to managerialist pressures and the concomitant need to produce 
research findings that ostensibly allow predictions to be made by school managers. 
Indeed, the school effectiveness research that now dominates New Labour policy 
making is qui ntessenti ally positivist. The ideological import of school effectiveness 
research is discussed in Chapter 5 (see also Angus 1993; Scott 2000; Thrupp 2000; 
Willmott 1999c). In contradistinction to the dominant positivist paradigm, this 
thesis explicitly uses the realist social theory of Margaret Archer (1995). It 
therefore concurs with Ozga's emphasis on the importance of theorising for 
everyone engaged in educational work. However, as Ozga then adds, not all 
theories are 'of the same size, weight, complexity or quality. Theories may be quite 
limited in scope' (2000: 42). The morphogenetic approach is proffered as a robust 
theoretical framework that captures the stratified nature of social reality, enabling 
the practical researcher to theorise on a multi-level basis about the conditions that 
promote/foster/condition change or stability. Fundamentally, theorising about 
education change versus stability presupposes (implicitly or explicitly) assumptions 
about 'structure and agency'. Despite the current pragmatist trend whereby 
practical education research is carried out without reference to ontological and 
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epistemological concerns, the morphogenetic approach is the methodological 
complement of transcendental realism (see Bhaskar 1989; Scott 2000). It has its 
origins in the systems theory of Buckley (1967) and is offered as a workable 
alternative to Giddens' (1984) famous structuration theory. 
Chapter One is critical of the organisational and educational sociology 
literature with respect to theorising about the interplay of structure and agency. In 
particular, the generic impact of structuration theory is documented and criticised. 
Counterposing the morphogenetic approach, it is argued that 'analytical dualism' is 
the methodological key for linking structure and agency, which is possible because 
they operate over different tracts of time, each possessing sili generis properties and 
powers. In other words, structure and agency are theorised on a sequential basis: 
structural conditioning -) social interaction -) structural elaboration or stasis. 
Chapter Two argues that culture can be theorised on the same sequential basis as 
structure. It elaborates and defends the morphogenetic approach's distinction 
between the Cultural System (composed of ideas, beliefs, theories and values and 
the emergent logical relations that obtain between them) and the relationships 
between cultural agents at the Socio-Cultural level. A discussion of the corpus of 
propositions that constitutes the New Managerialism is provided and of how it 
contradicts the propositions that comprise child-centred philosophy. Specifically, 
the objective constraining nature of this particular contradiction is delineated and its 
implications for practice are examined. 
Part Two of the thesis utilises the morphogenetic approach's three-part 
sequential schema of Socio-Cultural Conditioning 4 Socio-Cultural Interaction 4 
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Socio-Cultural Elaboration or Stasis. Chapter Three briefly traces the origins of 
child-centred philosophy. This provides the backdrop to the ways in which 
university-based philosophers of education have endeavoured to critique its central 
tenets, simultaneously embroiling themselves in the situational logic of a 
'constraining contradiction' (see Chapter Two). The latter ascendant manoeuvring 
provided the ideational context of Government policy making (specifically Plowden 
and the increase in the number of Teacher Training Colleges). In short, a 
delineation of the development of child-centred philosophy and its critique by 
highly positioned academics is important in terms of what and who are excluded. 
The Chapter discusses the specific Cultural Systemic items of educational 
philosophy, 'New Right' and New Managerialist philosophies and elucidates the 
contradictions/complementarities among such items. The economic context is 
delineated. The relative degrees of bargaining power on the part of teachers, central 
government and other interest groups are analysed. However, a defence is made of 
the autonomous properties of the education system itself. This defence is important 
since it raises fundamental issues about the ontology of autonomy that have 
implications beyond Marxism for a wide range of reductionist 'sociologies of 
knowledge' that have prevailed within (and deeply flawed) the sociology of 
education for so long. 
Chapter Four delineates the interactional phase, focusing in particular on the 
Tyndale Affair and the Ruskin Speech. It underscores the importance of the 
changing nature of the economy in affecting the degrees of negotiating strength at 
the disposal of teachers and the Government. Moreover, such exchange processes 
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are ideationally embroiled. Analysis thus focuses on the use of managerialist and 
right-wing ideas by cultural agents. It is argued that the teaching profession did not 
exploit the delimited degrees of freedom at its disposal. Chapter Five delineates the 
structural elaboration of the 1988 Education Reform Act in particular, the 
imposition of SATs and the Dearing 'tinkerings'. The quasi-marketisation of 
education and its extension by New Labour, OFSTED and assessment are critically 
appraised. The objective contradiction between neo-liberalism and conservatism is 
transcendentally established. In the Preface to Part Three, school effectiveness and 
the pragmatism of Robin Alexander are critically appraised. In particular, the 
ideological import of school effectiveness research is transcendentally established. 
The extent of the decrease in teacher bargaining power is laid bare, thereby 
underscoring the imposition of ideas and practices ('corporate culture programmes') 
without their consent. 
Part Three provides a contemporary, ethnographically based analysis of how 
teaching staffs in two primary schools mediate the new conditioning cycle 
delineated in Chapter Five. In particular, it theorises about the ways in which staff 
mediate the objective contradiction between child-centred philosophy and the New 
Managerialist restructuring of their work and activities. Both Chapters draw upon 9 
months (July 1996; September 1996 - April 1997) of participant observation and 
tape-recorded semi-structured interviews. Access was gained via formal letter, 
which set out the research objectives at the same time offering classroom help as an 
assistant. Letters were sent out to 6 schools in a city in the south of England, of 
which only 2 were successful. Pseudonyms are used throughout in order to 
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maintain anonymity. Chapter Six examines the processes, mechanisms and events 
that followed a 'failing' OFSTED report on a Church of England primary school 
and the imposition of a 'trouble-shooting' head who embodied the New 
Managerialism. The importance of contextual factors is highlighted alongside the 
need to specify the stringency of constraints under which agents act. Chapter Seven 
examines the processes, mechanisms and events that occurred and existed in a 
'successful' primary Catholic school in the prosperous side of the same city. Here 
it is found that the New Labour's imposition of national target setting is resulting, in 
this case, in a managerialist focus on maths, English and science at the expense of 
the rest of the National Curriculum. In short, it concurs with Morley and Rassool's 
(1999) argument that the tendency now is towards isomorphism. 
Both schools had distinctively differing socio-economic intakes, histories and 
problems. Indeed, 'Southside' was deemed 'failing' by OFSTED, despite generous 
degrees of funding; whilst 'Westside' was deemed 'successful', notwithstanding its 
OFSTED report's request for 'better management'. Both schools were underpinned 
by a Christian ethos. Thus contextual factors are crucial in explaining the extent to 
which schools can subvert the macro conditioning cycle of the New Managerialist 
quasi-marketisation. However, the imposition of national targets during my time in 
Westside dramatically attenuated the degrees of freedom previously afforded by the 
school's high socio-economic intake and strong practical Catholic ethos that was 
supported by the majority of parents. It is a pity that I was unable to revisit 
Southside to examine how they dealt with the concurrent added blow of national 
targets (although such targets would not have been much higher than that which 
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was demanded by the 'trouble-shooting head'). In 1997, Woods et al. found that a 
measure of deprofessionalisation had set in among their case-study primary schools, 
which involved 
the loss or distillation of skills, routinization of work, the loss of conceptual, as 
opposed to operational, responsibilities, the replacement of holism by 
compartmentalization, work and bureaucratic overload, the filling and 
overfilling of time and space, loss of time for reflection and for recovery from 
stress, the weakening of control and autonomy, and, in general, a move from 
professional to technician status (1997: 84-85). 
Prior to my time in Westside, local context afforded staff the ability to move back 
to a child-centred professionalism. However, whilst the deprofessionalisation 
scenario depicted by Woods et al. occurred at Southside, it started to reappear at 
Westside as a direct result of the imposition of national targets. The Concluding 
Chapter thus underscores the bleak future that children in our primary schools now 
face. It also recapitulates the indispensability of critical realist social theory for 
documenting and theorising about the continuing impact of New Managerialism on 
education in England and Wales. 
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I Structure, agency and educational change: morphogenesis and 
the need for analytical dualism 
Introduction 
As indicated in the introduction, the principal aim of this thesis is to theorise about 
the interplay of child-centred philosophy, managerialism and teacher mediation via 
the morphogenetic approach. It may therefore strike some readers as odd that my 
first chapter is devoted solely to thinking about social structure and human agency. 
Whilst structural analysis always needs to be complemented by cultural analysis, 
the reason for devoting this chapter to structure is two-fold. Firstly, in order to 
provide a robust explanatory grip on structural (and cultural) dynamics, a particular 
social ontology and concomitant methodology have to be outlined and defended. 
The social ontology defended throughout this thesis is a stratified one, grounded in 
transcendental realism, and practically fleshed out, so to speak, by the latter's 
methodological complement of the morphogenetic approach. In view of the 
complexity of the morphogenetic approach's corpus of methodological propositions 
vis-a-vis structure, and their transposability to culture, it makes sense to spell out in 
some detail its explanatory methodology before linking culture in the next chapter. 
However, secondly, the morphogenetic approach is explicitly counterposed to 
Giddens' (1979,1984) structuration theory in order to highlight the primacy that 
the fon-ner gives to ontological rigour as against structuration theory's ontological 
(and methodological) dilution. Many sociologists were quick to join the 
structurationist bandwagon (Willmott 1997). Educational sociology has by no 
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means been immune from this bandwagon effect. However, the reason for this is 
entirely laudable yet over-hasty. Its laudability derives from the need to avoid 
reifying social structure, treating it as a 'thing' above-and-beyond agency; its haste 
consists of compacting them into one indistinguishable amalgam, thereby 
precluding examination of their interplay over time. This chapter will proceed 
more slowly, arguing that a stratified approach to structure and agency does not 
entail reifying the two (or conceiving of them as separate). 
What is transcendental realism? 
At a common-sense level, it would seem that attachment to realism implies a 
rational grasp of the way things are, which in turn guides subsequent action. 
However, critical realism begins from the premise that the way things are affects us 
regardless of our own fallible epistemological grasp. For the Jay commentator, 
poorly paid, recently divorced Claire, faced with the decision of whether to re- 
mortgage her house in order to pay for a long-awaited family holiday to Disney in 
Florida, would be held to exemplify realism if she opted for a weekend in 
Weymouth. Her reasons would conceivably make reference to the likelihood of 
incurring substantial debts and the impossibility of keeping up with repayments if 
she opted for the holiday abroad. Many would not dispute this accurate assessment. 
The difference, however, between Claire's assessment and any sociological 
assessment lies in the latter's attempt to provide an explanatory account of Claire's 
(objective) predicament and her (subjective) response. Already we get a hint of 
where the term 'transcendental' enters into the equation. Sociology would aim to 
go beyond (transcend), though fundamentally not negate or disregard, actors' 
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accounts since social reality is not just the aggregation of agential. interpretations. If 
that were true, then we would not be able to explain why some people are 
strategically manipulated into vicious cycles of debt. In brief, transcendental 
realism is committed to what social reality niust be like in order to make analysis of 
it intelligible. In other words, it makes claims as to the necessary conditions that 
make it a possible object of knowledge. What is often confused is the a priori 
necessity of generalising the nature of social (or natural) reality and specific 
attempts to capture it theoretically (see, for example, Johnson et A. 1984). 
Transcendental social realism does not make claims as to what structures constitute 
social reality, but only that it is structured. Thus, for instance, any substantive 
disagreement about the precise role of the Secretary of State for Education and 
Employment, vis-a-vis the implementation of the 1988 Education Reform Act, 
necessarily presupposes irreducible social structures; in this case we make 
reference to the educational system, government machinery and so on. 
The early development of transcendental realism was concerned with the 
natural sciences (Bhaskar 1975; Harr6 1970; Harr6 and Madden 1975)1. The 
possibility of a priori knowledge, namely that which can be known independently 
of any experience, is associated with Kant. Kant transcendentally derived such 
possibility; that is to say, a priori knowledge is knowledge of the world that must 
be so if the world is to be known. However, as Collier (1994: 212) points out, Kant 
1 Hence the use of natural analogies by social realists to explain emergence and stratification (Sayer 1992). 
Many critics rightly point out that social reality is unlike natural reality since (a) it does not exist 
independently of us and (b) can never be likened, for instance, to a magnetic field precisely because it is 
quintessentially peopled (Manicas 1997). However, it will be argued that the dissimilarities are unhelpfully 
emphasised at the expense of the similarities between natural and social reality. 
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did not think that we could know if the noumenal world in itself had these 
properties - he thought that our mind merely imposed this knowable form on it. 
Bhaskar appropriates Kant's term 'transcendental' in a slightly different sense. 
The difference is that while Kant's arguments lead to a theory about the structure- 
imposing power of the mind vis-h-vis the world, Bhaskar's lead to extra-discursive 
conclusions, namely about what the world must be like. This is where Bhaskar 
parts company with Kant, since we are not dealing with unknowable things-in- 
themselves (we do not see the powers that are deposited within the position of 
Secretary of State, but we know they exist by virtue of their effects). Furthermore, 
Bhaskar's use of the term 'transcendental' is different in the sense that Bhaskar 
posits underlying mechanisms, which are unobservable and yet causally 
efficacious. Such mechanisms can be posited by virtue of transcendental 
argumentation in conjunction with the causal criterion. Thus, it could be argued 
that had Kant made the distinction between transcendental arguments and 
transcendental idealism, 'he could have deployed a transcendental argument to' 
establish the knowability of the transcendental subject who synthesized ... the 
phenomenal world and thus avoided blocking off the transcendental subject and the 
understanding-in-itself and the transcendental object and the world-in-itself from 
the experiencing human ego' (Bliaskar 1994: 46, original emphasis). 
The existence of events and the underlying mechanisms that generate them 
signals the stratified nature of reality. Part and parcel of Bhaskar's transcendental 
differentiation of reality into the three key strata of the real, actual and empirical is 
his rejection of Humean empiricism. The substantial powers at the Secretary of 
15 
State's disposal (1988 Education Act) belong to the realm of the real. They are 
mechanisms that only exist by virtue of human agency (as impersonal social 
relations) but are real because of their causal efficacy. When such powers are 
exercised we enter the realm of events. However, other mechanisms may (and 
often do) intervene to preclude simple deduction of generative structural 
mechanisms from such events. Indeed, events themselves may not manifest the 
workings of generative mechanisms, due to contingencies that suspend their 
powers. Moreover, agents do not always experience such events (or experience 
them in a manner congruent with their provenance); to assume otherwise turns 
every agent into an infallible sociologist. Hence the importance of delineating the 
realm of the empirical. All three realms are real and must be kept distinct in order 
to provide satisfactory explanatory accounts of social activity. The example of the 
powers deposited in the position of Secretary of State should be sufficient to 
underscore this. For (a) such powers may remain unexercised or exercised but 
unperceived because counteracted by other mechanisms or (b) may be wrongly 
experienced as emanating from other structural sources. To reiterate, the 
methodological problem that confronts any researcher is that the exercise of causal 
powers is not readily transparent from patterned empirical events. For example, a 
deputy head may confront a staff meeting whose agenda the head and senior 
management team had prearranged, yet at the same time s/he remains unaware of 
this exercise of power or that the powers of Heads of Department had been offset. 
Indeed, the deputy may misinterpret (or be led to misinterpret) the meeting as 
resulting from the machinations of governors and certain members of the 
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management team. What complicates matters further is that Heads of Department 
themselves may have only a partial understanding of the situation, whose accounts 
cannot therefore always be held a priori incorrigible. Transcendental social realism 
enables the social analyst to ask counterfactual questions in order to unravel the 
complexity of social reality. If the head had exercised powers buttressed by those 
of the governing body, could the head's positional powers still be exercised or exist 
without the existence of a governing body? Does a school remain a school without 
one? Though this is to jump ahead, it does provide a flavour of the explanatory 
power of social realism. 
In a nutshell, Humean empiricism remains wedded to the realm of the 
actual, i. e. at level of observable events. Bhaskar has termed this 'actualism', 
which entails a denial of the real existence of underlying generative structures that 
account for things and/or events. The problem with Humean empiricism is its 
acausality. For Hume, the external world consists of nothing more than 
contingently related events. Causality is untenably implied to reside in constant 
conjunctions of events. There are no real or necessary connections between a 
child's ability to write and the handed-in piece of written work. All we can say is 
that event A, the child writing, was followed by event B, the handing-in of the 
piece of written work. In fact, to ensure Humean consistency, one cannot even talk 
of pupil ability, for this is unobservable. To reiterate, instead of A caused B, we 
have A occurred followed by B. Clearly, to say that A occurred and then B 
happened does not imply that A caused B. Yet to say that A caused B is to say that 
the occurrence of A is a necessary and/or sufficient condition for the occurrence of 
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B. Yet to observe regularly the teacher opening the window and Jonathan sniffing 
every morning at 10 o'clock does not tell us whether the opening of the window is 
a necessary and/or sufficient condition for Jonathan's capacity to sniff. There is no 
necessary causal link between the two. Ultimately, empincism cannot account for 
either Jonathan's sniffing or the teacher's physical ability to open windows. 
In everyday life we experience mechanical causation, that is, the 
displacement of physical masses in time and space in terms of transitive verbs such 
as 'pushing' and 'pulling' which cannot be explained ostensively; rather they 
embody an intensional relationship between cause and effect (Bhaskar 1975: 90). 
This is simply a complicated way of saying that such verbs cannot specify the 
generative mechanisms that enable the teacher to open the window. Causality 
concerns not a relationship between discrete events (the teacher opens the window 
lock, pushes the window and it opens) but the causal powers or liabilities of objects 
or relations or their mechanisms (Sayer 1992: 104). The ability to open such a 
window exists by virtue of the body's necessary powers. Humean actualism fails to 
acknowledge that reality has depth, principally because of its insistence upon the 
criterion of observability to establish reality. Yet we cannot observe a magnetic 
force field, but accept its reality. We accept its reality because of its causal effects. 
This applies equally to social structure. Social realism insists, as a matter of 
intelligibility, that social structure is ontologically distinct from human agency and 
is knowable via the causal criterion. This distinction is not one of heuristic 
convenience. Social structures are held to possess sui generis properties and 
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powers, that is, causal properties that are examinable independently of agency and 
yet necessarily depend upon agency for their existence. 2 
Transcendentally, social reality is structured and differentiated and thus 
provides social science with its subject matter. To explain why individuals as role 
incumbents perform specific tasks on a regular basis, as manifested at the level of 
observable events (e. g. annual public examinations), necessarily presupposes some 
kind of phenomenon that is extra-indi vi dual. The activities of individuals within the 
school setting are often structured in quite specific ways and such activities are not 
about the individual qua individual. The very notion of role signifies that its 
required actions are independent of purely personal properties (though this is not to 
suggest passive acceptance). The 'extra-indivi dual' is what we normally refer to as 
'the social'. However, social realism differentiates the social into unintended sid 
generis emergent and aggregate properties that act back to condition subsequent 
activity. The activities of teachers, pupils, administrators and governors are the 
mediated results of sui generis emergent properties. Such structural emergent 
properties are causally efficacious (why the teacher teaches, the pupil learns, and so 
on) yet cannot be observed. However, not all realists subscribe to the view that 
mechanisms are always underlying and unobservable, since 'Clockwork, the ways 
of producing commodities, electing MPs etc. involve mechanisms which are no less 
2 The notion of structure (or culture) as possessing sid generis properties has been wrongly assumed to 
entail reification; viz. that such properties are either disconnected supra-human 'substances' or beyond 
agential grasp. But the phrase 'sid generis' means nothing more than 'of its own kind'. As Archer notes, 
The confusion arises etymologically because the same word genus (of which generis is the genitive) 
means 'birth', deriving from the older Sanskrit verb 'jan', meaning 'to be begat'. Hence the source 
of the Holistic error that (reified) society begets or generates its own (equally reified) properties. 
However, when referring to things, such as 'society', it denotes merely 'sort' or 'kind' (1995: 48-49). 
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observable than the effects they produce' (Sayer 1992: 280). Yet when MPs are 
elected, what exactly are we observing? We can readily observe a succession of 
individuals greeting election officials, who in turn direct them to booths in which 
slips of paper are placed into wooden boxes. These brown boxes are then moved to 
the local town hall for counting by other local government officials. 
We can observe that the conditions for voting are dependent upon the 
observable scrutiny of voter documentation and that the handing over of the voting 
slip enables the voter to mark an X in the appropriate box. The handing over of the 
slip enables the voter to vote and voting would not be possible without this 
transaction. But the handing over of the slip is not the key generative mechanism 
since the prior inspection of documentation would have been already approved. 
Whilst the latter is observable, the conditions for voting are not: they reside in 
internal social relations between positions (voter/local government official; local 
government official/central government official ... ). The electoral system cannot be 
seen, but proportional representation versus first-past-the-post influences how many 
people vote and who wins. It is granted that we may observe the mechanisms in 
clockwork, but is it not the case that such observed workings are the result of a 
stratum of combined unobservable generative mechanisms, such as magnetic fields 
and the properties of the materials concerned? We can observe the teacher 
instructing the pupil to attend detention or read aloud, but this in itself does not 
explain such behaviour. Explanation of such behaviour consists of positing the 
unobservable reality of irreducible emergent properties (the emergent social 
relation between teacher and pupil). In accounting for the powers of teachers, 
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social realists point to the internal and necessary relation between teacher and pupil 
(a teacher would not be a teacher without a pupil and vice versa). As Sayer rightly 
argues, this internal social relation is sui generis because it modifies the causal 
powers of the individuals qua individuals. Sayer is either conflating a 
sophisticated (realist) theory and the events that are its subject matter or much more 
likely neglecting the fact that unobservable social relations condition the observable 
mechanisms of interaction in organisations. Of course, some mechanisms are 
observable, but this does not make observability necessary for a generative 
mechanism to be at work. 
The above introduction to transcendental realism may strike a positive 
chord with those intuitively attracted to what has been proposed or deemed not only 
confusingly complex but also unwarranted by those predisposed to a less 
ontologically driven approach to social analysis. 3 Indeed, the transcendental 
presumption of sid generis structures does not tell us what such structures consist of 
and how they condition agential activity. In other words, it does not provide a 
workable methodology that captures the processes and mechanisms of structural 
conditioning and subsequent structural change (morphogenesis) or stasis. So we 
have to infer which specific ones are at work in any given area by virtue of their 
effects there. 
3 Any research methodology presupposes a social ontology. This cannot be avoided. However, school 
effectiveness research, for example, refuses to examine its ontological presuppositions and conducts its 
defence purely at the methodological level. (See the Preface to Part Three & Willmott 1999c for a critique 
of their positivist methodology and how its ontological presuppositions provide the necessary, though 
insufficient, conditions for the charge of ideological commitment. ) 
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Social structure, emergence and the Cartesian legacy 
An emergent stratum q social reality ýf 
At one level it is tediously truistic to maintain that sociologists of education (or of 
any substantive area for that matter) are fundamentally engaged in the task of 
documenting, analysing and theorising about social reality. Presumably there are 
not many who would wish to deny that educational sociologists are in the job of 
dealing with matters social - levels of attainment, the impact of race ideas upon 
curriculum content and delivery, issues surrounding teacher professionalism - yet 
at another level what precisely constitutes the social is a hotly contested matter. As 
McFadden (1995: 295) observed, '... questions about structure and agency, 
particularly in education, are obviously not going away. For some commentators, 
the 'problem of structure and agency' cannot be practically resolved (Abraham 
1994: 239). This Chapter will argue that the 'problem of structure and agency' is 
resolvable if one recognises that structure is sui generis real because it is not 
temporally coterminous with its creators. How, then, do we conceptualise social 
structure? What does not help matters is that often we are told the school is a 
structure, part of a system, itself a structure, which in turn belongs to society, a 
much bigger structure. Let's start with the school as structure. 
My discussion of the unobservable nature of the relation between teacher 
and pupil lies at the heart of the realist conception of social structure. Structure is 
neither viewed as an aggregate of individuals or as an observable regular pattern of 
events. Moreover, it is not held to be independent of agency; i. e. not a 'thing' in 
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the Lukdsian sense - an immutable feature of the social world. Social realism 
maintains that structure is emergent from agency by virtue of its sui generis 
properties. A teacher presupposes a pupil, a head presupposes teachers, a 
governing body presupposes teachers, pupils, heads and administrative staff and so 
on. In other words, we are talking about internal relations between roles, 
ontologically distinct from the individual people who fill them and whom they 
causally affect. The teacher/pupil relation is an irreducible emergent property 
because the powers deposited within the role modify the powers of the individuals 
as individuals. This modification arises from the combination of internally 
necessary social relations. A lecturer cannot self-award a first-class honours degree 
just as a student cannot revoke the decision of a degree classification board. Such 
powers do not reside in the properties of individuals but in the social relations that 
presuppose such individuals for their enduring efficacy (and thus mediation). 
I am not suggesting that the teacher/pupil relation exists in isolation. Schools, 
like all organisations, are composed of a multiplicity of role-sets and are dependent 
for their existence and endurance upon other organisational (structural) 
configurations. In other words, the school qua organisation is internally related to 
the state (Department for Education and Employment, local government ... ), which 
itself is anchored in further internal necessary relations (treasury department and so 
on). Of course, before the rise of the English educational system, schools were 
internally related to Church organisations; that is to say, they were financially 
dependent upon, and staffed by, the Church. We can now return to my point made 
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earlier about the capacity of social realism to differentiate the necessary from the 
contingent in posing counterfactual questions. Returning to the question of whether 
a school requires the existence of a governing body for it to be a school, it can be 
argued that a school could quite effectively function without a governing body. 
Deem et al. write that 
As organizations, governing bodies have an evanescent quality, that is best 
described as 'now you see them, now you don't'. This is partly explained by 
their voluntary and transitory nature, itself quite unlike the organizational 
character of either educational organizations or business and commercial 
organizations, both of which have a greater degree of permanency and taken-for- 
grantedness, even if their structure and processes are continually being recreated 
and changed (1995: 90). 
To maintain that a governing body per se is an organisation is incorrect; governing 
bodies are part of schools as organisations. The authors draw upon Weick's (1988) 
concept of 'loose coupling. For Weick, loose coupling '... carries connotations of 
impermanence, dissolvability, and tacitness all of which are potentially crucial 
properties of the 'glue' that holds organizations together' (1988: 59). What would 
clarify the notion of 'loose coupling' and at the same time denude it of its unhelpful 
&sensitising' import is the distinction between symmetrical and asymmetrical 
internal social relations. The relation between teacher and pupil is symmetrically 
internal because each could not exist without the other. Symmetrical internal 
necessity does not imply symmetrical power relations, since the teacher/pupil 
relation exemplifies one-sided domination. In other words, structurally teachers 
have the 'upper hand', though this is not to suggest that teachers exercise their 
powers in an untrammelled fashion, without having to mediate the effects of pupils' 
reflective powers. In explaining the internal relation between teacher and pupil to 
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an undergraduate seminar, I was asked about the relation between parents and their 
pupils, and that surely parents were therefore constitutive of the school as structural 
entity? The student was confusing the fact that actors are often occupants of a 
number of structures and that the role of parent presupposes the role of 
son/daughter, not that of pupil or student. In this case, the pupil is an occupant of 
two distinct structures, namely the school and family. S/he might also attend 
various clubs, in turn embroiling him/her in causally efficacious social relations 
(scout/scout leader; girl guide/guide leader). However, the school would not exist 
without children and is thus asymmetrically related to children qua children. The 
student was quite right to point out that schools presuppose children, who in turn 
presuppose parents/guardians. But this is an asymmetrical relation at the biological 
level, not the social one: how such children are reared is contingently related to the 
school and the structure for such rearing will either complement or contradict 
school activities (or comprise a mixture of the two). 
Maintaining that people are often occupants of several social structures does 
not entail spatio-temporal simultaneity. In attending school, a teacher is not 
exercising powers as husband or wife. In explaining the exercise of marital powers, 
necessarily one differentiates a different spatio-temporal setting (in the marital 
home, and so on). The fact that children behave in qualitatively different ways at 
different times (why Christopher undertakes his maths examination at 3 o'clock, 
watches television at home at 5 o'clock and follows the instructions of his scout 
leader at 7 o'clock) warrants the autonomy of social structure. As critics of 
25 
methodological individualism rightly point out, without the autonomy of social 
structure, how do we account for the fact that a bank teller does not hand over cash 
at a party? Such behaviour cannot be reduced to statements about individuals per 
se. It is not the characteristics of Christopher as an individual that accounts for his 
behaviour in the three structural settings delineated. 4 
However, the school is externally related to the family qua structure. But the 
familial structure can have a causal, albeit contingent, effect. The structural 'upper 
hand' of the teacher may be reinforced or counteracted by the familial structure. 
For example, most children recognise that they have objective vested interests in 
acceding to most parental demands, irrespective of whether they are deemed 
reasonable by them. One of the requests often made by parents is that their 
child/ren behave well in class. The mediation of this parental request to behave 
well in class thus buttresses the power of the teacher (and would be conceptualised 
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as over-determining the position of the teacher because of its reinforcing effects). 
Whilst the familial structure can be causally efficacious vis-ý-vis the school, the 
school is not ontologically dependent upon it. However, any governing body is 
clearly not contingently related to the school in this way. The relation of the 
4 As Layder (1990: 120) argues, methodological individualism presupposes a flat ontology of social reality 
and insists that facts about social phenomena can be explained solely in terms of facts about individuals. 
The principal reason for the emphasis upon the individual stems from its empiricist underpinning and hence 
any reference to unobservable social relations is taken to entail reification or the positing of a dubious 
social 'substance'. (See the useful collection of essays in O'Neill (ed. ) Modes of Individualism and 
Collectivism, in which empiricist propositions preclude a full-blown endorsement of ontological 
emergence. ) Indeed, the empiricist ghost has yet to be fully exorcised. In their discussion of Lukes' 
(1974) three-dimensions of power, Deem et al. write that '... because three-dimensional power is not 
directly observable, we can only speculate about its existence' (1995: 135). The foregoing should be 
sufficient to dispel any need to speculate about the existence of powers that may remain unexercised or are 
exercised but unperceived. 
5 Furthermore, the parental request that their children behave well in class is reinforced by the existence of 
truancy officers, education social workers, formal legal responsibilities and so on. 
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goveming body to the school is intemally asymmetrical. In other words, it is 
perfectly possible that schools could function without a goveming body, but not 
vice versa. Yet despite this intemal asymmetry, it still remains the case that 
goveming bodies could be further empowered via govemment legislation to 
override or supplant the powers of heads and their staffs. But even if this were to 
happen, the specialised knowledge of the head would provide a strong deck of cards 
with which to circumvent, resist or partially cancel out any substantial influence of 
governing bodies. In this scenario, the actual outcome would have to be traced 
through empirically. 
Governing bodies are now empowered, inter alia, to hire and fire staff, 
statutorily aided by Local Education Authority (LEA) advisors, and no head can 
change this. (This is not to suggest that heads cannot form a corporate body in order 
to effect or resist structural change, but any such attempt is not guaranteed success 
- the imposition of national testing arrangements bears witness to this. ) Any 
substantive research would be concerned with what heads and their staffs do about 
it, not in spite of it, and thus how it conditions their behaviour. Concepts like 
'loose coupling' are methodologically unspecific. We are not told how they are 
'coupled' (or linked) and why 'loosely coupled' phenomena are ever subject to 
immanent dissolution. A firmer analytical grip can be maintained on schools by a) 
recognising their sid generis reality, and b) thinking about what precisely 
constitutes a school in order for it to be recognised as such. The reason that 
governing bodies can be so readily 'dissolved' is due to their internal asymmetry. 
Empirically, however, I am not convinced that they are as impermanent and 
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transitory as Deem et al. would maintain. Whilst they endure, in principle they can 
have causal effects on the workings of a school, though staff to varying degrees 
necessarily mediate such effects. It can therefore be argued that Deem et al. 's 
misrepresentation of the governing body qua organisation stems from its 
asymmetrical internal relation with the school; namely that a school does not cease 
to be a school once the governing body 'dissolves' (or whose powers remain 
unexercised). The existence of equal opportunities officers in universities is a 
further example of an asymmetrical internal relation, for the position of equal 
opportunities officer necessarily presupposes a university - personnel, decision- 
making executive - but not vice versa. However much power is 'devolved' to that 
particular position, it does not alter the fact that a university does not depend upon 
the latter for its existence. Finally, Barber and White's (1997: 1) claim that the 
establishment of the School Effectiveness Division in 1994 saved LEAs from 
extinction shows the asymmetrical relation of dependence of LEAs on central 
government. 
To reiterate, that teachers have powers that are irreducible to themselves as 
individuals signals the stratified nature of social reality. A stratified social ontology 
is discernible in Pollard's (1982) approach to classroom coping strategies. Pollard 
extends Hargreaves' (1978) analysis, which, Pollard argues, over-accentuates 
macro factors and constraints on teacher action. Instead of viewing structure as 
above-and-beyond teachers' generic control, he sees structure as something that is 
processually mediated and thus considers the situationally specific perspectives, 
goals and interests of actors within schools. His extension of Hargreaves consists 
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of viewing the school itself as ontologically distinct from the actors who fill its 
positions. Essentially, Pollard provides a more stratified approach, since 
Hargreaves only deals with two irreducible levels - the macro context and what 
teachers and pupils do - whereas Pollard more clearly distinguishes between the 
macro context (education system, Government policy), the school (internal and 
necessary relations between roles) and the actors who personify such roles. Indeed, 
it is precisely by virtue of his adoption of a relational social ontology that Pollard 
can talk of the vested interests of teachers and pupils alike: 
Largely because of their differences in structural position, the power resources 
and interests of teachers and children are different in many ways and in a great 
many respects they must be seen as being in conflict. However, a problem 
which they share is that they both have to 'cope with' and accomplish their daily 
classroom lives (1982: 22). 
Pollard highlights the non-puppet-like manner in which teachers and pupils mediate 
the structural context in which they work. As he rightly notes, both have objective 
interests in carrying out the historically specific requirements of their roles. A 
teacher has interests in making sure that pupils succeed in public examinations, 
behave well in class, complete homework, etc. Undeniably, individual properties 
affect the ways in which teachers personalise their roles - why some are fair- 
minded, funny or downright ogre-like. But role-requirements must nonetheless be 
met and thus have a relative independence of role-incumbents. The latter 'must' is 
not one of unavoidable propulsion. It signifies the fact that not to carry them out 
would incur a cost (initial censure and possible dismissal). In other words, 
stringent constraints versus degrees of freedom attach to structured positions; they 
are objective and have to be weighed by actors. The reasons for carrying out one's 
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duties are objectively structured and place a premium on their execution and a price 
on their disavowal (Archer 1995; Buckley 1998; Porpora 1989). Yet subjective 
weighing of the latter is not to be taken a priori as always congruent, otherwise we 
would not witness uncomprehending debtors who continue to pay the price. 6 
So far I have discussed two irreducible levels of reality, namely individual 
people and the emergent social relations between them, which subsequently 
condition their activities. The teacher/pupil relation has been paradigmatic. 
However, the isolation of this internal social relation is purely artificial. The 
teacher/pupil relation is embedded in a wider network of relations that make up the 
social environment. The social environment itself has irreducible emergent 
properties. This is not always (if ever) made clear by the use of the portmanteau 
6social structure'. The school is part of an educational systen17 that is irreducible to 
its constituent elements, and which qua system is causally affected by the wider 
polity. To treat the educational system as sid generis, another level of social 
reality, is not to imply that it exists independently of the activities of agents, and, 
moreover, no presumption of causal primacy is made. As Blau puts it: 
Emergent properties are essentially relationships between elements in a 
structure. The relationships are not contained in the elements, though they could 
not exist without them and define the structure... The study of social life is 
6 Generally, however, most people are aware of their vested interests and undertake the requisite social 
action to promote and defend them. What is more interesting theoretically is the extent of what Giddens 
calls 'discursive penetration' of social reality. Even when full discursive penetration is attainable, it does 
not follow that such knowledge and any concurrent use of power will codetermine successful action. 7 Following Archer (1979), a state educational system is held to be 'a nation-wide and differentiated 
collection of institutions devoted to fOnnal education, whose overall control and supervision is at least 
partly govenjinental, and whose components parts and processes are related to one another. It should be 
noted that this definition stresses both the political and the systemic aspects, and insists that they should be 
present together before education can be considered to constitute a state system' (1979: 54, original 
emphasis). 
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concerned with the relations among people and thus always with emergent 
properties in the broadest sense of the term. Often, however, social relations are 
simply treated as characteristics of individuals [the error of methodological 
individualism], no different from their other characteristics, for instance, when 
the influences of the friendships of workers and of their technical skills on their 
performance are examined. In these cases, the fact that a variable - such as the 
extent of friendships - is an emergent social property poses no special problems 
since it is actually ignored. In contrast, the analysis of the structure of social 
relations in collectivities, for example, their differentiated status structures, deals 
explicitly with emergent properties. A more complex illustration is the study of 
the interdependence between the internal structures of subgroups and the 
relations among them in the larger society (1964: 3-4). 
Whilst I would prefer an emphasis upon impersonal relations, rather than 
relationships, because of the empiricist connotations attaching to relationships 
(Layder 1990), Blau succinctly brings home the point that social structures as 
human creations possess attributes that are not reducible to their individual makers. 
This was made clear in the example of the teacher/pupil relation, whereby 
individuals' powers are modified in fundamental ways. The educational system 
itself cannot be reduced to the school as organisation. The myriad changes brought 
about by the National Curriculum have to be mediated by all schools and constitute 
either an operational obstruction or facilitation, depending on the congruence or 
incongruence of policy prescriptions with extant teaching philosophy and practices. 
Thus the Government imposition of the National Curriculum constitutes an 
irreducible level that causally conditions activities in all schools. The fact that 
different schools respond in quite distinctive, unpredictable ways demonstrates the 
need to distinguish analytically between the two levels, for the macro level in no 
way determines in top-down fashion: macro policy has to be mediated by teaching 
staff. The processes of mediation are the substantive focus of current education 
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research (Bowe and Ball with Gold 1992; Campbell and Neill 1994; Deem et al. 
1995; Menter et al. 1997; Pollard et al. 1994; Willmott 1999b; Woods et al. 1997). 
However, 'the gap between theoretical development and empirical work is 
especially marked in research on primary schools and their staff... in which 
researchers pay considerable attention to documenting changes in work practices... 
but give relatively little space to seeking to explain and understand these changes' 
(Menter et al. 1997: 17). 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide an explanatory framework for 
understanding the ways in which (two sets of) primary school staffs mediate 
specific socio-cultural emergent properties. Moreover, it will theorise about the 
conditions that maintain for (educational) stability or change. Whilst macro policy 
does not determine in top-down fashion, one needs to theorise about the degrees of 
freedom that teachers possess vis-A-vis the latter. In other words, any discussion of 
the imposition of the National Curriculum must make reference to the (differential) 
degrees of bargaining power that derive from prior structured interests and their 
interplay over time. Initially, all schools had to confront policy prescriptions for 
which they were not responsible. Some schools were better placed than others to 
circumvent, partially accept or wholeheartedly endorse the National Curriculum. 
Caution thus needs to be exercised when using such metaphors as 'steering at a 
distance' (Ball 1994). One needs to be crystal clear about the terTain over which 
steering occurs. The educational terrain is hardly smooth, dry and pedestrian-free; 
it possesses an irreducible materiality (complex division of labour) that necessarily 
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precludes untrammelled steering. 8 Central government certainly attempts to steer 
through its reforms, but as the need for the Dearing Review highlighted, bumps in 
the road may be unforeseen or foreseen but inadequately acknowledged and whose 
potential to damage the wheels needs theorising about. Indeed, the very need to 
steer at a distance stems from the fact that complex divisions of labour require the 
support of spatially differentiated personnel (in this case school and LEA staff). 
But even if heads and their deputies generically support quasi-marketisation of 
education, teachers themselves cannot be assumed a priori to comprise a 
homogenebus collection of pliable material. (The role of teaching unions vis-a-vis 
the National Curriculum will be addressed in Part Two. ) 
The Cartesian legacy 
Methodologically, the key to examining the interplay of structure and agency is 
analytical dualism. This methodological procedure is warranted because the two 
possess distinctive powers and properties. We are thus dealing with dual aspects of 
social reality. Of course, like the generic referents 'structure' and 'agency', 
analytical dualism is a portmanteau, since we are not just dealing with two 
irreducible aspects of social reality (we are talking inter alia about the irreducible 
levels of school/educational system/polity). Indeed, there is no a priori limit to the 
number of emergent social strata in society. The methodological device of 
8 Centralised educational systems are intrinsically less 'bumpy' than their decentralised counterparts. But 
this does not negate the open nature of both systems. In other words, the reasons for successful steering in 
centralised systems certainly derive from its centralised configuration but otherfactors co-detennine this 
outconte. Conceivably, newly elected governments intent upon radical reform, whilst constrained by the 
nature of centralised systems, may nevertheless make inroads and confront enablements generated at the 
same time (e. g. teaching unions' backing). As Archer (1979) points out, the nature of centralised systems 
means that the locus of potential for change rests with political manipulation, rather than with what she 
calls 'internal initiation'. 
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'analytical dualism' is the generic springboard from which to gain entr6e to social 
reality because it denotes that 'structure' and 'agency' are sid generis levels and 
thus examinable dualistically (or separably) in order to examine their sequencing of 
mutual influence over time. However, many would be quick to pounce upon the 
word 'dualism', hastily by-passing the prefix 'analytical'. Yet without the latter, 
the morphogenetic approach simply collapses, since, essentially, we are not dealing 
with Cartesian dualism, that is, with disconnected entities like Descartes' mind and 
body. 9 Descartes' dualism of mind and body - of two completely separate entities 
- has profoundly influenced work on the philosophy of mind. In fact, considerable 
time has been expended on eschewing his absolute division between the two. Yet 
the concomitant problem is precisely how to avoid a complete separation of mind 
and body without losing their ontological distinctiveness. In other words, clearly 
the two interact and are mutually influential yet are not free-floating nor so 
intertwined that examination of their respective powers and properties becomes a 
priori impossible. Thus, for Shilling, the largest obstacle to the integration of 
macro- and micro-perspectives is the dominant conceptions of structure and agency 
in educational research. 'Not only are the respective conceptions of structure and 
9 As Hacker notes: 
The thought that a human being is a composite creature consisting of body and soul (or mind, or 
spirit) is an ancient one... This conception ... was articulated in the religious and philosophical 
thought of antiquity and the Middle Ages. It was given its most powerful philosophical expression 
in our era by Descartes. According to Descartes, a human being is composed of two distinct 
substances, the mind and the body. A person's innermost self, that in which his (sic) essential 
identity consists, and that to which he refers when he uses the first-person pronoun 'P, is his mind or 
soul, the res cogitans. The essence of the mind is thought, the essence of the body extension. A 
person is an embodied anima, for while the body is destructible, the mind or soul is not (1997: 14). 
It is thus not difficult to understand why those theorists who openly adopt a 'dualist' approach to social 
reality are often held to be culpable of reifying society, since society (or structure) is taken to be like 
Descartes' human body, disconnected from agency and unnecessary for its existence. 
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agency found in macro- and micro-level work deficient in their own right, they also 
contribute to an unresolved dualism which has characterised the sociology of 
education' (1992: 70, emphasis added). 
The intense dissatisfaction that talk of dualism often engenders can be 
dispelled if one recognises that the dual aspects (mind and body) are irreducible 
relational entities, analytically separable because of their distinctive causal 
properties. An emergentist ontology argues that Cartesian dualism can be resolved 
by conceptualising the mind as emergent from the body - dependent upon, but 
irreducible to, that from which it emerged. Thus, conceptualising human agency as 
a causally and taxonomically irreducible mode of matter is not to posit a distinct 
substance 'mind', endowed with reasons for acting apart from the causal network, 
'but to credit intentional embodied agency with distinct (emergent) causal powers 
froin the biological inatter out of which agents were forined, oil which they are 
capable of reacting back... ' (B haskar 1993: 5 1). 
We are not, then, dealing with two separate substances but with irreducible 
strata or levels of reality. One of the enduring fallacies to bedevil social theory has 
been the misconstrual of structure as a level that is completely divorced from 
agency. Hence the charge of reification, for structure is then held to be above-and- 
beyond agency, something that unavoidably determines us, rather than something 
that we mould and are moulded by. The Cartesian primacy of the mind over the 
body understandably leads some commentators to avoid all talk of dualism. 
Knights (1997), for example, rightly rejects dualistic formulations that privilege 
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structure at the expense of agency (or vice versa) and/or treat either as reified 
'things'. To posit the methodological device of analytical dualism is neither to 
privilege agency or structure nor to view them as contradictory oppositions. 
Instead, the dichotomy 'structure/agency' delineates two strata of social reality, 
which is warranted because of their irreducible properties and mutual influencing 
over time. But in rejecting (Cartesian) dualism many commentators fail to 
distinguish ontologically between the two, maintaining that at best we can only use 
the dichotomy as a heuristic device. Thus, to Knights, 
An important qualification needs to be made here, for while a concern of this 
paper is to eradicate dualisms, it does not imply the illegitimacy of distinctions 
per se. Clearly, communication, knowledge and language are dependent on 
distinctions and the classificatory schemes or typologies that are their social 
science counterparts. It is only when distinctions are transformed from heuristic 
devices into reified ontological realities that they become dualistic. What has 
come to be defined as the problem of dualism occurs when polarized distinctions 
are combined with an 'episteme of representation' wherein what is distinguished 
as 'this' or 'that' is reified as ontological reality rather than merely a provisional, 
subjectively significant, and hence contestable, ordering of 'things'. Dualistic 
theorizing, then, commits the fallacy of misplaced concreteness since it believes 
that the distinctions made as part of ordering 'reality... are accurate or true 
descriptions of a reality beyond, and as if it were independent of, the theorist 
(1997: 4). 
The problem with Knights' rejection of dualism is that he will only permit a 
heuristic distinction, disavowing an ontological status for structure. Yet to accord 
structure an ontological status sid generis is not to reify it. For, as the foregoing 
indicates, structural emergent properties are only causally efficacious through 
people, not in spite of people (the error of reification). Human agency ever remains 
the sole efficient cause. In his haste to avoid Cartesian dualism, Knights elides the 
referent. Linguistic distinctions (structure/agency) presuppose referential 
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detachment; namely the detachment of the act of reference from that to which it 
refers. 'This establishes at once its existential intransivity and the possibility of 
another reference to it, a condition of any intelligible discourse at all. Referential 
detachment is implicit in all language-use... ' (Bhaskar 1994: 257, emphasis added). 
By existential intransivity, Bhaskar is referring specifically to the independent 
existence of events, objects (natural or social), etc. The process of distinguishing 
between structure and agency presupposes an object (real or otherwise) to which 
such a distinction refers. Ever to wrap such distinctions with scare quotes is to 
deny the possibility of (fallible) access to reality. Without the notion of reality sails 
scare quotes, social scientific theorising is unintelligible. It may be that scare 
quotes are used to signify social reality's contestable nature (and not its 
transcendental ordering). In itself this is acceptable as long as it is made clear at the 
outset. 
Knights' emphasis upon what is 'subjectively significant' is unavoidable 
since structure is not held to possess independent causal properties. Whilst race 
ideas may be subjectively significant for black people in terms of how they explain 
their lack of employment opportunities, objective economic structures are such that 
race ideologies may be irrelevant. Race ideas may be important for explaining who 
gets what in the job market and who gets laid off first during times of recession, but 
a clothing factory that employs only Asian people because of its geographical 
location would, in times of recession, may collapse because of economic factors 
alone. Knights would be unable to account for the corrigible status of actors' 
accounts of social reality. Like many critics of dualism, he confuses any sui 
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generis ontological status with reification. 10 This is a non sequitur and is avoided 
by adopting ontological emergence (which permits analytical, not philosophical, 
dualism). To reiterate, social reality is transcendentally differentiated and structured 
in order for social scientific analysis to get underway and propositions about the 
relative importance of socio-cultural properties are indeed contestable. Necessarily, 
such debates make truth-claims and necessarily require phenomena to be 
independent of the theorist in order for them to be conceptualised. The 
transcendental independence of such phenomena is quite separate from the nature 
of their relations with the theorist (who at the same time may be causally 
responsible for, or irreducibly linked to, that which is being conceptualised). 
Stratified social ontology: misleading metaphor? 
For those, like Shilling, who wish to transcend dualism, the notion of structure and 
agency as referring to irreducible levels of reality is redolent of incipient reffication 
or held to be false. Shilling maintains that 
(e)ducational research is typically constructed as addressing either large-scale 
structural processes ... or small-scale individual interaction patterns; the 
assumption being that social life itself exists on different levels. As well as 
being a false assumption, since individuals do not occupy different 'levels' of 
existence ... splitting social life into hierarchical levels makes it difficult to 
conceptualise change as a dynamic process involving both structures and human 
agents (1992: 70). 
10 Ronald King's (1983) fear of reffication leads him to conceptualise structure in terms of 'repetitive 
encounters'. Structure's explanatory status is thereby erased at a stroke. Thus, to King, '... the social 
structure of a school consists of the patterns of social relationships occurring between those defined as 
members of 'the school'... In social terms they are not 'inside' the structure of the school; what they 
repetitively do is the structure of the school' (1983: 13). Here, King is conflating structure and agency (in 
an 'upwards' direction). Social realism posits the notion of sid generis structure precisely in order to 
explain such repetitive or routine behaviour. Without a notion of the school qua irreducible relational 
entity, we cannot explain why different cohorts of individuals behave in similar (structured) ways. Indeed, 
we posit the concept of the school in order to denote (a) its relational nature and (b) how its structured 
activities are qualitatively different from, say, those of a civil service department. 
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Shilling is right to insist upon the untenability of conceptualising social life in terms 
of hierarchical levels, since it necessarily implies the primacy of structure at the 
expense of agency (or vice versa). The Cartesian legacy must be finally laid to rest: 
conceptualising structure and agency as irreducible levels does not imply the causal 
primacy of one over the other. If the notion of stratum is taken literally then 
inevitably misunderstandings arise. Human agency is not like a compact disc, that 
is, slotted into one 'level' of the hi-fi system, unable to affect that which controls it 
- simply there to be played. In a nutshell, the metaphor of ontological stratification 
denotes the irreducible properties of inter alia social structure and agency. Yet for 
Bryant 
... most fundamentally of all, tile geological metaphor of ontological depth, of 
the stratification of surface actualities and beneath-the-surface realities is 
misleading. There is but one geological stratification of Salford, the city in 
which I work, but there is no reason to assume that there can be but one 
stratification of social reality there. It is one thing to argue that things seen can 
be explained by reference to things unseen, but it is quite another to argue that 
all things are arrangeable in a single stratified order which has an objective 
existence. The privileged explanatory status of the capitalist mode of production 
as described by Bhaskar, for example, is not an ontological discovery but a 
practical convention - something justified in ten-ns of the purposes it serves 
(1995: 89). 
I find Bryant's discussion of geological stratification rather confusing. Firstly, the 
geological properties of Salford do not exist in isolation from its neighbouring 
towns and cities. Secondly, such properties are not analogous to social reality in 
that, as Bryant points out, 'the geological composition of one geological stratum in 
no way governs the composition of the stratum above it' (1995: 87). Being 
unfamiliar with the discipline of geology, I would posit the familiar example of the 
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irreducibility of water as a level irreducible to its constituents, for hydrogen and 
oxygen on their own are highly flammable. We cannot see water's constituents just 
as we cannot see the internal and necessary relation between teacher and pupil. 
Bryant has misunderstood the nature of transcendental realism (Willmott 1997). 
The latter maintains that social reality is structured (or relatively ordered), which in 
turn provides sociology with its subject matter. It does not legislate about what 
ordered constituents exist: social relations are sid generis real and relatively 
enduring. It is their sid generis nature that enables (methodological) identification 
of them as a distinct level of reality. Bryant makes the untenable assumption that 
because social relations are only relatively enduring, one should focus attention 
solely on new social phenomena. This begs the question of the nature of the 
structural conditions that are logically prior to such new phenomena. Instructively, 
Bryant maintains that the assumption of objective existence matters to a Marxist, 
'but it would make no difference to the explanatory power of the supposed 
underlying reality if one were to treat it as, say, an ideal-type... ' (1995: 88). 
Yet the issue is not one of what matters to social theorists, but one of what 
must be the case for social theory to be intelligible. It is odd that Bryant accepts the 
explanatory power of underlying relations (capital/labour) yet at the same time 
denies their import, suggesting that we can make whatever we want of social reality 
(e. g. imposing Weberian ideal-types). Finally, it is disputable that Marx would 
couch his uncovering of the nature of capitalist social relations in terms of 
4practical convention'. Bryant has got things back to front. 'Practical convention' 
has to be ontologically grounded. If the discovery of the nature of capitalist social 
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relations was not a discovery of sid generis generative mechanisms, then what was 
it? I disagree with his assertion that '(p)erhaps the most valuable contribution of 
scientific realism will prove to be not social ontology but to methodology' 
(1995: 89). Epistemology is irreducibly dependent upon ontology and not vice 
versa. One cannot sensibly set about to study social life without some prior notion 
of what one is studying. 
Structuration theory: conflating structure and agency 
Giddens writes that in structuration theory 'a range of dualisms or oppositions 
fundamental to other schools of thought are reconceptualised as dualities. In 
particular, the dualism of the "individual" and "society" is reconceptualised as the 
duality of agency and structure' (1984: 162). Indeed, a few years later he remains 
tenacious in arguing that '(s)tructure and action cannot form a dualism, save from 
the point of view of situated actors, because each is constituted by and in a single 
44realm" - human activity' (1990: 299). Giddens is quite right to reject Cartesian 
dualism. However, his laudable aim to avoid the legacy bequeathed by Descartes 
and the concomitant need not to reify structure, regrettably, results in conflation of 
structure and agency, thereby precluding examination of their interplay over time. 
Undeniably, the influence of Giddens' structuration theory has been considerable in 
the social sciences. In the field of organisation studies, for example, Reed notes 
that '... the theory of structuration is invoked and deployed by a growing number of 
organizational theorists... ' (1992: 187). Structuration theory is drawn upon by 
Deem et al. (1995) in their study of school governance and, more recently, Elliott 
(1998) argues for its utility vis-h-vis education action research. 
41 
Apart from the influence of the Cartesian legacy on Giddens' work, he is 
particularly concerned to dissociate himself from naturalistic sociology, whereby 
social forces are held to resemble those of the natural world. Yet, as we have seen 
already, the teacher/pupil internal relation can be examined apart from agency (and 
therefore as a dual aspect of social reality) because the former causally conditions - 
though in no way determines - the latter. Before unpacking the central 
propositions of structuration theory, it is worth returning to the use of natural 
analogies to explicate ontological emergence in the social realm. Though Giddens 
is quite content to use language as the paradigmatic analogy for social structure, he 
rejects any use of natural analogies; ostensibly because social reality is so unlike 
natural reality; arguably because he rejects any notion of emergence per se 
(Willmott 1999a). Indeed, Giddens is deeply resistant to the notion of emergent 
properties held by social realism to be constitutive of social structure. He quotes 
Durkheim, who remarked that: 
The hardness of bronze lies neither in the copper, nor in the tin, nor in the lead 
which have been used to form it, which are all soft and malleable bodies. The 
hardness arises from the mixing of them. The liquidity of water, its sustaining 
and other properties are not in the two gases of which it is composed, but in the 
complex substance which they form by coming together. Let us apply this 
principle to sociology. If, as is granted to us, this synthesis sui generis, which 
constitutes every society, gives rise to new phenomena, different from those 
which occur in consciousness in isolation, one is forced to admit that these 
specific facts reside in the society itself that produced them and not in is parts - 
namely its members (Giddens 1984: 171). 
The Cartesian connotations attaching to Durkheim's talk of water as substance 
would be baulked at by Giddens - and rightly so - but instead of considering the 
similarities between social structure and water, Giddens swiftly dismisses the 
42 
explanatory import of the water (or bronze) analogy. He would be right to argue 
that structure is not some sort of Cartesian 'substance', divorced from agency like 
tin is from copper. Giddens argues that the above quotation has been particularly 
persuasive but is none the less fundamentally flawed, for 
... human actors, as recognizable 'competent agents', do not exist in separation from one another as copper, tin and lead do. They do not come together ex 
nihilo to form a new entity by their fusion or association. Durkheirn here 
confuses a hypothetical conception of individuals in a state of nature... and real 
processes of social reproduction (1984: 171-172). 
The notion of emergent properties still confuses some of those who remain 
committed to Giddens' structuration theory (see, for example, Manicas 1997: 210). 
One of the initial problems encountered by those predisposed towards structuration 
is the misplaced assumption that social reality is like natural reality, Le. self- 
subsistent, or indeed, 'hard' like bronze. It does not follow that a stratified social 
ontology entails that structure is somehow self-subsistent, ready and waiting 'out 
there'. The notion of structure as 'hard' like bronze would certainly lead one down 
the path of determinism. But in invoking such an analogy, Durkheirn is not 
suggesting that people are tin or copper! While Giddens would not (presumably) 
deny that water is irreducible to its constituents of hydrogen and oxygen, he would 
maintain that social structure is peopled and therefore cannot be theorised about via 
chemical analogies. Yet the water analogy is employed simply to show the 
similarity between the two in terms of their causal irreducibility, which exists solely 
by virtue of internal necessary relations. The intention is not to anchor social 
structure in any form of natural analogy since the nature of any analogy precludes 
exact correspondence with its referent. The manifest difference here consists of the 
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human constitution of social structure. In other words, the dissimilarity, namely the 
human constitution of social structure, is emphasised at the expense of the 
similarity between water and social structure by Giddens. 11 
When Giddens writes that actors, as 'competent agents', cannot exist 
separately from one another, he is (a) eliding the distinction between actor and 
agent and (b) disclaiming personal identity. The very concept of 'competent 
agents' only makes sense in relation to the prior existence of social structure: what 
people as agents can or cannot do about it. What they do within it as actors, 
however, denotes how they personalise their roles. The point of the use of the 
bronze analogy by Durkheirn is to show the similarity between the latter and social 
structure, for social structure exists as a combination (or Tusion') of internally 
necessary social relations. Such relations are ever the result of individuals, but 
once created they possess sid generis properties that act back to condition 
11 However, Giddens writes of Durkheim that: 
The point here [Durkheim's] is that 'social facts' have properties that confront each single 
individual as 'objective' features which limit that individual's scope of action. They are not just 
external but also externally defined... There is surely something correct about this claim, but 
Durkheim was prevented from spelling it out satisfactorily because of ambiguities about the notion 
of externality ... In linking externality and constraint... he wanted to reinforce a naturalistic 
conception of social science. In other words, he wanted to find support for the idea that there are 
discernible aspects of social life governed by forces akin to those operative in the material world. 
Of course, 'society' is manifestly not external to individual actors in exactly the same sense as the 
surrounding environment is external to them... (1984: 172). 
Again, the knee-jerk reaction to naturalistic comparisons leads Giddens to wrap objective and society with 
scare quotes. Giddens rightly counteracts Durkheim's over-emphasis upon structural constraint, but side- 
steps the issue of externality, preferring instead to wrap it, too, with scare quotes. In fact, I will argue that 
he conceptualises structure in such a way that constraint deriving from the latter is rendered impossible. 
The school qua organisation can be conceptualised as external because of its causal irreducibility. To take 
a different example, would-be benefit claimants confront an external Benefits Agency in the sense that (a) 
truistically the individuals who work within it are not dependent upon the claimant for their existence; but 
more fundamentally, (b) the Agency is siti generis for the would-be claimant confronts not individuals but 
role-incumbents, who possess irreducible powers to disallow any benefit claim. 
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individuals' (or groups') behaviour. Individuals do not then become some non- or 
extra-human entity (like bronze) when they come together to create (and reproduce) 
irreducible structural forms! Instead, they become recognizable as agents and actors 
because of the modification of individuals' powers qua individuals. 
The 'duality of structure: structure as rules and resources 
In structuration theory 'structure' is regarded as rules and resources recursively 
implicated in social reproduction; institutionalized features of social systems 
have structural properties in the sense that relationships are stabilized across 
time and space. 'Structure' can be conceptualised abstractly as two aspects of 
rules - normative elements and codes of signification. Resources are also of two 
kinds: authoritative resources... and allocative resources... (Giddens 1984: xxxi). 
Structure is deemed 'virtual' and becomes real only when 'instantiated' by human 
agency. Yet when specific powers deposited in the role of teacher remain 
unexercised, is it tenable to conceptualise such powers as 'virtual'? Necessarily 
they are real, not 'virtual', and can exist unexercised for long periods of time. 
Moreover, to maintain that schools exist only in their instantiation immediately 
forfeits analysis of precisely why schools are relatively enduring. Instantiation is 
inherently voluntarist, for it implicitly enjoins that the school possess no prior 
causal determinacy. In a nutshell, 'instantiation' is empirically nonsensical. 
Teachers turn up for work on a regular basis primarily because they have prior 
structured interests in so doing. The school is already there and thus is not 
dependent upon agential 'instantiation'. If Giddens were to swap instantiation with 
mediation then I would not demur, since mediation presupposes prior structured 
social relations that provide agents with reasons for maintaining or changing them. 
Essentially, Giddens is confusing the activity-dependent nature of social relations 
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with their sid generis causal properties: the two (agency and structure) presuppose 
each other, but not in the way Giddens proposes. 
I Many critics have thus accused Giddens of subjectivism (Callinicos 1985; 
Johnson et al. 1984; Turner 1986). In view of the primacy of the present tense 
enjoined by the concept of instantiation (that is, of structure existing as mere 
'moments' of interaction), I highlighted the resonance between Giddens' approach 
and methodological individualism (Willmott 1999a). This is because 
methodological individualism also enjoins present tense analysis (Goldstein 1973). 
Diachronic analysis is ruled out of court because of the denial of prior sui generis 
conditioning. Yet I also highlighted the frustration endemic to Giddens' 
structuration theory. By no means does he place himself in the methodological 
individualist camp. 12 Whilst I would maintain that there is prinzafacie evidence for 
viewing Giddens as an 'upwards conflationist', to use Archer's terminology, 
whereby the individual level 'swallows up' the social, Giddens himself would 
maintain that efficacious 'structural properties', rather than 'structure', causally 
condition interaction over thne. In fact, 'central conflation' is appropriate for two 
reasons. Firstly, Giddens' dislike of naturalistic sociology has led him to squash 
agency and structure into one indistinguishable amalgam, which whilst insulating 
against reification means that analysis of their interplay is immediately forfeited. 
12 Archer (1982) has discerned an oscillation between determinism and voluntarism in structuration, 
whereby all rules are held to be inherently transformable at any given time yet instantiation of structure is 
also held to embroil agency in the entire structural matrix. The notion of inherent transformability 
resonates well with Watkins' methodological individualist maxim that 'no social tendency exists which 
could not be altered if the individuals concerned both wanted to alter it and possessed the appropriate 
information' (1973: 168-169). This cannot be squared with the untenable agential invocation of the entire 
matrix. Moreover, by maintaining that agents invoke the entire matrix, he is unable to specify which parts 
of it are analytically more important. 
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Secondly, Giddens' definition of structure necessarily enjoins analysis in the 
present tense, though not for reasons stemming from an individualist social 
ontology. 
Giddens also maintains that structure 'is not 'external' to individuals: as 
memory traces, and as instantiated in social practices, it is in a certain sense more 
'internal' than exterior to their activities in a Durkheimian sense' (1984: 25). Note 
the use of 'exterior' rather than 'external' and how 'internal' is not defined by 
Giddens. Indeed, the prefix 'more' denotes a methodological equivocality that 
haunts his exposition of structuration. What is interesting, however, is the reference 
to the past via 'memory traces'. At a basic level, continuous social activity requires 
that actors have a recollection of past activities. If I could not recall the location of 
my office or where to catch the bus for work then (working) life would be 
impossible. To posit this as a necessary criterion for the reproduction of social 
structure is platitudinous. However, given that 'instantiation' denies pre-existence, 
it is clear that the criterion of 'memory traces' is doing a lot more. Yet, like 
instantiation, it singularly fails to explain why teachers turn up for work. To reduce 
the determinacy that derives from the prior materiality of structure to 'memory 
traces' is untenable and simply evades the issue of the nature of social structure. 
Teachers can remember where they teach, point to the availability of materials, 
regurgitate the key stages of the National Curriculum but recall itself does not 
explain the latter. 
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The important point here is that Giddens would not countenance the social 
realist concept of structure (as the irreducible relations between positions in 
organisations and the relations between organisations). Indeed, for Giddens social 
structure 'has no descriptive qualities of its own as a feature of social life... ' 
(1989: 256). How, then, can we even make reference to such relatively enduring 
social phenomena as schools? Giddens would no doubt reply that we can talk of 
schools as sedimented over time and space because of the distinctive rules and 
resources that are employed by those who work within them. But this would be to 
miss the point, since the rule "all pupils must complete their homework over the 
weekend" only makes sense within a relational context, which has relative 
autonomy from its makers (and reproducers). That teachers have the resources with 
which to enforce and/or facilitate the enactment of such a rule cannot be explained 
by reference to other rules and resources. The homework rule presupposes the 
temporal priority of the teacher/pupil relation; rules have to be relationally 
grounded and not vice versa. Indeed, it is only because of the sid generis nature of 
the teacher/pupil relation that the homework rule can have any causal efficacy. 
This is not to deny that other rules - which Giddens calls normative rules - play 
their part. But normative rules are not the same as those governing structural 
behaviour and are thus contingent. 13 To explain why Helen as police constable 
follows rules specified in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act presupposes the 
irreducible relations of constable/sergeant, etc., and their wider (relational) 
13 Porpora (1989) argues that structure qua rules and resources confuses structure with culture, since it 
disavows any notion of social relations. Porpora rightly maintains that culture shapes our behaviour, which 
must be complemented by an adequate (i. e. relational) concept of structure. Chapter Two will show how 
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anchorage (Government/Home Office ... ). That such rules do not deten-nine 
Helen's behaviour is a separate matter from their relational grounding. In 
examining the changes engendered by the various Education Reforms Acts, 
reference to rules and resources alone makes no sense. For (a) one would not be 
able to explain why some rules are more important than others, or why they are 
resisted and, moreover, (b) why there are prior per capita funding arrangements. 
As Thompson (1989: 64-65) argues, Giddens' emphasis upon rules 
presupposes a criterion of importance that cannot be approached via rules, but 
rather presupposes analysis of structural relations. Without any notion of relatively 
enduring autonomous social relations, one cannot theorise about differential 
degrees of constraint. In other words, the fact that the homework rule constrains 
pupils' behaviour is only possible because of their relational embedding. For 
Giddens to reply at this juncture that such a rule also enables pupils - to succeed in 
exams, etc. - is not the issue, since both constraints and enablements derive from 
social relations and their (in)congruence with actors' needs and wishes. To 
reiterate, social relations are the irreducible referents of the generic term 'social 
structure'. In reducing such relations to rules and resources, Giddens is not only 
truncating structure but removing the basis on which he can talk about power, 
capitalism and so on. He avoids the term social structure because 
[it] conforms too closely to a position... in terms of which structure appears as 
something 'outside', or 'external', to human action. In my usage, structure is 
what gives fonn and shape to social life, but it is not itseýf that form or shape - 
culture can be theorised in the same way as structure, possessing irreducible relations among its component 
parts that predispose agency towards specific courses of action. 
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nor should 'give' be understood in an active sense here, because structure only 
exists in and through the activities of human agents' (1989: 256). 
If external is taken to mean independent in the sense of 'separate from', then 
Giddens is correct to avoid conceptualising structure in terms of the latter. 
However, it does not follow that externality entails separateness. Instead, we are 
talking about relative autonomy, which is warranted because of the temporal 
priority of social relations that causally condition activity. At the same time, the 
relative autonomy of structure does not nullify its dependence upon the continued 
activity of agency. I concur that structure gives form and shape to social life (and it 
is on this basis that any charge of methodological individualism fails) yet in the 
next breath Giddens nullifies this transcendental prerequisite at a stroke, denying 
pre-existence and conflating structure with the activities of human agents. This 
cannot prevent the question-begging issue, namely in what ways are agents active 
(and can they be inactive yet still have efficacy? ) and why? Giddens remains 
unperturbed and maintains that talk of power is permitted because '... power is an 
elemental characteristic of all social systems... The fact that some actors are more 
able... to 'structure' their social environments than others is also a matter of power, 
and has no direct bearing upon either the concept of 'structure' or that of 
1system'... ' (1989: 257, emphasis added). 
The powers of a governing body reside in the social relations that are a 
school (which are further embedded in the LEA, local government, Department for 
Education and Employment ... ). Such powers are not 
derivable from rules and 
resources, though they are rule-governed and resource-implicated. Power is a 
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relational property that cannot be reduced to 'rules and resources'. Giddens' 
recourse to the constraints and enablements that flow from power protect him 
against the charge of methodological individualism, but at the same time he 
removes the ontological rug from under his very feet in reducing sid generis 
relations to 'rules and resources'. It is because of his disavowal of pre-existing sid 
generis relations that critics who accuse him of subjectivism derive their strength. 
But without pre-existence, we cannot talk of structural constraint or enablement for 
they are relational terms. Thompson (1989) notes that certain individuals have 
restricted opportunities for entry into a variety of organisations - universities and 
schools cited as exemplars. He argues that such restrictions cannot be adequately 
conceptualised in terms of 'moral rules' or 'sanctions', since such restrictions 
operate independently of the rights and obligations of the agents concerned. 
Giddens (1989) readily concedes that there are no rules attaching to being poor, 
having restricted access to prestigious universities and so on. However, he 
maintains instead that we should analyse 'certain forms of Systent reproduction, in 
which complexes of 'rules and resources' are implicated. For instance, Bernstein's 
distinction between restricted and elaborated codes... would certainly be relevant to 
understanding such differentials in life chances' (1989: 257). Yet this is a 
restatement of the problem! Giddens is merely transposing the untenability of 
theorising about differential life-chances in terms of rules and resources to the 
systemic level, which, as we have seen, comprises emergent relational properties 
(between organisations). 14 His reference to Bernstein does not advance his case, 
precisely because Bernstein's distinction only makes sense in the context of 
14 To Giddens, the systemic level is only action at a distance by big groups, that is, nothing organisational. 
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irreducible class relations. The point is to explain theoretically why certain sections 
of the population are subject to a restricted code in the first place. Again, this can 
only be done by reference to relatively enduring sui generis social relations. 
The Wittgensteinian inflection of structuration is undeniably attractive, 
since rules play a significant part in most people's lives. However, we must be 
careful not to elide rules and their grounding in irreducible social relations. In their 
Organizational Rides (1991), Mills and Murgatroyd are guilty of such elision. 
They carefully itemise different rules involved in organisational analysis but, like 
Giddens, disclaim pre-existence and emphasise process at the expense of product, 
in turn rendering the term 'organisation' vacuous (1991: 194). For if we cannot 
point to a social entity that is relatively enduring, but instead can only talk of 
'becoming' rather than 'being', then logically a school does not (as yet) exist. 
What does not help matters is that Wittgenstein himself never defined 'institution' 
(Bloor 1997: 27). (Bloor's Wittgensteinian reduction of institution to talk and 
thought (1997: 32) resonates well with Giddens' equally depthless social ontology. ) 
Yet, for Giddens 
Institutions by definition are the more enduring features of social life. In 
speaking of the structural properties of systems I mean their institutionalized 
features, giving 'solidity' across time and space. I use the concept of 'structures' 
to get at relations of transformation and mediation which are the 'circuit 
switches' underlying observed conditions of system reproduction (1984: 24). 
This does not square with Giddens' denial of pre-existence. If institutions have 
'solidity' then logically any attempt to re-shape them presupposes their temporal 
priority and any successful change creates a new action-context that causally 
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conditions agency (however short the temporal gap). Giddens does not define 
'institution' and, moreover, will not accord it sui generis reality. (Note also the 
empiricist claim that we can observe the underlying conditions of system 
reproduction. ) 
Unsurprisingly, Giddens' equating power with 'transformative capacity' 
further conflates the distinction between structure and agency. Teachers derive 
certain degrees of freedom within their work context from the social relations that 
comprise the education system. However, whether the exercise of their structural 
freedoms is successful in bringing about transformation is contingently related to 
their powers as agents - structural freedom is independent of agential power. If we 
returri to the example above of the engineered staff meeting, the head may have 
exercised full structural powers knowledgeably yet failed because of countervailing 
pressures (emanating from, say, governors and Heads of Department). Agential 
powers of reflection may be distorted, partially exercised or completely 
unexercised, thereby ensuring the status quo. To take a further example, the 
Education Reform Acts provide the structural potential for restructuring 
(transformation) yet may not be capitalised upon by agency (heads may prefer 
'old-style' approaches to team-working rather than 'business-like' confrontational 
models). One must respect the powers and properties of structure and agency 
respectively and not to elide them by enforcing co-variance. To accept that 
considerable powers may be exercised but fail is to seek answers to questions that 
cannot be posed by Giddens because ostensibly they re-invoke the dualist spectre. 
Failure to transfonn, say, the education system means disentangling which other 
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factors intervened and the nature of the structural properties themselves (the 
system), which can be examined independently from agency. 
Denying pre-existence: structure as the inediunt and outcome 
'By the duality of stnicture I mean that social structures are both constituted by 
human agency, and yet at the same time are the very nzedium of this constitution' 
(1979: 121). This more clearly establishes a deniýl of pre-existent social relations 
than 'instantiation'. To recapitulate, the notion of 'instantiation' implicitly denies 
pre-existent material relations because they are deemed a priori to have no prior 
efficacy. In other words, instantiation cannot be squared with the notion of social 
reproduction because the latter presupposes a prior, autonomous product, which 
must be differentially mutable in order to account for why agents are constrained to 
engage in replication or facilitated to pursue change. The notion of structure as 
medium and outcome explicitly removes the rug from under Giddens' reproduced 
6social practices' because the two do not operate in terms of temporal simultaneity. 
A school has to exist before teachers can teach, however short the time gap between 
the construction and occupation of positions within it. So, what subsequently 
happens - the outcome - is temporally posterior to the construction of the school. 
If the school were the medium and outcome simultaneously we would not be able 
to explain structural change since logically we cannot pinpoint the school at T, (the 
medium) and structural change (the outcome) at T3. 
Indubitably, the school, as structure, is ever the medium for continuous 
activity. Yet it cannot be the outcome at the same time, since this merely begs the 
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question: outcome of what? A car is the (necessary) medium for driving, but the 
car has to be constructed before it can be driven. Moreover, it is not ever the 
outcome in the sense of re-built each time it is driven. Like structure, a car cannot 
work unless driven by people and in the process of driving one is not rebuilding the 
car. Of course, a car remains a car when unused for years at a time, unlike 
structure, which is ever activity-dependent. However, the analogy is useful for 
accentuating the fact that qua product the car pre-exists any subsequent driving and 
can be added to or modified like social structure, in turn providing a new context 
for driving that is temporally posterior. It may be that Giddens' dictum is intended 
to show that structure is reproduced in the very process of agential activity. This is 
but a sociological truism and does not tell us theoretically in what ways the 
outcome is different and why. 
To be an agent or not an agent: Giddens on agency 
Quintessential to Giddens' conception of agency is the ability to 'do otherwise'. 
The principal reason for redefining agency is this way is his laudable yet over-hasty 
rejection of naturalistic sociology, whereby people are held to be like magnetic 
particles and structures akin to those of force fields. The education system can 
hardly be thought of as a magnetic field, with children and teachers conceived as 
iron filings pushed and shoved by some magnetic force or as part of a living 
system, rather like the body's lungs that provide it with its life-sustaining 
prerequisites. Whilst providing an important corrective to the extremes of 
structural determinism, the notion of 'ability to do otherwise' leads to the equally 
untenable extreme of voluntarism. For in the process of redefining agency, 
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Giddens is effectively rendering any notion of freedom redundant. If agents can 
ever do or act otherwise, then the positing of the stringency of constraints versus 
degrees of freedom makes no sense (e. g. unemployed job seekers versus 
headhunted graduates). The concept of agency is only meaningful in the context of 
a) structural constraint or enablement and, moreover, b) identifying the concomitant 
possibilities for enhancing people's freedom. Following an OFSTED (Office for 
Standards in Education) style inspection by LEA advisors of a 'failing' junior 
school in 1997,1 asked the deputy head why she did not ask for clarification 
concerning inaccuracies in the advisors' report presented to the school's governing 
body. She replied that 
We don't actually receive the report. So you can't clarify anything... [The head] 
and I were given the report to read half an hour before the Governors got it... 
and we went through it and picked up about 6 different things I disagreed with 
and so did [the head]. And then we said well we want this changed and we want 
this changed. Then they read it to the Governors. The Governors then had to 
give their copies back in, so that these amendments could be made umm any that 
they agreed with so that we could disagree with the facts if they were wrong; but 
we couldn't disagree with anyjudgements that were made ... (emphasis added). 
The reply that neither the deputy nor the head could disagree with any of the LEA 
advisors' judgements constitutes a stringent constraint. In order to theorise about 
its stringent nature, the notion of the ability to do otherwise has no explanatory 
purchase and necessarily undermines the materiality of social relations. Of course, 
the head and the deputy could walk away, but this would invoke a structured 
penalty. To maintain that agents can ever do otherwise entails a somewhat dubious 
psychological assumption, namely that agents will always be prepared to incur 
quite hefty costs and that structure has no determinate influence - in this case, the 
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impediment to challenging advisors' judgements of teaching ability. In theorising 
about the stringency of constraints, there is no implicit determinism, for both the 
head and the deputy could exit the concrete situation at any point in time were they 
willing to pay the (career) price. 
The could-do-otherwise approach means that social reality is what we make 
of it, not something that we confront or may be unable to change for some 
considerable time. That is not to say that what is socially produced can never be 
changed, simply that even the most stringent constraints can eventually be changed, 
but whilst attempts are being made to change them, they continue to exert a 
conditional influence upon agency. Even if the head and deputy were prepared to 
pay the career price, it must be remembered that in exiting one structured context 
they necessarily enter another one and confront its irreducible relations of 
constraint or enablement (another job or the Benefits Agency). In theorising about 
the impact of the National Curriculum, testing arrangements, etc. on child-centred 
philosophy, one is focusing on the ways in which structural and cultural properties 
delimit or facilitate activities for identifiable groups of specific agents (teachers, 
heads, pupils, government officials ... ). Even where government officials are able 
to set the agenda, they are nonetheless constrained by prior relations and the 
arrangements that they subsequently set in place, which may have to be modified in 
the process. That all teachers are required to test their pupils at Key Stage 2 cannot 
be theorised about adequately in terms of the ability to 'do otherwise'. Certainly 
some may wish to have nothing whatsoever to do with Standard Assessment Tasks 
and their contradictory implications for child-centred teaching, but not to carry out 
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the statutory tasks would invoke disciplinary action and possible dismissal. It 
might be reasonably pointed out, however, that teachers qua organised collectivity 
could take concerted action and in fact there was a boycott of testing in 1993. But 
this begs the question of why the boycott was essentially an aberration and that 
imposition, rather than negotiation, characterised the promulgation of the various 
Education Reforms Acts and national testing arrangements. In fact, its failure 
shows the stringency of constraints: the boycott was the collective best they could 
do in a stringently infelicitous situation. 
In a nutshell, we should be talking in terms of degrees of freedom versus 
stringency of constraints since the latter only makes sense within a prior structured 
or delimited context. Whilst teachers may be successful in altering or substantially 
revising national testing arrangements, it still remains the case that they have to 
teach, often using materials and curricula that are not of their making. The 
theoretical focus is on the room for manoeuvrability, not on how they could have 
'acted otherwise', implying that the door is not only always open but exists at every 
wall. 
The morphogenetic approach: the realist alternative 
Structuration theory is ontologically 'flat', precluding the possibility of examining 
the interplay of agency and structure over time because of its denial of pre- 
existence and assumption of temporal simultaneity. This final section of this 
chapter will delineate the central tenets of the 'morphogenetic approach', arguing 
that analytical dualism is the methodological key to examining the interplay of 
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structure and agency because the former is irreducibly emergent from the latter and 
causally efficacious. It can only possess causal properties and powers because 
structure and agency stand in temporal relations of priority and posteriority. Thus 
the morphogenetic approach is predicated upon an endorsement of ontological 
emergence and its temporal materialisation. 
Origins and Development 
The morphogenetic approach has its origins in general systems theory. 
Specifically, in the growing disenchantment with the untenability of organic, 
mechanical and simple cybernetic systems theories that were so eagerly transposed 
to the social realm. The term 'morphogenesis' 15 was first coined by Buckley 
(1967) in order to avoid the misleading connotations that attach to such concepts as 
'self-regulation', which entail an overemphasis on the internal system at the 
expense of situational and environmental factors. The development of 
morphogenesis was aimed at incorporating the often-overlooked fact that social 
systems are huynan constitutions; they are open and thus can never be modelled on 
any organic or mechanical systems analogy. As Archer puts it: 
Society is not a simple cybernetic system, which presupposes a particular 
structure capable of carrying out goal directed, feedback regulated, error- 
correction. All of these are special kinds of system and society is another, which 
is only like itself and is itself because it is open, and is open because it is 
peopled, and being peopled can always be re-shaped through human 
innovativeness. Hence the use of the term 'morphogenesis' to describe the 
process of social structuring; 'morpho' indicating shape, and 'genesis' signalling 
that the shaping is the product of social relations (1995: 165-166). 
15 Morphostasis 'Refers to those processes in complex system-environment exchanges that tend to preserve 
or maintain a system's given form, organization or state. Morphogenesis will refer to those processes 
which tend to elaborate or change a system's given form, structure or state' (Buckley 1967: 58). 
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The morphogenetic approach, unlike its analogical predecessors, is concerned not 
only with 
The causes acting on the phenomena under study, the possible consequences of 
the phenomena, and the possible mutual interactions of some of these factors, 
but also [with]... the total emergent processes as a function of possible positive 
and/or negative feedbacks mediated by the selective decisions or "choices" of the 
individuals and groups directly or indirectly involved (Buckley 1967: 80, original 
emphasis). 
Agency is properly conceptualised as possessing 'degrees of freedom, selectivity... 
mediating between external influences and overt behaviour' (1967: 95, emphasis 
added). That social fon-ns are mediated by agency signals the morphogenetic 
approach's caesura from its reifying precursors. It is precisely the (prior) structured 
distribution of resources and power that enables Buckley to theorise about agency 
in terms of its degrees of freedom (simply compare Tony Blair and the Big Issue 
vendor). Social systems qua agential products are held to act back to condition 
agential activity diffcrentially in the form of negative and/or positive feedback 
loops. These feedback loops arc not rcified mechanistic entities, operative above- 
and-bcyond agency. They reside in the irreducible emergent properties (relational 
properties between organisations) that constitute any social system at any given 
time. The latter provide structured reasons that work upon the vested interests of 
those differently positioned, thus predisposing various agents towards maintaining a 
particular organisational structure or changing it. 
Social and system integration: developing Lockwood's distinction 
Archer (1979) utilised and extended this sequential approach to structural change 
via Lockwood's (1964) seminal distinction between 'social' and 'system' 
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integration in her Social Origins of Educational Systeins. Lockwood's principal 
concern was to reject the methodological individualism of conflict theory and to 
explain why low social integration per se (high level of conflict among groups of 
actors) is not a sufficient basis on which to account for social change: it had to be 
complemented by an analysis of systenz integration. The problem for Lockwood 
was that conflict might be both endemic and intense in a social system without 
causing any basic structural change. Conflict theory would have to answer that this 
is decided by the variable factors affecting the power balance between groups. He 
maintained that this was inadequate by itself and needed to be complemented by the 
system integration focus. In short, social integration refers to the orderly or 
conflictual relations between actors; system integration refers to the orderly or 
conflictual relations between the parts of any social system. Therefore system 
integration could be low, but, unless its contradictions were seized upon and 
amplified by sectional social groups, they could be contained and stasis would 
persist because of high social integration. Alternatively, low social integration 
could be profound without leading to any significant change unless it was linked to 
systemic contradictions. Thus it was the conjunction between the two states of 
affairs that accounted for structural morphogenesis or morphostasis. 
Lockwood found it ironic that conflict theorists arrived at their respective 
positions through a generalisation of Marx, since it was Marx who differentiated 
social and system integration: 
The propensity to class antagonism (social integration aspect) is generally a 
function of the character of production relationships... But the dynamics of class 
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antagonisms are clearly related to the progressively growing "contradiction" of 
the economic system. One might almost say that the "conflict" which in 
Marxian theory is decisive for change is not the power conflict arising from the 
relationships in the productive system, but the system conflict arising from 
"contradictions" between "property institutions" and the "forces of production" 
(1964: 250-251, original emphasis). 
Indeed, the actualisation of the contradiction between the forces and relations of 
production is contingent and not a teleological necessity. The actualisation and 
amplification of the systemic contradiction (or incompatibility) is dependent upon 
the extent to which those with prior structured interests are able to resolve versus 
realise the functional incompatibility (or 'strain). The various historical and 
contemporary strategies of containment need not detain us. The importance of 
Lockwood's distinction between system and social integration (or between the 
'parts' and the 'people') lies in the increase in explanatory power gained by 
analysing the variable combinations between the two rather than unhelpfully 
reducing explanation to social integration alone - or alternatively to states of the 
system alone. However, Lockwood's distinction remained ontologically 
ungrounded and lacking in methodological specification (Archer 1995: 172). The 
morphogenetic approach supplies both the ontological grounding and the 
methodological specification of the processes involved in the variable combinations 
between the two irreducible aspects of lived social reality. Lockwood's 
ontologically ungrounded systemic 'component elements' have their referents in 
the irreducible relations between organisations, which themselves are emergent 
properties. 
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System and social integration: temporal priority and the possibility of 
analytical ditalism 
As Lockwood (1964: 250) rightly pointed out, system and social integration 
(structure/agency) are factually distinguishable because they operate over different 
tracts of time. Structuration theory, however, fails to acknowledge this and 
mistakenly construes the relation between structure and agency in terms of 
temporal simultaneity. Certainly, structure presupposes agency and vice versa but 
they do not - or rather cannot - operate over the same tracts of time. It is because 
structure is temporally prior to agential activity that we can talk of it possessing sui 
generis properties that condition such activity. Indeed, the morphogenetic 
approach acquires its analytical bite when presented as a sequence of phases 
(Archer 1998: xiii). Morphogenetic processes are quintessenti ally sequential, 
dealing in endless three-part cycles of Structural Conditioning 4 Social Interaction 
--> Structural Elaboration. The role of teacher necessarily pre-exists its incumbent 
and any subsequent role-modification provides a new action-context for its 
incumbent, the objective reality of which is captured by the fact that social practices 
are qualitatively different. As Porpora (1989: 207) rightly argues, if we want to 
analyse the interaction of role-incumbents, then the question is which is analytically 
prior, the established social relations or the rule-like routinised manner of the 
interaction teachers and pupils subsequently establish? As he points out, it is the 
powers afforded by the social relations that determine the character of subsequent 
interaction. Indeed, any routinised behaviour, however intimately rule-govemed, 
presupposes a (temporally) prior relational context and this proposition holds good 
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however short the time gap between the establishment (or modification) of 
relationally grounded rules and subsequent behaviour. 
Research on the effects of the National Curriculum, 'marketisation', etc., is 
implicitly (or explicitly) theorised in sequential terms. Fitz el al. write that 
In implementation terms, therefore, it is not just a case of evaluating the extent 
to which centrally formulated policies are adopted or deflected at the periphery, 
rather it is the case that research has to engage as well with newly created or 
restructured institutions and institutional relations, the purpose of which, in part, 
is the efficient delivery of educational reforms (1994: 6 1). 
We are thus dealing with a 'before, during and after' analysis (i. e. conditioning 4 
interaction 4 elaboration or stasis). At the same time, the morphogenetic approach 
advances concrete theoretical propositions about the conditions that maintain for 
structural morphogenesis or morphostasis. Structuration theory, however, remains 
ever confined to the 'during' phase, unable to delineate prior social structuring and 
advance propositions for any later restructuring or dissolution. Fitz et al. also 
maintain that the 1988 Education Reform Act 'is as much about restructuring 
institutions - defining new goals, delineating fields of operation... - as it is about 
promulgating substantive education policies' (1994: 60). It is precisely the nature of 
the education system before, during and after such generic restructuring that is the 
focus of this thesis. In particular, how objective systemic contradictions or 
complementarities (structural and cultural) generated at the 'after' phase are 
contemporaneously mediated by school staff (that is, circumvented, exploited or 
lived with). The 'after' phase provides the contextual backdrop to my ethnographic 
analysis of two junior schools. Analytical dualism is employed to examine the 
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autonomous action-contexts that impinge on teachers and therefore to examine 
what they do in it or can do about it. This is only possible because at any T, the 
school is prior to activity at T 2, whilst any morphogenesis post-dates such activity 
creating a new set of conditioning social relations at T3. Any structural (or cultural) 
change at T3 then constitutes a new phase of the cycle that is temporally prior to 
conditioned activity at T4. 
In establishing the T' of any sequential approach, one is not thereby 
embroiled in an infinite regress. In other words, the fact that the prior history of my 
first case-study is important in certain respects (the personality of the head, 
entrenched animosities, etc. ) does not entail back-tracking to the establishment of 
the school some 20 years' ago or to the relationships before the arrival of the head. 
Essentially, it depends on what one wants to explain and thus any T, will reflect the 
substantive preoccupations of the researcher. The time taken between interaction 
and any morphogenesis may consist of months, even years. In fact, the creation of 
a Senior Management Team in my first case-study school took place during a 
couple of days. As a consequence, certain members of staff thereby acquired new 
vested interests and powers. The establishment of the team thus constitutes a new 
phase in the morphogenetic cycle that is captured by the different activities of 
newly promoted staff. How such powers are then used, circumvented or 
unexercised is a matter for empirical investigation and needs theorising about. 
The system/social integration distinction has explanatory utility at a number 
of irreducible levels. At the level of the school itself, for example, objectively we 
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can establish any contradictions that maintain between roles and how they are dealt 
with by staff (unnoticed, ignored or exploited) or alternatively discover a high level 
of social malintegration without the latter issuing in any structural change. 
Malintegration at both levels may predominate, in which case any structural 
morphogenesis may not result because of (social) divisions precluding exploitation 
of the organisational fault-line. At the level of the educational system, we are 
dealing with contradictions or complementarities between organisations (schools, 
LEAs, central government bodies) and how they mould problem-free or problem- 
ridden situations for actors. Such contradictions may be internally necessary, thus 
signalling emergence at the systemic level, or external and thus contingently 
related. Recently, I gave the example of the Next Steps initiative'6 (Willmott 2000). 
Here, any substantive analysis of the development of Next Steps agencies requires 
that we focus on the structure before the Sir Robin Ibbs initiative (structural 
conditioning), the agential response (social interaction) and the subsequent outcome 
(structural elaboration or stasis). As Brooks and Bates (1994) found in their study, 
structured vested interests, ideologically backed up, conditioned limited structural 
morphogenesis. Their case study demonstrates the theoretical indispensability of 
analytical dualism. An identification of Lockwood's 'component elements' (civil 
service qua differentiated system), irreducible to actors' understanding, provides 
explanatory leverage inter alia on those issues surrounding agential miscalculation. 
The obstructions experienced by actors may be the result of 'contradictions' 
16 The Next Steps initiative followed Sir Robin Ibbs' report Improving Management in Government: Next 
Steps and was a result of the persistent demands for 'value for money'. Next Steps laid the foundation for 
the creation of agencies that were to be accorded greater self-determination and the right to seek and 
achieve trading fund status. It was highly critical of the civil service 'culture' that disavowed risk-taking. 
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(systemic incompatibilities) and are not necessarily matters of full agential 
'discursive penetration'. To reduce them to agential awareness is to commit the 
idealist fallacy that social reality is whatever we make of it. Of course, this is not 
the same as saying that agents have no conception of what they are doing. As 
Layder (1990) rightly argues, necessarily social structures are concept-linked, but 
they are not concept-dependent. 
Certainly, systemic incompatibilities are not constraining in abstract 
isolation, since their reception depends upon how they gel with human agency's 
extant intentions and plans. For some, they will be experienced as obstructions, 
creating practical exigencies; for others, they will be experienced as facilitating 
bonuses, unimpeding their daily behaviour. Yet how they are experienced is 
separate from their incompatible or complementary nature, which is ontological sid 
generis and independent of agential discursive penetration. However, Perkmann, 
for example, maintains that '... systemic incompatibilities can only occur if they 
are perceived as such at least by some actors' (1998: 495). In a later footnote, 
Perkmann qualifies this statement with the following: 'The argument that 
incompatibilities have to be perceived by actors does not necessarily imply that 
they cannot take actors by surprise' (ibid: 505). But if incompatibilities can 'take 
actors by surprise' then logically they must both pre-exist actors and exist 
independently of them. In brief, Perkmann wishes to withdraw objective status 
from incompatibilities. 'I suggested that there is no 'absolute' externalist outside 
from which society can exclusively be perceived as a 'system', because this 
67 
perspective can always be turned into an internalist 'inside', i. e. a contingent field 
of action potentially liable to transforniation' (ibid: 503). 
Marx's uncovering of the nature of capitalist social relations, specifically 
the contradiction between the forces and relations of production, should be 
sufficient to underscore the fact that systemic contradictions (or incompatibilities) 
are not ontologically dependent upon agential awareness. Not all recognise their 
incompatible nature or are misled into misrecognition via ideological manipulation, 
but this does not negate the objective reality of the labour/capital relation. 
However, whilst Perkmann maintains that '... incompatibilities are never 
objective... ' he grants that 'Reality tends to resist, given that society consists of 
many entangled processes which are co-constituted with 'their' respective actors 
and constitute 'real' constraints for others' (idenz., emphasis added). If, as he 
rightly maintains, reality resists, then perforce we are dealing with objective 
material properties that are causally irreducible. Yet note the use of scare quotes 
around real in the same breath. Perkmann is quite correct to point out that 
incompatibilities may not be recognised as such and be mistakenly identified, in 
turn guiding agential activity. But why only accord actors' discursive accounts 
objective status? Indeed, one wonders why actors in Perkmann's account have any 
notion of (in)compatible systemic properties if they have no objective status? 
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Structural conditioning: situational logic and strategic guidance] 7 
The prior distribution of resources and positions provides the mediatory mechanism 
of the first phase of the morphogenetic sequence. Pre-structured positions supply 
agents with reasons for pursuing change or defending extant arrangements because 
of the objective vested interests deposited in them. The morphogenetic approach 
adds greater precision to the manner in which situations are shaped for agency. 
Specifically, it draws attention to the 'situational logics' of structural configurations 
that predispose agents towards specific courses of action. Such configurations 
shape action-contexts for agency at the same time providing directional guidance. 
The systemic incompatibility (or strain), that causally conditioned agential activity 
in Brooks and Bates' case study, are second-order emergent relational properties 
between organisations; that is, between the newly created civil service agency and 
Whitehall. They are 'second order' emergent properties because they are 
themselves (irreducibly) emergent from the structural configurations of the civil 
service agency and Whitehall. (This example parallels the relationship between 
schools and the Department for Education and Employment. ) In this case study, 
the systemic incompatibility is an internally necessary one since the civil service 
agency could not exist without Whitehall and vice versa. It is conceptualised as a 
'strain' because agents' situations were being moulded by operational obstructions 
imposed by Whitehall, which translated into practical problems that had to be dealt 
with 'on the ground'. The objective nature of the incompatibility is independent of 
17 The morphogenetic approach identifies four institutional configurations and their situational logics. Such 
'logics' entail different forms of strategic action by predisposing different sections of the population (or 
organisation) to maintain their vested interests by defensive, concessionary, competitive or opportunist 
modes of social interaction. The example in this chapter addresses the situational logic of concession. 
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the (often partial or incorrect) accounts that are given for its existence (e. g. 
'Treasury mentality' or 'Government hypocrisy'). The fact that agency in this 
instance did not respond like robotic executors of pre-programmed (Whitehall) 
scripts attests to its reflective powers to mediate emergent structural properties in 
creative and fundamentally non-deterministic ways. 
The situational logic of a systemic incompatibility predisposes agency 
towards compromise and concession. Despite evident reluctance, the actors 
engaged in some form of action as a direct result of the systemic strain generated by 
Whitehall. Counterfactually, of course, no action (or unsubstantial restructuring) 
might have ensued, with agency simply circumventing the positive feed-back loop 
set in train by the Next Steps initiative. Yet this might have invoked a dangerously 
high price. For, in deciding completely to 'drag their feet', the key agents in 
Brooks and Bates' case study might have misread the situation to such an extent 
that the systemic fault-line created by Whitehall might have been fully actualised 
and amplified resulting in blanket dismissal, with the agency sold off to an 
independent (that is, non-governmental) organisation. That this was not a foregone 
conclusion, and, as such, might have been weighed correctly by agency, attests to 
the open nature of any social system. In other words, any lack of concession or 
compromise does not necessarily signal end time for agency precisely because the 
emergent potentiality inherent in any systemic incompatibility may remain 
unexploited because of contingent factors that act as countervailing forces (e. g. an 
unforeseen but substantial increase in civil service negotiating strength, buttressed 
by powerful interest-groups located elsewhere). Thus we are talking about the 
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tendential powers of the systemic strain (result of internal social relations) because 
of their existence in an open system. 
In short, the fact that the protagonists paid lip-service to the changes 
required by the Next Steps initiative does not thereby result in an expunction of the 
systemic strain. Whilst some agents here rightly reasoned that Whitehall would not 
privatise the agency, any continuing Whitehall commitment means that the 
systemic potentiality for actualisation may resurface, depending inter alia on their 
relative degrees of bargaining power and how it is converted into negotiating 
strength (Archer 1995). Furthermore, it is not being suggested that the organisation 
is an undifferentiated collection of agents uniformly united against the systemic 
tentacles of Whitehall. The systemic incompatibility (incongruence of role array) 
opens up possibilities for agents within the organisation to further their own vested 
interests, either by lending unequivocal support for senior management against 
Whitehall or by exploiting management's (potentially lethal) heel-digging. The 
fact that some may find the form of restructuring required by Next Steps to 
represent a step forward (thus entailing that prior roles were experienced as 
partially or wholly incongruent) lends credence to Perkmann's point that systemic 
incompatibilities will be experienced differently by different actors. Woods et al. 
(1996), for example, examined the ways in which three heads responded to the 
changes engendered by Local Management of Schools and the National Curriculum 
and found that only one was enthusiastic about the new managerialist role. The fact 
that some actors may perceive objective contradictions as complementarities does 
not license us to take their interpretations as incorrigible. Yet I suspect it is more 
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the case that objective contradictions are often recognised as such, but found to be 
psychologically acceptable - hence the fact that some teachers welcomed the 
'traditionalist' implications of the National Curriculum and testing arrangements, 
which contradict child-centred precepts. If sociology cannot posit objective 
systemic contradictions (and their complementary counterparts) and theorise about 
how agents should rationally act in view of them, then necessarily it loses its 
critical cutting edge. 
The imposition (successful or otherwise) of the Next Steps initiative 
constitutes the final phase of the morphogenetic sequence, namely the use of 
exchange and power. Following Blau, Archer maintains thus: 
... the basic notion is that exchange transactions and power relations are both 
responsible for social elaboration. Moreover, they are inextricably linked with 
one another and jointly account for the emergence of reciprocity or control in the 
interaction between different groups... The resources which are exchanged are 
varied (i. e. wealth, sanctions and expertise), but these resources do not have an 
exact price in terms of a single medium of exchange. This is not a 
methodological problem, it is a matter which is undefined for the actors 
involved... At a formal level, institutional interaction consists in using resources 
to transact exchanges with others in order to attain goals, whose target may be 
either social stasis or change. However, although the importance of the initial 
bargaining positions of the groups is indisputable... this gives no indication of 
even the most general conditions under which they are likely to be successful, or 
of the type of interaction which would be involved (1995: 296-7). 
Here, the prior structured distribution of resources delineates the respective 
bargaining positions of groups (or individuals) but what then gives such groups 
negotiating strength requires examination of the interaction between groups, since 
such strength is relational. Hence in explaining the actual outcome of the 1988 
Education Reform Act, one needs to establish the initial bargaining positions of 
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those structurally enabled to enter the exchange process, e. g. teaching unions. But 
the actual strength of the teaching unions needs to be theorised about relationally, 
i. e. vis-A-vis the polity and the relations between and amongst resource-holders. As 
will be discussed in Part Two, whilst the initial level of resource access is 
important, this alone does not guarantee success, since relationships amongst the 
teachings unions and their relations with those with whom they are transacting 
(mainly local and central government) are equally important. In brief, the initial 
effect of prior structural differentiation is to define who can bring what (level and 
types of resources) to the exchange process, yet such differentiation takes place 
within second-order socio-cultural constraints and enablements that furnish 
negotiating strength. However, what then needs to be theorised about is how 
structural differentiation, cultural diversification (see Chapter Two) and agential re- 
grouping gel together. 'The generic issue now is that the structural and cultural 
developments may or may not gel, yet both are exerting conditional influences 
upon agency. Therefore, what transpires depends upon their reception by PEPs 
[people's emergent powers] and the negotiating strength of Corporate groups vis-h- 
vis others' (Archer 1995: 303). 
Finally, the morphogenetic approach accentuates the fact that not only does 
structure (or culture) undergo morphogenesis, so too does agency. This is referred 
to as the 'double morphogenesis', for as agents attempt to promote or defend their 
vested interests, in the very process they undergo re-grouping. Unorganised 
groups, whose interests remain unarticulated, are referred to as Primary Agents, 
because they still exert a causal influence (the unemployed constitute part of the 
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environment that decision-makers have to confront). When Primary agents 
organise themselves, become aware of their structured vested interests and 
articulate their demands, they become Corporate Agents. Therefore the elaboration 
of groups in the process of working for change versus stability also results in 
unintended emergent and aggregate consequences. A classic example of this is the 
development and concomitant bureaucratisation of trades unions, whereby 
organisational structures endowed specific groups with vested interests that were 
not always compatible with the generic interests of union members. Nevertheless, 
the elaboration of emergent powers (from primary to corporate status) enhanced 
their initial bargaining power and the success of subsequent negotiating strength 
remains an issue for empirical investigation. 
Concluding remarks 
This Chapter has maintained the need for analytical dualism in examining 
educational change. It has shown how this methodological device is workable 
because of the sid generis nature of structural forms and their temporal 
materialisation. Put simply, analytical dualism is predicated upon two propositions, 
namely that (a) structure necessarily pre-dates the action(s) that result in its 
reproduction or transformation; and (b) structural elaboration necessarily post-dates 
the action(s) that created it. This is the temporal mainstay of the morphogenetic 
approach, whose analytical teeth are the three-part sequential cycles of structural 
conditioning 4 social interaction 4 structural elaboration. The mutual influencing 
of structure and agency over time is precluded by Giddens' structuration theory, 
since the 'duality of structure' insists upon their temporal simultaneity. Whilst an 
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emphasis upon 'duality', rather than 'dualism', is commendable, structuration 
theory is too hasty in its aim to avoid reffication of social structure and the putative 
reification that attaches to an analytically dualistic analysis of social reality. To 
employ the methodological device of analytical dualism is not to reify social 
structure. Instead, it is to honour the relative autonomy of structural properties that 
casually condition agency, which again is only possible because structure and 
agency stand in temporal relations of priority and posteriority. The cyclical 
sequencing procedure of the morphogenetic approach will be fleshed out in Part 
Two. However, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, structural analysis 
must be complemented by culture, and how their respective morphogenetic/static 
dynamics gel with agency. The next chapter will argue that parallel propositions 
can be made for culture. 
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2 Culture, organisation theory and the sociology of education 
Introduction: the 'sticky problem of culture' 
People often talk about the culture of their particular organisation in terms of 'the 
way things are done around here'. In requesting an iternisation of such 'things', 
one would anticipate a heterogeneous list of factors, ranging from the extent and 
depth of emotional attachments among staff, to generic work practices and the 
shared values that underpin them. In fact, some might go as far as to suggest that 
their culture is unique - not to be found in other organisations. Such heterogeneity 
is equally evident in organisation theory. The problem with such a heterogeneous 
conception of culture is that we gain limited explanatory purchase on, inter alia, the 
reasons why people share (or do not share) values and beliefs, whether such 
'sharing' is imposed, how values and beliefs change and their interplay with social 
structure. In fact, on the whole distinct irreducible levels are so tightly compacted 
that any workable entr6e into organisational reality is precluded. This chapter will 
argue that (a) a substantial increase in explanatory power is gained by a focus on 
the propositional components of culture, i. e. beliefs, theories, arguments, values, 
which (b) possess irreducible properties and powers among their relations that 
predispose their upholders to respond in specifically conditioned ways. 
For Hays (1994), theorising about culture per se and its relationship vis-A- 
vis structure and agency is a 'sticky problem'. Superficially, the notion of 
stickiness is attractive, for it refers not only to culture's contested nature but also to 
its tendency to remain ontologically elusive. In other words, upon picking up 
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culture, it becomes like a child's sweet that has fallen on to its hands: each time an 
attempt is made to put it back into the mouth, the sweet gets stuck on its fingers. It 
is the sticky residue that the child wants to avoid once the sweet is finally placed 
into the mouth. I want to argue that culture, like the child's sweet, is a human 
product, but qua product is irreducible to its human makers. One of the principal 
differences here, of course, is that the child's sweet is sucked and digested. 
Culture, however, is never digested in this manner: this is an ontological 
impossibility. It is ready-made for us at birth, constraining/enabling our actions in 
distinctive ways. Hays argues that 
... social structure consists of two central 
interconnected elements: systems of 
social relations and systems of meaning. Systems of social relations consist of 
patterns of roles, relationships, and forms of domination according to which one 
might place any given person at a point on a complex grid that specifies a set of 
categories running from class, gender, race, education, and religion... Systems 
of meaning are what is often known as culture, including not only the beliefs and 
values of social groups, but also their language, fori-ris of knowledge, and 
common sense, as well as the material products, interactional practices, rituals 
and ways of life established by these. While not reducible to systems of social 
relations, culture matches the other central structure of social life in its power, its 
patterning, its durability, and its collective and transcendent nature. If one wants 
to understand the resilient patterns that shape the behaviour of any individual or 
group, both the cultural and relational milieu must be taken into account 
(1994: 65-66, original emphasis). 
Hays' discussion of structure and culture resonates well with the approach adopted 
in this thesis. She rightly underscores their respective durability and irreducible 
causal efficacy. However, despite the need to distinguish analytically between 
structure and culture because of this, she contends that culture is part of social 
structure. This is a recipe for confusion. In realist fashion, she conceptualises 
structure in tenns of social relations yet at the same time introduces cultural factors 
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as part of this definition. Whilst class is a structural (relational) concept, race ideas 
are cultural phenomena and are thus contingently related. 18 As I argued in Chapter 
One, a school is such by virtue of the various sets of internal necessary social 
relation; between teacher/pupil, head/teacher, and so on. At the concrete level, race 
ideas may be causally influential (e. g. why children of Afro-Caribbean origin are 
systematically discriminated against) but such ideas are not a necessary condition 
for a school qua school. Equally, schools do not presuppose that boys and girls be 
treated differently or be held to possess differential levels of 'intelligence' and 
subsequently taught on that basis. The fact that pupils and teachers alike 
discriminate in varying and subtle ways enjoins that we both accord culture sid 
generis reality and distinguish its structured properties from those of social 
structure (qua irreducible relations between and within organisations). 
Hays maintains that culture is systemic, possessing an 'inner logic' of its 
own (1994: 68), which 'not only constrain[s] us to think and behave in certain ways, 
[it] simultaneously provide[s] us with a range of ways to think and behave at the 
same time... make human thought and action possible' (ibid: 69). She concludes 
thus: 
With all of this in mind, the relevant questions we face as researchers include, 
first, the specification of the characteristics of both cultural and relational 
structures - their logic, systematicity, the ways and the contexts in which they 
operate, and the relative resilience of their layers of patterning. Second, we 
18 The fact that race ideas are causally influential vis-h-vis structure should not lead us to conceptualise 
them as a necessary feature of concrete entities, such as the police force. Therefore, when using such 
concepts as 'institutional racism', one must be careful not to forget that any police force does not require 
that its incumbents be of a specific skin colour or ethnic background. In other words, the notion of 
'institutional racism' is an elision, since cultural and structural properties are compacted together. The task 
of the social researcher is to theorise about the relative interplay between race ideas, structural conditioning 
and agential mediation. 
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might turn our attention to the question of under what cultural and relational 
conditions, and through what cultural and relational processes, structurally 
transformative agency occurs... Finally, we confront the long and important 
project of determining the ongoing interconnections between systems of 
meaning and systems of social relations. 77tis project includes the recognition 
that these systenis are einpirically connected but analytically distinct, 1vith all 
underlying logic of their own (ibid: 7 1, emphasis added). 
Hays' final comment is crucial, since it underscores the methodological propriety 
of employing analytical dualism. Whilst it might be conceded by some that 
structure, culture and agency do constitute distinctive strata of reality, any 
disengagement of their emergent powers and properties in order to examine their 
relative interplay over time would result in an unfortunate submission to the 
tyranny of abstraction, inflicting unwarranted violence on everyday lived 
organisational reality. Indeed, analytical dualism - the morphogenetic approach's 
methodological springboard - would be taken as prinzafacie evidence for an overly 
6objectivist' approach: a focus on culture qua disconnected object precisely because 
of its dualist methodological charter. Thus, to Martin 
... cultures 
do not exist only in the realm of ideas and values; they constitute a 
specific material condition of existence that some consider oppressive and 
exploitative. It is misleading to portray cultures as arcane, ungrounded worlds 
of ideas and values, disconnected from the practicalities of earning a paycheck... 
(1992: 42). 
In a similar vein, Dahlstr6m maintains that one cannot separate culture from the 
social as an independent system, since 'ideas and beliefs are parts of material 
existence and of people's everyday life... Culture is a driving force behind social 
life' (1982: 143). Finally, Meek (1988) argues that culture is something an 
organisation 'is', not as something an organisation 'has' (see also Bate 1994; 
Meyerson and Martin 1987). Yet to elide the material, ideational and agential 
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aspects of lived organisational reality is to relinquish analysis of their relative 
interplay - precisely hoiv culture is a 'driving force' behind social life. The very 
notion that culture has 'driving force' logically enjoins that it is analytically 
separable from agency in order to examine its causal powers. As Brown (1995) 
rightly notes, the notion of organisation qua culture necessarily foregoes a causal 
analysis of those properties that are contingent to its structural configuration., 9 
The laudable yet misplaced fear of reffication has led many to assume that the only 
alternative is elision. However, practical consistency does not always follow. 
Meek concludes that 
... it seems necessary 
for the purposes of the interpretation of actors' behaviour 
that a conceptual distinction be made between 'culture' and 'structure'. It must 
be kept in mind, though, that both culture and structure are abstractions, and 
have use only in relation to the interpretation of observed concrete behaviour 
(1988: 470). 
Logically, Meek cannot simultaneously maintain that an organisation is a culture 
and insist upon the (practical) necessity of a conceptual distinction between 
structure and culture. That Meek recognises that in practical analysis structure and 
'9 To reiterate, it is untrue theoretically to assume that all concrete phenomena within any organisation are 
necessary for the organisation qua organisation. Meek maintains unconvincingly that 
A university, for example, would not be a university without the ritual and symbols that surround 
such events as graduation ceremonies and inaugural lectures. The ritual is as old as the idea of the 
university itself. At graduation, academics and graduands clothe themselves in medieval garb and 
speak in foreign languages - Latin. [ ... ] most members of the university... all know that these 
artifacts symbolize the university, and they share a feeling of belonging to an academic 
community whenever the artifacts are displayed and the ritual performed (1988: 468-469). 
The issue of whether people feel a sense of 'belonging' is an empirical matter and cannot be decided a 
priori. However, does a university cease to be a university if (successful) students are posted their degree 
certificates in the absence of any form of degree ceremony? And does its sign posting require symbolic 
representation? In sum, those who maintain that an organisation is culture inter alia conflate the distinction 
between necessity and contingency. Whilst it is contingent that any organisational configuration exists, it is 
composed of internal necessary relations (generically those between employer/employee); issues 
surrounding who fills the roles and the actuality of symbolisation are contingent matters for investigation. 
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culture have distinctive properties and causal effects should in turn regulate the 
guiding social ontology. The morphogenetic approach concurs that culture and 
structure ultimately derive from concrete behaviour. But it insists upon the 
transcendental claim that such abstractions refer to real relatively enduring 
phenomena that are ontologically distinct from the human agency that created 
them. As Hays intimates, they are ontologically distinct because they possess Sid 
generis causal powers ('an underlying logic of their own', as she puts it), whose 
interplay is teased out sequentially via the methodological device of analytical 
dualism. What often complicates matters is the fact that the adjective abstract is 
taken to entail vagueness or incomprehensibility. In social science, however, an 
abstract concept (such as power or gender) isolates in thought a one-sided or partial 
aspect of an object. What we abstract from are the other aspects that constitute 
concrete objects. Let's take the example of using a word-processor within the 
home environment. In order to explain such concrete activity, we would use 
abstract concepts. Thus, in the process, we would not need to consider the eye- 
colour of the person using the computer, his/her nationality, whether s/he had 
reached a high degree of typing proficiency, etc. (I am, of course, artificially 
bracketing power relations within the familial structure and their wider relational 
anchorage. ) 
It should be clear, then, that we use abstractions to aid explanation of 
concrete objects and activities (such as schools, educational systems). As a 
concrete entity, the school combines influences and properties from a wide range of 
sources, each of which might be isolated in thought in order to arrive at an 
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explanatory account of their combined effect (Sayer 1992: 87). Such sources 
would include personality, attitude, physique, etc. We abstract the impersonal 
social relations that comprise such concrete entities as schools because, among 
other things, whilst personality affects the ways in which individuals personalise 
their work-related tasks (why some heads are funny or ogre-like), this in itself does 
not explain why it is that teachers put up with ogre-like head teachers. Again, we 
abstract the pre-existing social relations that account for a head's capacity not 
simply to behave in an ogre-like fashion but why s/he can get away with it. 
Moreover, abstractions are not heuristic devices, that is, devices that simply order 
our observations of organisational life. Clearly, abstractions are different from the 
objects to which they refer (this applies equally to observations and concrete 
objects) but, as Sayer rightly points out, this does not mean that they cannot refer to 
real objects and the constituents that make them what they are. 
Note that our ogre-like head does not have to justify such behaviour via 
simultaneous attempts at ideological manipulation. The fact that s/he may-use ideas 
to buttress ogre-like behaviour ("We're all managers now and if you want to 
survive in the education market place you will do as I say! ") does not mean that 
such structural powers are dependent upon such ideas for their efficacy. What is of 
interest here is how such ideas embroil their takers in logical relations vis-A-vis 
other (necessary or contingent) ideas that predispose towards specific courses of 
action and how they gel with extant structural arrangements. However, this is to 
jump ahead. Culture and agency are not 'ungrounded worlds', as Martin would put 
it: they are intertwined in organisational life but can be analysed dualistically 
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because of their irreducible causal properties (and their sequencing of mutual 
influence over time). The aim of the morphogenetic approach is theorise what 
Dahlstr6m termed culture's 'driving force'. One of the key propositions of the 
morphogenetic approach that insulates against charges of reification is that its 
'driving force' is only operative through human agency and is never hydraulic in 
fashion but ever conditioning. Without human agency constituting the sole 
efficient cause, we end up in Martin's reffied world. However, the morphogenetic 
approach is not concerned simply with upholding the truism that ideas are causally 
influential vis-ý-vis structure and vice versa. Its rigour inheres in its ability to 
specify the conditions that maintain for cultural (and structural) stability or change 
- in the conjunction between culture and socio-cultural interaction and how such 
interaction is itself rooted in the structural domain. 
Theorising culture from the morphogenetic approach 
As Hays has already argued, culture pre-exists its users and modifiers, constraining 
what can or cannot be said in a particular language, for example. Transcendentally, 
therefore, it is the pre-existence, autonomy and relative durability of culture that 
establishes its ontological warrant as an irreducible entity that predates socio- 
cultural interaction, whilst any cultural morphogenesis post-dates such activity. As 
with structure, this provides the temporal basis for distinguishing analytically 
between the 'parts' and the 'people'. Culture (and structure) and agency are 
intertwined in reality; the morphogenetic approach simply disengages those 
properties, which provide explanatory leverage on such lived reality because of 
their sid generis nature. In other words, disengaging the properties and powers of 
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structure and culture does not entail a concomitant proscription of methodological 
attention to real actors and their interpretations. Those who wish to misconstrue the 
morphogenetic approach as unavoidably 'objectivist' tend to focus on the first part 
of the morphogenetic cycle, namely the identification of cultural (and structural) 
properties independently of agency. Yet the whole point of this is to examine how 
the cultural context is shaped for actors in order to gain explanatory insight upon 
what they subsequently do in it or what they can do about it. 
The so-called interpretivist (or 'subjectivist) paradigm thus constitutes an 
instance of those who want to have their ontological cake and epistemologically eat 
it. Put simply, such an approach collapses irreducible socio-cultural properties into 
actors' accounts. At its extreme, such an approach reduces social reality to 
language (e. g. Boden 1994). As Reed argues, such reductionism 'provides a classic 
restatement of a single-level social ontology that conflates 'agency' and 'structure' 
in such a way that they are analytically rendered down to localized social practices 
bereft of any institutional underpinnings or contextualization' (1997: 25). 
Organisations are held to be mere 'objectifications', having their locus of existence 
only in the minds of actors. In short, the interpretivist paradigm is another variant 
along the central conflationist (structurationist) line. It denies the pre-existence of 
causally efficacious socio-cultural forms, thereby removing the very basis of its 
epistemological claims. For actors' interpretations are interpretations of something 
independent. Without the transcendental reality of irreducible structural and 
cultural properties, the interpretivist paradigm cannot account for misinterpretation 
and, moreover, how and why it is possible that actors are manipulated, misdirected 
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or deceived. Many capacities for manipulation derive not from capricious inter- 
subjective machinations, but from irreducible social relations that have relative 
autonomy from the actors whose activity they condition. The ineluctable end-result 
of interpretivism is hyper-voluntarism, since the primacy of epistemology means 
that reality is whatever we make of it. This is not simply assertoric, because 
interpretations and meanings must be anchored ontologically. In reducing 
organisational reality to subjective meanings, interpretivism commits the epistemic 
fallacy, namely the fallacy that statements about being can be reduced to our 
statements of knowledge about being. 
Culture: establishing its 'world three' status 
The morphogenetic approach holds culture-systems to be more or less coterminous 
with Popper's (1979) notion of 'World Three'. In brief, Popper distinguishes 
'Three Worlds': 'World One' refers to physical states and processes; 'World Two' 
refers to mental states and processes; 'World Three' refers to the products of 
human minds. Such products range from sculptures, paintings and ancient plays, to 
highly complex scientific theories. All 'World Three' products qua products 
possess the dispositional capacity to be understood (and used). Whether the 
instructional programme to construct an Airfix kit is successfully implemented is a 
matter of contingency. Put simply, we are dealing with objective cultural 
phenomena that are independent of cultural actors, yet which retain the 
dispositional capacity to be understood or used (hence the existence of literary 
criticism, which presupposes such prior objective material as Shakespeare's plays). 
Only 'strong' social constructionists would disclaim the objective dispositional 
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nature of 'World Three' phenomena. 20 Anybody who has watched an episode of 
the Antiques Roadshow should recognise the 'strong' social constructionist 
absurdity that we can make whatever we want of historical artefacts. The fact that 
we get things wrong or tentatively proffer dates and uses of artefacts simply 
demonstrates the objective nature of Popper's 'World Three'. In other words, such 
human products constrain any human understanding of them. What makes the 
archaeological task no easy ride in comparison with that of the natural scientist, of 
course, is the fact that specific ineanings are attached to artefacts, how they were 
arranged and so on. Tile wooden table at one level, then, has intrinsic properties 
such as hardness but how the table was arranged at a particular time could entail 
considerable symbolic importance (e. g. sacrificial slaughter). Thus without much 
or any context, it may indeed turn out that we can never arrive at an adequate 
understanding of particular 'World Three' entities. 
However, Popper is more concerned with objective knowledge, viz. 
hypotheses, theories, arguments, unsolved problems. The morphogenetic approach 
distinguishes the Cultural System (CS), as that inherited sub-set of (cultural) items 
to which the law of contradiction can be applied at any given time. These items are 
therefore propositions because only those statements that make a claim to truth or 
falsity can be deemed to be in contradiction or to be consistent with one another. It 
is at this juncture that Hays' talk of logic is salient, for it will be argued that 
specific 'situational logics' predispose cultural agents towards distinct courses of 
20 See Sayer (2000) for an excellent critique of 'strong' social constructionism. 
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action by virtue of the logical relations that obtain between propositions. Drawing 
upon Mannheim, Hays argues that 
ideas exist as part of powerful and ordered cultural systems... Systems of 
meaning... shape not only what particular ideas we use, but also the logic ive 
use when stringing those ideas together. To put it another way, culture 
influences not only what we think about, but how we think about it (1994: 68, 
emphasis added). 
It is by virtue of the logical relations that obtain between CS properties that we can 
say that culture influences (constrains or enables) agential activity, but only as and 
when such properties have their takers. This will be fleshed out later. For the 
moment, however, the morphogenetic approach concurs with Mannheim that 
the universality of mathematics and logic was such that neither could be 
explained by reference to anything about the specific cultures in which they 
were adopted... However, [the morphogenetic approach] restores certain logic 
principles to where Mannheim left them, thus retaining their serviceability in the 
attribution of properties like 'contradiction', 'consistency' and 'independence' to 
CS items located anywhere in time or space (Archer 1988: 113). 
The Cultural System is objective and has autonomous relations among its 
components (theories, beliefs, values, arguments, or more strictly between 
propositional formulations of them). Its objective nature 21 is due to the fact that its 
components are 'totally independent of anybody's claim to know; it is also 
independent of anybody's belief, or disposition to assent; or to assert or to act. 
Knowledge in the objective sense is biowledge without a knower: it is knowledge 
without a knowing subject' (Popper 1979: 109, original emphasis). Thus any 
contradictions or complementarities between its components are not dependent 
21 As Layder (1997: 128) notes, 'objective, here is not meant to express a claim about truth or falsity, but is 
instead a claim about the relation between knowledge and the human beings that produce it. Furthermore, 
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upon us. The Cultural System would not, of course, exist without its human 
makers. However, this does not nullify its autonomy, even though we constantly 
act upon it and are acted upon by it: 'it is autonomous in spite of the fact that it is 
our product and that it has a strong feed-back effect upon us; that is, upon us qua 
inmates of the second and even of the first world' (ibid: 112). 
The Cultural System is referred to metaphorically as 'the Library' because 
of the indubitable fact that vast tracts of it are written down in books, journals, 
pamphlets, statutes and so on. Importantly, this is not to suggest that organisational 
actors have to pop out every five minutes in order to be able to act at all. On the 
contrary, it simply affinns the impossibility of the human mind(s) to store 
everything that has been said, debated, theorised, mooted, conjectured, discovered, 
etc. 22 Athey (1990: 43), in her Extending Thought in Young Children, underscores 
the reality of 'World Three': 
The central feature of the curriculum is knowledge. 77zis exists objectively in 
encyclopaedias and so oil [CS level], and it remains extenzal to the blower until 
constructed psychologically in the individual [S-C level]. External knowledge, 
once validated for 'truth', 'worthwhileness', 'relevance', 'usefulness' and 
'generalizability', must be discovered, assimilated and mastered by the learner. 
If knowledge is to be successfully assimilated it must fit in with the learner's 
'lived experience... (emphasis added). 
Athey's key point is that biblioth6que knowledge cannot be simply delivered by 
teachers like Royal Mail post. Such knowledge has to be 'delivered' (I prefer 
taught) in such a way that is congruent with the cognitive processes of the child qua 
'objective' should not be taken to imply that such knowledge (CS) is unchanging and beyond the grasp of 
human intervention. 
22 Even those who possess 'photographic memories' would not have the time to digest and retain an ever- 
expanding CS. Moreover, a photographic memory does not endow one with the capacity to pinpoint every 
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child. Athey also recognises that biblioth6que knowledge is independent of its truth 
or falsity. 23 Ineluctably, some 'World Three' properties have to reside in our heads, 
since otherwise social life would be impossible, namely language (yet even here we 
do not store the totality, or we would never consult a dictionary). Everyday 
recourse to Government-supplied statistics, curriculum documentation and orders, 
appraisal reports, newspapers, employment law texts and various types of aide- 
minzoire establishes the objective nature of the CS at any given time. Even those 
(propositional) properties that have their locus of existence in the human mind are 
nevertheless irreducible and may stand in a contradictory or complementary 
relationship to other CS denizens independently of the actor's awareness. 24 
Furthennore, it is not being argued that knowledge in toto is coterminous 
with the CS. 'Know-how' is central to much of what takes place in organisations, 
from making a cup of coffee to using a word-processor. In view of the focus on 
propositional knowledge, educationists would be rightly concerned that I am 
thereby ignoring those practical know-how processes that underpin successful 
teaching, such as knowing when a child is capable of being extended or needs 
remedial attention. I do not wish to downplay or deny the importance of such 
processes: the issue here is at which level of social reality one focuses one's 
conceivable logical contradiction and/or complementarity among its components, whose logical relations 
may bear upon an infinite number of situations. 
23 Propositional knowledge is that which instantiates truth (or falsity). Truth is thus metaphysical, not 
epistemological. 2 2 It may be argued that sexist ideology, beliefs, etc. are not so neatly lodged in the Library or the CS, for 
there exists no equivalent of a mathematics manual or literary journal. Whilst there is no 'sexist manual' 
per se (although historically one can easily dig up numerous pamphlets regarding women's 'natural' role in 
the home and so on), propositions can be passed on orally. As Popper argues, as far as objective 
knowledge is concerned, 'it may be said to be the world of libraries, of books and journals, but also of oral 
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analytical attention and the reasons for so doing. Teachers could not effectively 
teach without intuitive knowledge or know-how Yet at the same time such practical 
teaching is ideationally grounded (or specifically underpinned by philosophical 
assumptions). In terms of this thesis, therefore, the substantive focus is on the 
structural -i deati on al context in which such practices take place, since the 
structurally conditioned use of ideas vis-ý-vis the imposition of the National 
Curriculum is undeniable (e. g. proponents of child-centred learning are 'loony left' 
ideologues). And the very use of ideas itself conditions activity. As will be 
addressed in Part Two, the actual processes by which teachers assess pupils' needs 
are currently contradicted by the structural constraints embodied in the National 
Curriculum, which are ideationally backed-up. Indeed, they have logical 
implications for practice, of which actors may be aware, partially aware or 
unaware. And such lack of awareness may be the result of strategic manipulation 
(by central Government, teaching groups, head teachers). 
Athey argues that experience of teaching is a necessary but insufficient 
condition for professional advancement, since there is 'a great deal of difference 
between 'know-how' and consciousness of 'know-why' [knowledge of the Cultural 
System irreducible to, but dialectically grounded, in practice]' (1990: 31). 
Following Volpe (198 1), she argues that an ideal teacher is one who 
combines practical 'know-how' with the conceptual understanding that can only 
come from study and reflection. There are indications that, in spite of the 
politically-motivated, anti-theoretical Zeitgeist of the present time, many 
reports and traditions' (1994: 32). That such propositions are passed on establishes their irreducibility to 
human minds (or 'World Two' thought-processes). 
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teachers of young children wish to evolve from intuitive knowledge towards a 
more articulate system of professional understandings (ident). 
For Bruce, teaching, to some extent, 'has to be an act of intuition embedded in 
educational principles [CS properties]. The teacher has to have confidence in 
offering and organising the prepared lesson. It is an act of intuition because there is 
not much tangible feedback from these internal processes, especially with children 
of three to five' (1997: 50). Such intuition is conceptually underpinned, which is 
subject to immanent revision or modification. Bruce acknowledges the one- 
hundred-year difficulty of articulating the conceptual framework of know-how 
practices and argues that '(t)hose who can speak and write effectively and clearly 
about their work, as well as put it into practice, are more likely to be listened to' 
(ibid: 66). Indeed, research suggests that teachers rely almost exclusively on 
practical classroom experience as the main source of their professional knowledge 
and give little credence to formal educational theory (Blenkin et al. 1997: 220). 
(The lack of effective articulation will be discussed in Part Two. ) In sum, the focus 
on the conceptual underpinning of teaching practice is equally important as the 
practice itself and their mutual intertwinement. Again, the reason for focusing on 
its conceptual (CS) foundations stems from the Government-led attack on them, 
which culminated in the various Education Acts and testing arrangements. Finally, 
Athey notes that recently, 
Several books have been published with seductive titles that promise 
information on 'concepts', 'schemas', 'cognition', 'action', 'perception' and 
'representation'. Interesting though these books are, they are of doubtful use to 
teachers of young children because the emphasis has shiftedfronz the huntall, 
biological and psychological aspects of the above concepts towards the logical. 
They may lead to advances in information technology that may, at some point, 
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help in the study of human cognition but this stage has not yet been reached 
(1990: 45, emphasis added). 
As the foregoing indicates, one of the substantive foci of this thesis is the logical 
properties of the Cultural System. Fundamentally, the morphogenetic approach 
does not ignore or deny the psychological and quasi-propositional aspects of 
concrete educational (social) life, for this is an S-C affair. In fact, a focus on the 
logical properties of the CS would, for some, arouse immediate suspicion that 
important facets of social life are being truncated at a stroke. Firstly, as Archer 
(1988) points out, by no means is the logical exhaustive of the meaningful: the 
reason for abstracting the relational generative properties of the CS is due to the 
undeniable significance of claims to truth. Secondly, commentators might wonder 
about the importance of personality in accounting for the variable responses to the 
imposition of national testing arrangements. The morphogenetic approach does not 
wish or aim to nullify any stratum of reality. As will be discussed in Part Three, the 
personality of the 'trouble-shooting' is indispensable in explaining the tempo and 
extent of her drive. However, this begs the referential question of precisely what 
she could have a drive about. The fact that she enthusiastically endorsed elements 
of the New Managerialism directs substantive analysis to the temporal priority of 
the latter's constituents. In abstracting the sid generis causal properties of the 
Cultural System, it is not my intention nor wish to play down the importance of the 
factors that constitute good teaching practice. In fact, it is precisely the New 
Managerialist discourse that does play down the importance of quasi-propositional 
and embodied knowledge, since the latter is not readily (or possibly ever) 
'translatable' into performance indicators and associated proxies. As we shall see 
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in the Preface to Part Three, Professor Robin Alexander's disparaging remarks 
about so-called 'Primaryspeak' underscores his managerialist co-option, since 
Primaryspeak is held to be tacit and therefore not 'proper' knowledge that can aid 
'good' teaching practice and hence is devalued. 
However, the use of ideas in power play is not without its costs or 
benefits. As Popper argued, 'World Three' has a strong feedback effect upon us. 
Already we can discern similarities between structure and culture since structure 
acts back to condition its makers. The morphogenetic approach provides the 
methodological specification of the feedback mechanisms in the form of 
costs/benefits that result from the use of ideas that shape action-contexts for their 
users because of their embroilment in specific logical relations. In establishing the 
parallel with Lockwood (see Chapter One), the Cultural System (CS) is analysed in 
terms of its logical consistency, that is, the degree of consistency between the 
component parts of culture. What agency does with such cultural emergent 
properties (or 'World Three' entities) is conceptualised in terms of causal 
consensus, that is, the degree of cultural unifon-nity produced by the imposition of 
ideas by one set of people on another via legitimation, manipulation, persuasion, 
argument, etc. Thus the issue of power becomes marked, though such uniformity is 
not ever implicated in the exercise of power. Cultural uniformity does not 
necessarily require the exercise of power in the sense of getting people to comply 
with your wants (cf. Giddens 1979). The Government may exercise considerable 
powers in attempting to eradicate 'institutional racism' within Britain's police 
forces, but it cannot be assumed that success will follow. On the other hand, Her 
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Majesty's Constabularies may provide adequate learning sessions about the origins 
and immorality of race ideology, at the end of which police officers are persuaded 
of its inherent perniciousness and reorient their behaviour accordingly. Such 
learning processes that promote cultural uniformity could only be termed 
compliance by rendering the term vacuous (to accept the force of the anti-racist 
argument is not compliance). 
However, in parallel with Lockwood, we can talk about the variable 
degrees of 'Cultural System integration' and 'Socio-Cultural integration' for the 
two are not co-variant. In short, the former refers to the emergent relations between 
the components of culture (the degree of logical consistency, which exists 
independently of human awareness); the latter refers to relationships between 
people (the extent of causal cohesion). Cultural morphogenesis is thus theorised on 
the same sequential basis as structure: Cultural Conditioning 4 Socio-Cultural 
Interaction 4 Cultural Elaboration. The methodological employment of the 
invariant rules of logic (laws of identity and non-contradiction) to distinguish the 
non-coextensive levels of reality does not entail that actors are mere clones of Mr. 
Spock. To insist that actors ever live logically would be grossly to distort social 
(and personal) reality and indeed to rob us of that which makes us human, rather 
than robot-like, beings. The fact that there is an objective contradiction between 
child-centred philosophy and the implications for its enactment as embodied in 
SATs may not be recognised by actors, or recognised but ignored and so on. As 
Buckley argues, 'the human personality can harbor fairly great incompatibilities in 
ideas, beliefs, attitudes, ideologies, while operating quite effectively' (1967: 16). 
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Therefore, those critics who arraign the morphogenetic approach on the charge of 
an incipient cognitivism and/or rationalism (see Nellhaus 1998; Shilling 1997) 
confuse the objective contradictions and complementarities that obtain amongst CS 
components at any given time with what people do with them. 
The use of culture is particularly evident in the organisation theory 
literature, which is currently being raided by education sociologists and education 
management texts. Jang and Chung's (1997) case study of a corporate renewal 
initiative in Korea, for example, exemplifies the reality of a generic lack of 
awareness of systemic contradiction: here between Confucianism and Western 
discourses (Taylorism, managerialism). Jang and Chung interviewed 
approximately 70 of Samsung's middle managers in order to ascertain the extent of 
awareness of the contradiction between New Management principles and 
Confucianism: 
In these interviews, we found that most of the managers are not conscious of 
whether the stated principles of New Management are contradictory. After the 
contradictions were pointed out, however, most seemed to agree reluctantly with 
the argument... In conclusion, Korean workers are not conscious of this 
contradiction in everyday life, which may produce a considerable amount of 
confusion for westemers (1997: 66). 
The assumption of 'Western' confusion is attributable to the untenable proposition 
that East Asian 'logic' asserts that a thing can be both X and non-X (ibid: 59). Yet 
how I can I be in the process of writing this thesis and simultaneously not be 
writing this thesis? Jang and Chung maintain that Koreans do not take seriously 
'the Western-style logic of syllogism (e. g., the rule of contradiction), at least when 
they consider nianagement discourses and practices. Furthermore, Koreans feel 
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comfortable in the coexistence of A and non-A in the same place' (ibid: 61, 
emphasis added). If there is not a universal law of contradiction, how could Jang 
and Chung conceivably engage in any form of conversation with their 
interviewees? How, indeed, could they point out the (logical) contradiction 
between Confucianism and Western management discourse, which their 70 or so 
interviewees 'reluctantly' understood? Further, 'feeling comfortable' is an S-C 
phenomenon, independent of the logical properties of the CS. It is instructive that 
the authors note that the rule of contradiction is not contravened with impunity 
beyond management practices. Unfortunately they elevate the generic lack of 
agential awareness of contradiction to a fundamentally (alien) logic axiom that 
somehow guides organisational activity. They seem to be confusing the subsequent 
toleration of contradiction with the impossibility of its simultaneous invocation and 
revocation. In fact, the contradiction in this example is one of contingency (i. e. 
New Management does not presuppose Confucianism) and may therefore go some 
way to explaining why it left actors unruffled. Whereas a necessary contradiction, 
to be discussed, entails that its upholders engage in some form of cultural repair 
work, as and when they recognise, or are made to recognise, the dependency of 
their ideas on their ideational antithesis. 
Nevertheless, Jang and Chung's case study testifies to the salience of 
ideational aspects of organisational behaviour. What would have been of interest 
here is if some of Samsung's more ambitious younger members had been aware of 
the contradiction and whether the systemic fault-line was then exploited and 
amplified in order to advance their own vested interests. Confucianism provided 
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ideological legitimation for older members of the organisation, to remain within the 
upper echelons of the hierarchy; Western-style management discourse, on the other 
hand, viewed this as a potential obstacle to profitability and entrepreneurship. In 
this case study it simply would not have been in the younger members' interests to 
exploit the fault-line because structurally the cards were stacked against them. 
However, any downturn in the Korean economy and/or internal restructuring would 
provide, ceteris paribus, the younger members with objective reasons for so doing. 
In the latter scenario, the hierarchy's defence of its vested interests may result in 
ideational change in the form of, say, some redefinition to legitimate their vested 
interests that are structurally rendered vulnerable. In Jang and Chung's case study 
we witness S-C orderliness and CS disorderliness. CS disorderliness may remain 
unexploited because of structural factors. Indeed, as will be discussed, whilst 
cultural morphogenesis may be at the mercy of the conjunction between the two 
levels, the CS itself nevertheless has properties and powers irreducible to, and 
independent of, social structure. 
Unsticking the glue 
It should be clear from the foregoing that the Cultural System is not a tightly-knit 
web of logical complementarities that provides an inherently 'stabilizing force' 
(Schein 1992b) enabling any dysfunctional organisation to get back on track. Not 
only did Buckley acknowledge that actors can harbour contradictions in their daily 
lives, he also argued that 'so can and do socio-cultural systems embrace wide 
diversities and incompatibilities while remaining amazingly persistent over long 
periods' (1967: 16). A major flaw that characterises a significant number of 
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approaclics to culture, particularly within organisation theory, is tile a priori 
assumption that, oil the contrary, culture is that which we all share or hold in 
common, thereby ensuring social coliesion and solidarity. Anthony exernplifics 
this position: Ilic development or culture is a process natural to and inseparable 
from tile development of communi tics, ill which people collie to share vahles and 
belit: fs... Communities (ire cultures' (1994: 50, cinphasis added). To Harnpden- 
Turner, tile investigation of 'corporate cultures' involves looking at llow people 
behave and discovering the glue that holds together the corporation: 'culture gives 
continuity and identity to the group... I'lie values within a culture are harmonious' 
(1990: 21). And to Schein culture is simply stability and nonnality, and cannot exist 
unless there is a group that 'owns' it: culture is held to be cnibcdded ill groups - it 
cannot be detennincd unless there is a definable set of people with a shared history 
(I 992a: 24 1 -, see also 1992b, 1996). 
Notwithstanding the conflation of the CSIS-C distinction, the generic a 
priori assumption is empirically (and ontologically) refutable. In fact, Schein, like 
Parsons, readily accepts the reality of tile systemic incompatibility and S-C 
disorderliness. but swiftly denies any theoretical significance deriving from the 
latter, assuming that a cognitive drive for order and consistency in tile brain will 
ensure that human groups will gradually learn sets of compatible ideas. However, 
ill Organizational Culture and Leatlership lie documents high levels of 
confrontation and fighting within and between groups: 
To reach a decision and to get "buy in", you must convince others of tile validity 
of your idea and be able to defend it against every conceivable argument. 11iis 
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causes tile high levels of confrontation and fighting that I obscrvcd in groups, 
but once all idea lias stood up to this level of debate and survived, it can then be 
moved forward and impicinctited because everyone is now convinccd that it is 
the right thing to do (1 992b: 34). 
'Mis inerely begs tile cluestion of tile socio-cultural conditions that facilitate tile 
success of one person's (or group's) idea over another's. In the first case-stud), 
school, by no mcans did all staff w0corne the changes initiated by tile so-called 
'trouble-shooting' licad. Ilius, conim Schein, the fact that certain ideas %vcre 
implemwited does not necessarily incan that tlicir impicnienters were convinced of 
tlicir efficacy or rightness. Indeed. the majority of organisation/business studies 
texts oil organisational culture are concemcd inore with tile need to impose 
management precepts oil subordinates in order to achieve collcctivc compliance 
and not with its causal properties and flow tile), gcl with agency. In ollicr words, 
that teachers carried out SAI's does not nican they welcomcd such ideas and 
procedures, but generally did so for structural reasons. 
If culture is shared, its components consistently interwoven, then Ilow 
does Schein account for high levels of protracted ideational debate? Logically, 
Schein's approach precludes cultural morphogenesis (Collins 1998). Such 
inconsistency derives from culture's anthropological heritage, specifically tile 
empirical findings that document a high degree of S-C orderliness over long 
periods of time. The generic assumption was transinuted into an unalterable 
axiom that later reached its zenith in the Parsonian central-value systern. In fact, 
tile CS itself was never viewed as conditioning the S-C level as a result of its own 
internal dynamics. In surn, Schein should not confuse a counter-factual (utopian) 
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conception of culture with its current systemic configuration, which is characterised 
by logical consistency and contradiction. Furthermore, referring to subcultures 
does not solve the problem of heterogeneity or contradiction: organisational 
ideologies can be divided into fundamental and operative groups (Alvesson 
1996: 63). The use of the prefix 'sub' denotes Schein's unremitting a prioristic 
need to render culture an integrative force within organisations, untenably playing 
down the role of contradiction. Many of the school improvement and management 
texts in education enthusiastically endorse the Scheinian approach. Roger Smith's 
Successful School Managenient (1995) talks only of shared values and cohesive 
social practices. In Strategic Planytingfor School Improvement, Philip Mann writes 
that school cultures '... are the sum of the shared beliefs and values, in short the 
character and personality (sic) of the school. Techniques and developments need to 
be employed that can be used to develop a shared culture within a school' 
(1996: 173, emphasis added). He then quotes West-Bumham, who asserts that 
'(c)ulture only has meaning when it is given expression, when it is expressed in 
tangible forms. The critical difference about culture is that it is those abstractions 
which are shared, those which are widely held and dominant' (idem. ). 
Instructively, Mann adds that '(w)ithout this understanding [i. e. West-Bumham's], 
school improvement can be hindered'. 
Yet if culture consists of shared values and beliefs, why the need to 
develop techniques to ensure this state of affairs? And why talk of their 
dominance? To assert dominance is to imply the existence of alternatives within 
the Cultural System, which may indeed be contradictory. Mann's comment about 
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school improvement is evidence of the ideological nature of the imposition of CS 
properties, in particular managerialist values that emphasise group solidarity and 
cohesion in order to effect organisational change (be it 'down-sizing' or national 
testing arrangements). The purpose of this Chapter (and Part Two of the thesis) is 
to argue that notions of organisation culture have no explanatory purchase but 
themselves constitute the object of theoretical study. Such conceptions talk of 'the 
power of culture' yet (a) do not theorise about its properties and arguably (b) are 
mere slogans that practitioners and managers (both inside and outside education) 
can adopt in their attempts to effect change: at present they are synonymous with 
business values. 25 This thesis is about providing explanatory leverage upon the use 
of specific ideas, how they causally condition their takers and their relationship vis- 
A-vis structure. The irony of a morphogenetic analysis of the interplay of child- 
centred philosophy and the 'new managerialism' is that the latter's use of the notion 
of culture is deemed not only inadequate but also subject to immanent (ideological) 
critique. To recapitulate, the notion that (a) culture only exists when people own it 
is to conflate its objective nature with its subjective reception (and genesis) and, 
moreover, (b) to posit consistency as its hallmark is empirically untenable. As 
Blenkin et al. note: 
25 As Geoff Esland puts it: 
Of all the areas of social policy subjected to the New Right's 'cultural revolution', the reform of 
education has arguably been the most central to its moral and political project ... like those in 
other parts of the public sector, educational institutions have been compelled to incorporate 
elements of the 'new public management' designed to eliminate 'waste' and 'inefficiency' and to 
induce a greater responsiveness to the new 'customer culture' (1996: 26). 
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Words and terms used in defining culture - 'standard practices', 'shared 
expectations', 'core values', 'regularities', etc. - seem to imply that cultures are 
heterogeneous entities... This is clearly not true of cultures in general or of 
school cultures in particular. Admittedly, the nature of schooling is such that 
teachers do, to a significant extent, share a common occupational culture... 
But... there are considerable variations both between and within schools in the 
uniformity of their cultures. Rather than homogeneous entities, schools are sites 
where a number of different cultures intersect and interact... (1997: 219, 
emphasis added). 
The morphogenetic approach posits the CS/S-C distinction in order to explain what 
people do with the culture they inherit: how they can or cannot change it because of 
the conjunction between tile structural realm, the irreducible powers of the CS and 
people's powers of reflection. In other words, it sedulously maintains the 
distinction between social practices and social structurelcultural practices and 
cultural structure (i. e. between 'the parts' and 'the people') and the need to examine 
the interplay in and between them over time. In turn, this avoids Hays' 
methodologically unhelpful (though ontologically correct) comment that '(c)ulture 
is, in fact, both external and internal, objective and subjective, material and ideal' 
(1994: 70). Of course, the CS is not ontologically conjoined with the S-C level: to 
maintain that culture is objective and subjective is simply to recognise that people 
make it, accept or reject parts of it, change it but are not ever the bearers of it. 
Menter et al. (1997: 15) write that 
We believe that a significant element of the marketization project lies in its 
consequences for the work cultures of educational organizations. Thus the fact 
that we found considerable constraints on the operation of a primary school 
market in County Town led us to consider the work that the market was doing in 
reshaping those cultures, particularly the traditional cultures of autonomy in 
primary schoolwork, and amateurism in its management. 
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Confusion is easily dispelled and analytical leverage gained if attention is focused 
on the CS/S-C distinction. Firstly, the effects of the market are separate from their 
ideational origins, legitimation or critique. The reasons for welcoming, tolerating or 
actively circumventing such effects are almost invariably cultural. Secondly, that 
teachers were (or were not) traditionally autonomous is a structural, rather than 
cultural, phenomenon. The structural conditions for such autonomy were culturally 
backed up, but this is not an ontological prerequisite. Indeed, the current generic 
lack of autonomy is quintessentially culturally embodied (in managerialist and anti- 
progressivist or anti- child-centred discourses), but it does not follow that such 
structurally induced lack of autonomy requires cultural (ideological) legitimation. 26 
Clegg and Billington (1997) argue that culture can be almost entirely divorced from 
structure, but not from values and ultimately not from behaviour. Whilst they 
26 As Hatcher (1994: 55) notes, it is the market that is intended to provide not just a source of new material 
powers for management but also a new legitimising discourse, 'which has been fostered by the government 
under the key concepts of 'choice', 'accountability' and 'quality'... The struggle to create this new school 
culture takes place on the terrain of ideologies of teachers' professionalism'. In creating a 'new culture', 
Hatcher is not suggesting that child-centred, ethically-based approaches to management and so on are 
somehow expunged from the CS, which is an ontological impossibility. Instead, the aim is to impose such 
ideas in legitimating new structured working arrangements. The fact that he talks of struggle (i. e. 
competition between ideas at the S-C level) means that success is by no means a simple, untrammelled 
process of top-down implementation. As lie rightly points out, it would be wrong to take management 
rhetoric at face value: 
The creation of a permanent common ideological discourse encompassing management and 
workers is an unattainable goal. Coercion is always present and necessary too. While it is true 
that the ideological element in the new management offensive is crucial (in education as in the 
private sector), its success does not depend on ideologically convincing teachers... It depends on 
ensuring their compliance in practice, in other words on installing a set of management practices 
that prevent teachers carrying out a different agenda. There is a danger in adopting an over- 
ideological approach... (ident. ) 
in other words, given the specific structural conjunction that gave the Tory Government the 'upper hand', 
inter alia, quasi -marketi s ation did not require its ideological legitimation, even though this was part and 
parcel of the process of the imposition of the various Education Reform Acts. However, I do not wish to 
suggest that such processes of ideological legitimation are mere structural window-dressing. As will be 
elucidated shortly, championing ideas conditions its upholders to follow specific courses of action by virtue 
of the situational logic in which they embroil themselves. 
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rightly recognise the sid generis nature of each and equate culture with values, I 
would question their subsequent conflation of the CS/S-C levels. They cite Stoll 
and Fink (1996) who, in their view, correctly distinguish between structure and 
culture because structures can be changed without a corresponding change in 
culture (that is, concurrent structural morphogenesis and cultural morphostasis). 
They conclude that structurally, 
... most schools have staff meetings or senior staff meetings. These are not in 
themselves particularly indicative of a school's culture. The way people behave 
within those meetings, what is acceptable or unacceptable, the allocation and the 
location of powers, and the attitude to conflict and disagreement would be much 
better indicators of what the culture of the school is like. To begin really to 
describe a desirable culture we need to look at fundamental values and how they 
may be manifested; this may have some implications for structures, but would 
have much more fundamental implications for the nature and quality of the 
relationships within the school (1997: 39). 
This resonates well with the morphogenetic approach. A focus on values and 
particularly on that which is deemed to be acceptable/unacceptable within the 
school setting attests to the undeniable importance of claims to truth or falsity. 
Conflict and disagreement quintessenti ally involve propositions ('that children do 
not learn in that manner', 'that the head is wrong to treat certain staff like 
production-line workers', 'that base-line assessments are of no help to us as early 
years practitioners') and how power is used in the process. That the authors refer to 
the manifestation of values entails an endorsement of the CS/S-C distinction, 
whereby values may remain unnoticed or unexplored. Furthermore, they rightly 
note that CS properties may have implications for structure. Indeed they do, and 
the next section will theorise about the causal properties of the Cultural System 
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(which exist whether or not actors activate them) and how they mesh with structure 
and agency. 
Cultural conditioning: situational logic and strategic guidance 27 
Our methodological interest here is with those contradictions or complementari ties, 
which, for whatever reasons, people uphold. And as Schein (1992b: 148) rightly 
noted, not all systemic items are relevant to any given issue the organisation may be 
facing (and the substantive concerns of the researcher). Explaining the action- 
context shaped by upholding an incompatible learning proposition does not, for 
example, entail reference to sexist ideology since the latter is logically unrelated to 
it, although it may be contingently linked. Morphogenetic analysis proceeds 
sequentially, firstly by examining the relational properties of the systemic items of 
interest; secondly, explaining the consequences for people of holding specific 
theories or beliefs; and thirdly, delineating any cultural morphogenesis (which may 
parallel structural morphogenesis). Thus, like structure, culture has emergent 
relational properties (of logical contradiction or complementarity) that act back- to 
condition their makers. But they only do so when invoked by actors. 
Morphogenetic analysis of the Samsung case study would primarily focus on the 
agential invocation of systemic items that mould action-contexts for their invokers. 
However, in this case, middle managers were unaware of a specific CS 
contradiction (between Confucianism and Western management discourse), yet 
27 The morphogenetic approach identifies four cultural configurations and their situational logics. Such 
situational logics entail different forms of action by predisposing different sections of the population or 
organisation towards corrcclion, protection, elimination or opportunism. The examples in this chapter 
address the situational logics of constraining and competitive contradictions respectively (see Archer 1995 
pp. 229-245 for a discussion of the remaining two). 
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even a general awareness, as discussed, may nevertheless have not 'moved' agents 
for reasons residing in the structural realm. 
However, when agents are 'moved' because of the relational properties 
between specific CS items, the morphogenetic approach provides explanatory 
leverage on the mechanisms of constraint or facilitation that condition cultural 
action and morphogenesis. To reiterate, none of this occurs within a structural 
vacuum. Necessarily, recourse will be made to the structural realm (initial relative 
distribution of power; availability of resources ... ) yet cultural dynamics are not 
only irreducible to the latter: they may be out of synchrony with the latter, thereby 
confronting actors with a third-order emergent property of constraint or enablement 
that derives from their incongruence or congruence. However, in maintaining the 
parallel with Lockwood, an example of cultural 'strain' will now be elucidated. 
The situational logic of a 'constraining contradiction' 
The necessary yet contradictory (or incompatible) dependence of relations of 
production on the forces of production, for example, predisposes agential 
concession or compromise in order to prevent actualisation and amplification of the 
systemic fault-line. Clearly, the very nature of this internally necessary relation 
threatens its durability. The structural contradiction between the forces and 
relations of production represents an obstruction for certain institutional operations 
and these translate into problem-ridden situations for those involved. The problem 
here is not so much resolved as contained via various well-known safety nets 
(unemployment benefit; bonuses; trade-union recognition; personnel 
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managers ... ). 
28 Similarly, this incompatibility has its counterpart in the cultural 
realm, theorised as a 'constraining contradiction'. A contradiction between A and 
B is an irTeducible property of the CS and only exerts a conditional influence upon 
agency (the S-C level) if any actor(s) wish to uphold it. In brief, those who uphold 
A also unavoidably invoke B and with it the logical contradiction. This necessary 
connection is due to the dependence of A on B: without B it cannot work and is 
only operable in terms of it. At the same time, B constitutes a threat to A because it 
simultaneously conflicts with it. 29 
The systemic constraint or 'strain' derives from the necessary dependence 
of A upon B, for agency cannot simply repudiate B yet if B is fully actualised then 
it threatens to render A untenable. Therefore, the situational logic dictates that for 
those who wish non-dogmatically to uphold A then since direct resolution is 
28 The capital/labour internal relation is one of one-sided domination, which accounts for the fact that much 
pro-labour legislation was hard-won. However, this does nullify the situational logic of 
compromise/concess ion: it remains in the capitalist's vested interests to 'soften' the inherently exploitative 
nature of the contradiction in order to sustain it. As Sayer points out, the causal powers of capitalist 
ownership are not absolute: '... sometimes they are limited by state regulation (e. g. regarding employment 
legislation); sometimes they are rendered worthless, as in the ownership of obsolete means of production; 
and sometimes they can be overridden by other forces, such as powerful occupational groupings or 
organized labour' (1995: 49). 
29 The use of A/B relations should not be taken to imply that we are dealing with 'stand-alone' 
propositions. As Davis (1998) rightly argues, many propositions are part of connected clusters. For 
example, the proposition "that Faraday discovered the dynamo" is 'not a 'stand-alone' entity. Its essential 
nature is inextricably bound up with other propositions... [It]... cannot be separated from other 
propositions about dynamos, electricity, coils, magnetic fields... ' (1998: 53-55). In the context of 
educational assessment, Davis's critique of extant arrangements centres on the oft-neglected problem of 
assuming that pupils are aware of the connections between propositions and, moreover, that they 
understand them. Unwittingly, Davis underscores the tenability of differentiating ontologically between 
the emergent relations of propositions (CS) and what people do with them (S-C), since pupils do not 
necessarily have an adequate understanding, despite performing well in assessment situations. This applies 
equally to the Staff Meetings I observed in the first school, for example, and thus constitutes a 
methodological problem for any substantive research. In other words, when staffs express agreement with 
the proposition "that pupils learn best when... " are they (a) agreeing upon the same thing and (b) is such 
public agreement contrived? The problem in this instance is that it was not practicable at the end of each 
weekly staff meeting to enquire as to what individual staff meant by the use of specific educational terms 
and, if aware of any objective CS contradictions, why they did not point them out, accentuate them, deny 
their salience, etc. 
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logically impossible corrective repairs must be undertaken. Importantly, 
contradictions mould problem-ridden situations for actors that they are enjoined to 
confront if and when they realise, or are made to acknowledge, that the 
proposition(s) they endorse is enmeshed in some inconsistency (Archer 1988: XX). 
Subsequently, cultural agents have the option of engaging in some form of 
syncretism, abandoning the cultural project or entering the mire of irrational 
dogmatism. Archer gives the two examples of the development of Christian beliefs 
and the advancement of scientific theories: 
Both are cases of birth into a hostile ideational environment, with which they 
had to cope if they were to survive but which constituted an unending threat to 
their survival. To claim that both surface(d) in inhospitable surroundings is not 
like saying they had the misfortune of bad 'home backgrounds'... for without 
their respective environments we cannot conceive of them at all. Thus 
Christianity had to tangle with Antiquity because it emerged enmeshed in it, just 
as scientific propositions have to tackle observational data because the (f)act of 
stating a hypothesis entangles it in them. The key feature shared by these 
disparate instances of constraining contradictions is that both are concerned with 
the relationships between ideas (with a belief in relation to other beliefs, with a 
theory in relation to other theories)... (pp. 149-150, original emphasis). 
Briefly, the situational logic generated by the 'constraining contradiction' 
generically results in the sinking of differences to achieve unification. Such 
ideational syncretism can follow three paths (and not in any necessary order): 
(1) A <- B, that is, correcting B so that it becomes consistent with A; 
(2) A <---> B, that is, correcting both A and B so they become mutually 
consistent; 
(3) A --) B, that is, correcting A so that it becomes consistent with B. 
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Clearly, for proponents of A, path (1) is the preferred option. Any corrective 
repairs in order to 'stick' (or be accepted) at the Socio-Cultural level must gel with 
the extant distribution of structured vested interests. I will crudely sketch out the 
deten-ninate effects of a constraining contradiction by reference to child-centred 
philosophy and its more recent critics. 30 A fuller examination will be provided in 
Part Two. 
In brief, child-centred philosophy has its origins in Rousseau. The ideas 
contained within Emile (1762) have been developed notably by Pestallozi (1894), 
Dewey (1897,1900) and Kilpatrick (1916,1918). At the core of their respective 
contributions to systernatisation is the view that education should reflect the nature 
of the child; that childhood is not a defective version of adulthood and that what is 
to be learned should be determined by an understanding of the child's intrinsic 
nature at each stage of his or her development. 
In underscoring the 'World Three' nature of child-centred philosophy, 
Darling notes that in Britain the influence of these thinkers 'beyond the world of 
ideas was for a long time very limited' (1992: 2). Initially, constraining (or 
competitive) contradictions may be concealed by a variety of Socio-Cultural 
4containment strategies' and the temporal extent of their success is a matter of 
socio-cultural contingency (see Archer 1988, Chapter Seven). Thus, for example, 
when Emile was published it was burnt on the streets of Paris. However, the 
influence of child-centred philosophy can be traced to its official recognition in the 
30 See Willmott (2000) for an example of a 'constraining contradiction' in the scientific field of sex 
hormones. 
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Hadow Report (193 1) on Primary Education. Yet it was not until the establishment 
of the Teachers' Training Colleges, legitimated and buttressed by the Plowden 
Report (1967), that the requisite fertile soil for its practical implementation was 
provided. It was recognised that a class is not a homogeneous entity of Durkheim's 
indeterminate material but rather a heterogeneous collection of individuals who are 
not all the same and who therefore work at different learning speeds that require 
careful monitoring. 
Unlike the pre-war conditions that acted as negative (morphostatic) 
feedback loops precluding practical fruition of child-centred philosophy, the post- 
war period of full employment, inter alia, provided the socio-cultural context that 
was required. The Plowden Report (1967) underscored the benefits to be had from 
the study of the ways in which children grow and endorsed an approach to primary 
education that focuses on children qua children rather than on some long-distance 
end product (Darling 1994). 
... activity and experience, 
both physical and mental, are often the best means of 
gaining knowledge and acquiring facts. This is more generally recognised today 
but still needs to be said. We would certainly not wish to undervalue knowledge 
and facts [CS level], but facts are best retained when they are used and 
understood, when right attitudes are used to learning are created, when children 
learn to learn. Instruction in many primary schools continues to bewilder 
children because it outruns their experience (CACE 1967: 195). 
Furthen-nore, the Plowden Report expressed palpable dissatisfaction with a subject- 
based curriculum: '... knowledge does not fall into neatly separate compartments... 
[and] children's learning does not fit into subject categories' (ibid: 203). For 
reasons of brevity, the socio-economic conditions that have subsequently shaped 
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the counter-reaction will not be dissected. Suffice it to say, pro tem., that child- 
centred philosophy now has its antithesis embodied in the National Curriculum, 
SATs examinations and league tables. However, the critique by university-based 
philosophers of education is exemplary of the syncretic repair work engendered by 
the unleashing of a constraining contradiction undertaken by Peters (1958,1963, 
1964,1967,1969), Hirst (1970,1974) and Dearden (1968,1969,1975,1976) 
during the 1960s and 1970s. The salient point here is that the latter are constrained 
to deal with child-centred philosophy in order to advance their defence of, inter 
alia, a subject-based curriculum, not because they wish to juxtapose what they 
believe to be an irrefutable critique, but because in the very process of providing 
their critique they ineluctably invoke child-centred philosophy, which 
simultaneously threatens to undermine it. Darling (1994) has nicely documented 
the various illogical ruses developed by Peters et al. However, each author could 
not function without the metaphysical claims vis-A-vis children. Indeed, Peters 
(logically) could not escape enmeshment in child-centred philosophy: 'It was 
understandable about forty years ago that reformers should proclaim that 
"education is growth" or that children should be encouraged to learn from 
experience; for there ivas a great deal wrong, both morally and psychologically' 
(1969: 1, emphasis added). 
We should thus not be at all surprised that Peters and his colleagues 
swiftly proceed to relegate this acknowledged importance to the historical dustbin - 
a mere fad that has since been supplanted. The logic of the constraining 
contradiction enjoins that proponents of anti-child-centred thinking must not invoke 
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its hostile ideational environment in its entirety yet cannot avoid invoking some 
aspects of it - hence the acknowledgement of the psychological and moral merits of 
child-centred philosophy and its simultaneous relegation to that of historical fad. 
Logically, of course, the indubitable importance of the psychological aspects of 
child development cannot be acknowledged and simultaneously dismissed as 
something of mere historical interest. Any test or public examination, for exalliple, 
presupposes the very cognitive basis on which people learn. 
The 'trouble-shooting' head, during a tape-recorded interview, maintained 
that there 'doesn't have to be' a contradiction between child-centred learning and 
the secreted reductionist philosophy of SATs. On five separate occasions the head 
postponed the tape-recorded interview, despite a firm promise well before the first 
date was arranged. The head was defensive and reluctant to address many of the 
issues on which I wanted to focus during the interview. I tried almost in vain to 
return to the contradiction, eventually being dealt what she considered a resounding 
blow that would complete that part of the interview. Her 'blow' consisted of an 
attempted A (SATs) <- B (child-centred learning) syncretic manoeuvre: she 
asserted quite simply that 'You need to redefine what you mean by child-centred 
learning [ ... ]' (emphasis added). Regrettably this was said near the end of the 50- 
minute interview and consequently I was unable to pursue the matter any further. 
Nevertheless, it was when she was forced to recognise the necessary contradiction 
that she was conditioned to engage in corrective repair. That there is a necessary 
contradiction is due to the inescapable fact that examinations presuppose the 
cognitive nature of their subjects, in this case children. Yet the technicist-cum- 
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managerialist underpinning of SATs denies this necessary presupposition yet 
cannot operate without it. 31 Hence the emphasis upon its secreted reductionism, 
because implicitly it cannot avoid making assumptions about the cognitive 
processes by which children are able to undertake such examinations (and do so 
successfully), yet wants to eschew any discussion about child cognition. Indeed, 
the later systernatisation of child-centred philosophy was precisely to unmask this 
implicit presupposition and ultimately to negate it. As already discussed, such 
negation provided the hostile ideational environment for Peters et al. However, if 
SATs had been explicitly grounded in anti-child-centred propositions about the 
cognitive development of children, then we would be dealing with a competitive 
contradiction between the avowed philosophical underpinning of the tests and 
child-centred assessment approaches. This is not made clear by the interview 
excerpt with the head. In fact, what should have been made clear to the head 
31 It might be reasonably countered that the head is not responding to the determinate effects of a 
constraining contradiction even though she engages in corrective repair since the philosophy of the SATs 
simply implies a (competitive) contradiction between child-centred approaches and their antitheses. 
Certainly the antithesis of child-centred approaches acknowledges that they cannot avoid the cognitive 
processes by which children learn; yet even here they often deny such processes. However, the recently re- 
enacted quasi-payment-by-results system of examining evades its cognitive import. The implicit 
philosophical position is left for others to tease out. The reason why the head engaged in such corrective 
repair work stems from her avowed acceptance of managerialist approaches to primary education, as will 
be discussed in Part Three of the thesis. Julie Fisher rightly points out that 'It is a lack of understanding of 
young children's learning processes and the impact these have on their educational development which 
characterises current policy decisions' (1996: 39). However, two pages later she maintains that: 
While I do believe that there are serious tensions between the National Curriculum and a 
developmentally appropriate early years curriculum... I also believe that there are ways of looking 
at the apparent dichotomies which may make the application of one not wholly incompatible with 
the constraints of the other. I believe that the answer to the tension lies within a better definition 
of the major stages of curriculum planning (1996: 41). 
Here, the morphogenetic approach would maintain that (a) systemic contradictions and complementarities 
exist independently of knowing subjects and (b) focus on what cultural actors make of them. In this 
instance, Fisher is trying to live with the objective contradiction between the National Curriculum and 
child-centred philosophy and practice. She is attempting to reconcile the irreconcilable and this attests to 
the fact that at the S-C level actors do not operate in Rational, Mr Spock-like fashion. 
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during interview is that SATs disclaims the very basis on which they make sense 
i. e. denying the tenability of offering any substantive propositions about the 
cognitive processes by which children learn. SATs are the product of the New 
Managerialism, whereby the means are separated from the ends. To reiterate, the 
philosophy of SATs attempts to deny the 'means' of its approach yet necessarily 
cannot avoid it. 
32 
In both schools, the majority of staff was aware of the contradiction 
between the child-centred philosophy that underpinned their daily work (any 
theory/practice inconsistency is not at issue here) and the thrust of the secreted 
SATs philosophy. SATs philosophy, inter alia, is part and parcel of the 
'perfonnance indicator' disease that since the mid-1980s has infected almost every 
I 
nook and cranny of the public sector. The problem with SATs is its reductionism, 
by-passing the cognitive processes by which children learn and develop. Thus, to 
Cutler and Waine, 'The intangible character of outcomes means that measures are 
always dependent upon constructs, which attempt to generate proxies or substitutes 
for the outcome. The central difficulty, therefore, lies in the fact that the proxy can 
be criticised for failing to capture the character of the outcome' (1994: 35). As they 
32 In fact, Butterfield (1995: 200) notes that the initial evaluation of SATs and teacher assessment was later 
sabotaged by managerial considerations; that is, classroom convenience has been of greater importance 
than considerations of validity of results, etc. Indeed, Clegg and Billington note that it is the basis of the 
prevalent school management studies to consider 
means rather than ends: hence the emphasis upon the senior management team and staffing 
structures, school development planning, action planning and the constant need to be able to 
demonstrate and illustrate the apparent efficiency of the organization... As we have said, 
accountability has been reduced to a crude set of limited figures which relate only to those 
aspects... amenable to measurement, and the corollary of this has meant that if it cannot be 
measured it is not important (1997: 17). 
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rightly point out, how do we measure whether 'quality of life' has been improved 
and if knowledge has been developed, how do we determine whether we are 
adjusting to the goals of school pupils and discover whether our curriculum is 
appropriate? As Ball (1990) argues, the parameters of OFSTED (whose essential 
remit is to assess the 'effectiveýess' of schools in improving SATs scores) operate 
judgementally within the input-output logic of the commodity form and displace 
and exclude other criteria of judgement. For these teachers, the Government 
imposition of the National Curriculum and yearly SATs constitutes a stringent 
obstruction to what they hold primary teaching to be about. Certainly, they accept 
the need for a structured framework, but one within which child-centred philosophy 
can be enacted, not stultified, subject of course to the contextual limits provided by 
the number of children and limited resources. Yet for the deputy head in the 
second school, the National Curriculum and SATs, despite some minor limitations, 
were welcomed. This underscores the fact that socio-cultural properties are not 
constraining or enabling in abstract isolation. Whether they are constraining 
depends on their incongruence with the aspirations and wishes of the actors 
concerned. Thus, structural or cultural constraints are relational terms vis-a-vis 
actors. As Blenkin et al. succinctly put it, '(w)hat is a frustrating constraint for 
one teacher is a golden opportunity for another' (1997: 226). 
For most staff, then, the philosophical-practical implications of SATs 
constitutes a fundamentally unwelcome third-order emergent property, exacerbated 
by the systemically incongruent second-order emergent property between central 
government and the school (restructuring and overloading of teachers' roles via 
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imposition of the National Curriculum, per capita funding arrangements, League 
Tables, etc. ). If we want to theorise about how different teachers deal with 
objective (un)activated cultural systemic properties, then we have to adhere to a 
working distinction between the causal and the logical. If the 'trouble-shooting' 
head in the first school had confronted a staff meeting in which a member of the 
Senior Management Team pushed for a more child-centred approach in developing 
the School's OFSTED-imposed Action Plan, then without the acknowledgement of 
autonomous logical relations impinging upon agency, we would forfeit an 
explanatory account of the subsequent use of power to deflect such an initiative. 
The situational logic of a 'competitive contradiction' 
In direct contrast to the 'constraining contradiction', the invocation of A does not 
invoke some B and is therefore not a matter of Systemic constraint. The existence 
of opposing groups or individuals championing different ideas is an essential 
precondition of a competitive contradiction. Its accentuation is an S-C affair and 
basically its logic is one that predisposes elimination as opposed to the syncretic 
correction enjoined by the constraining contradiction. As Archer puts it, '(b)ecause 
partisans of A and B are unconstrained by any dependence between these items, 
there is nothing which restrains their combativeness for they have everything to 
gain from inflicting maximum damage on one another's ideas in the course of 
competition' (1988: 240). Exemplars of competitive contradictions are, of course, 
ideologies and their use in concealing vested sectional interests. 
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The recent literature on the changing nature of personnel management is 
an interesting example of the way in which ideational contradiction has resulted in 
a structurally conditioned stalemate, currently embodied in that ideational m6lange 
called 'human resource management'. As Legge has rightly argued, '(b)oth the 
activity and personnel specialists are driven by contradictions that promote 
ambiguity of action. The chief contradictions are those embedded in capitalism' 
(1995: 10). The role of personnel manager exemplifies the situational logic of 
concession generated by the existence of the structural (necessary) incompatibility; 
in this case, the generic incompatibility (or contradiction) between the forces and 
relations of production. Historically, in providing a legitimatory gloss on their role, 
personnel managers have invoked 'collectivist' ideas, reflecting their 'caring' or 
paternalist approach. They were endowed with the capacity to override the 
sectional interests of individual employers. This structured capacity derived from 
the successive legislative enactments prior to the Second World War that were 
designed to protect employees. Of course, the issue is not one of benign protection 
but rather one of mediating the inherent contradiction of capitalism, ensuring 
unimpeded extraction of surplus value by obscuring the commodity status of 
labour. The ideas used to buttress and legitimate the role of these 'caring' 
mediators whilst contradicting individualist market ideas did not depend upon the 
latter for their agential invocation, in contrast to the constraining contradiction. In 
other words, collectivist ideas do not automatically summon up individualist ones, 
which in turn unavoidably threaten to engulf them. 
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Structurally, those within organisations who abhorred the paternalism of 
personnel managers were unable to banish them. Contracts had to be negotiated (or 
4seen' to be negotiated thereby ensuring a role for the personnel manager, however 
attenuated or inflated). Personnel managers had structured vested interests in 
supporting trade-union de jure rights and obligations at the same time remaining 
committed to the goals and aims of capitalist organisations. Thus, '(a)ny mediatory 
role, as with the proverbial Janus, runs the risk of giving an impression of two- 
facedness, with attendant loss of credibility' (p. 19). But prior to the inauguration 
of the Thatcher years, one side of the face could be accentuated at the expense of 
the other since, structurally, the conditions were especially conducive - relative full 
employment being one of the obvious key factors. However, the Thatcher years of 
recession - of the 'enterprise culture' - and the substantial truncation of 
employment legislation have combined to force personnel managers to show the 
other cheek, so to speak. In fact, both cheeks are often shown, leading 
commentators (Legge 1989,1995; Blyton and Turnbull 1992) to underscore its 
contradictory nature, as reflected in the generic inconsistency between so-called 
'hard' and 'soft' versions of human resource management. 
Here, the contradictory items cannot be eliminated because otherwise, as 
Guest has noted, personnel managers would effectively render themselves 
redundant. As he puts it, 'if HRM is to be taken seriously, personnel managers 
must give it away' (1987: 51) since it contradicts the latter's traditional collectivist 
underpinning. It is precisely because they cannot be eliminated, due to the extant 
structural context that gives the 'upper hand' to senior management, that the 
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(logically) inconsistent approach of 'human resource management' has been 
constructed. Critics such as Legge (1995) and Blyton and Morris (1992) remain 
sceptical about HRM's survival given its mutually inconsistent premises (which 
centre round the three related issues of individualism versus co-operation; 
commitment versus flexibility; and a 'strong culture' versus adaptability). 
However, at the S-C level the contradictory m6lange of HRM sticks at present 
because other actors (viz. middle managers), whilst structurally predisposed 
towards elimination, currently need to buttress their own precarious positions and 
thus join in the unholy alliance in maintaining the essential rhetoric of HRM. 
Finally, any package that is bundled together for purposes of structural 
change (or ex post facto ideological legitimation) does not perforce entail logical 
coherence. Grace notes that '(t)he New Right populist project appropriated very 
effectively and very skilfully the rhetoric of democratic accountability in schooling 
and sought to integrate this with the discipline of market accountability - despite 
the many contradictions which residtfrom this conjunction' (1995: 25, emphasis 
added). The issue then becomes one of who recognises the contradiction (that is, 
the extent of cultural discursive penetration) and what they subsequently do (or can 
do) about it. Democratic accountability does not presuppose market accountability 
in order for it to work qua corpus of propositions and thus we are dealing (at the CS 
level) with two contradictory items, which, when perceived by actors, may be 
accorded social salience by opposing groups in order to advance their divergent 
interests (at the S-C level). As and when opposing groups accentuate such systemic 
contradiction, the situational logic of the competitive contradiction comes into play, 
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i. e. elimination. Indeed, one of the containment strategies attempted by the Tory 
government during competition (between 'traditionalist' and 'progressive' teaching 
methods) was dismissal-by-devaluation, as Archer puts it. Yet the latter are not 
internally homogeneous: at the CS level progressive theories are not tightly woven 
logical complementarities (simply compare Piaget and Vygotsky). However, the S- 
C import of such heterogeneity will be addressed in Part Two. 
Culture and managerialism 
Clegg and Billington write that managerialism has some claims on being aware of 
the importance of the nature of 'organisational culture': 
As the proponents of managerialism are confronted by the limitations of their 
incantations they seek new avenues to explore. Culture is seen as such a new 
avenue. Organizational culture is, ironically, a feature of organizations that may 
have been instrumental in exposing the limitations of managerialism. The story 
could be told about how the theories of managerialism were entirely correct, but 
the culture of the organization prevented the ideas from taking hold: in effect 
people were not ready for the initiatives... The Chief Inspector's frustration 
about the apparent unwillingness of teachers to engage in a debate about 
teaching strategies was attributed to the particular culture of the primary school 
(Woodhead 1995). What we are again presented with is the desire to manipulate 
the culture to achieve particular ends and, for some, these ends would not be 
desirable (1997: 36-7). 
Where they write that culture has been instrumental in exposing the limitations of 
managerialism, they are talking about the existence of CS items that generally have 
informed practices in primary (and other) schools and which contradict 
managerialist propositions. Parts Two and Three of the thesis will explore the 
genesis and impact of the New Managerialism and how two sets of primary school 
staff mediate it. Precisely how they mediate is necessarily complex and requires 
recourse to anterior socio-cultural conditioning (Part Two). It is not specific items 
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of the Cultural System alone that frustrate Chris Woodhead, but rather the Socio- 
Cultural (S-C) use of CS properties in circumventing the imposition of 
contradictory CS items and concomitant structural arrangements. The manipulation 
of culture is better theorised about in terms of attempts at the S-C level (involving 
use of structural power) to impose structural change via CS properties that 
themselves possess dynamics with which agency is conditioned to deal (i. e. 
objective contradictions and the situational logics they entail). The usefulness of 
the CS/S-C distinction is indicated by its ability to pinpoint objective contradictions 
and/or complementarities that may remain unnoticed or noticed but unexploited 
because of factors residing in the structural realm. Even here, such structural 
factors may be unperceived or partially understood and the task of the 
morphogenetic researcher is to identify reasons, where possible, for partial 
discursive penetration (of either or both realms). Namely, how the properties and 
dynamics of structure and culture mesh with the irreducible reflective powers of 
agency. 
Again, such objective socio-cultural properties are not readily transparent 
to actors. In some, especially post-modernist, quarters, the morphogenetic 
approach's identification of objective emergent cultural properties and the logical 
relations among them independently of human agency would be deemed untenable 
in its putative 'privileging' of the researcher over the subject(s) whom s/he is 
studying. Yet such 'privileging' is part and parcel of the nature of critical social 
analysis. To return to the earlier example of the precarious economic position of 
black workers, it may be that in times of recession, race ideologies are not causally 
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influential. If critical sociology cannot make claims as to this objective state of 
affairs independently of such workers' beliefs or theories, then its status as critical 
interrogator is erased at a stroke. There is a difference between objectivity per se 
and ourfallible claims to know it. Furthermore, epistemic fallibility does not mean 
that all truth-claims are ever subject to falsification (see Norris 1995). Grace writes 
that 
There will be major dilemmas for those headteachers whose conceptions of 
educational leadership have involved giving priority to moral and spiritual 
values or to professional, cultural and human values. Faced with the calculus of 
market imperatives in contemporary English schooling such values may be 
easily marginalised. On the other hand, some headteachers will see no necessary 
opposition between these values and the new trading conditions for schools 
(1995: 43). 
Yet objectively there is a contradiction between the values of the market and the 
professional values of primary school teaching. That specific heads may not 
perceive it is an S-C affair, i. e. primarily a psychological one, and is independent of 
the CS. Conceivably, it may be that certain heads, supportive of the new 
managerialism in education, are aware of the contradiction but would deny its 
existence or salience because of the S-C counter-reaction that would emanate from 
staff. 
Yet what is 'managerialism'? In fact, we have not been told about the 
more precise constituent propositions of 'child-centred philosophy'. The nature 
and genesis of child-centred philosophy will be addressed in Part Two. Equally, 
the genesis of the so-called new managerialism will be addressed. However, it is 
worth pausing briefly to focus on managerialism for the simple reason that uses of 
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it tend to conflate the CS/S-C distinction. In some ways, this is unavoidable since 
much social scientific (and everyday) discourse uses portmanteau concepts (like the 
generic term social structure) as a convenient form of shorthand. Indeed, as with 
the catch-all 'child-centred philosophy' there is a world (in the Popperian sense) of 
difference between the corpus of ideas that constitute managerialism and how they 
are used, modified or unexploited in practice. That is to say, we must stick to the 
CSIS-C distinction in theorising about the impact of managerialism on education. 
Put another way, we need to distinguish analytically between structural emergent 
properties, cultural emergent properties and agential practices: the former are 
temporally prior to the practices that embody them and any subsequent change 
constitutes a new conditioning context that post-dates such practices. 
Everyday talk of management tends to conjure up the image of suited 
wo/men in plush offices earning above-average salaries, making high-level 
decisions and possessing near-untrammelled power over their subordinates. 
Alternatively, talk of the management is taken to be synonymous with bosses in 
general. Consequently, any reference to ideas, their material grounding and their 
use in power play is played down or unexplored. However, more sociologically 
minded approaches to management theorise about the explicit (or secreted) 
propositions that underlie managers' practices and their structurally conditioned 
attempts to impose and/or enforce them. Exworthy and Halford (1999) note that 
traditionally, the public sector has been characterised by Taylorist management, i. e. 
bureaucratic, inflexible and mainly concerned with control and cost cutting. By 
contrast, 
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The new managerialism emphasized innovation, creativity and empowerment. 
The new managers are policy 'entrepreneurs', highly motivated, resourceful, and 
able to shift the frame of reference beyond the established norms and 
procedures. In addition, the new managers enable staff to make their own 
contributions and, in doing so, to generate greater identification with, and 
commitment to, the corporate success of the organization (1999: 6). 
Drawing upon Pollitt (1990), Flynn argues that the new managerialism embodies a 
number of different assumptions and values, which are assumed to be 
unproblematic and include '... the idea of progress through greater economic 
productivity, technological innovation, worker compliance and managers' freedom 
to manage. It is a diffuse ideology which privileges commercial models of 
organization and management practice and insists that these can (and must) be 
transplanted to public sector services' (1999: 27). The idea of progress through 
worker compliance, technological innovation and so on is ontologically distinct 
from its ideological nature, however, which is an S-C affair, since qua CS denizens, 
such ideas remain simply ideas, until activated by actors in pursuit of their sectional 
interests. Flynn rightly differentiates managerialism qua assumptions and values 
from managerialism qua practice. Indeed, following procedures, establishing 
commitment and worker compliance are S-C phenomena. Morphogenetic analysis 
is interested in the propositional use of managerialist ideas that underpin public 
sector restructuring and/or ex post facto legitimation of structural change. This is 
because we can then identify the conditions that maintain for change or stability 
and the situational logics into which actors become embroiled. However, it is not 
being suggested that the efficacy of managerialist ideas is dependent upon their 
propositional manifestation. The changes brought about the 'trouble-shooting' 
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head in Southside were underpinned by managerialist ideas, yet such ideas were 
never publicly defended qua propositions. This does not vitiate the analytical bite 
of the morphogenetic approach. Instead, it begs the analytical question of why 
actors did not request (propositional) defence or clarification of the changes enacted 
by the head, in turn focusing attention on the structural realm and the extent of 
agential discursive penetration. 
Equally, Ball (1994) distinguishes between management as theory and 
management as practice. Furthermore, he argues that it is not a unitary whole. 
There are at least two, perhaps three, discourses of management in play here 
within the reform process in the UK. They have different effects. One is what 
might be called 'professional management'. This is articulated around a 
development planning perspective and relates particularly to the production of 
school management plans... it is a 'clean' (context-free) management insofar as 
it treats the school in isolation and concentrates upon the business of education 
rather than education as business... It divorces management practices from 
values and from politics... It is technically oriented, rational and apolitical... 
The second discourse I would term 'financial management'. It begins from a 
concern with balancing the books, with maximizing the budget, and with doing 
educationally what can be afforded. This is for many practitioners the 
unacceptable face of management... There is a close relationship between the 
discourse of financial management and the third discourse, which I call 
gentrepreneurial management'. Here the market is to the fore; image, hype and 
PR, and competition, diversification and income generation are prominent in the 
managers' lexicon (1994: 67-8). 
At the S-C level, Ball points out that these discourse are not mutually exclusive. At 
the CS level, however, '(t)here are contradictions... between versions 1 and 2, and 
in ethos and method between versions 1 and 3' (ibid: 69). What is of interest here is 
whether (a) heads use a m6lange of contradictory CS items, and, if they do, (b) 
whether other actors perceive the contradiction and consequently amplify it. Even 
at the classroom level, it is widely recognised that teachers proffer inconsistent 
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premises for their behaviour, and even when consistency characterises their 
approach, their actual practice belies it. However, Ball maintains that schools differ 
in terms of the extent to which any of these discourses become 'dominant and 
pervasive. The possibilities here are very much related to a school's history and 
market position' (ibid: 71). Whilst discourses may be dominant, one must 
remember that because people uphold specific CS items at the expense of others 
(crudely, child-centred versus traditional), other S-C factors may preclude their 
practical realisation. Ball's point about the efficacy of S-C action in upholding CS 
items and concomitant practices against S-C encroachment or domination being 
related to the school's history and market position is an important factor vis-a-vis 
my two case-study schools, as will be discussed. 
Concluding remarks 
The purpose of this chapter has been to argue that cultural analysis would benefit 
from a focus on that sub-set of cultural items to which the law of non-contradiction 
can be applied, thereby paralleling Lockwood's seminal distinction between 'the 
parts' and 'the people' (between social and system integration). Thus this chapter 
has been explicit in its rejection of current portmanteau conceptions of culture, 
which at best conflate the logical and the causal (CSIS-C), encompassing a 
disparate collection of organisational phenomena. However, not only has it been 
argued that culture be rid of its catch-all status, it has been further argued that the 
Cultural System has emergent relational properties (of logical contradiction or 
complementarity) that causally condition specific courses of action for those who 
uphold its item(s). Such an approach is grounded in a stratified ontology, which in 
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turn enables identification of the causal mechanisms and processes involved. The 
methodological means for this is analytical dualism, which is workable because of 
the siti generis nature of culture (like structure) whose mode of being is temporally 
prior to agential activity, whilst any modification post-dates such activity. Whilst 
there is nothing intrinsically wrong with portmanteau terminology, it must be 
remembered that such terms unhelpfully compact distinct strata. 
Cultural dynamics are theorised about on the same sequential basis as 
structure, i. e. Cultural Conditioning 4 Socio-Cultural Interaction 4 Cultural 
Elaboration. Cultural morphogenesis may get underway without paralleling 
structural morphogenesis. Whilst each penetrates the other, each is nonetheless 
ontologically distinct, possessing sid generis properties and powers. Thus, 
modifications of child-centred philosophy (cultural morphogenesis) did not parallel 
structural morphogenesis (restructing of state educational system to accommodate 
new practices and methods). Finally, however, such cultural morphogenesis leads 
to the reshaping of agency in the process (the 'double morphogenesis', as discussed 
in Chapter One). Very briefly, the development and systernatisation of child- 
centred philosophy led to re-grouping and the establishernnt of new groups (Froebel 
Institute, for example). The morphogenetic umbrella will now be opened to capture 
the interplay of structure, culture and agency at their sequential intersection in the 
following chapters. 
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Part Two: Child-Centred Philosophy, New 
Managerialism and the English Education System: A 
Morphogenetic Account 
3 Socio-Cultural Conditioning: Plowden, the Philosophers and 
Teacher Training 
Introduction 
Archer's elaborated morphogenetic sequence finished in 1975. Her Social Origins 
of Educational Systems was published four years later and concluded thus: 
... in England when the 1944 Act signalled an unprecedented degree of 
unification and systematization, this did not imply supremacy for the process of 
political manipulation. On the contrary the post-war period was one of the 
richest for internal initiation, with the teachers gaining mastery over curricular 
development... Certainly it is true that... their respective centres [England and 
France] would like to gain more control, particularly over higher education at 
the moment... What is much more important to emphasize is that they cannot 
achieve such control at will: the acquired rights of the profession and of external 
interest groups are defended and retained. Furthermore, we must resist the 
temptation to endow the most recent events with a greater significance than their 
predecessors. It is certainly the case in England at the present tinie that the 
centre seenis poised to intervene inore roughly at both secondary and higher 
levels, but this is better interpreted as one of the periodic re-orderings 
conducted by the central authorities than as a drainatic change in the nature of 
educational control (1979: 787-788, emphasis added) 
The task of the following three chapters is to explain and delineate how, just over a 
decade later, England and Wales witnessed not simply a 'periodic re-ordering' but a 
complete reversal of curricular fortunes, embodied in the imposition of the 1988 
Education Act (and subsequent modifications). The 1988 Reform Act constitutes 
the start of a new morphogenetic sequence that provides the contextual backdrop to 
my two case-study schools. The 1988 Act endowed the Secretary of State with 
over three hundred new powers, prescribed what was to be taught and enjoined 
examinations at the ages of 7,11,14 and 16. In fact, notwithstanding its inherent 
contradictions, the Act was designed to subject the education system to the logic of 
'the market', that is, through open enrolment, local management of schools (LMS) 
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and pupil-based funding formulae. The centrally imposed national curriculum and 
its associated testing requirements were thus part of the quasi-marketisation of the 
education system - to provide parents with published information (league tables) on 
which to make 'informed' decisions about the 'efficiency' of schools. 
However, the 'battle ground of ideas' (Riley 1998) that was part and 
parcel of the lead up to the Act not only involved 'Right versus Left' socio-cultural 
machinations but also embodied the (equally) crude polarisation between child- 
centred philosophy (or progressivism) and traditional teaching methods. As Riley 
Puts it: 
The battle for ideas was played out at many levels: in the Black Papers and the 
many articles and books which challenged, or supported that analysis; in the 
'Think Tanks' and Policy Forums... It was played out in the classrooms of 
William Tyndale Junior School, Islington and in the rooms of London County 
Hall... ' (1998: 19). 
The above quotation neatly heads in the direction of a morphogenetic account, 
specifically the adoption of the CS/S-C distinction (that is, between knowledge 
without and with a knowing subject). In other words, Riley distinguishes between 
the CS (articles, books, 'Think Tank' pamphlets ... ) and what people do with them 
at the S-C level: such CS properties may remain unexploited, even unnoticed for 
extended periods of time and only 'awoken' during specific structurally 
conditioned struggles. Equally, of course, even when animated by actors, such ideas 
may not move them to act for various reasons. However, Riley helpfully 
accentuates the need for a stratified analysis, since the school is irreducible to the 
educational system of which it is a constituent part, which itself is irreducible to the 
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polity. At the same time, ideas about how children learn, their nature and their 
needs and the contingent relationship between them and other ideas are irreducible 
not only to each other but also to the school, educational system and polity. 
Whilst the focus of this thesis is on the agential mediation of the 
contradiction between child-centred (or progressive) philosophy and managerialist 
philosophy, as structurally embodied in SATs and League Tables, a detailed 
account of the morphogenesis of managerialism qua corpus of propositions will not 
be provided. This is because, substantively, I am more interested in the nature of 
child-centred philosophy and the socio-cultural factors that prevented, attenuated or 
smoothly facilitated its practical implementation. Equally, of course, any 
ethnographic study has to set realistic limits on what can be delineated and 
critically evaluated. This is not to say that the propositional nature of (the new) 
managerialism will not be laid bare. Instead, more detailed discussion will be 
delayed until Chapters 4 and 5. However, before entering the Plowden Era, a brief 
sketch of child-centred and concurrent managerialist ideas will be provided as well 
as a defence of the autonomy of the education system itself. A defence is made 
because of the resurgence of interest in a Marxist educational sociology, which 
disavows the morphogenetic analysis undertaken in this thesis. 
The Revised Code of 1862 and payment by results... deja vu 
The system of payment by results was introduced in 1862. It consisted of a 
payment to inspected elementary schools for each child, one-third of which was for 
attendance; the remainder was a payment that was reduced by one-third in each of 
130 
the three areas of reading, writing and arithmetic if the child failed to satisfy the 
inspector. The children had to be presented for an examination in set 'standards', 
and the regulations also provided for further grant reductions if the buildings were 
inadequate, or if there were insufficient pupil teachers (Silver 1994: 32). At the 
same time - and in a manner wholly congruent with OFSTED philosophy - each 
school's religious and moral tone was to be taken into account by the inspectors. 
Silver quotes Fitch, who wrote in 1901 that payment by results is 'a business-like 
and sensible plan for apportioning the public grant among school managers, and... 
a satisfactory assurance to the taxpayer that he was receiving a good educational 
equivalent for his outlay' (ibid. ). This quotation could readily have been taken 
from comments made during the past decade. Indeed, as with the Education 
Reform Act, there was strong opposition, which proved equally ineffectual, to the 
system of inspection. Matthew Arnold, one of the inspectors, rejected the payment- 
by-results system on the grounds that it would result in a mechanistic preparation of 
children for examination. 
The crucial question is whether such mechanistic preparation was an 
unintended consequence or a necessary constituent of the philosophy underpinning 
the payment-by-results system. In fact, the mechanistic ways in which children 
were taught as a result of the payment-by-results system were inextricably 
underpinned by managerialism. As Fitch makes quite clear, the focus was on 
examination results, which were held to be attainable independently of any 
reference to, or consideration of, children. The impetus was on what should be 
achieved in relation to a specific amount of cash spent; as if a cash-value could be 
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readily placed on a child's achievement of a specified number of examination 
passes. The payment-by-results system thus predates Ball's argument about the 
commodification of education brought about by the 1988 Education Act, since here 
the system likewise excluded the human element; namely that children were part of 
the examination process. The fact that a retired Inspector of Schools for the 
London County Council, G. A. Christian, wrote in 1922 of the reactionary 
influence of the 1862 Revised Code, which resulted in 'at best a pernicious 
influence on education', is attributable to the technicist or technocratic philosophy 
of the Revised Code. A recent former Head of the Education and Equal 
Opportunities Department at the National Union of Teachers (N-LJT), Professor 
Michael Barber, maintains that a technocratic approach to the school curriculum 
involves a narrow view of learning. Vis-a-vis the technocratic nature of the pre- 
Dearing national curriculum, Barber writes that 
There are many recent examples of technocratic influence on the curriculum. 
The GCSE [General Certificate of Secondary Education] general and subject 
criteria are strongly influenced by this approach. However, the best example is 
the pre-Dearing National Curriculum which set down in great detail, through 
Programmes of Study, Attainment Targets and Statements of Attainment, what 
both the content and proposed outcomes of the curriculum at every level should 
be. The most enduring image of the pre-Dearing National Curriculum -a 
primary teacher ticking boxes - is a testament to technocracy gone wild... It 
seenis likely that, as long as we have a national curriculum, an element of the 
technocratic approach will be with its. It has, however, been subjected to sonle 
important criticisins. One is that it purports to be value-free. In other words, it 
is an approach to planning a curricultan, but it assunies agreement about the 
goals of the curriculum (1996: 13, emphasis added). 
Firstly, it is a non sequitur to assume that an element of the technocratic approach 
is an ineluctable accompaniment of any (national) curriculum. Indeed, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 5, the initial Task Group on Assessment and Testing's 
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(TGAT) proposals submitted to the Secretary of State for Education were designed 
specifically to avoid any narrow technicist approach to the curriculum. Secondly, 
and more importantly, the 1988 Act, as with the Revised Code of 1862, did not 
purport to be value-free: it was value-free in that, inter alia, values about children, 
more specifically about the 'good life', could not be entertained because of its 
managerialist underpinning. The criteria of managerialism are palpable in the 
Revised Code: efficiency, productivity and cost-effectiveness ('value for money' in 
OFSTED terminology). Inglis encapsulates managerialist philosophy thus: 
Technicism is what vindicates (or legitimates) management theory and practice. 
For the technicist, poesis - which, very roughly, we may translate from Aristotle 
as 'creation' - and praxis, which no less roughly means purposive action - are 
not distinguishable. All making is instrumental; action for the technicist can 
only be described in relation to a product, or more broadly, to bringing about a 
state of affairs (readily conceptualised, most particularly by managers, as a 
product). By these talismans, making has no 'character' of its own; it becomes a 
series of techniques. Aristotle's tekne, which licence might allow us to translate 
as 'the skilful use of craft', is for the technicist absolutely and easily describable 
without reference to persons... The notion of a good life, lived in a livelihood, is 
expelled along with responsibility. Livelihood is replaced by job definition, 
responsibility and accountability. Responsibility and accountability are in turn 
stripped of their ethical and democratic associations, and turned into functions of 
state surveillance (1989: 44-45). 
We will return to the theme of accountability in the next two chapters. As we have 
seen in Chapter 2, current commentators talk about the 'new managerialism' in 
respect of public sector restructuring the 1980s and 1990s. What needs to be 
emphasised here is that the technicist core remains firmly in place; the 'newness' of 
current managerialist approaches stems from its additional accentuation of 
6entrepreneurship', the 'right to manage' and the maximisation of group 
commitment to 'total quality'. Also in Chapter 2 Ball distinguished between the 
133 
business of education (essentially an intra-school affair) and education as business. 
The latter is technicist in orientation and underpins the SATs-cum-League-Table 
philosophy. Clearly, the payment-by-results system is managerialist in Ball's latter 
sense of education as business. A chilling precursor of the effects of the National 
Curriculum and testing arrangements is reflected in Silver's reference to an 
interview with a teacher conducted by the Cross Commission in 1887 on the 
working of the elementary education Acts. The teacher commented that the 
payment-by-results system had 'a very harassing effect upon the teachers' and that 
the teaching of children was 'very much pleasanter' prior to the Code. At the same 
time, the Code encouraged such fraudulent activities as fixing attendance figures. 
Contemporaneously, rumours of SATs cheating in my case-study area abounded in 
1997 and, indeed, were to be found throughout England and Wales. The 'trouble- 
shooting' head in my first school was especially keen to develop a variety of 
figures, ranging from truancy and graffiti levels to the number of parents who 
attended Parents' Evenings. 
Many critical commentators (e. g. Angus 1993) have noted the essentially 
positivist nature of OFSTED methodology. Positivism, in tandem with technicism, 
adopts the fact/value dualism. As I have argued (Willmott 1999c), the fact that it is 
impossible to measure whether quality of life has improved within the school 
context is not an unwitting omission on the part of OFSTED and its ideological 
feeder, the School Effectiveness Division. Such issues are consistently played 
down by OFSTED (despite nebulous reference to pupils' spiritual development and 
school ethos). Indeed, the achievement of 'procedural objectivity' (Eisner 1991) 
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underpins the OFSTED framework and Handbook and is designed to eliminate the 
scope for personal judgement. In short, why-questions are consistently eschewed. 
It is sadly ironic yet ineluctable that the inspections enjoined by the 1862 Code also 
paid lip-service to issues of spirituality and morality. 
Without wishing to dwell much further on the nature of managerialism, it 
is worth introducing one of its well-known progenitors, Frederick W. Taylor. For it 
was noted in Chapter 2 that traditionally the pubic sector has been characterised by 
Taylorist management. Taylor was the founder of 'scientific management'. He is 
well known for his book Principles of Scientific Management (1911). He began his 
working life as an apprentice and proceeded to become chief engineer of a large 
steel company. He was a member and later president of the American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers. Taylor assumed a priori that people are intrinsically lazy 
and will thus attempt to get away with doing the minimum amount of work. Taylor 
was opposed to any form of group activity, maintaining that group involvement 
resulted in a decline in productivity. The reasoning behind this stemmed from his 
belief that self-interest was an over-riding human characteristic. For Taylor, work 
tasks should be well planned in advance and that the worker be given written 
instructions (pre-Dearing National Curriculum ... ). He operated bonus schemes 
(current furore about performance-related pay ... ). He was not in favour of trades 
unions, mainly because he believed that the principles of scientific management 
would considerably attenuate conflict between employees and management. 
Moreover, he advocated authoritarian methods of management. As Clegg and 
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Dunkerley note, Taylorism offered the most thorough de-humanisation of work 
ever seen under capitalism: 
... Taylor presents the individual in the same way as he would an item of 
machinery. The worker thereby is perceived as a means of production. In just 
the same way that management's task is to maximize output from capital 
equipment, under the principles of scientific management it is also part of the 
managerial task to maximize the output of the human component. Pursuing this 
analogy, in the same way that there is no psychological involvement with capital 
equipment, under the principles of scientific management, similarly there is none 
with human assets; as machines are fuelled by coal, gas or petrol, so humans are 
regarded as being fuelled by money... (1980: 96). 
Here we reach the quintessential flaw in the extant testing arrangements of the 
National Curriculum, since, as argued in Chapter 2, the examinations focus solely 
on the 'output', neglecting the 'input', that is, the children and their intrinsic 
cognitive capacities. The prescriptive content of the curriculum in its emphasis 
upon discrete subjects militates against the cognitive processes involved child 
development. Moreover, the imposition of competition via League Tables enjoins 
that children's different and distinctive cognitive capacities are ignored at a stroke, 
since the pressure to reach high scores ultimately means that any actual 
understanding (or lack of) be at best played down. However, this is to jump ahead. 
The salient point here is that the 1862 Code was underpinned by the same 
managerialist considerations that currently underpin the National Curriculum and 
testing arrangements, whereby children qua children are negated (yet 
transcendentally cannot be). The payment-by-results system, like the LMS and 
League Table structures, necessarily excludes reference to the human (child) 
element as part of their ideational underpinning: the rationale focuses on matters 
pecuniary, namely the (impossible) requirement that ever-improving results be 
136 
obtained at the cheapest possible cost. 33 Hence the contradiction between child- 
centred. philosophy (or, indeed, any nebulous reference to children per se) and the 
National Curriculum because of the Taylorist negation of the human and the 
concomitant reduction of learning to ostensibly valid measurable outcomes, which 
are the result of the drive for cost effectiveness and efficiencY. 
A critical commentary on Marxism and the sociology of education 
However, before addressing the so-called Plowden Era I want to discuss Dale's 
critical comment on Archer's discussion of the teaching profession in her Social 
Origins of Educational Systenis. The reason for this stems from its congruence 
with the recent 'mini-renaissance' of Marxist educational theory (particularly 
Rikowski 1996,1997), which disavows the morphogenetic analysis undertaken in 
this thesis. A defence of the autonomous properties of the education system is 
important since it raises issues about the ontology of autonomy that have 
implications beyond Marxism for a wide range of reductionist 'sociologies of 
knowledge' that have deeply flawed the sociology of education for so long. 
This section takes as given the continuing relevance of radical political 
economy. The explanatory utility of the distinction between use-value and 
33 Yet 'the cheapest possible cost' in reality means ever below the level that is required for minimal 
resource requirements for those schools that have greater need. In brief, Local Management of Schools is a 
centrally imposed means of enforcing schools - not all - to manage inadequate levels of funding. I say not 
all schools since when introduced more affluent schools, often based in equally affluent areas, had the 
advantage and subsequently were able to maintain their position. The nature of quasi-marketisation means 
that necessarily there will be winners and losers. Inexorably, this will increase the pressure on teachers in 
socially deprived areas to adopt more technicist ways of improving test scores. But because the system is 
competitive - that is, schools compete for a slice of the inadequately funded cake - the pressure is 
unremitting. The existence of League Tables will almost invariably direct resourceful parents to those at 
the top: in other words, we are dealing with a perpetual vicious circle. 
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exchange-value and of the concepts of capital accumulation, labour-power and 
uneven development is indubitable. This section has two modest aims. Firstly, to 
reaffirm the autonomy of the education system. Marxist educational sociology has 
tended to play down or expunge the irreducible autonomous properties of the 
education system. A typical (yet ambiguous) example delineated below is that of 
Dale, who tends towards an Althusserian 'detennination-in-the-last-instance' 
approach. Secondly, it takes issue with the recent adoption by Rikowski of the 
universal internal relations ontology of Bertell Ollman. The universal internal 
relations ontology asserts that all social relations form an internally related totality; 
it precludes the possibility (and reality) of external social relations. Any adequate 
Marxist sociology of education must eschew this path, since one of the 
consequences of this is to withdraw autonomy from the education system. The 
rejection of the universal internal relations ontology enjoins that we respect the 
autonomy of the education system and pay due attention to the open nature of any 
social system. In brief, we must not reduce concrete social reality to the 'Capital 
Relation'. 
Prior to Rikowski's incipient attempt to develop the rudimentary building 
blocks of 'labour-power theory', the primacy accorded to capitalist social relations 
(be it theoretically or practically) as subsuming the education system (and the state 
in general) is readily discernible in the Marxist literature. Thus, to Dale, for 
example: 
While very many social forces affect education in very important ways, the 
major motor of educational change in capitalist societies is the changing nature 
of the capitalist state. Thus, while I would, for instance, agree very largely with 
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Margaret Archer's (1979) view of the influence of the organized teaching 
profession on educational change since the war and especially over the last 20 
years, neither the profession's rise to the peak of its influence, nor its recent fall 
from that peak can be explained by examination of its composition, its policies, 
its leadership, its size, its level of expertise or anything else internal to it. All 
these factors are necessary to explain the fonn that the rise and fall took, but 
cannot explain why it took place. To do that, we have to examine the changing 
demands on the State in carrying out its basic functions... (1989: 45). 
Dale's criticism resonates well with Broadfoot's comment that Archer's 'elaborate 
model of educational systems might be criticised by neo-Marxists for its failure to 
address the characteristics of the over-arching capitalist order' (1996: 109). There is 
a tension here. For, on the one hand, Dale acknowledges the sui generis autonomy 
of the structure of the teaching profession (particularly its nature as corporate 
group), yet, on the other hand, wants to subsume this under the 'major motor of the 
capitalist state'. He accepts the reality of other (that is, non-capitalist) social factors 
that account for the nature of education system at any given point in time, but 
assumes a priori that capitalist factors are invariably more important. But the 
relative importance of non-capitalist factors is an a posteriori matter. In fact, one 
of Archer's key arguments was that at the beginning of the 1980s, 'the single most 
neglected question in the vast literature on education [prior to the 1980s] concerns 
the educational system itself... The defining characteristics of a state system are in 
it having both political and systenzic aspects' (cited in Broadfoot 1996: 102). The 
education system possesses emergent sid generis properties, of which the 
centralised or decentralised configuration conditions agential activity in distinctive 
ways. Whatever the functional needs of capital (perceived or otherwise), there is 
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no tabida rasa on to which economic or cultural needs can be readily imprinted, 
modified or expunged at will. 
Crucially, any state education system qua system possesses sui gelleris 
properties that are irreducible to the nature of the economic system (capitalist, state 
socialist, market socialist or post-capitalist) in which it is embedded. Dale's 
implicit reductionism of the sid generis properties of the state education system to 
capitalism implies considerable degrees of freedom on the part of those fulfilling 
the needs of capital, yet historically this is not the case. In fact, Archer does not 
artificially isolate the education system from the wider influences of the polity. She 
maintains that any macro-sociology of education involves recourse to the complex 
social interaction that results in particular forms of education and the complex types 
of social and educational structures that shape the context in which such interaction 
and change occur. 
It is a complicated task because it involves separating out the factors which 
impinge upon education and those which may be ignored at any given time 
because they do not impinge upon it. It also follows that the factors which are 
included are themselves treated as unproblematic - for instance, in incorporating 
the educational consequences of economic organization we do not try to explain 
the nature of the economy, but treat it as given (1979: 4). 
Archer is thus not denying the (obvious) importance of the economy and its 
organisational implications for education. Instead, she is simply highlighting the 
methodological implications of one's substantive focus. When incorporating the 
impact of the economic recession during the 1970s (see Chapter 4), one does not 
need to spell out in detail its temporal dynamics, since this would be to detract from 
the substantive explanans in hand. But, of course, methodologically to take the 
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economy as given is to accord autonomy to the education system as a prior 
ontological commitment. Such a commitment is a transcendental realist one, since 
any system (educational, civil service... ) has to possess autonomous relations 
among its parts in order for it to be identified as such. However, Dale maintains 
that the largest category of staff in the education state apparatuses is teachers and 
that therefore 
no account of how education state apparatuses operate and what they can 
achieve is complete without some reference to the teaching profession. I do not 
want to go into this in any great detail, but I do want to suggest that teachers are 
not merely 'state functionaries' but do have some degree of autononzy, and that 
this autonomy will not necessarily be used to further the proclaimed ends of the 
state apparatus. Rather than those who work there fitting themselves to the 
requirements of the institutions, there are a number of very important ways in 
which the institution has to take account of the interests of the employees and fit 
itself to them. It is here, for instance, that we may begin to look for the sources 
of the alleged inertia of education systems and schools; that is to say that what 
appears as inertia is not some immutable characteristic of bureaucracies, but is 
due to various groups within them having more immediate interests than the 
pursuit of the organization's goals (Dale 1989: 57, emphasis added). 
That 'some' autonomy is granted vis-a-vis the teaching profession evinces Dale's 
ontological equivocality about the relative causal efficacy of the profession qua 
corporate group vis-ý-vis the polity and the basis for such efficacy. However, such 
equivocality is more apparent than real. The underlying prioritisation of the 
capitalist nature of the educational system(s) logically enjoins that Dale eschew any 
detailed analysis of the profession: he is not so readily inclined to put all his 
ontological cards on the table, so to speak. Yet his concession that teachers have 
some autonomy immediately throws up the question of the degrees of freedom 
versus stringency of constraints; namely, that 'some autonomy' entails that 
capitalist needs cannot be deemed a priori of more importance. The fact that 
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teachers have interests begs the question of their structural provenance; here Dale 
only accords the system itself at best a pale materiality. He writes above that any 
inertia is not due to the nature of the education system per se but rather to the 
immediate interests of various groups. This elision of vested interest groups and 
their structural embedding means that Dale would be unable to explain why 
concerted efforts by either the government or teaching groups (or both) does not 
necessarily result in structural change because of the nature of the system itself. 
The nature of assessment, whilst a key concern of this thesis, is useful in 
highlighting the materiality of the education system; namely, its independent 
properties vis-A-vis capitalist economic dynamics. For, as Broadfoot (1996) rightly 
points out, the education system is now inconceivable without some form of 
external assessment. Indeed, assessment has been central to the creation of 
educational systems per se. Whatever the imperfections of past and current 
assessment procedures and their intended/unintended inegalitarian consequences, it 
remains that the assessment rationale is constitutive of educational systems, in turn 
conditioning what central government and teachers can do within in them and/or 
about them. Dale (1989: 55) notes that the government is unable to institute 
effective day-to-day control over every aspect of an apparatus's activities but does 
not adequately specify the ontological basis for this. I would want to add that this 
is the case for any government. That is, capitalist and non-capitalist polities alike 
confront similar systemic properties that condition their activity. Any educational 
system objectively provides teachers with vested interests because of the 
irreducible materiality of the system itself and the associated division of knowledge 
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and expertise. It is the latter expertise, inter alia, that needs theorising about in 
terms of the degrees of objective bargaining power that teachers bring to the 
negotiating table and their subsequent negotiating strength that can then be 
analysed in conjunction with other factors. In other words, teachers' relative 
bargaining power derives from the skills and knowledge afforded by the education 
system rather than simply from the social relations of production. Therefore I am 
not denying that capitalist societies condition activity in distinctive ways from their 
4state socialist' counterparts. The point is that both types of society have to contend 
with common features that are independent of their economic-systemic anchorage. 
Hence the metaphor of 'steering at a distance' discussed in Chapter One, whereby 
the educational division of labour precludes untrammelled top-down central 
control. In a similar vein, Sayer notes that whether formal ownership yields actual 
control over property and activities depends upon the material and informational 
qualities of their objects. 
Thus the token character of 'social ownership' derives not merely from 
contingent forms of organization but from the fact that millions of people cannot 
hope to control and co-ordinate the products of property that is diverse, often 
dependent on arcane specialisms and information, and highly dispersed (1995: 3) 
In a nutshell, the educational systemic division of labour and the associated division 
of knowledge and expertise do not comprise a pliable bundle with which any state 
can do as it pleases. If the process of meeting capitalist needs were simply a one- 
way untrammelled process of clarification and subsequent imposition, then one 
wonders why in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the development of the 
capitalist economy could be impeded by Anglican instruction and that 
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entrepreneurial groups were compelled to become 'self-taught scientists, to 
experiment with industrial applications on a trial and error basis [and] to develop 
in-service training for mechanics, operators and accountants... ' (Archer 1979: 113). 
Indeed, without a detailed examination of the organisation, values and 
related negotiating strength of the teaching profession, one would be unable to 
provide an adequate account of the Plowden Report, that is, how groups exploited 
anterior socio-cultural conditioning (Hadow Report, nature of the economy and so 
on). Equally, for example, the 1993 teacher boycott of tests cannot be explained 
away as a sort of capitalist hiccup. Yet, for Dale, in the final analysis, one must 
focus attention on the 'major motor of change' (the needs of the capitalist state). 
What he omits, of course, is that any state within an advanced economy will have 
needs that may not be met by the education system for the very reasons discussed 
above. The problem with the a priori importance accorded to the needs or 
functions of the capitalist state is that we miss many important things. 
Rikowski: the denial of autononzy 
However, Whitty (1985) refers to Dale (1982), who wrote that we should be aware 
of trying to relate everything that goes on in schools back to the functions of the 
state on behalf of capital. In turn, one can argue that Dale does not allow a 
reduction of the concrete social reality - specifically the autonomous properties of 
the education system - to that isolated in abstract thought, namely the capital 
relation. But for such Marxists as Rikowski (1996,1997) and Sharp (1986) the 
opposite maintains. We should thus not be surprised that Rikowski takes to task so- 
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called 'relative autonomy' Marxists such as Fritzell (1987). For, as Fritzell puts it, 
, In the structural context, autonomy may be seen to refer to a type of relationship in 
which significant properties or internal relations of one system cannot be 
empirically derived from corresponding features within another system... ' 
(1987: 25). In other words, he is talking about ontological emergence and the 
irreducibility of social structure (see Chapter One). To recapitulate, the internal 
and necessary relation between lecturer and student is an irreducible emergent 
property since the powers of the individual as individual are modified. Even 
though this emergent property depends for its existence upon continued state 
funding, the powers of the relation between lecturer and student are not reducible to 
the Department for Education and Employment and/or Local Education Authority. 
Following Gordon (1989), Rikowski believes that he has defeated the 'relative 
autonomy' theorists: 
Firstly, [Gordon] argues that it lacks meaning. How much strength are we to 
give to the notion of 'relative' in 'relative autonomy'? Just like arguments about 
angels on pinheads, it implies that there is an answer to a question that defies 
answers... Secondly, whilst she sees that relative autonomy theory is appealing 
for those who wish to escape vulgar Marxism... [she] also notes that the 
determinism lurking within it in its insistence on 'determination in the last 
instance' (of educational forms and practices by the economy) through the 
workings of the capitalist state... Thirdly, Gordon notes that the work of Apple 
(1985) and other supporters of relative autonomy theory is schizoid as it tends to 
oscillate violently between an 'all-powerful' state as a juggernaut pushing 
through education measures of the New Right which are purportedly in the 
interests of capital, and the ability of students and teachers to 'resist' the 
seemingly irresistible through a variety of counter-hegemonic cultural forms and 
practices (Rikowski 1997: 559). 
Rikowski argues that 'A dualistic structure-agency dilemma runs through the 
relative autonomy discourse which is indeterminate' (idenz. ). He concludes that 
Gordon's alternative ends up as a variant along the same relative autonomy theme: 
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She attempts to construct a theory of the 'limits' and 'capacity' of the state and 
apply this to education. 'Limits' suggests that the state is unable to do certain 
things regarding education, thus it becomes 'relatively autonomous' once more 
and Gordon's critique falls back upon itself (idenz. ). 
Firstly, there is nothing dilemmatic about the structure/agency distinction, since it 
delineates two irreducible strata of social reality. Rikowski is correct to point out 
that to posit the (transcendental) reality of the autonomy of structural forms does 
not tell us the extent of such autonomy (or degree, as Dale rightly notes). What is 
sometimes missing from the equation, then, is a specification of the degrees of 
freedom versus stringency of constraints. The 'schizoid' tendency of relative 
autonomy theorists as described by Gordon is precisely that specification; in this 
instance a recognition of the (now) substantially increased degrees of freedom at 
the state's disposal to impose policy underpinned by New Right philosophy. What 
needs to be emphasised here is that even the most stringent constraints do not 
determine agency in puppet-like fashion, since they have to be mediated. Thus 
agency can exit at any point in time, but, as I argued in Chapter One, to do so 
would be to incur a structured penalty. 
Secondly, we need to bear in mind that Rikowski (1996,1997) wishes to 
dissolve the structure/agency dualism, not because of the usual (though misplaced) 
assumption that the dualism is a Cartesian rather than an analytical one. Rather, it 
is because of the all-powerful omnipresence of the 'Capital Relation', whose 
immanent 'transcendence' is left to the sociological imagination. Indeed, whilst 
undoubtedly Rikowski would deny the charges of reification and determinism, we 
are left with a residual sense of agency responding to, rather than shaping, the 
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'logical' outcome of the unfolding of the Capital Relation. However, he writes that 
whilst the notion of the education system qua autonomous entity is the antidote for 
6simple economic reductionism', he follows Sharp, arguing that we should not view 
the relations between capital, the state and education as a set of relations between 
institutions or systems - 'Capital is a social relation' (1997: 560). Indeed it is, but 
so, too, are the lecturer/student relation, headteacher/teacher relation, husband/wife 
relation and so on. Rikowski, like Sharp, is making redundant any adequate 
sociology of education. We are denied the capacity to assess the extent to which 
policy can be imposed and how policy intentions match their implementation. In 
fact, they are committing the fallacy that the material character of what is organised 
by the state has no effect. Ultimately, one would expect empirical reality to lead 
Rikowski to reassess his prior ontological commitments. However, his conflation 
of a multiplicity of sid generis strata leads him to recommend the Vestruction of 
the project of 'Marxist educational theory' in its entirety. Whoever treads this path 
ends up as a Labour-power Theorist rather than a Marxist Educational Theorist' 
(1997: 568). So, education is out of the equation altogether now. Yet clearly a 
focus on labour-power is somewhat unhelpfully narrow. But such is the logic of his 
approach, since '... a focus on the social production of labour-power necessitates a 
theoretical perspective where process and processes replace systems and 
institutions at the heart of analysis. The social production of labour-power cuts 
across and through institutions' (ibid.: 568-569). 
Rikowski wants to expunge ontologically institutions and systems yet, 
naturally, cannot avoid using such terms. A focus on process and processes will 
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not do. The processes involved in deciding whether to market a school 
aggressively take place within a 'product' namely the school. The concept of 
school necessarily entails reference to sid generis social relations (paradigmatically 
the teacher/pupil social relation). However, Rikowski maintains that 
Only a philosophy of internal relations allows us to think in these terms [process 
rather than product]. Flat, static thinking through such concepts as 'institution' 
and 'system' makes analysis of the social production of labour-power as process 
and as trajectory impossible... Through utilising a philosophy of internal 
relations following Ollman (1993), the attention shifts away from 'systems' and 
'institutions' (the usual fare of much sociology of education and Marxist 
educational theory) (1997: 569). 
The next section critically dissects the Ollman social ontology adopted by 
Rikowski, extending its logic to argue that not only does it disavow a 
disaggregative analysis (Sayer 1995), but also precludes any adequate explanatory 
methodology. 
Ollman, Internal Relations and the omnipresent Capital Relation 
Class, capital and the division of labour 
In the context of the division of labour in both capitalist and non-capitalist 
advanced economies, Sayer (1995) has convincingly argued that the generic flaw in 
Marxist analysis of capitalism is its inability to appreciate the materiality, 
complexity and intractability of an advanced division of labour, whose properties 
and powers are independent of the mode of production. I would argue that this 
criticism applies equally to the recent (and past) treatment of the education system. 
As Sayer rightly points out, if we have too few abstractions over too narrow a range 
of angles, then material aspects of social reality are lost at a stroke. Possibly in 
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Dale's case - and certainly in Rikowski's - we end up missing the materiality of 
the education system itself and the differing degrees of freedom it affords the 
teaching profession (or fragmented groups thereof). 
Whitty (1985) refers to the work of Holloway and Picciotto (1977) as 
illustrative of the limitations of neo-Marxist accounts of shifts in education policy. 
He notes that for Holloway and Picciotto, like Rikowski and others, the central 
dynamic of the whole social formation is provided by the 'capital relation', which 
enters into all features of social life under capitalism. Although Whitty notes that 
Holloway and Picciotto introduced many caveats into their argument, in turn 
distinguishing it from a 'logic-of-capital' thesis, their approach still eluded an 
adequate understanding of the complex relative interplay of economic, political and 
ideological practice. Whilst Whitty acknowledges the importance of economic 
needs on education policy, he does not elevate it to an ontological proposition that 
engulfs social reality ill toto. On the contrary, what cannot be assumed is that 
economic pressures 
will always generate policy initiatives whose character can be derived directly 
from them, nor indeed is it necessarily the case that they will bring about 
outconzes that are incontrovertibly functional for capital. Much of the progress 
of the Great Debate in England... has to be understood in terms of the peculiar 
political, professional and cultural character of the English educational system 
and the existence within it of elements to which capitalism is 'relatively 
indifferent' or 'had great difficulty in changing... (Whitty 1985: 85). 
Holloway and Picciotto's privileging of the 'capital relation' is not uncommon in 
current neo-Marxist theorising, both within and outside the sociology of education. 
The assumption is that the effects of capitalism's central processes are so far- 
149 
reaching that everything in such a society is to some extent capitalist. Indeed, we 
are now used to such terms as 'cultural capital', 'human capital', and so on. 34 Any 
advanced division of labour possesses an irreducible materiality that is more 
fundamental that particular modes of co-ordination. As Sayer (1995) argues, it is 
not only capitalism that generates macro-economic problems but also market 
socialism. This should alert us to the fact that the social relations of production do 
not assume causal primacy or, indeed, constitute the key abstraction for Marxist 
theory, especially in the sociology of education. 
In addition to our routine attachment to such over-extended concepts as 
4cultural capital', there is a pervasive tendency both in Marxism and mainstream 
sociology to subsume the effects of division of labour under class. Put simply, 
class is conflated or confused with division of labour, thereby obscuring the 
different sources of power at different corporate groups' and individuals' disposal. 
The teaching profession's varying degrees of negotiating strength are not derivable 
directly from the social relations of production. Equally, technical divisions of 
labour objectively create scope for conflicts and inequalities within and between 
firms and these objective power-bases can (and did) exist in state socialist society. 
The salient point here is that the materiality of an advanced division of labour 
greatly attenuates the causal primacy accorded to private ownership by Marxism, 
inter alia, because of the considerable variety of power-bases it creates (which may 
or may not be strategically exploited) and the associated dispersal of knowledge. 
34 However, Hodgson (1999) argues that these are abuses of the word 'capital', which is properly confined 
to the notion of the money value of an owned stock of assets that exists in, or is readily convertible into, a 
monetary form. 
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As Sayer (1995: 51) argues, such multiple sources of power cannot be subsumed 
under one single heading (that is, class), yet this is precisely what much Marxism or 
'class theory' tries to do. He suggests that those who resist the idea of treating 
professional employees and employee cleaners as in the same class probably do so 
because they cannot drop the habit of using an overburdened concept of class that 
attempts to cover all differences in power, income and life-chances. (This is one 
habit of which I am culpable. ) 
Bertell Ollinan and universal internal relations: the repudiation of 
disaggregative analysis 
The common Marxist emphasis on the totalising nature of the Capital Relation has 
its origins in the universal internal relations ontology, which can be traced back to 
the work of such prominent Marxist thinkers as Bertell Ollman and Marx himself. 
Rikowski's recent contributions attempt to supersede the historical problems that 
have bedevilled 'Marxist educational theory', such as the well-known 
'correspondence theory' and 'resistance theory'. However, whilst applauding his 
engagement with such past problematics, his unfinished programme is fatally 
flawed because of his adoption of the Ollman internal relations approach. One can 
glean Rikowski's programme from Ollman's account of his dialectical approach: 
My account of the dialectic stresses its roots in the philosophy of internal 
relations which holds that the irreducible unit of reality is the relation and not the 
thing. The relations that people ordinarily assume to exist between things are 
viewed here as existing within (as a necessary part of) each thing in turn, now 
conceived of as a Relation (likewise, the changes which any "thing" undergoes). 
This peculiar notion of relation is the key to understanding the entire dialectic, 
and is used to unlock the otherwise mysterious notions of totality, abstraction, 
identity, law and contradiction. In the interests of clarity, these notions are 
examined in Hegel as well as Marx and contrasted with their equivalents in 
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Aristotelian logic and its watered-down version - common sense (Ollman 
1990: 74-75). 
For 011man, all 'Relations' are aspects of the whole. Crucially, he writes thus: 
The twin pillars of Marx's ontology are his conception of reality as a totality 
composed of internally related parts, and his conception of these parts as 
expandable relations, such that each one in its fullness can represent the totality. 
Few people would deny that everything in the world is related as causes, 
conditions or results; and many insist that the world is unintelligible except in 
terms of such relations. Marx goes a step further in conceptually interiorizing 
this interdependence within each thing, so that the conditions of its existence are 
taken to be part of what it is. Capital, for example, is not simply the physical 
means of production, but includes potentially the whole pattent of social 
relations which enables these ineans to fiinction as they do (Ollman 1990: 100, 
emphasis added). 
Contrary to Ollman, common sense would immediately question the bizarre notion 
that everything is part of an internally related whole -a totality. The totalising 
reductionism is transparent: capital is the whole pattern of social relations. Of 
course there are causes, conditions and results in the world, but not all conditions 
are internally related. Water is composed of the internal and necessary relation 
between two molecules of hydrogen and one of oxygen. Yet water is not internally 
related to human beings (despite our asymmetrical internal dependence upon it). In 
other words, water provides one of the conditions for human existence, but water 
can exist without us yet we cannot exist without it. To extend the internal necessity 
that characterises the capital/labour relation as applying to all social relations and 
objects is at best an extremely unhelpful non sequitur. At worst, it makes any form 
of critical social theory pointless. But if everything is internally related, how is it 
possible to step back? I would suggest that the internal relations ontology 
precludes critical standpoints. 
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Nevertheless, Rikowski quotes Holloway, who maintains that 'If all aspects of 
society are to be understood as forms of social relations, then clearly they all form 
part of an internally-related whole... ' (Holloway 1995: 166). He maintains, again 
following Holloway, that the state, money, capital and so on are apparently 
separate: 'they are forms of social relations, the interconnections between which 
should be understood not as extenzal (causal relations, for example), but as 
internal, as processes of transformation or metamorphosis' (Holloway 1995: 165, 
emphasis added). An unfortunate repudiation of explanatory power per se is the 
(heavy) price paid by adopting Ollman's universal internal relations ontology. The 
complete lack of explanatory purchase on concrete educational systems and their 
interplay with the polity is readily gleaned from the above restriction of causality to 
the state and capital respectively in the above reference to Holloway and 
Rikowski's own (unfinished) exposition of 'labour-power theory'. Surely if they 
are interconnected, as Holloway maintains, then they must possess some modicum 
of autonomy in order to be so identified? And if they possess autonomy, then 
perforce they have properties independent of, and irreducible to, each other. But to 
recognise their irreducibility (which is not to deny any form of necessary 
interdependency) would be to accept that they have independent (autonomous) 
structural identities, which the universal internal-relations ontology disclaims. 
An internal relations ontology would disclaim the tenability of the 
asymmetrical relations between schools and their governing bodies discussed in 
Chapter One, since the former can exist without the latter. Inconsistently, Rikowski 
(1996: 445), following Hatcher, argues that it is possible to envisage gender equality 
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in capitalist societies. This belies the intemal-relations ontology, since gender is 
not ontologically dependent upon capitalism for its existence and vice versa. As 
Sayer puts it: 
The ontology of universal internal relations leads one to assume that objects or 
processes cannot be the same under different circumstances. It simply excludes 
the possibility [and empirical reality] that particular processes that exist in 
capitalism could also exist in a society with non-capitalist social relations of 
production, for it assumes that they must be different, and not just superficially 
but fundamentally (1995: 29). 
In fairness, Sayer points out that with respect to the relationships between class, 
division of labour, money, commodities and property relations, Marx tended to 
assume ubiquitous internal relations in Hegelian fashion. However, the denial of 
external social relations means that Oilman et al. cannot conceive of the 
asymmetrical relation between money and capitalism, namely that the former can 
exist without the latter but not vice versa. In fact, Sayer argues that it would be 
maintained that if the social relations of production were different, then everything 
would be different (D. Yet, pace Sayer, the very identification of that which is 
different is impossible. The universal internal relations ontology cannot explain (or 
identify) enduring causal entities at all, since any change enjoins that some form or 
entity possess causal powers proper to itself, that is, an independent sui generis 
identity in order for the identification of change to be possible. Transcendentally, 
therefore, the universal internal relations ontology is false. How, indeed, could 
Marx identify the transition from feudalism to capitalism if the latter did not 
possess an independent structural identity? In sum, the internal relations ontology 
disallows a disaggregative approach, whereby we can consider whether particular 
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elements of political-economic systems can exist in combination with one set of 
other elements or whether they can also co-exist with other sets. 
The Plowden Era - the beginning is the end 
For some, the choice of the Plowden years as the starting point of my 
morphogenetic conditioning cycle would be deemed unhelpful given the rich 
systematisation and cultural work carried out prior to it. This is undeniably true. 
However, no definitive account of child-centred philosophy and practice can be 
given because of the obvious constraints of any research project and, indeed, the 
fact that child-centred philosophy itself does not constitute an easily identifiable, 
homogeneous corpus of tightly woven logical complementari ties. In his 
introduction to his historical account of the progressive schools (c. 1881-1967), 
Stewart notes that the term 'progressive' may be applied to a range of schools 
'which themselves span wide differences in theory and practice... ' (1968: xvi). He 
concluded that such schools were numerically small, aimed at reforming 
educational practice. 'We have emphasized more than once that no corporate 
movement was shaped in radical education, and we have said that the strength of 
this group of schools has been their individual identity... ' (ibid.: 345, emphasis 
added). The international movement of child-centred philosophy developed during 
the inter-war years, under the auspices of the New Education Fellowship (NEF). 
Of the NEF, Stewart remarks that, 'It represents a remarkable achievement of 
voluntary effort based on principles that cannot be too precisely stated if schisms 
are not to appear' (lbid.: 240). Equally, Selleck has criticised the NEF for lacking 
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rigour and exuding 'vague principles' (1972: 46). Finally, Punch argues that 
progressive philosophy 'never approximated to a readily identifiable doctrine but 
was more a philosophical flag of convenience that tenuously united a diverse group 
of thinkers and practitioners' (1973: 4). 
That there were doctrinal differences is not disputed here. However, there is an 
underlying philosophical thread that facilitated the uniting of this diverse group of 
thinkers and practitioners that is almost invariably traced back to Rousseau. What 
must not be confused is the concomitant complementarity embodied in 
developmental psychology. For at the level of child psychology we encounter CS 
disorderliness; most notably between Vygotsky and Piaget. Here one can identify 
other important contemporary 'schools of thought', such as information processing 
(IP), the structuralists, the metacognitive influence and the nativists. Indeed, we 
can even differentiate between fundamentalist Piagetians, neo-Piagetians and post- 
Piagetians (see Sutherland 1992). The nativists, for example, represent a radical 
biological approach, whose implications for teaching are deterministic, leaving 
little teacher control over the learning process. Sutherland's (1992) text on 
cognitive development itself documents the thrust and counter-thrust at the S-C 
level between the Vygotskyans and the Piagetians, that is, the S-C unfolding of a 
competitive contradiction. 
However, the focus is on child-centred philosophy and not on its 
concomitant complementarity. Though the S-C schisms generated by CS 
contradiction at this level are clearly important in terms of accounting for structural 
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(educational) stasis. As Stewart rightly noted above, CS disorderliness ultimately 
precluded the development of a united corporate group. When we look at the 
teaching profession as a whole today, we can see that structural cleavages 
(objective division of labour between primary and secondary/secondary and higher 
education) and the associated status hierarchy further militate against corporate 
agency. To reiterate, both the Vygotskyans and Piagetians both operate within 
child-centred philosophy: necessarily their propositions presuppose the 
metaphysical assumption that children qua children are different from adults and 
thus have distinctive needs and processes of development. Hence the concomitant, 
rather than contingent, nature of the systemic complementarity. Both accept that 
teachers must start with the child and his or her extant needs. Whether the 
contradictions between Vygotskyans and Piagetians are more apparent than real 
(that is, mere family squabbles) is a crucial area of enquiry - especially the issue of 
innate stage development - it is not the concern of this thesis. The salient point to 
be stressed is that both follow the child-centred (or progressive) view that children 
are not 'defective adults', passive receptors of knowledge dished out at the front of 
the classroom by an authoritarian teacher. This is an appropriate point at which to 
discuss the provenance of child-centred philosophy and its celebration in the 
Plowden Report (1967). 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau: contra traditionalism 
Many of the progressive schools discussed in Stewart's book were set up as a result 
of a radical dissatisfaction with traditional practice. (And as will become clear, the 
progressive/traditional dichotomy is abused and used as part of various S-C 
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strategies in the pursuit of vested structural and ideal interests. ) The traditional 
versus progressive dichotomy is not a convenient rhetorical or heuristic device. 
Instead, it refers to specific CS (incompatible) properties, almost invariably written 
down in books, pamphlets, school prospectuses and international journals. Darling 
draws attention to the indubitable importance of CS inheritance as embodied in the 
latter. 
We have noted that today's primary schooling can be traced to yesterday's 
books, with training colleges performing the intermediary role of fostering child- 
centred ideas in student teachers... two writers can be identified as intellectual 
giants by any standards - Rousseau and Dewey. What is significant... is that 
both were philosophers as well as advocates of child-centred education, a fusion 
of thought that showed no signs of internal tension [CS level] (1994: 52). 
The consolidation of teacher training colleges occurred during the Plowden decade. 
However, what is often unexamined in the literature is the concurrent critique of 
child-centred philosophy undertaken by the university and college philosophers of 
education. In discussing the teachers between 1964 and 1975, Archer, for example, 
does not address the latter. 
35 Instead, she describes the period as witnessing the 
'high water mark of professional normative consensus with the publication of the 
Plowden Report... In many ways it was the pinnacle of the liberal NUT influence 
over professional values... ' (1979: 560). She also refers to organisational and 
ideological factors as the key factors in accounting for the dissolution of 
professional consensus by the 1970s, inter alia the failure of the unions to deliver 
satisfactory pay settlements, which resulted in a more militant posture and the 
failure of the Educational Priority Areas. This chapter therefore aims to fill an 
important lacuna. The education philosophers' critique is important for the basic 
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reason that trainee teachers were (and are) confronted with structurally skewed CS 
properties. In other words, lecturers and staff predisposed towards the philosophers' 
critique (or subject to their S-C machinations) are structurally positioned (or 
coerced) to delimit who has access to tracts of the CS. Any arts or social science 
graduate should recall that each course reading list necessarily comprises a fraction 
of the relevant CS items and that its compiler will be predisposed towards certain 
texts, unwittingly or not. The implications for classroom practice and corporate 
union activity should be obvious. Teachers who have been subject to a staple diet 
of anti-child-centred precepts are necessarily at a corporate disadvantage if they 
find that the National Curriculum directives that are underpinned by the latter do 
not square with the reality of children's needs, intuition and, indeed, experience 
itself. Such corporate and/or individual disadvantage stems from the structurally 
enforced debarment from access to the systernatised (child-centred) conspectus 
from which to choose items at the S-C level (i. e. classroom practice). And as we 
saw in the last chapter, lack of effective systernisation at the early-years level has 
exacerbated the lack of corporate agential activity. 
I mentioned above that a definitive account of child-centred philosophy 
and practice cannot be given and that the latter does not constitute a nicely woven 
web of logical complementari ties. This is not to say that child-centred philosophy 
cannot be referentially fleshed out. On the contrary, there is a generic philosophical 
core, whose propositions have been added to, partially replaced (consistently or 
otherwise) or sympathetically critiqued. Punch's comment above conveys the 
35 See also Lowe (1997). 
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impression that the referents of child-centred philosophy, because vaguely 
espoused by the international movement, do not in fact exist. This is untrue: Punch 
is confusing the S-C level with the CS level, which played down the nature of the 
richly systematised nature of the CS. Child-centred philosophy resulted from 
dissatisfaction with traditional practice. The traditionalist paradigm emphasised 
mastery of factual knowledge. Pedagogically, the teacher instructs the class, and 
not individual pupils. Pupil motivation is held to be dependent solely upon 
compliance and competition. As Darling rightly notes, it is precisely the variety of 
critical reactions to this that makes any definitive account impossible. Equally, one 
could not provide a definitive, once-and-for-all account of Marxism. However, it 
would be absurd to say that one cannot provide a generic framework for Marxist 
(and child-centred) thought. 
Essentially, exponents of child-centred philosophy focus on children's 
growth and development. As Darling summarises: 
Children's development is seen as a gradual and 'natural' (sic) progression, 
which is best aided by adults who have an appreciation of and a respect for the 
ways of children... Childhood, it is insisted, is not a defective version of 
adulthood... progressives emphasise that it is the nature of the child to be active. 
Traditionalists are seen as being either unaware of this central characteristic, or 
as seeing it as something regrettable... The findings of educational psychology 
[show] that children are intellectually curious, keen to find things out, and 
actively engaged in making sense of the world... Child-centred education is not 
just a respecter of childhood, but a respecter of individual children and their 
differences (1994: 3). 
One of the principal precursors of the above is, of course, Rousseau. For Rousseau, 
individual children vary, implying that education thus needs to be individualised. 
Each child is held to be innately predisposed towards activity. Like Piaget, he saw 
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children growing through a series of developmental stages, and that consequently 
appropriate techniques must be developed for each stage. More importantly, he 
emphasised the intrinsic differences in powers of thought between children and 
adults. Indeed, fie wrote that the child 'should remain in complete ignorance of 
those ideas which are beyond his grasp... I cannot too strongly urge the tutor to 
adapt his instances to the capacity of his scholar' (1911: 141-144). More recent 
child-centred approaches have subsequently focused on the notion of 'readiness'; 
that is, delaying the teaching of knowledge and skills until the child is ready. In 
Emile, Rousseau is critical of the (traditional) approach that pays no attention to 
what a child is capable of learning at different stages of development. Such 
capability is held to be constitutive of the intrinsic nature of the child qua child. 
Thus the notion of readiness is a cognitive one, grounded in the bio-psychological 
emergent (and emerging) powers of the child. The traditional approach (along with 
technocratic/managerialist approaches) disavows any need to unpack this (and in 
the case of tile latter, attempt ontologically to erase it). 
Critics of child-centred philosophy wrongly maintain that an emphasis on 
the child's readiness entails an overly voluntarist hue, namely that the child decides 
what s/he wants to do, irrespective of the teacher. Undeniably, A. S. Neill's 
(in)famous Surnmerhill reflected this (see Stewart (1968) for an excellent account). 
However, the key principle to be drawn from Rousseau's Enzile is that 'discovery 
learning' is not left to the child. On the contrary, in Endle we find that the tutor 
engineers learning experiences. The whole point of the notion of 'readiness' is that 
one cannot force-feed a child to learn something that cannot be learned because of 
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its intrinsic make-up just as you cannot drive to work on a frosty morning if the car 
has not been cleared of ice and the engine left running for 5 minutes or so. Like the 
car, the child has to be ready. Where the analogy breaks down, of course, is that a 
child may perform well in tests, despite not being ready, since a concomitant lack 
of understanding is not easily discernible (whereas the car simply cannot start). 
Finally, then, Rousseau emphasised the importance of understanding and how easy 
it is for teachers to be misled into thinking a child has understood something. 
As we saw in Chapter Two, Rousseau's ideas have been subsequently 
developed; such ideational development underpinned the Hadow and Plowden 
Reports. The generic nature of the Plowden Report is discussed in Chapter Two 
and need only detain us briefly. The 'constraining contradiction' that Peters et al. 
unleashed will not be addressed. In sum, the unfolding dynamic of the constraining 
contradiction is less important than the success of Peters et al. in dominating at the 
S-C level. The S-C success of Peters et al. is a significant yet often-neglected factor 
that further weakened resistance to the post-Plowden political and populist critiques 
of child-centred philosophy (see next chapter). However, we have already seen that 
Plowden was not an anarchist's charter, as some on both sides of the Tyndale affair 
later interpreted it (see next chapter). On the contrary, to reiterate, the tutor subtly 
and painstakingly plans and monitors learning situations congruent with the child's 
extant ability. Plowden argued that there had been too much class instruction and 
that a greater balance needed to be fostered between class teaching, individualised 
learning and group work. As Riley sums up: 
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Both critics of the day and recent critics have tended to present an over- 
simplified view of the arguments presented in the Plowden Report. In the 1990s, 
there have been calls to suggest that 'Plowdenism' retains a stranglehold on our 
education system, generating relativist views about pupil performance, rather 
than belief in absolute standards of achievement to be expected from all pupils... 
Critics of progressive education have implied wrongly that Plowden advocated 
one approach to teaching and learning. The issue... is not what Plowden 
advocated but how people have chosen to interpret it (1998: 15-16, emphasis 
added). 
I would argue instead that the issue is precisely the philosophical nature of 
Plowden, its cogency and implications for practice; the analytical focus is on how 
and in what ways critics at the S-C level selectively extract components as part of 
the competitive process. Equally, at the S-C level attention to its advocates has 
shown how they failed to develop and sustain any substantial progressive 
momentum, misreading and ignoring the potential and direction of the critics (as 
will be discussed in the following chapter). 
Plowden, the reality of teaching practice and the philosophers 
Lowe (1997) has documented several factors that co-determined the Plowden 
Report. Firstly, the 1964 Education Act enabled some local authorities to abandon 
transfer at 1 1-plus by introducing middle schools. This freed schools from the 
hated intelligence tests. Secondly, the establishment of the Schools Council led to 
the widespread dissemination of new approaches to primary school teaching. 
Thirdly, there was a speedy expansion of the teacher training colleges. According 
to Lowe, this had several results. 
First, the introduction of three- and then four-year courses of teacher training 
and of the B. Ed degree gave an academic respectability to initial teacher training 
which it had previously lacked, and meant that the new entrants to primary 
school teaching might have been expected to have greater self-confidence in 
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terms of curriculum definition and teaching method. The growing anny of 
college tutors fed these students on a diet of Piagetian psychology and 
background work in the educational disciplines, all intended to enhance 
professional self-awareness and autonoiny (p. 49, emphasis added). 
I wish to return to this in a moment. Fourthly, one also needs to supplement 
Lowe's list of factors by reference to the widespread economic prosperity that 
Britain enjoyed at this time. Unemployment was negligible and consequently 
parents had no reason to assume that their children would not be able to find 
employment. At the same time, a number of local authorities disseminated new 
approaches to pedagogy, notably Oxfordshire, Leicestershire, West Riding of 
Yorkshire, Bristol and London. The Nuffield Foundation provided an important 
focus for primary school curriculum reform. For instance, in 1964 it sponsored a 
major project on the teaching of mathematics, which widely disseminated the 
theoretical work of Z. P. Dienes. However, a rosy picture of Plowden and the 
extent of progressivism during the following years is often painted. Dearden, for 
example, comments that 
Classrooms became much more colourful places as more time was found for 
creative work. Topic work flourished... The contribution of educational 
publishers to making possible some of these changes deserves note. Teacher- 
pupil relationships became more relaxed and friendly, though not merely 
permissive... Plowden's ideal may have proved practical for a few... But 
something of the spirit of Plowden has found a permanent place (cited in Lowe 
1997: 51). 
Yet surely the issue is precisely the extent of practical fruition rather any nebulous 
'Plowden spirit'? Lowe raises serious doubts as to how far the 'Plowden's spirit' 
was bome out in the teaching strategies adopted in the majority of classrooms in the 
seventies and eighties. In 1972, for example, a report by HMI commented 
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favourably on work being carried out in a large sample of open-plan schools, but 
these schools were a minority. However, Lowe argues that 'What can be seen in 
retrospect as a more significant and more pervasive set of influences was the 
growing backlash which identified progressivism and child-centred approaches in 
the primary schools with falling standards. This first emerged in the 1969 Black 
Papers' (ibid. ). The backlash to which Lowe refers will be discussed in the next 
chapter. What is required here is an account of the influence of the education 
philosophers. For his reference above to the teaching of Piagetian psychology does 
not acknowledge the education philosophers' simultaneous negation of it and their 
impact on teacher training college curricula. 
At the beginning of the Plowden decade, philosophers of education 
became critical of the development of progressive educational theory. Prior to this, 
the philosophy of education had no prominent status. The development of 
philosophy of education by Peters et al. was greatly influenced by the work of A. J. 
Ayer, particularly his Language, Truth and Logic (1936). In brief, Ayer's 
philosophy was verificationist. In other words, for a statement to be meaningful it 
must be possible in principle to verify it or at least establish its probability by 
gathering evidence through sense experience. Consequently, 'good', 'wrong' and 
'beautiful' were designated pseudo-concepts. Indeed, such metaphysical issues as 
the existence of God or the nature of the good life were deemed meaningless. As 
Darling notes 
The force of [Ayer's] polemic dealt heavy blows to philosophy of education and 
political philosophy. Traditionally, enquirers in these fields have sought to 
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justify forms of human relationships, institutions and transactions, and have tried 
to demonstrate that some forms are more desirable than others. The message 
from Language, Truth and Logic is twofold: (i) this is not a proper kind of 
activity for philosophers; and (ii) any conclusions reached about the nature of a 
good society or a good education are strictly meaningless (1994: 54-55). 
In essence, verificationism is a species of the epistemic fallacy, namely the fallacy 
that statements about being can be reduced to our statements of knowledge about 
being. What exists is reduced to sense-data experience. Yet transcendentally the 
objects of such experience exist independently. Upon upholding the distinction 
between ontology and epistemology, the verificationist immediately recoils, since 
the very notion of independent sid generis phenomena would be taken to be 
meaningless. For the verificationist, the meaning of a proposition consists in the 
method of its verification, that is, in whatever observations or experiences show. In 
essence, the verifiability principle is the basis of an attack on theology and 
metaphysics. At best, then, the propositions of metaphysics, like those of 
aesthetics or ethics, are only permissible as expressions of emotional attitudes, 
rather than defacto statements. The untenability of this position need not detain us, 
although Peters et al., as will be discussed shortly, have consistently adhered to its 
central tenets. The influence of verificationism, particularly the attribution of 
ontological status via the senses, has been profound. In Chapter One the empiricist 
influence embodied in methodological individualism was noted, which gained its 
strength from the fact that sid generis emergent properties are unobservable. The 
empiricist doctrine enjoins that because value-judgements cannot be verified via the 
senses (smelled, tasted and seen ... ) then any such judgements are meaningless. 
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Fundamentally, there is at best something rather odd in the idea of anyone 
writing about education in a way that eschews all value-judgements (Darling 1994). 
I would simply maintain that this is a (logical) consequence of a sustained 
commitment to Ayer's 'philosophy'. Indeed, for Peters, 'Many philosophers who 
have been brought up in the "revolution" [reference to Ayer]... are ... rather aghast 
when they encounter what is often called "philosophy of education" with its rather 
woolly chatter about "growth" "wholeness" "maturity" "discipline" "experience" 
"creativeness" "needs" "interests" and "freedom"' (Peters 1964: 141-2). 
Furthermore, Peters denigrates an historical approach to philosophy, asserting that 
modem philosophers are 
aghast when they ]cam that students very often are brought up on an antiquated 
diet of Plato, Rousseau, and Froebel - perhaps with a dash of Dewey to provide 
a final obfuscation of issues. It is as if a course on educational psychology 
consisted mainly of snippets from Aristotle, Locke, James Mill, Herbart and 
Thomdike (ibid.: 142). 
Darling (1994) argues that any contemporary study of philosophy presupposes 
knowledge of its past - sociology does not owe a fleeting gratitude to Marx, 
Durkheim and Weber! Whilst the above is not at all surprising, it is a consistent 
result of the situational logic in which Peters has embroiled himself. Undeniably, 
his own work secretes a series of contradictory (i. e. ethical-aesthetic) positions, but 
the key point for our purposes is the generic anti-metaphysical thrust of his writings 
(and those of his acolytes), which permeated teaching colleges and post-graduate 
courses throughout England and Wales. Criticism of progressive educational theory 
also permeates the writings of Hirst and Dearden (previously referred to in Chapter 
Two). Most of the child-centred critique is to be found in 77te Philosophy of 
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Primary Education (1968) by Dearden, Perspectives on Plowden (1969) edited by 
Peters, and A Critique of Current Educational Ainis (1975), edited by Peters, 
Dearden and Hirst. In the introduction to A Critique of Educational Aims, it is 
stated by the editors that 'The authors in this collection are usually critical of 
attempts to characterise education in terms of "growth" or the satisfaction of 
"needs"' (1975: ix). The actual critique of needs and growth need not detain us. 
The critique itself, to reiterate, is an empiricist (or logical positivist) one. Thus, for 
example, given that a need is not a property than can be established simply by 
empirical methods, then one should not be at all surprised that the concept is 
disparaged as 'woolly' or 'vacuous'. Indeed, such concepts as need, growth and 
creativity are dismissed at a stroke yet at the same time accorded a superficial 
plausibility. As I argued in Chapter Two, the situational logic of a constraining 
contradiction entails that they cannot repudiate such concepts altogether since their 
critique is only operable in terms of their metaphysical anchorage. 36 However, 
what is important is the power of Peters et al. to dominate at the S-C level. 
Barrow and Woods' book (see footnote below) is not an aberration. 
Indeed, the Inspectorate in the mid-1970s adopted Hirst's thinking. Hirst's work on 
36 The influence of Peters et al. is discernible in Barrow and Woods' Ali Introduction to Philosophy of 
Education. This was first published in 1975. The second edition appeared in 1982 and subsequently has 
been reprinted 7 times. A 38-page chapter is devoted to a critique of the child-centred approach, 
specifically the interrelated notions of needs, interests and experience. They charge child-centred theorists 
with vacuity and ambiguity. Yet the nature of the constraining contradiction enjoins that they cannot 
disavow child-centred philosophy in its entirety. Thus, contradictorily, the authors write that 'Our 
conclusion must be that although much of what passes for child-centred education may be extremely 
valuable and although there may be points of importance embedded in various child-centred theories, the 
term 'child-centred' itself is too obscure to be of much practical benefit... ' (1997: 135-136). Yet I would 
argue that the focus on practicality is a mere ruse that disguises the verificationist hue of their book. Like 
Ayer, they want 'conceptual precision' and deny the tenability of such metaphysical talk as 'children's 
needs' largely on the basis of subsequent S-C disagreement. But S-C disagreement is not the issue. The 
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forms of knowledge was used to sustain a subject-divided curriculum. In the early 
1980s, Scotland's educational establishment began to waver in its commitment to 
child-centred philosophy for the first time since 1965. In Primary Education in the 
Eighties the Committee on Primary Education noted that the Memorandum's use of 
the 'growth' and 'needs' concepts had been 'rigorously examined' by Dearden. 
The key question, however, centres on the factors that co-detennined the S-C 
dominance of the child-centred critique during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. A 
useful starting point is Peters et al. 's style of writing, which exuded academic 
rigour and repute in the eyes of the education world. As Darling puts it: 
Unlike Rousseau, Peters wrote in a cultural atmosphere where the highest 
accolades had long been reserved for scientific forms of study. The prevailing 
view was that any enquiry which is to establish sound answers must be: (i) 
detached, impersonal, unemotional; (ii) precise, methodical, orderly; and (iii) 
small-scale, piecemeal, cautious. These are today the hallmarks of rationality, 
and they are not to be found in Rousseau, whose style is by these standards 
dubiously intuitive. The new philosophy of education, by contrast, was 
produced by professional academics. In their writing, Peters and Dearden 
proceed cautiously, and generate conclusions which verge on the conventional 
(1994: 88). 
Moreover, practically every philosopher of education in the country appeared to 
share the putative intellectual dubiety of child-centred philosophy. The reason for 
this is attributable to the position that Peters occupied in philosophy of education 
and the concurrent developments in teacher training. One of the recommendations 
of the 1963 Robbins Report was that training colleges be renamed 'colleges of 
education' and that they should prepare students for the new B. Ed degree. This 
resulted in a 'search for academic and theoretical substance' (Browne 1987, cited in 
issue is what people (teachers, parents, etc. ) are disagreeing about. The fact of S-C disagreement does not 
negate its (unavoidable) metaphysical underpinning. 
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Darling 1994: 91). Such new colleges now had to establish their academic 
credibility and thus their courses had to be seen to be of the 'right kind'. Students 
would therefore have to study education with the kind of rigour that would bestow 
academic status. 
In 1964, the then Department of Education and Science (DES) suggested 
that a conference be held to discuss the nature of educational studies. One of the 
key speakers was Professor Peters, whose seminal paper identified 'the foundation 
disciplines of philosophy, psychology and sociology'. The academic world 
allowed Peters to define the parameters of educational studies because (a) he had 
impressive academic credentials and (b) teachers in the London Institute of 
Education have almost invariably exercised an extraordinary influence. As Darling 
notes, 
Much as Susan Isaacs revitalized the study of child development in this country 
when she went to London ... so Peters brought a new standing to the philosophy 
of education by bringing with him credentials from a different, but related 
field... He had more than won his spurs in a 'hard' discipline and his move was 
instrumental in helping philosophy of education to lose some of its 
'marshmallow image'... In philosophy of education Peters rapidly took tip a 
position of absolute dominance: as one of his colleagues put it, Peters 'not only 
redefined British philosophy of education but set its programme for sonle twenty 
years'... (1994: 91-92, emphasis added). 
In 1966, Peters founded the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain of 
which he was chair. He also became editor of Jounial of Philosophy of Education. 
From such a position, buttressed by the government and his band of acolytes, he 
was able to exercise considerable cultural power in excluding articles that did not 
fit with what he and his colleagues believed to constitute 'good' education 
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philosophy. This is an interesting S-C strategy of containment and one that did not 
rest solely upon control of the defining journal in the field. In his edited collection 
The Concept of Education, published at the same time as the Plowden Report, all 
articles contained therein were mutually consistent. And Peters was the editor of 
the Routledge and Kegan Paul's 'Students' Library of Education' series. 
Furthermore, at the DES-sponsored conference held in 1964, Peters 
informed delegates that the ideal of one philosophy of education specialist on every 
staff was being met by the training afforded by the London Institute's MA -a 
training that eschewed the history of philosophical ideas - unsurprisingly. Peters 
(1983) acknowledged that a significant percentage of British philosophers of 
education graduated from the London Institute's philosophy of education 
department. In all probability, then, those armed with an MA from the Institute 
went on to teach a philosophy of education that explicitly rejected the metaphysics 
of child-centred theory and practice. A 1982 Thnes Education Supplement survey 
of the twenty most frequently prescribed textbooks in pre-service training showed 
that three were philosophy books: Dearden's Problems in Primary Education 
(1976); Hirst's Knowledge and the Curricithint (1974); and Hirst and Peters' The 
Logic of Education (1970). The TES survey noted that the reason why Peters did 
not feature more prominently was that his votes were distributed over a number of 
titles. The survey also highlighted the absence of Plato and Rousseau. As a result, 
colleges of education were 'often effectively transmitting two contradictory 
messages. Since the war they had been committed to the principles of Froebel and 
Hadow... Yet the view implicit (and sometimes explicit) in the books used on 
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philosophy of education courses was that child-centred education was incoherent, 
confused, and intellectually unrespectable' (Darling 1994: 95). Child-centred 
thinking - particularly with respect to the early years work on child development - 
is not renowned for its intellectual rigour (though I would venture that this is 
occasionally more an S-C manoeuvre designed to denigrate). Thus, those working 
in the colleges of education would not have had the 'cultural capital', or, indeed, 
the academic power, for mounting a stringent riposte. Since philosophy of 
education was seen as playing a central and rigorous part in establishing the 
academic credibility of the new colleges, for child-centred practitioners 'to dismiss 
the philosophers' contribution would have been to risk sawing off the branch of the 
tree of knowledge on which they were perched' (ibid.: 96). 
The foregoing shows that the Plowden decade could hardly be described 
as one in which child-centred philosophy became widely entrenched at the S-C 
level. With the benefit of hindsight, my sub-title "Plowden - the beginning is the 
end" is clearly appropriate. For even before its publication, influential 
educationists worked against its metaphysical underpinning - which, of course, 
dated back to Rousseau and Plato. I have emphasised the role of the education 
philosophers because whilst it is now recognised that socio-culturally child-centred 
practice was not as widespread as the Golden Age of Plowden often suggests, there 
were important factors working against Plowden at the outset. It was precisely 
those institutions that were indispensable, if Plowden were to gain an adequate 
foothold, in which the child-centred critique was imposed. The education 
philosophers derived their cultural power from, inter alia, the structural conjunction 
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between the buoyant economy and the development of the teacher training colleges. 
Those staff committed to child-centred education were not structurally predisposed 
to counter the philosophers' critique. However, this is not to suggest that the 
stringent constraints that staff confronted were such that no attempt could be made 
to override them. Since, firstly, at the level of the schools the scope for 
autonomous action on the part of teachers was widening. At the beginning of the 
decade, the government had 'little, if any, direct hold over the patterns of 
curriculum and development' (Kogan 1971: 20). Secondly, at the same time, the 
teaching profession continued to be successful in inserting itself on various 
decision-making agencies by virtue of its recognised expertise. 
Indeed, the National Union of Teachers was represented on 125 official 
educational bodies and advisory committees. In 1964 it had 37 Mps in the House 
of Commons. The main advancement in insertion came with the establishment of 
the Schools Council for Curriculum and Examinations (1965). The teaching 
profession was successful in insisting that this body should rest with teachers' 
control. However, the college tutors could not rely upon the teaching profession for 
corporate support. Objectively it could be argued that the profession was in a 
position to mount a potentially successful campaign contra the burgeoning 
influence of Peters et al. yet did not exploit its freedom. Such freedom of course 
was not untrammelled. The state delimited its degrees of freedom via financial 
dependency, legal control and etatist values (Archer 1979) in order to keep the lid 
on internal innovation. However, expertise remained an important bargaining chip 
and, as already noted, the profession as a whole had its fingers in the parliamentary 
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and local government pie. But internal schism, exemplified by an increase in 
militancy, following the lack of success in the union's ability to deliver pay 
increases and the turn away from children following the failure of the Educational 
Priority Areas, were contingent factors that inhibited any attempt to stem the Peters 
tide. Towards the end of the sixties, internal criticism mounted of the way in which 
the union executives were more concerned with maintaining respectability than 
with militancy (in order, of course, to maintain their influence vis-a-vis the polity). 
What I am arguing, then, is that the bargaining chip afforded by expertise was 
undermined by internal schism. At the same time, the lack of pervasive impact of 
child-centred theory on practice received little, if any, attention. This, coupled with 
the Peters phenomenon, hardly constituted an auspicious set of conditioning 
circumstances vis-a-vis a generic implementation of Plowden. 
Concluding remarks 
From the foregoing one can argue that structurally matters were auspicious for any 
concerted push towards an overall implementation of Plowden: the development of 
teacher training colleges, the generous degrees of curricular freedom accorded to 
teachers, the establishment of middle schools (1964 Education Act), the Plowden 
Report, the Schools Council and the buoyant nature of the economy. However, 
such felicitous structural arrangements were only partially exploited by exponents 
of Plowden. Moreover, such partial exploitation was overshadowed by, inter alia, 
the dominance of the education philosophers and their role in shaping curricular 
developments in teacher training colleges and internal schisms within the NUT. In 
the case of the teacher training colleges, we can point to structural morphogenesis 
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that, once stabilised, was not accompanied by cultural morphogenesis and the 
expected S-C hegemony of child-centred theory. In other words, CS disorderliness 
(Peters versus child-centred philosophy) was not paralleled by S-C disorderliness 
(accentuation of incompatible elements) for the reasons delineated above. Peters et 
al. derived their power to impose cultural uniformity by virtue of factors residing 
purely in the structural realm. Nevertheless, other sites did witness both structural 
and cultural morphogenesis that gelled, which in turn provided the impetus towards 
a consolidation of child-centred philosophy and practice. Yet such sites were in the 
minority. Finally, that the teachers qua corporate body did not fully exploit 
the structural situation to any child-centred advantage enjoins that, pace Dale, we 
respect the nature and organisation of it at the same time analysing factors both 
within and outside the education system that gel or do not gel with its unified or 
diverse aims and interests. Of course, what makes analysis more difficult, but still 
necessary, is that such interests may be misunderstood, negated or altogether 
unrecognised. In sum, the argument of this chapter, with the benefit of hindsight, is 
that the Plowden Report was more or less moribund from the minute it hit the 
presses. As will be seen from the next chapter, before the onset of the economic 
recession there was an opportunity, albeit limited and diminishing, to fight the anti- 
progressivist critique and extend progressive practices. The question to be 
addressed next is precisely how and why the precarious position of child-centred 
practice was subject to a particularly vociferous string of S-C campaigns to turn 
back the 'Plowden Years'. 
175 
4 Socio-Cultural Interaction: Tyndale, Ruskin and the Black 
Paper Years 
Introduction 
So far reference has been made almost exclusively to the 1988 Education Reform 
Act and its negation of child-centred philosophy. Whilst in the next chapter it will 
be made clear that the legislative impetus towards marketisation of the education 
system began in 1980, the Act itself may reasonably be taken as the structural 
elaboration of a new morphogenetic conditioning cycle. We saw in the last chapter 
that child-centred practice did not reach the mythical heights often depicted during 
the sixties and seventies. The structured potentiality for a pervasive change in 
teaching practices remained unexploited. The purpose of this chapter is briefly to 
sketch out the concatenation of factors that facilitated the swift destruction of this 
potentiality during the eighties. Structurally, the education system did not undergo 
any notable morphogenesis. The Labour government's circular on comprehensive 
reorganisation 10165 was simply a request to local authorities - there was no 
statutory obligation until 1976. Yet here the teachers' unions, the Local 
Authorities, the Labour Party and the then Department for Education and Science 
(DES) did not individually (or collectively) provide a coherent strategy. Indeed, 
the tendency to portray that 1965 circular, like the Plowden Report, as a decisive 
turning point masks the extent of continuity. As Ball puts it, 'In contrast to the 
comprehensive movement the Conservatives have successfully managed to 
integrate and maintain and manage a high degree of contradiction and incoherence 
within their critical educational discourse' (1990: 31). 
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Ball's comment upon the Conservatives' successful ability to play down CS 
divisions in order to maintain a united (S-C) front is paralleled by the international 
progressive movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries discussed 
in Chapter 3. The salient point here is that the Conservatives, like the progressives, 
recognised their objective common ground. This is in stark contrast to the teachers. 
Minority dissension fuelled internecine conflict, particularly over the role of 
education in maintaining the capitalist status quo, which should have been quickly 
nipped in the bud. The lack of concerted corporate activity was typified by the 
Tyndale affair. The chance provided by Tyndale to spell out, defend and maintain 
the nature of progressive theory and practice was lost: the NUT's stance was 
reactionary and there were divisions within and between teaching unions. In a 
nutshell, there was no proactive attempt both prior to and after the Tyndale affair to 
mount an articulate defence of the Plowden philosophy. In fairness, however, the 
economic recession (1973-5) exacerbated by the oil crisis, and the sustained attacks 
played by the media during and after the Tyndale affair, were factors beyond the 
control of teachers. But bearing this in mind, it still remains that delimited 
opportunities were not exploited. If anything, the Tyndale affair highlighted the 
misunderstood nature of child-centred or progressive philosophy, particularly the 
elision of the abstract and the concrete (children qua children and the structural 
context within which they are taught). Nevertheless, the OPEC oil crisis exposed 
for many the underlying weaknesses of Keynesian social democracy. These years 
provided the fertile soil for the widespread dissemination of right-wing ideas. As 
Chitty notes, the post-war welfare consensus 'relied on an increasing prosperity for 
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any success it might have had in creating a semblance of social unity; and when 
that prosperity disintegrated, so, too, did the consensus... [T]he Keynesian 
approach... simply could not cope with the economic shocks and adjustment 
problems of the 1970s' (1994: 12). The inability to cope with the economic crisis 
and the concomitant need to tighten the budgetary belt furnished the ideational 
backdrop to the 1990s 'New Managerialism', with its emphasis on 'value for 
money' (that is, more for lesS). 37 It does not provide the ingredient 'new', since 
this denotes the entrepreneurial aspect of eighties managerialism that has its origins 
in the Hayekian inflection of 'Thatcherism'. 
That the teachers did not fight the right-wing onslaught during the late sixties 
and seventies simply attests to its failure to exercise agency at various levels. To 
reiterate, there were factors that by no means facilitated corporate collective action 
yet at the same time the structural conditions (curriculum autonomy, parliamentary 
representation, 'liberal' union leadership, higher education expansion ... ) could 
have been exploited in the battle against the anti-progressive critique. The extreme 
views and activities of the key players in the Tyndale affair were not symptomatic 
of the majority of teachers yet the NUT simply engaged in a process of muted 
distancing. However, notwithstanding the dominance of the education philosophers 
in higher education that undermined Piagetian psychology, and the generic lack of 
progressive practice, exponents of child-centred practice came under attack from 
such Black Paper authors as Rhodes Boyson and the right-wing dominated media. 
37 As Lowe notes, after the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement in 1971, Britain suffered as much 'and 
probably more than any of the developed countries from the effects of the rise in world oil prices which 
began in 1973 and from the downturn in world trade which resulted' (1997: 24). 
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Moreover, they had to contend with the concurrent ramifications of Callaghan's 
1976 Ruskin Speech. In essence, the Ruskin speech was the turning point for 
teacher autonomy: at the S-C level it widened and legitimated a fundamental 
questioning the power of teachers to determine curriculum, assessment and 
pedagogy. 38 The Tyndale affair was a potential (yet missed) opportunity for the 
teaching profession to address the widely propagated extreme nature of the Tyndale 
protagonists and to point to the improvements brought about by progressive 
practice, whilst at the same time extracting and accentuating the policy 
inconsistencies that constituted the (CS) corpus of the 'New Right'. Ruskin 
ultimately destroyed the teachers' already-precarious potential to rebut the anti- 
progressive onslaught. 
Tyndale, the media and progressivism 
'Head who thought writing was obsolete' (Daily Mail, 1975). 'Who can mediate in 
the class warT (77te Guardian, 1975). 'Trotskyist Teachers' Warning to Parents' 
(Evening News, 1975). Such were the populist headlines during the Tyndale affair. 
If an effective riposte to the media onslaught were to be provided, then clearly 
corporate agential activity would be no easy ride. But, at the same time, 
circumstances were not such that the Orwellian spectre can be invoked to show that 
matters were a foregone conclusion. As already mentioned, the NUT stance was 
essentially reactive. There was a failure to take advantage of, inter alia, the 1972 
HMI Report that commented favourably on the work being carried out in a large 
38 At this stage - indeed up to the few years prior to promulgation of the 1988 Act - Taylorist curriculum 
structures were not on the agenda. That control was to be wrested from the teachers did not entail strictly 
managerialist approaches to the curriculum and tests. 
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sample of open-plan schools, despite their minority status, and the 1975 Bullock 
Report, which failed to substantiate media claims that standards were falling in 
primary schools. However, the purpose of this chapter is not to detail the variety of 
'what ifs' and the structural -cum-cultural potentialities they embodied. The 
importance of the Tyndale affair lies in its role as the catalyst for the Ruskin 
speech. Specifically, the media-led frenzy coincided with both the appointment of 
James Callaghan as Prime Minister following the resignation of Harold Wilson in 
March 1976 and the pressing problem of inflation (then running at 21 per cent). The 
economic crisis stringently shaped the Labour government's agenda, whereby such 
issues as progressivism would have been at best played down or more likely 
dismissed. Such contingencies as the role of the Down Street Policy Unit and 
Callaghan's personality further reduced the negotiating strength of the teachers. 
The William Tyndale junior and infants schools were located in the St 
Mary's Ward of inner-city Islington. They were also based near the home of most 
national newspapers, Fleetstreet. The saga began in the spring of 1973 with the 
resignation of the incumbent headteacher of the junior school. Terry Ellis took up 
the post in January 1974. Within two terms, the school had hit crisis point. How 
was this possible within such a short period of time? One needs to examine the 
crucial role played by a recent appointee, Brian Haddow, a part-time teacher, Mrs 
Walker, and Terry Ellis. Brian Haddow took up his post in January 1974 and the 
acting head, Mrs Chowles, returned to her post of deputy. Supported by Brian 
Haddow, the head initiated a series of debates about the function of schools in 
society and teaching methods. Divergent views were expressed about whether the 
180 
role of education was to provide working-class children with generic life-skills, or 
whether it was merely a means for ensuring that children conformed to the status 
quo. The left-wing connotations were deliberate. There were heated disagreements 
about how the school should be run and also the decision-making mechanisms in 
place for staff as a group. Mr Ellis wanted to widen school democracy and 
suggested that the position of headteacher should be abolished and decision-making 
handed over to staff. Whilst majority decision-making mechanisms were not 
established, teachers who opposed Mr Ellis were marginalised. In fact, Mr Ellis 
informed the deputy that her role was no longer of any significance and ostracised 
Mrs Walker. 
In the second half of the first term, Mr Haddow, following Mr Ellis's 
approval, introduced a twenty activities options scheme for his class. The scheme 
was meant to promote freedom of choice and individualised learning, in turn 
promoting self-motivated active learners. But, as Riley notes, 'the options scheme, 
as many of the other changes at Tyndale, was poorly planned and badly executed. 
Neither parents, nor other teachers in the school had been informed, or involved in 
the reorganization (despite the commitment to democracy)' (1998: 24). However, 
there were some notable successes, epitomised by the winning of an ILEA prize for 
excellence. Indeed, reading levels improved substantially. Yet at the same time 
schisms deepened. The issue of democracy hit the agenda once more, and some 
staff wanted to open the staff room to children in order to remove barriers. There 
were thus two camps - those who wanted to promote freedom and choice and 
expression and those who wanted to promote basic skills and discipline. There was 
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also a third, minority group of staff that simply withdrew altogether. 
Notwithstanding the deep chasm that was by now firmly entrenched at Tyndale, all 
staff were united in the need to develop a new reading scheme. However, as 
already noted, the new scheme was inadequately planned and beyond the 
experience of a number of staff. 
Criticisms began to erupt from a range of sources during that summer term. 
Critics included Miss Hart (headteacher of the infant school) who was 
concerned about the breakdown of behaviour of children in the junior school. 
Mr Ellis rejected Miss Hart's criticism on the grounds that 'she had sold out 
to the middle classes'... The district inspector received further complaints 
about the school and discussed these with Mr Ellis but the situation continued 
to deteriorate... (Riley 1998: 28, emphasis added). 
In May 1974 Mrs Walker called a Parents' Evening and produced a paper 
'Commentary on William Tyndale School'. She also produced another paper, 'A 
Criticism of the "Free Choice" method of education based on total children's rights 
as William Tyndale Junior School'. This paper was subsequently identified as part 
of the Black Paperite tradition. Importantly, she met up with Rhodes Boyson MP. 
Rhodes Boyson viewed the Tyndale affair as a direct result of the activities of a 
left-wing clique within the NUT - 'head-bangers concerned with ending the 
system... ' (cited in Riley 1998: 29). Whilst Mrs Walker's involvement led some 
staff at Tyndale to talk of a right-wing conspiracy, equally on the other side of the 
bank, Mr Ellis and his colleagues viewed education as means to tackling social 
disadvantage. The Auld Inquiry (set up to investigate the Tyndale affair) concluded 
that Mr Ellis and Mr Haddow encouraged staff to adopt progressive teaching 
methods. For Rhodes Boyson, however, progressive education was anathema: 
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Often you can define something most clearly by defining the opposite. The 
opposite of progressive education is structured education where the teacher is 
a teacher and he comes into the classroom and he says 'sit down' and the 
pupils all sit down facing the right way, and he says, 'we are doing this and 
you are going to learn something'... The opposite is the idea like a bud of a 
flower, almost 'Rousseauesque' that all you need to do is free people and they 
will then become the learners themselves. The child is desperate for 
knowledge and development, and thus you do not have a structure for 
learning. Each child does what it wants to do, possibly playing table tennis 
with another in the corridor to disrupt everyone else in the school... (BBC 
1989, taken from Riley 1998: 3 1). 
Although this extract is from an interview in 1989, its central criticism was widely 
espoused by Boyson and his Black Paper colleagues during this period. The crude 
structured versus unstructured dichotomy certainly had populist appeal, but failed 
to acknowledge one of Rousseau's key points, namely the subtle structuring of 
leaming experiences by the teacher. Here the power of media lies in its role of 
information provider, a role that is quintessentially non-neutral. Those parents 
who, for whatever reasons, do not possess knowledge of germane components of 
the CS register rely upon the media as the only source of reliable information. The 
political hue of the medium means that selectivity will take a particular form. 
Necessarily the nature of the medium entails that not everything can be reported. 
Moreover, the political dimension enjoins a specific form of filtering of the fraction 
of information to be provided. 39 
However, the ambiguous, almost non-existent nature of school governance 
per se became an important focus during (and, indeed, after) the affair. Pursuant to 
39 As Sealey (1994) rightly notes, complexity does not have populist appeal and is difficult to condense into 
newspaper headlines. Although ahead of our time, Sealey writes of the LINC (Language in the National 
Curriculum) controversy during the early nineties in the following terms: 'The LINC controversy is only 
one example of the compression of complex educational issues into binary opposite slogans: real books 
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the 1944 Education Act, local authorities were obliged to appoint school managers, 
although there was no requirement to appoint managers for individual schools. As 
Tomlinson (1993) notes, by the mid-1960s only 21 out of 78 county boroughs had 
established governing bodies for each school. It was Tyndale that led to a 
fundamental questioning of the nature and extent of school governance. Two 
governors tried unsuccessfully to clarify their role and powers with the ILEA in 
July 1974. It was made clear, however, by an ILEA politician that, whilst it was 
acceptable for governors to ask the head for information, they could not tell the 
head what to do. In the event, then, the ILEA provided insufficient guidance. 
Nevertheless, the school's managers continued to campaign for ILEA intervention. 
Informally, they used the Labour Party in order to bring their concerns to the 
attention of County Hall. Again, the ILEA failed to act. On this occasion, a petition 
was organised. In response, the staff at Tyndale appealed to the ELEA for help 
against the managers. Matters escalated and the teachers refused to allow managers 
to visit the school during school hours. Physical debarment led some managers to 
involve the national press. The chair of the managers described the teachers' ban in 
the following terms: 
The whole concept of the managerial system is under attack. The authority 
must decide the relationship of managers vis-A-vis the school. It is extremely 
shortsighted of teachers not to allow managers in on the education of 
children. You cannot sweep things under the carpet (The Times, 1975, cited 
in Riley). 
versus phonics; abstract theory versus practical training; trendy experiments versus the traditional basics' 
(1994: 133). 
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When staff refused a suggestion by the =A that the infant and junior 
schools be inspected, an inspection was ordered. In response to this order, the staff 
went on strike and opened an alternative school in a neighbouring building, where 
they continued to teach for two weeks with 24 pupils. The Inspectorate produced 
an interim report and the chair of the governors passed it on to the press ('Rebel 
School is Slammed, School of Shame' was one of the headlines). The following 
week the teachers returned to Tyndale, co-operated in the inspection and agreed to 
give evidence at the public inquiry. 
At the heart of the Tyndale affair was the extent and nature of 
progressivism. Riley notes that the analysis of progressivism resonates well with 
Sharp and Green's (1975) critique. In brief, both emphasised its (ostensible) 
voluntarism and individualism, which thus constituted a new form of (state 
capitalist) social control. Riley argues that the Tyndale staff 'failed to reconcile 
their aspirations with the practical realities of planning, progression and challenge 
and to accept that boundaries need to be set... ' (1998: 33). Yet I would argue that it 
is not about the unavoidability of reconciling progressivism with planning, 
progression and challenge since the latter are constitutive of it. Indeed, as we saw 
in the last chapter, Plowden was emphatic about the need for careful monitoring 
and record keeping. As Peter Wilby noted, schools such as Prior Weston primary 
school in London were exemplars of progressive teaching at the time because they 
recognised that 'informal teaching requires hard work, careful preparation, skill, 
patience and good record-keeping' (Riley 1998: 41). 
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At the S-C level progressivism was identified with left-wing and/or 
extreme radicalism. As Jones puts it: 
Despite its diverseness, it can still be termed a modernizing tendency of a 
broadly left-wing kind. In the 1920s - its classical period - it had been 
critical of 'industrial society' and social authoritarianism. As taken up in the 
1960s by promoters of reform, it added to these commitments a concern to 
eradicate educational disadvantage (1991: 89). 
Yet the reason for its critical stance vis-A-vis 'industrial society' stems not from 
industrialism per se but from its disrespect for the nature of children qua children. 
In other words, in order for children to become equipped for their lives as adults, 
the industrialist logic should be kept at bay until that time. Progressivism abstracts 
from concrete social reality the cognitive capacities and stages of children qua 
children. That such abstract needs are, at the concrete level, contradicted, 
denigrated or denied must not be confused. However, such confusion, as discussed 
in Chapter 3, led to a shift of focus from children to the nature of 'social class' 
inequality. In their misguided quest to improve the lot of their working-class 
children, the radicals at Tyndale lost metaphysical sight of the young pupils in their 
charge. The fact that children need structured routines that underpin staged 
autonomous development is contingently related to any external (in)congruent 
influences. 
In October 1975 Robin Auld QC was appointed to conduct a public 
inquiry into the teaching, organisation and management of William Tyndale junior 
and infant schools. At the same time no one anticipated the duration and 
widespread publicity. The inquiry opened on 27 October 1975 and continued until 
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10 February 1976, with almost daily press coverage. Evidence was heard from 107 
witnesses and six hundred documents were submitted in written evidence. Eleven 
barristers in all represented the various parties at the Inquiry. The teachers were 
criticised for their lack of planning and unresponsiveness to parents. Equally, the 
local authority was criticised for having no policies on attainment standards and for 
failing to intervene at an earlier stage. Despite criticism of the governors, it was the 
local authority that took the brunt, particularly over its not having established a 
framework of governance that could deal with such events as Tyndale. As Riley 
rightly argues, the two-year power struggle at Tyndale brought into sharp relief the 
question of school governance: 
It created demands for a clearer settlement between local authorities, teachers, 
school governors and parents. It raised issues about teacher professionalism, 
the autonomy of headteachers, the authority of governors and the rights of 
parents... Tyndale also demonstrated conflicting definitions of progressive 
education and differing interpretations of the needs and aspirations of 
working-class children (Riley 1998: 50). 
Again, the fact that Tyndale teachers were dealing with working-class 
children evinces the complex nature of concrete social reality through which 
progressivism must navigate. Furthermore, the critical role of the media must not 
be underestimated. The Daily Mail, for instance, changed the wording of a 
quotation from William Blake that Mr Haddow had written on the blackboard. 
Instead of "The tigers of wrath are wiser than the horses of instruction", Mrs 
Chowles and Mrs Walker maintained that Mr Haddow had written "The tigers of 
destruction are stronger than the horses of instruction". Yet the quotation 
metamorphosed further in the Daily Mail, as "The smile on the face of the tiger is 
revolution". Clearly, the quotation was 'reworked' in order to fan the flames of 
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suspicion; namely that Mr Haddow was attempting to indoctrinate children in his 
charge. Part and parcel of any S-C strategy embroiled in the throes of a 
competitive contradiction (right versus left ... ) is to attempt to naturalise one's 
propositional corpus. Consequently, Mr Haddow and Mr Ellis's ideas were seen as 
(malignly) ideological, whereas the views of the Black Paper authors were 
presented as an objective, natural view of the world. 
One of the key weaknesses identified by Auld centred on the lack of 
criteria against which to judge the 'effectiveness' of a school following 
disagreement between heads and the local Inspectorate. (Without lapsing into 
teleology here, one can start to pinpoint the origins of the OFSTED inspection 
regime. ) In essence, Tyndale was taken up by the right-wing press as a 'loony-left' 
manifestation of a pervasive educational phenomenon, despite the fact that Tyndale 
practices were at odds with the majority of successful progressive developments in 
London and elsewhere. 40 For critics it exemplified the need not only for a clearer 
articulation of the teacher-parent-local authority relationship but also for a 
concomitant change in the nature of political control. 
40 In a 1989 BBC interview, Rhodes Boyson referred to Tyndale as evidence of the supremacy of 
progressive education. 'Colleges of education... were turning people about with a sort of liberation, the 
equivalent in religion to a theology... Suddenly ILEA [Inner London Education Authority] did not like it, 
and it was a turning point' (cited in Riley 1998: 53). Yet the supremacy of progressive practice was 
mythical and, as we saw in Chapter 3, colleges of education confronted the antithesis of progressivism in 
the form of the education philosophers' S-C ascendancy. That Tyndale was a turning point is correct, for 
reasons to be discussed shortly. 
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The effects of Tyndale: Callaghan's Ruskin speech and the failure of 
agency 
The extent and nature of press coverage of the Tyndale affair meant that the Labour 
government could not escape it. During the affair Callaghan was Foreign 
Secretary, yet upon becoming Prime Minister the affair hit the headlines again 
following the publication of the findings of the Auld Inquiry. In July 1976, The 
Stinday Telegraph's headlines were "Save Our Children"; The Sunday Times "How 
to Control the Teachers"; The Evening Standard referred to the teaching staff as 
"The Classroom Despots". When questioned in 1996, Callaghan said that 'I was 
determined that the Tories were not going to line us up with Tyndale... and every 
idiotic teacher who was sympathetic to the Labour Party' (Taken from Riley 
1998: 58). Moreover, he commented that: 
I was concerned with what was being said to me in the constituency about 
literacy and numeracy, not exactly in those terms but people were talking to 
me about those things. Some parents were expressing disquiet as to whether 
their children were being taught or not, because of the child-centred 
approach... There was a feeling of dissatisfaction. The 1944 Settlement 
seemed to be getting frayed at the edges, particularly by the activity of the 
unions... The Tyndale school was rattling on, getting a lot of publicity and 
that wasn't doing the teaching profession any good... The Government could 
not escape its responsibility. I was also talking to the CBI about those battles 
and they were coniplaining about the quality of the school... I spoke with 
Bernard Donoughue as I was looking for themes which I could take up as 
Prime Minister... (Riley 1998: 59, emphasis added). 
The issue of 'the child-centred approach' caused the Labour Party leadership 
much embarrassment (Chitty 1994). Such embarrassment stemmed from the 
association of the party in the eyes of the public (whipped up by a predominantly 
Tory press) with putative progressive education, in particular the antipathy towards 
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hierarchy and inequality. Yet, as I have argued, the issue of inequality was 
(unhelpfully) conjoined with the Rousseauesque underpinning of the progressive 
philosophy. The first three Black Papers were published in 1969 and 1970 and 
basically recommended formal teaching in primary schools and emphasised the 
high standards held to be coterminous with graminar-school education. Chitty 
notes that it was only the last two Black Papers published in 1975 and 1977 (Cox 
and Boyson, 1975,1977) that support was given to the introduction of educational 
vouchers and increasing the scope for parental choice of schools. 'By the mid- 
1970s, the politics of reaction had been replaced by the politics of reconstruction' 
(1994: 14). Chitty maintains that Rhodes Boyson's triumphalism was not 
unfounded. In May 1976, at a meeting of the National Council for Education 
Standards, he was quoted as saying that: 'The forces of the Right in education are 
on the offensive. The blood is flowing from the other side now' (Chitty 1994: 15). 
Chitty points to the remarkable extent of right-wing success in seeing the legislative 
realisation of its ideas. Part of the success is attributable*to the changing patterns of 
decision-making since the mid-1970s. 
The nature of decision-making will be discussed in a moment. Clearly, 
the role of Callaghan himself is equally as important as the position he holds and 
the powers it affords, as well as the jockeying for favour by right- and left-wing 
pressure groups. There was a corporate (teacher) failure to pinpoint and 
consolidate the propositional nature of child-centred philosophy, which is 
contingently related to the nature of structured inequalities (even though the latter 
may affect the practical realisation of the former). Silver (1994) has emphasised 
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the lethargy of progressive educators and their lack of discursive penetration in 
dismissing the Black Paperites and the media-fuelled momentum during and after 
Tyndale. As he rightly notes, 'progressive' education is shorthand for a range of 
positions and that homogeneity has never characterised the progressive movement 
of the twentieth century. In the 1960s and 1970s progressive educators were 
involved in, inter alia, curriculum refonri, the development of new pedagogies, the 
exposure of educational and social inequalities, the explanation of disadvantage and 
underachievement. Nevertheless, from the 1960s 
The progressive movement gradually lost its sources of energy, failing to see 
through its inertia the strength of emergent conservative values and policies. 
In Britain as in many other countries progressive educators failed to see not 
only the seriousness of the challenge of traditionalist view, but also the 
changing economic circumstances that would make them more assertive and 
acceptable (Silver 1994: 154). 
The response to the Black Papers was a m6lange of derision, silence and an 
expectation that the threat would quickly dissipate. Silver concludes that 
progressive education had become so self-assured to the extent that it no longer felt 
the need seriously to defend extant positions and practices. That there was a failure 
of agency is undeniable. I would only wish to add that practically minded 
progressive educators were essentially a minority phenomenon. However, Silver's 
point about agential failure to act indicates the extent to which a degree of freedom 
existed but remained unexploited. Such delimited freedom, of course, was 
41 
audaciously transformed into stringent constraint within a relatively short period . 
41 Similarly, Lowe, in discussing the Black Paper attack on progressivism and the impact of 
comprehensivisation, argues that the greatest significance of the Black Papers lay in the fact that they began 
to articulate a Conservative philosophy in an area hitherto monopolised by socialist and social democratic 
writers. Moreover, he accentuates the insularity of the Left: 'Trapped in the conviction of their own 
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Donoughue and the Downing Street Policy Unit 
The Downing Street Policy Unit was a creation of Harold Wilson in 1974, shortly 
after the Conservative electoral defeat. It was headed by Dr Bernard Donoughue 
and in the first five years of its existence was described by Hennessy as 'a prime- 
ministerial cabinet in all but name' (cited in Chitty 1994: 15). Donoughue was 
acutely aware of the potential role of the Unit in influencing the Prime Minister. It 
was Donoughue who argued that the Labour Government had to respond to the 
Conservative charge of declining educational standards. By the mid-1970s, the 
Government was looking perilously vulnerable on this issue, and there was scant 
evidence of a genuine concern to mitigate public disquiet. The resignation of 
Harold Wilson provided Donoughue with the opportunity to make education a 
major issue of concern. Consequently, he sent Callaghan an extensive 
memorandum in April 1976 suggesting that he raise publicly the issue of declining 
educational standards. This resonated with Callaghan's own concerns and 
prejudices about child-centred education. As Chitty notes, essentially the Policy 
Unit wanted to use the Prime Minister as a lever in forcing the DES to adopt a more 
interventionist stance in policy-making. 
According to Donoughue, the teachers' unions had made no effort to stem 
the influence of militants and progressives, thereby downgrading any concern with 
developing children's skills and aptitudes. Donoughue also maintained that young 
people were not being trained in job-seeking skills. This is congruent with 
intellectual superiority, the supporters of comprehensivisation grossly underestimated the extent to which 
these authors preyed on the fears of the new middle classes... ' (1997: 153). 
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Callaghan's interview excerpt above. Furthermore, however, Donoughue's 
proposed solution was for (central) government to make teachers more accountable 
to politicians, employers and parents. Yet, note Donoughue's elision of militancy 
and progressivism. To reiterate, militancy in this context is associated with the 
political left and therefore is not necessarily tied to progressivism (in the abstract). 
Indeed, whilst advocates of progressivism would campaign for structures and 
curricula that focus on the child qua child, it - does not enjoin that unequal 
employment structures be abolished or remedied, etc., as a necessary concomitant. 
Both progressive practitioners and the teaching unions did not unpack this elision. 
Callaghan took it at face value, embraced Donoughue's analysis of the problems 
facing education and welcomed the idea of making an important speech at the 
earliest opportunity. 
The securing of the replacement of Sir William Pile by James Hamilton as 
Permanent Secretary at the DES in June 1976 signalled the growing importance of 
the role of the Policy Unit. It was the Unit that was responsible for drafting the 
questions to be asked of Fred Mulley by Callaghan at an important Downing Street 
interview and for co-ordinating the various drafts of the speech on educational 
standards that was later delivered by Callaghan at Ruskin College, Oxford, in 
October that year. The 1977 Green Paper was a direct result of Ruskin, though its 
final contents did not match the degree of challenge that Donoughue had wanted. 
During 1976-7, the DES produced a 63-page confidential document known as the 
Yellow Book. It was commissioned by Callaghan and reported on the education 
system. The Yellow Book was against the notion of inspection and overall was 
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positive, suggesting that some issues needed addressing and clarifying, particularly 
in relation to the Schools Council and issues vis-a-vis preparation for work. 
Certain sections of the document were leaked to 77ze Guardian and The Times. 
Donoughue was especially keen that Callaghan's speech emphasise the need to 
improve standards and the issue of teacher accountability. As Chitty points out, the 
Ruskin speech was indeed an important development - 
both for what it chose to highlight and expand upon and on account of its 
peculiar origins... it seems clear that the early months of the 1976-9 
Callaghan administration can be recognized as the first occasion when a body 
of influential advisers operating outside the normal policy-making networks 
played a major role in determining the future direction of government 
education policy. By the spring of 1976 Donoughue was anxious to 
circumvent the teachers' unions, the local authorities and, above all, the civil 
servants of the DES. Callaghan's new concern with value for money and his 
fear of the populist appeal of the opposition campaign on standards meant 
that he was not prepared to rely solely on the DES for strategic advice 
(1994: 19). 
Under the new Permanent Secretary at the DES, James Hamilton, civil 
servants developed a new interest in policy, efficiency and the need to make 
effective use of limited resources (as a result of the deepening economic crisis). At 
the same time, it was widely accepted by both civil servants and politicians that 
there had to be greater control of education, especially the secondary curriculum, in 
order to improve standards and that teachers had their role to play in improving 
relations between education and industry. Crucially, after 1976, partnership was 
replaced by accountability as the dominant metaphor vis-ý-vis the distribution of 
power in the education system (idem. ). The role of the Policy Unit played an even 
bigger role in the development of education policy following the election success of 
the Conservatives in 1979 and is therefore crucial in accounting for, but not 
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determining, the 1988 Reform Act. The role of personality cannot be subsumed 
under some all-embracing logic of capital, since counterfactually Callaghan's 
personal predilection and prejudices might have been diametrically opposed to the 
views of Donoughue and Hamilton. Indeed, pace Dale, that Kenneth Baker's 
equally highly personalistic imprint on the 1988 Education Reform Act was 
(contradictorily) supportive of 'New Right' philosophy does not lend credence to 
any logic-of-capital teleology. The contingent nature of the complementarity of 
viewpoints cannot be accommodated by the over-arching emphasis accorded to the 
'Capital Relation'. However, we shall return to the role of the Policy Unit and the 
use of 'New Right' ideas in the next chapter. In brief, Ruskin was a defining 
moment, since 'it raised issues of accountability and control and echoed some of 
the concerns of the Black Papers... it represented for Labour a shift to the Right in 
thinking about education' (Riley 1998: 66). 
The economicfactor 
Callaghan's concern with 'value for money' is inextricably bound up with the 
economic crisis; a crisis that was exacerbated by Britain's weak underlying 
industrial base, which, in turn, necessitated fiscal belt-tightening. Yet, to reiterate, 
the consequences of crisis were not inevitable. There was no capitalist-determined 
cure-all. The reasons for the crisis and, in particular, the reality of Britain's 
precarious situation vis-a-vis the rest of the world were incorrectly diagnosed, 
thereby fuelling and buttressing the anti-progressive onslaught. However, a flavour 
of the extent of the changes in policy-making is readily gleaned by the strategies 
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delineated in a section from the 1977 Green paper for improving school-to-work 
relations. 'School and working life' emphasised a 
basic understanding of the economy and the activities, especially 
manufacturing industry, which are necessary for the creation of Britain's 
national wealth. It is an important task of secondary schools to develop this 
understanding, and opportunities for its development should be offered to 
pupils of all abilities. These opportunities are needed not only by young 
people who have careers in industry later but perhaps even more by those 
who may work elsewhere, so that the role of industry becomes soundly 
appreciated by society in general (1977). 
The 1977 Green paper was part of the flurry of documents produced during 
the so-called 'Great Debate' unleashed by Ruskin. Yet the positively idealist 
fallacy underpinning the need for a greater understanding of industry is hardly new. 
During the 1880s or the 1920s, the economy was crucial in the focusing of attention 
on the purpose, content and outcomes of the education system (Silver 1994). In his 
Ruskin speech, Callaghan emphasised that schools should play a more conspicuous 
and integral part in preparing pupils for working life as a key to economic 
development. The idealist fallacy lies in the widely endorsed notion that a swift 
dose of technological-cum-scientific understanding, mixed with some time spent 
gaining work experience, would regenerate Britain's declining economy, as if 
knowledge of the intricacies of corporate banking endows one with a steady flow of 
cash! Yet while it might be possible to make a case that formal education systems 
can help set the scene for technological innovation and concomitant economic 
development, 'in reality the transformations which have revolutionised world and 
national economies have taken place outside formal education systems... school 
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systems may reflect economic and technological change but are unlikely to play 
much part in generating it' (Lowe 1997: 25). 
What did not help the progressive cause was its alleged anti-industrialist 
bias (see, for example, Mathieson and Bernbaum (1988)). But, as already 
discussed, this approach, grounded in a historiographical tradition of blaming 
'English culture' and the educational system for Britain's economic decline, is an 
elision. As Ahier rightly notes, the most effective development of progressivism 
took the form of a child-centredness 'which was built on notions of the nature of 
childhood and its stages' (1991: 131). Culture-as-the-cause advocates generally 
adduce (school) history textbooks as exemplary. of the 'British disease'. Yet for 
young children in particular it was thought that because such children cannot grasp 
the abstractions of money, markets, capital, investment and profit, the development 
of capitalism had to be 'dumbed down' for them (Ahier 1991). It has been argued 
that against a background of political attempts to make British industrialists more 
accountable to the state and their employees, the industrialists turned such demands 
on to the teachers (Beck 1983). However, as Ahier rightly argues, notwithstanding 
the plausibility (or otherwise) of Beck's argument, the very notions of a national 
economy and a 'national culture' are somewhat questionable, both in those 
accounts that blamed the schools and culture for the economic decline and those 
which blamed the industrialists themselves. As he puts it: 
At a time when the economy seems to open, so easily influenced by the 
strength or weakness of the American dollar, so penetrated by manufacturing 
imports, and so dependent on decisions by multi-national companies based 
both in the UK and elsewhere, the appeal of a thesis which keeps 
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explanations of economic failure and future success within national 
boundaries is reassuring to many. Plus, when the explanation requires a 
revised national culture, enshrined, perhaps, in a national curriculum and 
prompted by the spread of enterprise initiatives, then it is truly comforting 
(Ahier 1991: 134). 
The continuing onslaught: Bennett on 'ineffective progressive methods' 
However, given that the economy was in dire straits, the concurTent 'evidence' of 
ineffective progressive teaching methods was a veritable godsend for critics of 
progressivism and the Right in general to posit a causal link. (In reality, of course, 
we are dealing with a corTelation, which does not pretend to any necessary causal 
relationship. ) In 1976, at the time of Tyndale and Ruskin, Neville Bennett and 
colleagues published what was, according to Silver (1994), probably the most 
talked-about educational book of the decade in Britain. Teaching Styles and Pupil 
Progress focused on the 'effectiveness' of different teaching approaches. The 
overriding message of the book, gladly disseminated by a sympathetic media, was 
that progressive methods simply did not work. Bennett was well aware that his 
findings would be disturbing to many parents and teachers. The findings 
documented that in reading, the pupils of 'formal' and 'mixed' teachers progressed 
more than those of 'informal' teachers, with some four to five months' difference in 
attainment. In mathematics, 'formally' taught pupils were superior vis-A-vis 
'informal' and 'mixed' styles of teaching. It was reported that 'the teaching 
approaches advocated by the Plowden Report, and many of the educational 
advisory staff and college lecturers, often result in poorer academic progress, 
particularly among high ability children' (cited in Silver 1994: 90). 
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However, a project carried out by researchers at Leicester University 
contested Teaching Styles and Pupil Progress. It pointed to the classroom 
management problems that resulted from Plowden recommendations in classes of 
30 or more. Moreover, the research was unequivocal in its view that progressive 
teaching hardly existed in practice. A few years later, a re-cxamination of Bennett 
et al's data found significant methodological weaknesses. Nevertheless, the 
importance of Teaching Styles and Pupil Progress lies in the mcdia-directed attack 
on progressivism and its pressing for the superiority of formal teaching methods at 
the primary level. And, as should be clear from the foregoing, they were not short 
on ammunition. Following Tyndale, Auld, Ruskin, The Yellow Book and Bennett, 
the anti-progressivist offensive continued unabated. In March 1977 a BBC 
Panorama programme attacked the Faraday Comprehensive school in West 
London. The programme conveyed the impression that schools in general were 
undisciplined, poorly organised, thereby contributing to Britain's dire economic 
situation. More important, however, is that by the time of this programme, parental 
choice, a national curriculum, testing at ages seven, eleven and fourteen, the 
publication of test results and an emphasis on the core curriculum were being 
articulated as key components in educational policy. 
Indeed, as Lowe (1997) notes, this was the juncture at which 'New Right' 
thinking began to permeate the Conservative Party as a whole. Boyson used the 
Conservative Political Centre as a base from which to publish such pamphlets as 
Parental Choice (1975), which was aimed at grassroots; Tory supporters. The 
Centre for Policy Studies, set up in 1974 by Keith Joseph and Margaret Thatcher, 
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promptly became a key focus for these ideas. By 1975 the Conservative Research 
Department's journal began to echo the ideas of the Black Papers and in the same 
year the so-called pressure group IT-VER began to lobby actively for the use of 
vouchers in education, drawing its inspiration from ideas first voiced by Milton 
Friedman in 1955. Consequently, 'Thatcher's assumption of tile leadership of the 
party in the same year meant that any future Conservative administration would 
have the question of educational reforiii at the heart of its agenda and would be 
sympathetic to this lobbying' (Lowe 1997: 156). In a nutshell, New Right concerns 
were reflected on a daily basis. The 1977 Taylor Report called for closer parental 
involvement in the running of schools (although it was not until the 1980 Education 
Act that LEAs were required to make such provisions). Furthermore, the focus of 
the British research community had shifted somewhat by the end of the decade, too. 
As Silver notes, economic stringency, inflation and poor industrial performance 
were central to the emergence of accountability and standards as central themes of 
policy discourse, and to an accelerating search for a common curriculum. 'By 
1979... a research emphasis on 'the assessment of performance' and testing was 
strong, including controversy over the nature and role of evaluation... These 
preoccupations were to be important in the new policy climate created by the 
Conservative government in the 1980s' (Silver 1994: 91). Such preoccupations are 
part of the focus of the next chapter. Indeed, the education research community 
now finds itself divided and subject to internecine debate. Specifically, there is a 
significant proportion of university academics and researchers who have provided, 
and continue to provide, the impetus for an international school effectiveness 
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movement, whose ideological import is indisputable (Willmott 1999c). Such 
rescarch is intimately allied to past Conservative and present Labour policy, 
particularly its links with OFSTED. 
However, in 1978 an NFER (National Foundation for Educational Research) 
study Sources of Difference in School Achievement undertaken by Alan Brimer and 
colleagues highlighted the methodological problems of measuring effectiveness and 
the failure of large-scale surveys to indicate whether children benefit from school. 
The study also looked at the relative importance of home and school and tile 
differential impact of schools. Silver is surprised by the study's lack of impact. 
Yet agential failure has been the hallmark of the teachers' unions and the Labour 
Party itself. The importance of the Ruskin and the Great Debate lies in the change 
of political context, namely one that increasingly demanded restrictions on teacher 
autonomy. As Bates puts it: 
The Great Debate reflected a trend towards defining and limiting the 
boundaries of teacher autonomy. The very initiation of a public debate on 
education, involving tile unprecedented consultation of industrial 
organizations and parents as well as educational organizations, served as an 
explicit reminder to the teaching profession ... that the curriculum was not 
solely their responsibility to determine (1984: 199). 
It would be tempting to suggest that the death of child-centred philosophy and its 
minority practising status was complete by the end of 1976. (Its death is 
metaphorical, of course, since its CS status precludes ontological erasure. ) Yet 
despite the call for circumscribing teacher autonomy, a core national curriculum - 
which would be more attuned to the world of work - and making teachers 
accountable to parents and the state (read: more for less in climate of economic 
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stringency), the child-centred approach was not denied any role. Undeniably there 
were strong voices in the Conservative Party and especially in its affiliated think 
tanks that wanted a 'return' to 'traditional methods'. But as Chitty rightly points 
out, while the national curriculum has its roots in tile Great Debate of 1976/7, 'its 
raison d'61re has changed dramatically in the hands of tile policy-makers of 
1987/88' (1990: 12). As we shall see in the next chapter, it was during these years 
and after that managerial considerations took centre stage. Indeed, it was at the 
final stages of the genesis of the Act that child-centred practical underpinnings 
were erased following, inter alia, the direct intervention of the Prime Minister. The 
so-called 'New Right' corpus of propositions about society and, in particular, the 
state's role vis-5-vis the education system will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Such contradictory CS properties were explicitly drawn upon by successive 
Secretaries of State for Education during the 1980s, of which the potential S-C 
import will also be addressed. 
Concluding rernitrks 
The interactional phase delineated above indicates the overall morphostatic nature 
of the educational system following the publication of Plowden and the generous 
degrees of curricular freedom bestowed upon the teachers. Equally, there was no 
concurrent corporate regrouping. Instead, this period witnessed schism and 
dissension, including a manifest failure practically to develop Plowden and to 
maintain its impetus. During the sixties and seventies the debate on the school 
curriculum was conducted largely among teachers, local authority advisors, 
teacher-trainers and Her Majesty's Inspectors (Lowe 1997). Whilst this is true, 
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such debate was not translated into widespread progressive practice and, moreover, 
such debate was subject to acerbic attack by right-wing think tanks and pressure 
groups. In tenns of the eventual expunging of child-centred considerations from 
the testing and curricular arrangements of the 1988 Education Reform Act, one 
must be careful to avoid the illegitimate imputation of any post hoc teleology. 
Whilst the growing interventionism of Government was the result of economic 
trends that were endemic and retrospectively ineluctable, the actual outcome of the 
National Curriculum was not. But of course such an outcome could not be 
envisioned without the CS components bequeathed by the expanding corpus of 
right-wing, anti -progrcssi vi st pamphlets, books and related media that found a 
ready and willing audience in the Conservative Party, particularly its leader and 
successive Education Secretaries of State. 
The cultural morphogenesis exemplified by the Black Papers and the 
numerous CS items disseminated by cognate groups was not paralleled by the 
progressivists (notwithstanding some important work in modem languages, 
mathematics and science). To be fair, much of the morphogenetic cultural 
embroidery had already been carried out, yet it was not defended in the light of the 
right-wing onslaught, for reasons already discussed. What did not help matters was 
the dominance of the education philosophers discussed in Chapter Three and 
undoubtedly the economic situation that was exploited fully by the right-wing 
press, the Conservative Party and the Prime Minister of the Labour Party. Indeed, 
during the Tyndale affair, successful child-centred programmes were being 
successfully installed in London itself. Yet its unexploited success was 
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symptomatic of a divided, yet still potentially relatively powerful, teaching 
profession that grossly underestimated the turning tide. The bargaining power of 
the teachers was diminishing almost on daily basis whilst the Profession's alleged 
deficiencies were unremittingly trumpeted. Objectively their professional 
knowledge - backed by Plowden, the development of teacher training colleges and 
University education departments, and so on - was not exploited as the key (or 
rather only) component of relative negotiating strength. 
The portentous origins of the 'managerial state' (Clarke and Newman 1994) 
were clear enough: the need for improved 'quality' (often entailing better exam 
results at reduced price) brought about by stringent managenzent of cannot-be- 
trusted teachers. In other words, it was not simply pedagogy that was at stake but 
the teacher autonomy per se and the nature of their work, which any potential 
Conservative government would insist upon curtailing in the British context. The 
overly managerialist restructuring of teachers' work was not a foregone conclusion 
at the beginning of the Thatcher years. Of course, part of the staging was provided 
during this period following the discussion about accountability, value-for-money 
and school governance that the 'Great Debate' unleashed. In fact, testing at the 
ages of 7,11,14 and 16 was not the brainchild of the 1980s. To reiterate, a 
managerialist approach to testing was not the overriding or, indeed, subsidiary 
concern. The question to be addressed now is how the tide completely engulfed the 
teaching profession during the 1980s, following the electoral success of the 
Conservatives in 1979, which culminated in the 1988 Act and its subsequent 
legislative consolidators. For reasons of expository convenience, a more detailed 
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examination of the 'New Right' corpus is provided in the next chapter. However, 
mention has already been made of Hayek, who is one of the key ideational players 
vis-a-vis the 1988 Act. These ideas are part and parcel of the interactional phase, 
but since they were put into practice during the late 1980s and early 1990s, it is 
more helpful to elaborate them in the next chapter. 
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5 Socio-Cultural Elaboration: the 1988 Education Reform Act and 
the New Managerialism 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to delineate the final phase of the morphogenetic 
sequence, which in turn provides the temporal starting-point of a new conditioning 
sequence. The three-part sequential schema adopted for this part of the thesis is 
necessarily generic because of its broad sweep. Fundamentally, it should be clear 
that the phases of conditioning 4 interaction 4 outcome have not been arbitrarily 
plucked out of the historical time-scale. The explanatory power of the 
morphogenetic approach lies in the link between substantive research and the 
temporal multi-sequential nature of social reality: what is to be explained is 
necessarily anchored in sid generis strata and their temporal materialisation. In 
other words, a broad-brush analysis of the type I have provided dictates a broad 
sequencing procedure. Thus, at almost innumerable points in each chapter could a 
morphogenetic sequence begin: again, where it begins depends on what one wants 
to explain. The establishment of the Senior Management Team in my first case- 
study mentioned in Chapter I constitutes the start of a new conditioning sequence, 
which is the end-product of a temporal sequence of social interaction. The point is 
that whilst this sequence lends itself to detailed empirical enquiry, it is part of a 
wider (macro) morphogenetic sequence. Any study that detailed the minutiae 
involved in the establishment of the management team without recourse to the 
wider sequence would be somewhat vitiated. However, the multi-sequential nature 
of social reality enjoins that we respect the fact that at any given point in time there 
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are cycles within cycles, operating at different (irreducible) levels of social reality. 
The number of cycles at any one level cannot be determined a priori, but 
established a posteriori. 
Within any school one can conceive of cycles in terms of various specific 
committees alongside the Senior Management Team and their associated roles and 
deposited powers, which are analytically distinct from their concrete operation. A 
significant number of teachers will therefore also be members or Heads of 
committees, equal opportunities officers, parent-school co-ordinators, and so on, 
whereby role-associated powers shape activities often unrelated to classroom 
practice. This applies equally at the level of the DfEE, which itself provides the 
conditioning cyclical background to schools and LEAs. It is because the DfEE 
constrains and/or facilitates activities at the school (and LEA) level that one can 
talk of third-order (systemic) emergence. (Here, of course, the LEA itself may 
overdetermine school activities. ) In essence, at whichever level(s) one is theorising 
about, the temporal unfolding of morphogenetic/static dynamics cannot be avoided. 
Unlike structuration theory, the temporal priority of structural (and cultural) 
conditioning is a transcendental prerequisite for any substantive research however 
42 
short or long the time-scale adopted . 
The 1988 Education Reform Act (ERA) removed restrictions that previously 
prevented parents opting to send children to schools of their choice. It gave schools 
42 Scott (1994), for example, uses a phase (or cyclical) approach to the evolution of National Curriculum 
assessment arrangements. He posits four phases over a five-year period: mixed messages, adjustments by 
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substantially increased control over their budgets. Funding was allocated according 
to numbers on roll (per capita funding). Formal examinations at the ages 7,11,14 
and 16 were imposed. Central control was increased over the content of schooling. 
A National Curriculum imposed three core subjects and six or seven foundation 
subjects, which were to be taught to all children from the age of five to sixteen. 
The Secretary of State determined the programmes of study. Teachers' hours were 
specified for the first time. The 1987 TGAT (Task Group on Assessment and 
Testing) Report augured well for teachers committed to child-centred practices. 
However, such recommendations contradicted the managerialist marketising of the 
education system, envisaged in particular by Thatcher, and were soon discarded. 
increased competition via the publication of League Tables was later promoted. In 
fact, under the current 'New' Labour administration, league tables remain fim-fly on 
the educational agenda, alongside the recent imposition of national target setting. 
Part of the managerialist consolidation of ERA is the Education (Schools) Act 
1992, which established arrangements for independent inspections (on a four-yearly 
basis) by registered inspectors to be trained by, and responsible to, OFSTED. The 
OFSTED rationale is managerialist and reinforced by the School Effectiveness 
Movement, which is dominated almost exclusively by international academics upon 
whom past Conservative and current Labour ministers rely for advice. The tight 
link with national and international universities means that OFSTED and the ERA 
constitute a particularly stringent obstruction for child-centred primary school 
teachers. 
central authority, reassertion of control and compromise. Each new phase differently conditions agential 
activity. (Again, the 4 phases delineated by Scott are linked to his substantive concerns. ) 
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Such Structural Elaboration is necessarily intertwined with, and underpinned 
by, ideas. The Elaborated corpus of ideas used both to construct and legitimate the 
ERA is characterised by logical contradiction, specifically betwpen neo-liberalism 
and conservatism. The transcendental realist argument for the objectivity of the 
latter and concomitant practical untenability of the Act is provided. It is argued that 
the so-called paradoxical elements of the Act are the result of an immanent 
contradiction. The precise playing-out of how corporate agents dealt with the 
contradiction is delineated. Here, it is maintained that corporate agency is 
necessarily enjoined to commit theory/practice inconsistency. A lengthy analysis 
of the contradictory CS items that underpinned the ERA and subsequent legislation 
is provided, since the contradiction is almost invariably not recognised by neo- 
liberals and, moreover, accounts for the (contradictory) nature of the restructuring 
of the education system in England and Wales. That is, for example, the desire to 
devolve autonomy to individual schools versus the concurrent imposition of a 
national curriculum and inspectorate. Equally, when it is recognised by critics it is 
played down or dismissed as ultimately reconcilable. Crucially, therefore, the 
decentralisation versus centralisation paradox is an objective S-C contradiction 
derived from the untenability of neo-liberalism. Furthermore, since the explanatory 
critique offered here enjoins the identification of unwanted constraints, it is 
especially relevant in the present context of a Labour administration, since the latter 
has not only consolidated the Conservative bequest but also extended it (viz. 
Education Action Zones and national target setting). The economistic, technicist 
driven nature of the ERA meant, though by no means determined, that congruent 
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ideational items be used to justify a managerial approach to assessment and 
accountability. Indeed, the then Secretary of State warmly welcomed the TGAT 
proposals, which emphasised formative assessment at the expense of short, sharp 
standardised tests. The managerialist usurpation of assessment and co-option of 
leading academics was not a foregone conclusion. Whilst it was not a foregone 
conclusion, however, the market rationale of the reforms made it unlikely that such 
proposals would be adopted because of their cost. 
To recapitulate, this chapter will (a) scrutinise the neo-liberal inflection that 
provided the basis for the quasi-marketisation of the education system, which was 
concomitantly restructured along managerialist lines; (b) delineate the lead-up to 
the ERA. The ERA and the subsequent legislative consolidation provide the 
backdrop to the two case-study schools analysed in Part Three. I should like to 
reiterate that it is simply for expository convenience that I have postponed 
discussion of the generic tenets of the 'New Right' (CS) corpus until now. This is 
because analysis of the contradictions of the 1988 Education Reform Act (ERA) is 
thereby facilitated. In fact, the burgeoning 'New Right' corpus has already been 
spelled out, specifically the attack upon progressivism and the illegitimate elision 
of it with left-wing ideology. 
New Right Philosophy and Systemic Contradiction 
Back to the Downing Street policy unit 
In the last chapter the burgeoning powerful role of the Policy Unit in the 
development of education policy was discussed. The power of the Unit increased 
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considerably during the mid- to late 1980s. 43 Indeed, by 1983 the Prime Minister, 
Margaret Thatcher, relied increasingly for advice, encouragement and a steady 
supply of radical ideas on a growing number of young right-wing analysts who 
came to occupy key positions in the Unit. During the early years of her tenure at 10 
Downing Street, Thatcher strengthened her own personal resources, whilst at the 
same time weakening those of her cabinet colleagues for the performance of their 
collective deliberations. In fact, Thatcher got rid of the Central Policy Review Staff 
(CPRS), a creation of Edward Heath, which had provided policy advice for the 
cabinet as a whole and had been an important feature of collective government 
(Chitty 1994). In a nutshell, Thatcher welcomed the Policy Unit into what 
Hennessy has dubbed 'a shadow Whitehall', with each of its young members 
covering a variety of subject areas (cited in Chitty 1994: 20). The Unit challenged 
extant Conservative orthodoxies and following Professor Brian Griffiths' 
appointment to oversee its daily running in October 1985, it became particularly 
influential vis-b-vis education policy. 
Under the direction of Professor Griffiths, the Unit was part of the Prime 
Minister's own Downing Street machinery. Consequently, any advice was not 
subject to censure or rebuttal by the cabinet. According to an ex-member of the 
Unit, David Willetts, members were 'always on the lookout for new policy ideas, 
the fresh angle, the new policy proposal worth putting before the Prime Minister' 
43 However, because of Thatcher's predilection for relying on her ministers for advice she reduced the size 
of the Policy Unit, which in turn reduced its role in policy formation. As Chitty rightly notes, it was her 
experience of working with a cautious set of ministers - the oft-dubbed 'wets' - that led her to revise her 
earlier judgement. 
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and its main task was to undertake 'the politically impossible' (Chitty 1994: 21). 
Rosenhead neatly sums up thus: 
The Policy Unit supplies the Prime Minister with a radically new policy 
consistent with her principles and instincts. She then announces this policy in a 
glare of publicity, thereby establishing a political fait accompli. The debate 
having thus been finessed and forestalled, the relevant Department is left with 
the job of trying to make the innovation work (cited in Chitty 1994: 21). 
However, it is salutary to remind ourselves that education policy especially was not 
the result of the Policy Unit. Indeed, after 1985, the Unit was essentially a channel 
for a number of influential right-wing pressure groups, notably the Centre for 
Policy Studies and Margaret Thatcher herself. By 1987, such groups had provided 
a set of policy prescriptions designed specifically to establish marketisation of the 
education system (and indeed the public sector as a whole). Alongside the Centre 
for Policy Studies, which was founded in 1974, was the Institute of Economic 
Affairs, which established its own Education Unit whose director was Stuart 
Sexton, and the Hillgate Group, which comprised Caroline Cox, Jessica Douglas- 
Home, John Marks, Lawrence Nocross and Roger Scruton. Of course, one cannot 
pinpoint with accuracy which group was responsible for specific elements of 
education policy. However, as Chitty notes, when Kenneth Baker was offered the 
education portfolio in May 1986, he was well aware that the CPS, the IEA and the 
Hillgate Group were the policy-makers as far as Margaret Thatcher was concerned. 
Furthermore, the three groups are influential exemplars of an array of like-minded 
study groups and organisations. Nevertheless, given the ease of access to Brian 
Griffiths and thus Downing Street, Roger Scruton et al. were ideally placed to 
influence the policy-making process. During 1986-7, a number of educational 
212 
planning meetings were held in Downing Street. For the Hillgate Group, the main 
objective was to restructure the education system such that all schools would be 
owned by individual trusts, their survival in the education market place contingent 
upon their ability to satisfy their customers. Yet all right-wing groups by no means 
shared the Hillgate's key objective. 
The one issue on which the various groups failed to reach agreement concerned 
the desirability or otherwise of a centrally imposed National Curriculum. This 
source of conflict could be said to reflect a major paradox within Thatcherism 
itself. For, as has often been pointed out... what makes New Right philosophy 
special is a unique combination of a traditional liberal defence of the free 
economy with a traditional conservative defence of state authority. This 
combination of potentially opposing doctrines means that the New Right can 
appear by turns libertarian and authoritarian, populist and dlitist. For neo- 
liberals the emphasis is always on freedom of choice, the individual, the market, 
minimal government and laissez-faire; while neo-conservatism prioritizes 
notions of social authoritarianism, the disciplined society, the nation and strong 
government... Keith Joseph, Stuart Sexton and Alfred Sher-man could be said to 
be leading figures on the neo-liberal wing of the movement; while the leading 
exponent of neo-conservatism is probably Roger Scruton... (Chitty 1994: 23). 
It was the Hillgate Group that pushed for the introduction of a detailed national 
curriculum for all pupils. The group envisaged that such a curriculum would 
encompass such concerns as respect for the family, the church, private property and 
so on. At the same time it would underscore the need for the virtue of free 
enterprise and the pursuit of profit. In direct contrast, Stuart Sexton categorically 
opposed the idea of an imposed curriculum. However, Kenneth Baker and key 
DES advisors were able to enlist the support of the neo-liberal camp for central 
control of the curriculum. Chitty (1994) maintains that a national curriculum is not 
incompatible with the furtherance of the quasi-marketisation of the education 
system, since inter alia it would provide evidence to parents of the desirability or 
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otherwise of individual schools via a national programme of testing. 'In other 
words, additional consumer information provided by the test results would actually 
help a market system to operate more effectively' (Chitty 1994: 24). Equally, 
Whitty maintains that the neo-liberal and neo-conservative positions 'may 
ultimately be reconcilable' (1991: 105). In brief, the contradiction centres on the 
fact that the 1988 Act gave 'market forces' a leading role within areas of policy that 
had hitherto been subject to detailed regulation and planning by central and local 
government yet introduced curricular prescription into an area where there had been 
generous degrees of autonomy. 
Contradiction: apparent or real? Hayek, social ontology and the nature of 
'the inarket' 
Chitty is right that a national curriculum is not incompatible with the furtherance of 
the marketisation of the education system since it would provide evidence to 
parents of the relative performance of schools. However, what is missing from 
Chitty's analysis is that the neo-liberal ideas, upon which such marketisation is 
based, preclude any form of national curriculum since this necessitates state 
involvement. In other words, we need to differentiate different levels of analysis: 
the fact that the provision of evidence may help parents became better 'consumers' 
is anterior to the inconsistent enactment of the latter. As Ball rightly notes, the neo- 
liberal and neo-Conservative elements of the New Right 'display a number of vital 
contradictions' (1990: 41, emphasis added). I want to argue that Ball is quite right 
not to lose sight of the objective contradictory m6lange that is the 'New Right' 
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philosophy, that is, between the neo-liberal and neo-conservative constituents. 44 TO 
recapitulate, central to the morphogenetic approach is the identification of objective 
socio-cultural contradictions and complementari ties, which both shape action- 
contexts and at the same time may remain unnoticed or noticed yet stringently 
obstruct (and vice versa). The origins of the neo-liberal conspectus can been traced 
back to the collapse of Keynesian social democracy, particularly the oil crisis, as 
discussed in last chapter. The temporal coincidence of such neo-liberal ideas as the 
need for the state to withdraw from, rather than continue to inhibit, the spontaneous 
workings of 'the (capitalist) market' and the oil crisis provided the necessary (but 
insufficient) conditions for the imposition of the managerialist (or business) model 
on to the public sector as a whole. The Black Paperites contributed to the anti- 
statist thrust of the neo-liberal critique of the state. In particular, their elision of 
left-wing ideology with progressivism and imputation of deeply entrenched vested 
interests of progressivist teachers in an unwieldy, bureaucratic education system 
resonated well. 
In contrast, the neo-conservative strand of 'New Right' philosophy 
underscores the need for 'strong' state involvement. As Gamble notes, the 
conservative element is characterised by its emphasis upon the conditions that are 
required for the establishment and maintenance of social order, namely 
44 As I have already argued (Willmott 1999c), as with the epithet 'Thatcherism' considerable caution needs 
to be exercised. Tile employment of 'right wing' is a portmanteau. Its components do not comprise a 
neatly woven (CS) web of logical complementarities. As will be discussed, the contradictions within 
'Thatcherism' are not variations along a Conservative theme, since inter alia some of its components do 
not adopt an individualist social ontology, that is, an ontology of the social world as flat, undifferentiated 
and unstructured. The generic basis for education policy during the 1980s drew upon individualism, 
however inconsistently enacted in practice. 
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the need for authority, hierarchy and balance. Conservatives have generally 
been fierce critics of liberal doctrines of individualism which justify the removal 
of all restraints... Both [the neo-liberals and Conservatives], however, regard 
the trends established by the growth of public sectors and the kind of 
government intervention practised since the 1940s as pernicious. Both focus on 
the rise of a 'new class' of public sector professional employees who come to 
staff the agencies of the public sector and who have a vested interest in its 
continued growth (1988: 54-55). 
Clearly, in order to provide the conditions that are necessary for the maintenance of 
'authority, hierarchy and balance', then irreducible social structures are 
unavoidable. However, it is important to mention that at the S-C level neo- 
conservatives, whilst (unavoidably) responsible for the creation of social 
structures/systems (e. g. civil service), may at the same time subscribe to 
voluntarism, or more specifically, the fallacy of composition. This is the 
assumption that what is possible for an individual must ipsojacto be possible for all 
individuals at the same time. An example of this is the view that all children have 
the opportunity to attend university and subsequently enter one of the professions. 
The fact that all children have differential opportunities is thereby repudiated, for 
there is no notion of the structuring of life-chances, namely that the education 
system requires successes and failures. 
The complex reasons for the incorporation of monetarist nostrums, the 
repudiation of any state involvement and the glorification of the ostensibly superior 
regulatory efficacy of 'the market' have already been touched upon in the last 
chapter. However, Jonathan (1997) has convincingly argued that the populist 
appeal of the 'New Right' agenda for restructuring - or the quasi-marketisation of - 
the public sector needs to be traced back further than the oil crisis. It stems more 
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from the liberal promises of equality following the 1944 Butler Act. She argues 
that New Right attacks on education tapped a reservoir of popular unease. Such 
unease was not unsurprising since, 'despite reformist measures over three decades, 
the post-war education project of individual emancipation for each and 
simultaneous social progress for all had failed to deliver to many what they had 
hoped for from it' (1997: 57). Indeed, it was the failure of Keynesian social 
democracy that resonated well with 'liberal' thinking that dates back further than 
the oil crisis. One of the key arguments of this chapter is that the New Right 
panacea was both misconceived and contradictory. Such contradiction and 
misconception will be teased out via an analysis of the ontological underpinning of 
the neo-liberal project whose aim is to inject the competitive nature of 'the market' 
into a stifling, inefficient and expensive public sector. 
I have deliberately placed scare quotes around liberal in the preceding 
paragraph, since neo-liberalism, whilst anchored in eighteenth and nineteenth 
century premises about the danger Of well-intentioned paternalism leading to 
authoritarian coercion, fails to engage with unresolved questions about the 
interdependence of agency in the social world. Thus, to Jonathan, 
... nineteenth-century liberal niceties about the relation of the individual to the 
social are conspicuous by their absence in the pronouncements not only of 
politicians of New Right persuasion... but also in some philosophical writing 
and in the exhortations of 'opinion-formers' in right-wing 'think-tanks'. The 
claim that neo-liberalism represents the eclipse of politics by economics may 
seem superficially surprising when apologists are typically keen to adopt the 
mantle and invoke the authority of the early liberals, but that invocation is 
seriously inisleading (1997: 48-49, emphasis added). 
217 
Part of the S-C process of systernatisation of the 'New Right' philosophy places a 
premium on a (potentially rewarding) search for congruent CS items. Hence the 
selective use of CS items from Mill, Hume, Smith et al. during the 1980s by such 
organisations as the Centre for Policy Studies, the Adam Smith Institute and the 
Institute for Economic Affairs. As we saw in the last chapter, the Centre for Policy 
Studies was founded by Margaret Thatcher and Keith Joseph and quickly became a 
focus for the ideas of such right-wing thinkers as Milton Friedman and F. A. 
Hayek. The underlying theme for the ideas systernatised by the sections of the New 
Right was the alleged superiority of market mechanisms and the need for sound 
money. Such cultural embroidery was carried out against the backdrop of the 
Black Papers, of which the last was published in 1977. 
[Henceforth] the discursive cudgels of the conservative educational offensive 
were taken up by a variety of related and overlapping New Right agencies and 
groups... What makes them markedly different from the rather informally 
produced Black Papers is the degree and sophistication of their organisation and 
strategies for dissemination... By the 1980s ... neo-liberal texts, particularly the 
work of Hayek, and monetarist theories like those of Friedman, are paraded as a 
basis for social and economic policy making... (Ball 1990: 34-35). 
However, as Gamble (1988) notes, the call for the restoration of sound money has 
been the New Right's centrepiece and is the issue on which the New Right first 
made a major impact. Despite continuing disagreement about the nature of the 
economy, the widening of divisions between competing macro-economic 
perspectives and the undermining of the theoretical underpinnings of monetarism, it 
was the marked deterioration in economic performance in the 1970s that accounts 
for its ascendancy. Monetarists argue, inter alia, that the control of inflation should 
be prioritised, irrespective of any increase in unemployment. New Right 
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economics decries state intervention because it is held that administrative and 
bureaucratic structures are inherently inferior to markets as a means of allocating 
resources. With regard to public expenditure and taxation, New Right economists 
assert that market solutions would in every case be superior to the established 
public provision. At the same time, there evolved the contribution of 'public choice 
theory', which argued against the notion that public bodies were disinterested and 
enlightened, while private individuals and companies were self-interested and 
avaricious. The argument here is that the pursuit of self-interest by private bodies 
is licensed by the existence of a competitive framework of rules that does not exist 
in the public sector. Consequently, many in the New Right concluded that 'markets 
were much superior to democracy in representing and aggregating individual 
choices. It was only a short step to arguing that democracy needed to be hedged 
around with restrictions to ensure that it did not permit encroachments upon the 
private sphere' (Gamble 1988: 52). 
The 'moral argument' proffered by New Right thinkers will not be 
addressed here (see Gamble 1988 and Jonathan 1997). 1 want now to focus on the 
social ontology that underpins the 1988 Education Reform Act. We have briefly 
looked at the need for 'sound money' embodied in the monetarist doctrine, whereby 
taxes and public expenditure should be as low as possible and that its institutions be 
subject to the competitive ethic of the market. New Right thinkers and politicians 
alike readily adopt the rhetoric of the so-called free market and how its wealth- 
generating, dynamic properties should be transposed to the public sector. In brief, 
the argument that an objective contradiction underpins the 1988 Act (as well as all 
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public sector policies that have introduced quasi-market principles) is a 
transcendental one. It will be argued that those critical commentators who argue 
for the apparent reconcilability of the neo-liberal and neo-conservative elements (at 
the CS level) are confusing an S-C necessity brought about by an immanent 
contradiction. Syncretism at the S-C level does not necessarily parallel syncretism 
at the CS level. Indeed, the constraining contradiction unleashed by Peters et al. 
enjoined some form of syncretic endeavour at the S-C level. In this case, 
ontologically the necessary incompatibility ever remains, independently of human 
cognisance (and, of course, the systemic contradiction may be concealed at the S-C 
level, whose temporal success cannot be determined a priori. ) The 'paradoxical' 
elements of the 1988 Education Reform Act are the result of an immanent 
contradiction that is 'lived with' syncretically. 
Hayek's catallaxy: the denial of social structure 
The key thinker used by the neo-liberals in their unrelenting drive towards quasi- 
marketisation of the public sector-is Hayek. As already mentioned, neo-liberalism 
- and the 'New Right' generically - is also employed as a portmanteau, which 
embraces Friedman's economic liberalism, Nozick's libertarianism (the advocacy 
of the minimal state) and Hayek's Austrian economics. In Chapter 3,1 discussed 
the nature of the materiality of the division of labour, whose materiality is 
autonomous of capitalist social relations. Hayek lends support to the sui generis 
properties of the division of labour. He distinguishes between 'catallaxy' and 
'economy'. His conception of economy is a restricted one, referring to clusters of 
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economic activities that are organised for a specific purpose and have a unitary 
hierarchy of ends, in which knowledge of how to achieve ends is shared. A 
catallaxy, on the other hand, has no unitary hierarchy of ends, but a mass of 
innumerable economies without a specific purpose. As Hayek has famously 
pointed out, it is the product of spontaneous growth as opposed to design. One of 
Hayek's central arguments, contra state socialism, is that the catallaxy eludes 
regulation by central control. This is because of the extraordinary division of 
knowledge immanent to any advanced industrial economy. Thus the fundamental 
economic problem is not calculational but epistemological, namely how to co- 
ordinate the actions of innumerable agents without the possibility of any adequate 
centralised knowledge of their needs and resources. Consequently, competition 
operates as a discovery procedure and the main role of markets is in generating 
information, through the price mechanism, as to how economic agents who are 
ignorant of each other may best attain their equally unknown purposes (Sayer 
1995). 
The salient point, then, is that the complex and evolutionary nature of the 
catallaxy makes its qualities unknowable to any single mind or organisation. 
Hayek correctly takes to task the socialist vision of a collectively controlled and 
planned advanced economy -a 'fatal conceit', which he terms 'constructivism'. 
As Sayer points out, many Marxist positions have failed to acknowledge the 
fundamental difference between running a technical division of labour for 
producing a particular type of commodity and co-ordinating a social division of 
labour involving millions of different commodities, thousands of enterprises and 
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billions of customers. This is not to license chaos, for although catallaxies are 
unplanned they are ordered. Yet, for Marx, the only good order 'must be the 
product of conscious collective purpose, a Hegelian legacy of humanity rising to 
consciousness and control over itself... Marx is resistant not only to actions having 
bad unintended consequences, but to unintended consequences per se' (Sayer 
1995: 76). However, Hayek adopts the extreme counter-position to Marx. In brief, 
he reasons that because unintended consequences of actions are central to the 
functioning of catallaxies, one must not intervene. This is simply a non sequitur 
and, inter alia, excuses problems that can - and should - be confronted and 
removed (ecological problems, poverty ... ). More crucially, Hayek denies that 
catallaxies possess emergent properties. 
Absent from Hayek's image of capitalism as an unimaginably complex mass of 
individuals responding to one another through markets is any notion of major 
social structures... while modem societies and advanced economies are indeed 
catallaxies, they are also systems with grand structures... his celebration of the 
miracle of the market simply ignores the temporal and spatial upheavals 
associated with the creative destruction of capitalism. Hayek's exaggeration of 
'order' is the complement of Marxism's exaggeration of 'anarchy' (ibid: 77-78, 
original emphasis). 
It is thus not surprising that the ontological erasure of relatively enduring social 
structures leads to an emphasis on 'the market' as a sphere of freedom. Yet a 
market encompasses not simply commodity exchanges and associated transfers of 
money, but also enduring organised practices that facilitate such exchanges on a 
regular basis. It is worth briefly discussing the different types of market and the 
multiple meanings of 'market'. 
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The nature of 'the market' 
Essentially, makers differ according to the way in which transactions are organised, 
particularly with regard to pricing. 'Spot markets' are those in which prices are 
flexible and relationships between actors ephemeral. Spot markets approximate 
economic models. Yet most real markets do not fit this type of market. Instead, 
fixed prices provide a stable environment for calculating costs and organising 
production and distribution. Economic models tend to assume the universality of 
'arm's length contracting', whereby little information other than price is provided 
and buyer-supplier relationships are minimal. 'Relational contracting', by contrast, 
involves the sharing of infon-nation, the careful building of trust and collaboration 
between buyer and seller, before and after the transaction. However, neo-liberals 
wrongly contend that markets work best 'on the spot', at arm's length, and thus 
discourage information sharing. Hayek et al. overestimate the sufficiency of price 
as the source of information for buyers and sellers in markets. Prior to commodity 
exchange, non-price information normally has to be exchanged and is usually 
provided at no extra cost to the buyer. 
The New Right is well known for its trumpeting of the 'free' market, in 
which all that exists (or, rather, matters) are spontaneous exchanges between 
individuals who have something to sell. The role of the state is thus held to distort 
this smooth-running, spontaneous gathering of free individuals. 'Yet far from 
being an unnecessary interference, the state is a nonnalfeature of real n1arkets, as 
a precondition of their existence. Markets depend on the state for regulation, 
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protection of property rights, and the currency' (Sayer 1995: 87, emphasis added). 
We will return to the latter shortly. Clearly, markets are not 'free', since their 
regulation does not benefit all. There are enduring s1ructured power imbalances. 
However, Sayer points out that the conceptual slides endemic to employment of 
'the market' are a feature of both lay and academic uses and are found in right/left- 
wing, liberal and economic theory. The Right proffers idealised models of markets 
as descriptions of defacto markets; the Left avoids any rigorous scrutiny of their 
properties. Sayer argues that concepts of markets different according to (a) their 
level of abstraction; (b) their inclusiveness; (c) whether they are couched within a 
'market optic' or a 'production optic'; (d) whether they refer to real or imaginary 
markets. 
Real markets may be conceptualised at different levels of abstraction. One 
can talk about the local fruit-and-vegetable market concretely (who the sellers and 
buyers are, what is sold, etc. ) or more abstractly, namely in terms of the exchange 
of commodities and property rights for money or as a mode of co-ordination of the 
division of labour. At the same time, concepts of markets also differ in 
inclusiveness. Markets may be defined narrowly in terms of routinised buying and 
selling, or inclusively to cover production and consumption of exchanged goods 
and the particular property relations involved. Restricted concepts exclude major 
contextual influences that explain behaviour. As Sayer puts it, 'The dynamism of 
capitalist economies is not simply a consequence of markets in the restricted sense, 
but of capital, obliged to accumulate in order to survive, and liberated from the ties 
which bind petty commodity producers' (1995: 99). What is included on the Left is 
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determined by a 'production optic', in which markets are marginalised. For the 
Right, what is included is determined by a 'market optic', whereby production is 
conflated with exchange. For our purposes, we are concerned with the 'market 
optic' of the Right. Tile market optic ignores production and its social relations. 
Indeed, in mainstream economics, the whole economy becomes the market (in the 
singular) and almost invariably counterposed to the state. The salient point here is 
that markets are not an alternative to production, finns or hierarchies (Sayer 
1995: 101). Instead, they are a mode of co-ordination of the division of labour. 
Furthermore, one can distinguish between literal concepts referring to real 
markets from those referring to imaginary and also from those that use market 
metaphors that have limited similarity with real markets. As Sayer argues, it is not 
the level of abstraction used in metaphorical approaches, but their quality, that is 
important. Indeed, what is often lost is the social relations that underpin real 
markets. Thus the notion of latent markets 
which only need freeing figures strongly in neo-liberal rhetoric, and contrasts 
strikingly with the view... that markets are social constructions whose birth is 
difficult and requires considerable regulation and involvement by the state and 
other institutions to achieve... The liberal underestimation or denial of this 
institutional support is partly derived from the elision of the difference between 
potential or imaginary and the actual in its concept of 'the market' (Sayer 
1995: 104). 
The rest is supplied by the ontological effacement of sid generis organisations and 
the relations between them. 
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The transcendental argument 
Transcendentally, the neo-liberal social ontology cannot be sustained: market 
exchange requires state involvement. By corollary, the existence of schooling is 
equally necessary. Given that the market is not 'free' and necessarily subject to 
some form of institutional regulation, then 
deregulated governance of education loses its justification, and the [neo-liberal] 
project loses its rationale even on its own terms... If this line of reasoning can be 
sustained when elaborated, it would provide a transcendental argument against 
the existence of principles of free-market exchange into the governance and 
distribution of education... Furthermore, if neo-liberal principles can be shown 
to be incompatible with the governance of that social practice without whose 
alignment no vision for the ordering of society can be realised, then the vision 
itself is called into question, not only on grounds of equity... but on grounds of 
coherence (Jonathan 1997: 25-26). 
There are two distinct issues here. Firstly, there is the transcendental argument that 
markets - or Hayek's catallaxy - are regulated by institutions that are irreducible to 
individuals. Secondly, Jonathan's argument is that the very institutions that 
underpin market relationships themselves require an educated workforce, in turn 
negating the neo-liberal project of subjecting the education system to market 
disciplinary mechanisms. Put simply, the rationale of the neo-liberal marketisation 
of the education system would ultimately preclude the possibility of market 
activity. However, what is important for our purposes is that the neo-conservative 
element of the New Right corpus contradicts the Hayekian contention that 'free' 
markets do not require regulation. Moreover, neo-liberals themselves could not 
avoid the fact that the education system is state-run and did not appear out of thin 
air. The argument for reconcilability is centred on the short-term need for the state 
to establish the conditions for a market-based education system. Yet the fact that 
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the state has to regulate belies the neo-liberals' atomistic social ontology that is 
central to the argument for state non-intervention. Following Gamble, Whitty 
maintains that 
the paradox of at one and the same time building a strong state through increased 
expenditure on the military and the apparatuses of law and order, while at the 
same time using state power to roll back state intervention from whole areas of 
social activity, does have a degree of consistency. This is because the state 
needs to protect the market from vested interests and restrictive practices and 
prevent the conditions in which it can flourish being subverted either from 
without or within... On this basis, the government's curriculum policies may not 
necessarily be as much at variance with its policies on the structure of the 
education system as is sometimes suggested, even at the level of principle. The 
contrast between apparent centralization in one sphere and apparent 
decentralization in other may not be the paradox it at first appears (1991: 108). 
Here, Whitty is providing a transcendental argument against neo-liberalism. He is 
confusing the ineluctable need for state intervention (which will always be 
necessary) at the S-C level with propositions about the nature of the social at the CS 
level. In fact, equivocality characterises the above: there may not be contrariety 
between policies and the structure of the education system and the 
centralisation/decentralisation issue may not be the paradox it at first appears. The 
fact that the neo-liberal elements of the ERA deny the need for state intervention 
has serious implications for heads and their staff in terms of what is to be taught, 
how it is to be taught and under what conditions of service (inter alia demanding 
more for less as schools become subject to the discipline of quasi-market 
mechanisms). Yet Whitty maintains that 'It has also been pointed out that, 
provided the discourse of the New Right as political rhetoric strikes a chord and can 
command assent, its intemal inconsistencies and its eclectic philosophical roots are 
something of an irrelevance... ' (1991: 107). 
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That the New Right m6lange may strike a chord among the electorate is an 
S-C affair, whose potential S-C import should be dissected given that it was 
unexploited by the teachers' unions. The unions generically were more concerned 
with pay rather than matters curricular and organisational. The protracted teachers' 
strike of 1984-7 helped to divert attention away from the glaring objective CS 
incompatibilities that were feeding into Conservative social policy and, moreover, 
to attenuate union bargaining strength. In fact, even up to the 1993 Dearing 
Review of the National Curriculum, union division again precluded exploitation of 
the CS level, irrespective of the concomitant issue of success. The union action, 
according to Warnock, 'will go down in educational history as one of the most 
disastrous times in the relationship between the teaching profession and the public' 
(1989: 107). As Pietrasik (1987: 188) notes, the reasons for the failure of the 
teaching unions centre on governmental strength of purpose and disunity. 
Crucially, however, the devolution of control to individual schools contradicted the 
neo-liberal corpus since such devolution was done at the behest of central 
government. Any notion that such centralised control was to be ephemeral, a 
necessary prelude to complete deregulation, is simply to conceal the contradiction: 
the need for state control ever remains whilst we have an education system. The 
transcendental impossibility of deregulation of the education system is readily 
gleaned from the reduction of LEA involvement and powers. The Hayekian 
approach disclaims the need for any form of planning, partly because of its state 
socialist connotations. Consequently, LEA plans for limiting the number of 
children per school were dismissed out of hand and instead replaced by LMS 
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(Local Management of Schools) funding arrangements, whereby schools were 
funded on a per capita basis and empowered to recruit as many pupils as practicable 
via open enrolment. Yet as has often been pointed out, such LEA planning 
structures work-ed and generally were efficient. 
Indeed, markets can never be a complete alternative to planning and 
hierarchy. Contra the down-sizing, hierarchy-flattening nostrums of the New 
Managerialism, 
bureaucratic control, in Weber's non-pejorative sense, is the norm for 
organizations of any scale, whether operating in markets or outside. It is by no 
means associated with public ownership; private organizations need a significant 
degree of bureaucratization if they are to cope with large throughputs of 
information and materials. Though bureaucracy has well known deficiencies, 
especially with respect to flexibility and motivation, it is efflicient, and even the 
most post-Fordist of firms need significant degrees of hierarch ization and 
routinization of activities in order tofiniction (Sayer 1995: 106, emphasis added). 
There is a world of difference between planning a division of labour within an 
organisation or enterprise and the central planning of the whole social division of 
labour as in state socialism. The Hillgate Group's idea of providing vouchers for 
parents would itself, if implemented on a wide scale, have required significant 
planning. 45 Moreover, such planning would have been expensive and not as 
efficient as the LEA system. That state socialist planning failed does not negate the 
need for planning per se. At the end of the day, the neo-liberal diagnosis of the 
relatively poor economic performance of Britain and the concurrent oil crisis of the 
45 The idea here is that money available for publicly provided education would be given directly to parents 
in the fon-n of a voucher, which could be cashed in for a place at any school that had available space. The 
voucher could also be used as a contribution to the fees of a private school. But such a system would be 
bureaucratically unwieldy and involve a substantial increase in the subsidisation of private education. This 
is simply the logical end result of the neo-liberal ideology. The fact that the voucher scheme requires 
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1970s was fundamentally flawed. So-called 'public choice theory' is (truistically) 
I 
right in maintaining that bureaucratic structures endow their incumbents with 
objective vested interests, in turn accounting for structural morphogenesis/stasis at 
a number of levels. Where things go drastically wrong is the insistence that such 
structures per se can be ontologically erased, subjecting individuals solely to 
discipline of the market. This is simply to adopt the methodological individualist 
conflation of the sui generis nature of social relations and the individuals who 
occupy roles within them. The point is that the vested interests of bureaucrats, 
teachers, and NHS workers derive from irreducible social relations. Consequently, 
the denial of sid generis social reality ineluctably degenerates into voluntarism. It 
is precisely because of the teachers-can-do-whatever-we-tell-them corollary of the 
New Right project that, pace Whitty, its CS contradictions and S-C import be 
unpacked . 
46 To reiterate, the structured nature of social inequality necessarily 
delimits the extent to which heads and their staff can raise 'standards' (read: 
examination results). Yet, at the same time, the ERA is underpinned 
(contradictorily) by a depthless social ontology that promotes an intra-school 
&optic', namely on how 'better management' of staff and limited resources will 
raise standards. 
For Sayer, commodified education permits those with sufficient money to 
buy it without any justification to others who have equal need but from whom 
bureaucratic regulation is (conveniently) by-passed by the Hillgate Group and, indeed, Keith Joseph 
himself. 
46 As we shall see in the Preface to Part Three, the School Effectiveness Movement has been successfully 
co-opted by past Conservative and present Labour Governments because of its congruence with neo- 
liberalism. At the same time, key educationists such as Professor Robin Alexander (co-author of the so- 
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resources may be diverted. And whilst there may be dangers of paternalism in state 
provision, 'right-wing claims that markets encourage self-reliance instead of 
dependence tend to ignore inequalities in the resources needed to be self-reliant or 
overlook the question of whether those inequalities are deserved and justifiable ... 1 
(1995: 121). Whilst this is true, the transcendental argument is prior to such issues. 
Finally, whatever the extent of inefficiency or abused state-funded resources, the 
New Right has created a situation in which it is wrongly assumed that a dose of less 
money, market discipline and New Managerialist nostrums will improve the 
education of the nation. The events that led to the ERA - particularly the resultant 
managerialist usurpation of assessment - will now be delineated. 
This section has provided the transcendental grounds for the untenability 
of the neo-liberal rationale for the quasi-marketisation of the education system. In 
so doing it has elaborated the variety of definitions of 'the market' and how the 
'market optic' of the neo-liberals denies the irreducibility of social structure. In 
turn, this accounts for the oft-noted paradox of concurrent centralisation and de- 
centralisation of the education system, since markets are regulated. 
Keith Joseph, Kenneth Baker and the ERA 
The reason for drawing attention to Joseph and Baker in this section is to 
underscore the non-teleological nature of the genesis of the ERA and briefly to 
show how the attempted enactment of marketisation of education results in 
theory/practice inconsistency. The final outcome was a result of a complex 
called 'Three Wise Men' Report) were also co-opted because of their focus on classroom management 
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interplay of contradictory ideas, compromise, and personality of the incumbent 
Secretary of State and cannot be reduced to any logic of capital dynamic unleashed 
at the time of the Great Debate. As Ball puts it, 'Clearly it is a mistake to dwell 
over-much on the significance of personality differences... but the style, the 
political standing and the personal concerns of the incumbent have been of 
increasing importance in understanding changes in the way policy is made and 
implemented' (1990: 179). Both Joseph and Baker were committed advocates of 
the neo-liberal project. They found LEAs and trades unions abhorrent, with the 
latter in particular held to impede the spontaneous nature of the market. However, 
Joseph was more consistent than Baker in adhering to neo-liberalist tenets. 
The move towards accountability and competition is evidenced by the 
promulgation of the 1980 Education Act, which required schools to publish their 
examination results and to hold compulsory Open Evenings. Here we can pinpoint, 
non-teleologically, the start of the legislative impetus that led to the ERA. For in 
enjoining schools to publish their exam results, parents - now 4consumers' - have 
information with which to chose where to send their child/ren. Indeed, the 
principle of a Hayekian market rests upon diversity. In one sense, then, one can 
comprehend the ERA, the (failed) development of CTCs (City Technology 
Colleges) and 'Opting Out' arrangements as a logical outcome of the commitment 
to providing more 'choice' and diversity. However, this is to negate the neo-liberal 
argument against state intervention. In consistency, Keith Joseph saw the 
fundamental problem with the education system as residing in the fact that is a state 
rather than learning per se. 
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system and a compulsory one at that. This of course begs the question of what is to 
be its non-state replacement? Consistent neo-liberals maintain that the curriculum 
should be left to market forces. This begs the question of (a) how is the economy 
to remain competitive without the services provided by the state; (b) how parents 
can find out what should be taught, where it should be taught, how it should be 
taught and (c) reconcile different (i. e. unequally structured) interests? But, again, 
we return to the transcendental argument against marketisation of the curriculum, 
since Hayek's catallaxy enjoins some form of state provision. Given that Hayek's 
market is quintessentially one in which there is financial exchange, this cannot be 
transposed to the education system. Here, consumer choice does not impact 
directly upon the income or well-being of the producers. Joseph was well aware of 
this, which is why he wanted to introduce the equivalent idea of bankruptcy into the 
education system (namely the threat and actuality of closure). 
in Hayekian fashion, Joseph was dismissive of 1EAs and the teaching 
unions. Thus in 1983 he abolished the Schools' Council precisely because the 
teaching unions dominated it. The School Curriculum Development Committee 
(SCDEQ and Secondary Examinations Council (SEC) replaced it. Whilst the 
teachers' unions were outraged, there was no national forum in which the 
professional voice in the curriculum debate could be heard. Alan Evans, the then 
Head of Education at the NUT, sounded out colleagues in other unions and among 
the LEAs on the possibility of the establishment of their own curriculum council. 
He was unable to generate sufficient enthusiasm. Given the exploitation of this 
vacuum by central government, 'the foresight of Evans's proposal is apparent, but 
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at the time the prevailing view was that sooner or later the status quo ante would be 
restored. With hindsight, of course, it is clear that this was not remotely possible' 
(Barber 1996: 26). Indeed, objectively the teaching unions' bargaining strength was 
somewhat circumscribed; it was not a question of a missed opportunity but of 
making the best of a unpropitious situation. They found themselves in conflict with 
the Government over curriculum, appraisal, pay, conditions of service and the 
decision-making process. The former was never high on the agenda. The teachers' 
strike 1984-7 simply confirmed Joseph's prejudices and reduced popular support. 
During the period 1981-1986 he emphasised standards and quality, rather than 
entitlement, at the same time focusing on assessment, rather than content. In his 
January 1984 speech at the North of England Conference and in the DES White 
Paper of 1985 Better Schools, he pointed to the twin aims of raising standards and 
securing the best possible return from resource investment. 
Keith Joseph consistently eschewed a legislative National Curriculum. 
However, we can expect at least some degree of theory/practice inconsistency (at 
the S-C level). Joseph was not averse to indirect forms of intervention, e. g. 
approval of use of GCSE criteria and was intent upon using Attainment Targets in 
the primary area. 47 Indeed, for the Hillgate Group, testing, attainment targets and 
47 As Broadfoot argues, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that in both decentralised and centralised 
education systems, assessment procedures have a different, but equally central, role to play - they act as 
one of the greatest constraints on classroom practice. 
In this sense, much of the variation between systems in terms of their dominant patterns of control 
can best be understood in terms of the particular fonn that control by assessment takes in each 
case. Such differences in control cannot be reduced simply to differences between centralized and 
decentralized systems... This does not mean that the importance of assessment factors makes the 
centralization issue per se irrelevant to the study of control. Indeed, a centralized, government- 
controlled, external assessment apparatus possesses great power to enforce the pursuit of a 
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the publication of results are viewed as an effective form of accountability. Yet, as 
Ball rightly points out, testing, 'despite its role as a basis for market comparisons 
and consumer choice, does not sit easily with the strict neo-liberals' (1990: 52). 
This substantive contradiction was recognised by Sexton and Boyson, yet is played 
down. In fact, Joseph's introduction of the GCSE (General Certificate of 
Secondary Education) was decried by the neo-liberals since it accorded too much 
control to teachers via the process of continuous assessment (a matter which was 
resolved to their satisfaction under John Major's premiership). Such contradiction 
was not prised apart by the teaching unions and amplified in their transactions with 
central government. At the time of the 1985 White Paper, the NUT's response was 
simply one of concern. 
However, the 1986 Education Act continued to accord curriculum 
responsibility to the headteacher. In essence, the Act changed and enhanced the 
role and constitution of school governors. The head was required to seek approval 
from the governing body on curriculum policy. For the DES, this was a successful 
part of their fast growing influence over the policy-making process. The resolute 
personality of Joseph combined with his antagonism vis-ý-vis the Schools Council 
enhanced the power of the DES officials. With the swift demise of the Schools 
Council, competition now operated between the DES and HMI, including such 
right-wing think tanks as the Centre for Policy Studies. Yet the philosophy of the 
centrally determined curriculum... It is... important to distinguish between the degree of 
assessment control on the one hand (strong or weak) and the source of that control (central or 
local) on the other. This distinction is crucial, for the tendency to conflate strong control with 
central control... has led to an over-preoccupation with administrative variables in the study of 
differences between educational systems... (1996: 119). 
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think-tanks tended to complement the bureaucratic-cum-assessment-driven 
approach of DES officials. The DES imposed a highly restricted brief on the 
SCDC. Despite its official independent status, the SCDC started from a low level 
of resourcing and expectations; it also had its freedom restricted by DES officials. 
By 1984 both the DES and HMI had succeeded in clearing the ground for control 
over education policy by marginalising or muting LEAs and the teaching unions. It 
was Joseph's personal and political exasperation with the teachers and their local 
authorities that buttressed the position of DES officials. However, when Kenneth 
Baker took office in 1987, it was decided that education would be made into a 
major issue for the 1987 General Election. 
The principal ideological difference between Joseph and Baker centred on 
the issue of a nationally prescribed curriculum: Joseph was set against a common, 
standard National Curriculum. Indeed, it was on this issue that Joseph, in the 
House of Lords, opposed Baker. Ironically, Joseph's period in office witnessed a 
move away from formal examinations (via the use of coursework - in some cases 
there were no formal examinations). A number of educationally progressive 
programmes were set up, since Joseph maintained that the best way to motivate was 
not via a one-off examination. However, Joseph's approach to curriculum change 
was predicated upon exhortation rather than legislation and was not shared by his 
Cabinet colleagues or, indeed, Margaret Thatcher. A further difference between the 
two was that Baker provided the political will to carry through a fundamental 
reform of the education system. Whereas 'Keith Joseph's ideology of reform 
remained embedded in the last vestiges of partnership ... The dramatic shift came 
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when Kenneth Baker replaced Keith Joseph' (Ball 1990: 177-8). As Ball points out, 
it was Baker 'who left behind the doubts, worries and hesitations and to push on 
towards a large-scale, radical and reforming Education Act' (Ball 1990: 181). 
Indeed, Baker was a key figure in the process. He set the membership of the 
working parties, commented directly on interim and final reports, received the 
Consultation Report from the National Curriculum Council (NCC), and approved 
Statutory Orders (specifying attainment targets and programmes of study). Whilst 
civil servants oversaw much detail, Baker was almost invariably involved in the 
scrutiny and re-working of earlier reports. 
The TGAT Report and the ERA 
Baker set up the Task Group on Assessment and Testing (TGAT). The TGAT 
report was educationalist, rather than managerialist, in its substance. The Group 
was accorded a high degree of independence and was not subject to interference by 
either DES officials or Baker himself. However, later curriculum working groups 
were subject to 'guidance' from DES officials. The TGAT report emphasised the 
central place of teacher assessments. It recommended a system of terminal and 
summative assessments at the end of each Key Stage to ensure comparability and 
reliability of teacher assessments. Within a criterion-referenced framework, it 
proposed a ten-level system to encourage progression with the average pupil 
expected to change levels every two years. The reason for a criterion-referenced 
framework was to provide written statements for achievement. The Report was 
fundamentally opposed to assessments unconnected to curricula. It suggested that 
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only at the end of Key Stage Three should results be published, without adjustment 
for socio-economic intake. 
For primary school teachers, then, publication of 'raw' results was not on 
the table, thereby pennitting teachers to focus on the processual nature of teaching, 
rather than a focus solely on its 'product' (examinations) in order to provide as far 
as possible high scores for league tables. However, it became clear that Margaret 
Thatcher did not share the educationalist underpinning of the Report. On March 10 
1988, a letter (dated 21 January) from her office to a Private Secretary at the DES 
was leaked. The letter firstly underscored the disturbingly complex and elaborate 
system proposed by TGAT that would entail setting up two new powerful bodies, 
namely the Schools Examination Council and the National Curriculum Council. 
Secondly, the letter indicated Thatcher's concerns (a) that the purpose of 
assessment is diagnostic and formative rather than summative; (b) the role 
envisaged for the LEAs in the implementation of the system, and (c) the lack of 
attention to the overall costs. The issue of increased expenditure took up the 
remainder of the letter. The assessment context for the two case-study schools was 
altered radically following the ERA. 
Before scrutinising the TGAT Report, and delineating the managerialist 
usurpation of assessment, it is worth recapitulating the main characteristics of the 
1988 ERA. Whilst the 1988 Act constitutes the main break with the past (thereby 
providing the start of a new conditioning sequence), the 1992,1993 and 1994 Acts 
consolidate and extend its managerialist-cum-competitive nature. In essence, the 
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ERA established, without any substantive consultation with the teaching profession 
and LEAs, the conditions for a competitive market in publicly funded school 
provision in order to enable parents (qua consumers) to make informed choices. 
The Act removed restrictions that prevented parents opting to send their children to 
schools of their choice. It gave schools substantially increased control over how 
they used their budgets. Funding was allocated according to numbers on roll (per 
capita funding), which was intended as a market mechanism to reflect the success 
of particular schools. Indeed, the market attraction of schools was to be judged via 
examination results at ages 7,11,14 and 16. Schools were required to publish an 
information booklet for prospective parents and an annual report to be presented at 
a public meeting. 
At the same time, central control was increased over the content of 
schooling. The National Curriculum imposed three core subjects and six or seven 
foundation subjects, which were to be taught to all children from the age of five to 
sixteen. The Secretary of State, using detailed attainment targets that would 
underpin the publication of results, determined the programmes of study. Also, 
teachers' hours were specified for the first time (Baker abolished the Burnham 
Committee in 1987) and schemes for teacher appraisal were to be required. 
Performance-related pay was also envisioned. Employers and local business 
interests were to play a leading part on school governing bodies. Schools were 
empowered to spend money in a competitive market place rather than enjoined to 
spend it on services provided by LEAs. Finally, a majority of parents could vote to 
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6opt out' of LEA control, funded instead by central government as GM (Grant 
Maintained) schools. 
The quasi -marketi sation of the education system necessarily involves 
winners and losers. The fact that losses are ineluctable stems, inter alia, from 
inadequate funding. Yet as we have seen, the neo-liberal project wrongly assumes 
that decreased funding, dispersed via the market, will improve standards, despite a 
few casualties here and there. This ignores both the socio-economic intake of 
children and the transcendental need for adequate state provision of educational 
services. Sinclair et al. (1995) rightly point out that a central purpose of the 1988 
Act is to reduce state spending. (The issue of whether the neo-liberal project is 
simply an ideological ruse, dressed up in liberal philosophical garb, is not important 
here. ) Given that the government's objective is to reduce spending without 
lowering standards, the issue of pay and performance arises. Not surprisingly, this 
has been the key concern of the teaching unions post-ERA. In view of the inability 
of the unions to insert themselves on to key committees and bodies both prior and 
subsequent to the ERA, it is not surprising that assessment and curriculum issues 
were accorded little significance. Sinclair et al. write that 
League tables of examination results, truancy rates and other performance 
indicators add a further dimension of market competition among schools [in 
addition to LMS]. Schools are under pressure to provide evidence of high 
standards of quality to the parents of both existing and potential pupils. The 
combination of budgetary and competitive changes places an imperative on 
management to extract higher levels of teacher performance at lower cost... 
School managers are required to maintain quality while increasing both the 
volume and the intensity of the teachers' workload and this involves the 
mobilization of human resource management (HRM) techniques (1995: 25 1). 
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The immediate question here is what about the children? Where do the children fit 
into the competitive system that intensifies teachers' workload and continually 
expects unremitting quality improvement across the board? More specifically, are 
the processes involved in learning eclipsed by the unremitting need for teachers to 
be ahead of their competitors in the education market place? 
The Managerialist Usurpation of Assessment 
The argument of this section is to maintain that the managerialist thrust of the ERA 
and subsequent legislation is precisely to eclipse or rather expunge the reality of 
children and their distinctive processes of cognitive development. The conflation of 
children and examination results is directly attributable to the managerialist nature 
of the ERA and its market-driven assessment arrangements. The current nature of 
the education system is underpinned by economic rationalism, whereby education is 
commodified and education policy is the means by which it can be more efficiently 
regulated and distributed. Indeed, the logic of the commodification of education is 
that we lose sight of the intrinsic 'use-value' of knowledge and concomitantly the 
children who are taught to understand it. Whitty et al. draw upon the notion of the 
tevaluative state'. Here, instead of 
a priori evaluation, we have a posteriori evaluation. What matters is not the 
process by which goals might be achieved, but the output... this shift of 
emphasis from process to product, from input to output, indicates a significant 
new development in the relationship between the state and education system. 
First, it replaces the predominant concerns of quality of provision and equity of 
access and opportunity. Second, by focusing on output, it redefines the purpose 
of education in terms of the economy rather than individual demand (1998: 37) 
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The reason for the conflation of children and examination results (cognitive 
development underpinned by process and the end product) stems from the 
(attempted) appropriation of managerialist principles and practices. When all that 
matters is a few quantifiable proxies (viz. examination results), whether they have 
improved and how much they cost, then necessarily children do not enter into the 
equation. As Fergusson (1994) has argued, managerialism in education is flawed 
because teachers' knowledge, skills and values are rooted in teaching and learning. 
Their motivation is inextricably bound up with this and therefore league tables are 
of little (educational) value. Thus, to Gunter, 'Children's work is deten-nined by 
efficiency rather than welfare, and they are tested according to a timetable rather 
than readiness and capability' (1997: 15). As we saw in Chapter 3, notions of 
readiness are quintessential to child-centred approaches. Yet the overriding logic of 
a competitive systent, of which one central inechanisin is examination results, 
negates this. However, I now want to return to the TGAT report and the years that 
led to the 1993 Dearing Review. 
Criterion referencing, accountability and Dearing 
The TGAT report recommended a criterion-, rather than norm-, referenced system. 
Its appeal is, on the one hand, to the bureaucratic and, on the other, to the 
pedagogic (Butterfield 1995). Norm-referencing is the determination of assessment 
by the attainment of an individual in comparison to others. A familiar example is 
its use in the 1 I-plus examination used for selection to grammar, technical and 
secondary modem schools. Criterion-referencing replaces the notion of ability with 
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a notion of achievements (in the plural), which can be individually represented and 
enable progress to be documented. Psychologists concerned with techniques of 
arriving at better (more valid and reliable) tests initially developed the tenn 
educational measurements. Here we find technical debates about what precisely 
are a criterion and the nature of mastery. Nedelsky (1954) developed a method 
known as the Minimum Pass Level method, applied to multiple-choice tests. This 
method is concerned more with establishing the difficulty of an item than with 
ensuring its validity in tenns of any particular criteria. Glaser (1963) developed 
'criterion-referenced measures', whereby the latter depend upon an absolute 
standard of quality, while norm-referenced measures depend upon a relative 
standard. However, as Butterfield points out, his exemplification of the difference 
does not resolve the difficulty of separating criteria from distributive judgements. 
The scores obtained from an achievement test provide primarily two kinds of 
information. One is the degree to which the student has attained criterion 
performance, for example, whether he can satisfactorily prepare an experimental 
report, or solve certain kinds of word problems in arithmetic. The second type 
of infori-nation that an achievement test score provides is the relative ordering of 
individuals with respect to their test performance, for example whether Student 
A can solve his problems more quickly than Student B (cited in Butterfield 
1995: 119-120). 
The definition of a satisfactory achievement is likely to be derived from knowledge 
of performance of that age group, i. e. from the normal distribution of results. 
However, Hambleton et al. (1978) argued that domain of behaviours was meant, 
not a minimum proficiency level. In other words, Glaser's example of 
'satisfactorily preparing experimental reports', the criterion is not to be as 
'satisfactorily' but the domain 'prepare an experimental report'. Yet, as Butterfield 
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points out, the National Curriculum sidesteps this debate by using both definitions: 
Attainment Targets constitute domains (e. g. speaking and listening), whereas the 
Statements of Attainment constitute the minimum proficiency definition. 
The domain-proficiency duality helps to explain the contradictions and 
tensions that teachers are experiencing in their attempts to assess pupils against 
National Curriculum levels. One of the problems with the minimum proficiency 
model is that it draws upon the notion of mastery, which itself might be seen as a 
state or judged along a continuum. The state model distinguishes only between 
mastery and non-mastery and teaching is usually structured so that the great 
majority of pupils achieve mastery of each stage. The continuum model suggests 
that there may be stages or degrees of mastery. The National Curriculum is not 
clear about whether it is underpinned by a state or continuum approach. Whilst the 
tenri is used in training manuals, it is not defined. The key point is that the 
continuum model involves a greater degree of input of teacher judgement, yet such 
judgement is precisely what the National Curriculum has been designed to nullify. 
However, evidence for the success of the more rigid application of mastery learning 
is questionable (see Slavin 1987). 
However, notwithstanding the above, the model chosen by the government 
rests on the assumption that it is possible to define levels of achievement and to 
assess these levels nationally. Butterfield suggests that this might have appeared to 
open up large questions about the relationship of levels and ages and about the 
advisability of teaching and assessing all pupils of a similar age together. Indeed, 
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'Work on graded assessments in the UK focused on the need to consider stages 
rather than ages of learning, as a logical concomitant of criterion-referencing' 
(Butterfield 1995: 127; emphasis added). In an early critique of the National 
Curriculum, Murphy wrote that: 'There is little justification for prescribing 
attainment targets in related to fixed ages. Optimum attainment levels should be 
recorded and rewarded regardless of age when they are reached by individual 
pupils' (idem. ). (The Dearing Review in its discussion of the 10-point scale did 
not question the appropriateness of an age approach. ) Whilst the TGAT report 
seemed to augur well, ambiguities and contradictions were clearly apparent. In 
fact, Scott (1994) argues that criterion-referenced systems conflate logical 
hierarchies of skills and content with developmental approaches to learning 
employed by pupils. 
Furthermore, the TGAT proposals supported conflicting notions of 
accountability. Scott distinguishes between contextualised and decontextualised 
approaches to assessment. The contextualised model centres on the timing of the 
assessments, their relationship to the specifics of the course and the conditions 
under which they are taken. The focus is solely on the teaching and learning of 
pupils and their past achievements - comparisons with other schools and pupils 
cannot be drawn. This clearly belies the market mechanism of competition and re- 
establishes professional autonomy. The contextualised model is thus concerned 
with intenial accountability, directly to the pupils, which is tempered by 
professional integrity. The decontextualised model prioritises extenzal 
accountability. As Scott puts it: 
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here a high emphasis is placed on comparability, so that variables peculiar to 
specific pupils, teaching situations or schools are not given the same priority as 
they are in the first model... [It is] competitive -a teacher's work is judged in 
relation to the achievements of his or her peers. This model also strongly 
emphasizes external accountability. Indeed in line with Kogan's (1986) free- 
market consumerist model of accountability, failure in the context of the public 
market place leads to loss of income for the school and of employment for 
teachers. Aspects of both models featured in the initial TGAT report, though 
subsequent arrangements made for assessment ... are inore in line with our 
second model (Scott 1994: 5 1; emphasis added). 
Indeed, the shift towards external accountability was speedy. Its starting-point has 
already been discussed above, namely the Prime NEnister's personal intervention. 
However, the key point here is that despite its flaws, criterion-referencing would 
have been welcome by the majority of teachers, particularly at the primary level 
given its individual-level diagnostic rationale. Yet the legal requirement of 
reporting the overall performance of schools and LEAs is antithetic. The 
managerialist need for quantifiable data that permit comparison of schools as part 
of the competitive process necessarily negates such issues as cognitive 
development, the impact of socio-economic background on pupil intake and, 
indeed, non-quantifiable phenomena. As I argued in Chapter 2, we are dealing with 
a constraining contradiction (albeit one that remained fundamentally unexploited by 
corporate agency). For managerialism negates 'the input', that is, children. 
Logically, it cannot avoid any treatment of the input and arguably the managerialist 
usurpation of assessment in turn secretes a Durkheimian (or factory) model of 
children, whose cognitive capacities are fleetingly acknowledged or reduced to one- 
way dependence upon society. The fact that the latter is secreted must not lead one 
to assume this is what was meant all along: the constraining nature of the 
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contradiction stems from managerialism's erasure of humanity per se. Thus its 
secreted factory model would be of no interest or, rather, recognised as logically 
possible. The fact that schools are working with a model that links progression 
fin-nly to fixed curriculum objectives and marginalises alternative notions of 
progress or development should not be taken to be an implicit acknowledgement of 
the cognitive nature of children qua children. However, we need to complete the 
story that led to the Dearing Review. 
The purpose of SATs was to ensure reliability and comparability; these 
should work at the class and not the individual level. If there was any divergence, 
the teacher assessment was to be adjusted. In 1989 SEAC made recommendations 
to the Secretary of State. These recommendations formed part of the final Standing 
Orders published in July 1990. The Orders signalled a radical change of direction. 
In essence, SATs were to be the main method of assessment, with teacher 
assessments being marginalised. However, the then Secretary of State, John 
MacGregor, argued in favour of a number of the TGAT principles, viz. that 
assessment should be connected to curricula and that parity of importance be 
granted to teacher assessment. In 1990 Kenneth Clarke took over from MacGregor. 
In a nutshell, he was determined to reassert central control and wanted to 
circumscribe the power of the individual teacher. He inherited a number of 
problems. SATs were too long-winded, difficult to manage and required 
considerable input by teachers. Moreover, doubts about their reliability and 
validity were expressed (see Butterfield 1995; Davis 1998). Consequently, at Key 
Stage 3, for example, shorter tests were requested; the Mathematics Development 
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Agency devised three one-hour tests. Ineluctably, the ability to make diagnostic 
and formative judgements was eliminated at a stroke. There was also a 
considerable emphasis on the publishing of league tables. However, the 
irremediable unmanageability of the National Curriculum led to the Dearing 
Review (1993). 
Dearing recommended that national tests and teacher assessments should 
be shown separately in all forms of reporting. He proposed that the prescribed 
curricular arrangements (as expressed in the Public Orders) should be cut back. In 
turn, the time released would permit teaching of non-statutory SCAA material. It 
was suggested that the ten-level system should be re-evaluated. As already 
mentioned, this re-evaluation did not consider the appropriateness of an age-related 
structure. Tile overriding concern was to simplify within a managerialist 
framework. Indeed, Dearing still maintained the need for publication of summative 
data about pupils and schools. Though sympathetic, he was not convinced about 
the need to re-work the raw test scores to allow for socio-economic factors. The 
conflict between the two models of accountability remained, weighted more firmly 
on the 'decontextualised' model. The market mechanism of examination failure for 
some (resulting in possible closure) underscores the managerialist underpinning of 
the curriculum: any conceivable reference to the differential needs of children 
would enjoin the closing down of a system that links income to examination 
perforinance. 
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This section has delineated the speedy ascendancy of economic 
rationalism. Despite the ambiguities and contradictions of the TGAT proposals and 
the conflicting notions of accountability contained therein, the legal requirement 
that schools provide quantifiable data to ensure comparison and the 
decontextualised model of assessment that Dearing kept intact combined to ensure 
that the central government remained firmly in the managerialist driving seat. At 
the same, the creation of its overseer, OFSTED, and the considerable influence of 
the School Effectiveness Movement contingently overdetermined the managerialist 
usurpation of primary (and secondary) education. The next section dissects the 
Taylorist nature of quasi-marketisation and the Preface to Part Three addresses the 
contingent compatibility of the School Effectiveness Movement, which continues 
to infonn and strengthen the managerialism of education. 
Taylorism and Organisational Culture 
In Chapter 3 reference was made to the scientific management of F. W. Taylor. 
The managerialist restructuring of the public sector has spawned a huge literature 
on the extent to which Taylorism is characteristic of the latter and related issues of 
TQM (total quality management) and organisational culture genetically. Ackroyd 
and Bolton's (1999) study of the mechanisms of work intensification in the 
provision of gynaecological services in a NHS hospital concluded that such 
mechanisms are not Taylorist. The authors accept that some deskilling has 
occurred, alongside grade dilution and the employment of increasing numbers of 
nurses on non-standard contracts and the use of bank and nursing agencies. 
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Furthermore, they note those managerialist nostrums such as management by 
objectives (MBO), performance management (PM) and total quality management 
(TQM) have obvious points of continuity with Taylorism. 
Not least of these is that they all feature concern for specific measures of 
performance and output. It would be strange indeed if new managerial regimes 
in the NHS had escaped all influence from management ideas like these... 
Performance management and perfon-nance-related pay, for example, do seem to 
be applied to the work of senior managers... But, there is, equally, little 
evidence that such ideas are being used to set quantitative measures of efficiency 
and performance for the likes of individual nurses and social workers... Meeting 
targets is not usually the responsibility of individual nurses and this is certainly 
the case in [our] hospital... (1999: 373-374). 
Their argument against Taylorist restructuring of nurses' work is that (a) NHS 
managers do not directly control the work of nurses and, moreover, (b) managers 
have not redesigned nurses' work in order to improve efficiency. The key criterion 
is job redesign. As they point out, NHS managers do not have the requisite 
knowledge. In contrast, the ERA and subsequent legislation is Taylorist. The 
National Curriculum prescribes what is to be taught. Primary teachers are now 
required to set aside 2 hours per day for mathematics and English (so-called 
'Numeracy and Literacy Hours'). Subjects have been externally imposed with the 
avowed intention of expunging professional judgement. Moreover, the publication 
of league tables diverts attention away from the less able, focuses attention on exam 
success at the expense of understanding. The eventual emphasis on external 
assessment at the expense of teacher assessment further underscores the Taylorist 
underpinning of the reforms. Equally, the recent Labour imposition of national 
target setting and creation of Education Action Zones represents its educational 
zenith. 
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As Fergusson (1994) notes, many of the key features of managerialism in 
schools cluster around the headteacher. The headteacher is ceasing to be a senior 
peer embedded within a professional group. The head is now responsible for 
pursuing central ly-deten-nined objectives and methods, ensuring the compliance of 
staff. In contrast to the NHS managers, heads do have significant knowledge of 
what their staff does (or should do). For Fergusson, school managers 'can bring 
about a more thorough-going and far-reaching overhaul of the methods and 
purposes of service delivery than an army of policy-makers and inspectors... They 
are in this sense a sine qua non of systemic reform... ' (1994: 95). The weak 
management lines between heads and classroom teachers that existed prior to ERA 
have been strengthened by the introduction of appraisal systems. Changed 
procedures of promotion and the incentive allowance scheme have vested 
governing bodies with sole responsibility. And HMI has effectively been 
supplanted by OFSTED. Heads' principal source of power derives from the 
devolution of financial control. Although responsibility for the internal allocation 
lies fori-nally with governors, heads have used their knowledge and position to 
usurp the powers that derive from this. Thus, to Fergusson, 
Heads have acquired both power and responsibility to oversee the content of 
teachers' work, to scrutinize its outcomes as measured by tests, truancy rates and 
leavers' destinations, to appraise performance, and to account for all these to 
governors, as well as exerting a powerful influence over promotion... (ibid.: 97). 
It is thus not surprising that heads exploit the budgetary powers afforded to them to 
justify autocratic behaviour. The Audit Comrrýission (1993) found evidence of 
important budgetary information being withheld from governors and improper use 
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of funds. In my first-case study school, ostensibly democratically-run staff 
meetings were subject to prior agenda fixing, as will be seen. 
Managerialism and organisational culture 
The irony of the New Managerialism centres on the employment of 'cultural' 
techniques designed to improve efficiency and effectiveness, whereby employees 
are 'empowered'. Such cultural techniques have their origins in the early 1980s, 
during which the 'culture' of corporations emerged as a central theme in the field of 
management and organisation studies. The so-called gurus of 'excellence' 
(notably, Peters and Waterman's In Search of Excellence) promoted the project of 
strengthening corporate culture. It was argued that improvements in productivity 
and quality derived from corporate cultures that systematically recognise and 
reward individuals for identifying their sense of purpose with that of the 
organisation's values. Qua ideational corpus, corporate culture's key characteristic 
is to promote employee commitment to a monolithic structure of feeling and 
thought in the name of empowerment or expanded autonomy. The successful 
imposition of 'corporate culturism', as Hugh Willmott (1993) puts it, is an S-C 
affair, whose outcome cannot be decided a priori. 
The origins of 'corporate culturism' need not detain us (see Harvey 1989). 
Programmes of corporate culturism (human resource management and TQM) seek 
to promote a corporate ethos that demands loyalty from employees as it excludes, 
silences or punishes those who question its creed (H. Willmott 1993: 519). The so- 
called 'strength' of culture is tied to the extent to which contradictory or 'rival' 
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values are absent (at the S-C level). Each employee is encouraged to become 
embroiled in a process 'that structures work situations by means of intensive 
training, planning, continuous learning, and the use of various human resource 
management techniques' (Hydebrand, cited in H. Willmott 1993: 523). Insofar as 
employees are drawn to the allure of what Hydebrand calls 'technocratic 
informalism', employees come to discipline themselves with feelings of anxiety, 
shame and guilt that are aroused when they sense themselves to fall short of the 
sacred values of the organisation (idem. ). Textbooks on how-to-do intensive 
training, planning and continuous improvement are easy to find in the veritable 
growth industry of education management. 48 Such texts emphasise the teacher 
qua manager and at the same time neutralise the processes of management - they 
are held to be apolitical and thus the stress is placed on consensus-building. Thus 
consensus-building is often the result of the use of power to impose S-C uniformity 
and my task has been to assess the extent to which S-C uniformity has prevailed in 
two schools (both of which inter alia serve disadvantaged/advantaged children 
respectively). 
Thus 'culture' here is about the imposition of values. In our phraseology, 
it is concerned with both the CS and S-C levels: how managers/corporate leaders 
must impose a set of compatible ideas, which in turn must be enthusiastically 
imbibed by employees. There is no room for dissensus at the S-C level, despite the 
48 As Gunter puts it, 'Education management has grown rapidly in the last ten years to the extent that it is 
an industry driven by the market with ever-changing products in the form of books, courses and contract 
work' (1997: vii). She goes on to note that current orthodoxy in management text and training 'is the 
human resource management model, which has its origins in the excellence and quality models of US 
business writings' (ibid.: I). 
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existence of (potentially) numerous fault-lines at the CS level. The overriding aim 
of any corporate culture programme is to erase critical reflection, i. e. as a prelude to 
any agential surveying of the CS for incompatible items. Of course, the intrinsic 
human capacity to reflect can never be erased - this is a transcendental 
impossibility. Thus, 'under the guise of giving more autonomy to the individual 
than in organisations governed by bureaucratic rules, corporate culture threatens to 
promote a new, hypermodem neo-authoritarianism which, potentially, is more 
insidious and sinister than its bureaucratic predecessor' (H. Willmott 1993: 541). 
Indeed, what's 'new' about the current corpus of propositions and practices that 
comprise managerialism is the shift from bureaucratic rationality to market 
rationality, which demanded 'a metamorphosis in prevailing organizational 
subjectivities or identities. The characteristic forms of motivation and action 
associated with 'organization man' or the 'bureaucratic personality' was to be 
replaced by those definitive of the 'enterprising or calculating self'. The 'culture of 
the customer' emerged as a 'total ideology'... ' (Reed 1995: 44). Hence the 
expectation that LMS and per capita funding arrangements, underpinned by the 
competitive mechanism of examination league tables, would result in the adoption 
of entrepreneurial values and practices. This has certainly been borne out. 49 
As Reed notes, on the surface TQM may be seen as a mundane procedural 
mechanism directed to the technical requirements for operational efficiency and 
effectiveness within work- organisations. 
49 Gewirtz et al. (1995) reveal how schools are increasingly spending money on marketing strategies. The 
authors calculate that if every school spent ElOOO on marketing each year, the total annual marketing bill 
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But this surface reality occludes an underlying logic and strategy of control 
deployed in the service of values and interests held by those occupying positions 
of governance within corporate hierarchies... In its most conceptually pristine or 
ideal typical form, it offers an effective organizational integration of core values 
and control technologies through which ideological homogenization and 
behaviour conformity can be jointly secured... However, the actual 
implementation of TQM-type principles and methods is likely to be much more 
partial and contested than the ideal type would indicate (1995: 47; emphasis 
added). 
The extent and nature of contestation is a matter for empirical investigation at the 
interface between the structural and cultural realms. That contestation is likely is, 
of course, attributable to the dehumanising thrust of the New Managerialism and its 
form contingent upon the values and practices that it attempts to displace. Children 
and their developmental needs, along with teachers and their needs as professional 
human beings, have no place. Thus we should not be surprised that the National 
Curriculum has no educational aims, but plenty of managerial ones. Hence both 
Baker and Clarke's disregard for matters theoretical and the incredible speed with 
which Baker pushed through the reforms. As Butterfield rightly points out, no 
curriculum is genuinely atheoretical. Hence the constraining contradiction 
delineated in Chapter 2. Managerialism cannot conceive of any theory that 
underpins children's learning since it denies the existence of children per se, but 
transcendentally cannot operate (in the context of education) without them. To do 
so would belie the technicist-cum-commodifying nature of its rationale. 50 
for the UK as whole would be around E28 million! In terms of resource efficiency -a term beloved by the 
New Right - this state of affairs is untenable. 50 It is, as Butterfield emphasises, important to consider some of the problems not identified by the 
Secretary of State for review. The Attainment Targets and Schemes of Work are pragmatically derived; 
essentially they are functionalist. Yet there were no workplace studies carried out. The pragmatic 
approach breaks down because it has included more than can be reasonably done altogether. 
The objectives are not operating within any overall statement about educational purpose. The 
National Curriculum has no overarching statement of its educational aims, nor is there any 
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Concluding remarks 
This chapter has delineated the final sequence of the generic morphogenetic cycle, 
of which the end product is Structural Elaboration in the form of the 1988 
Education Reform Act and its subsequent legislative consolidation, and Cultural 
Elaboration in the form of systernatised New Managerialism and contradictory 
mixture of neo-liberalism and conservatism. The details of the Act and subsequent 
legislation have been documented. In brief, the mixture of economic rationali sm, 
New Managerialism and pragmatism has resulted in the negation of the differing 
rates of cognitive development of children. Furthermore, the neo-liberal-cum- 
conservative ideational mix that underpinned the legislation has been scrutinised. 
The contradiction between neo-liberalism and conservatism is objective and the 
untenability of the 'market optic' of neo-liberalism has been transcendentally 
established. This explains the practical problems experienced by legislators, viz. 
centralisation in one sphere versus de-centralisation in another. Crucially, the 
immanent contradiction cannot be reconciled. Such contradiction was not 
accentuated at the S-C level and amplified by the teaching unions. Instead, the 
manoeuvring of the unions has been essentially defensive, focusing on traditional 
matters of pay and conditions. Successive Secretaries of State rode roughshod over 
the unions, creating an unmanageable, near-crisis situation, whose urgent 
reappraisal came about in 1993. Yet, as we have seen, the Dearing Review 
remained within the managerialist mould and did not question the fundamentally 
anti-educational nature of the National Curriculum, especially the inequitable 
statement of the educational contribution each subject area is intended to make... [and again there 
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nature of the market mechanisms. Indeed, the arbitrary nature of the levels of the 
curriculum and the decontextualised nature of examinations (and issues of 
reliability and validity) equally remained out of reach. 
One of the key contradictions that is the focus of the thesis is encapsulated in 
the following: 'If a school is about to be 'OFSTEDed' and rings you up for a 
consultancy to prepare the staff, it is a foolish consultant who refuses a day's 
training on efficiency and effectiveness and tries to persuade the school that what 
they really need is a day on the theory of how children learn' (Gunter 1997: 12). 
That is, the managerialist quasi-marketisation of the education system represents a 
stringent obstruction to the enactment of child-centred philosophy. Now, the 
overriding concern for heads is to manage their limited budgets and their staff so 
that they do not become losers in the battle that is now education. The neo-liberal 
input of the 1988 ERA has engendered a situation in which teachers are implicitly 
held to be the cause of 'failing' schools, rather than inadequate funding, work- 
overload and the reality of 'school mix'. Indeed, the lack of discursive penetration 
on the part of New Labour has exacerbated the latter, since now primary teachers 
are stringently conditioned to meet imposed national targets, of which one response 
is discussed in Chapter 7. The charge here rests on the fact that a purportedly pro- 
egalitarian Government has uncritically endorsed and consolidated legislation that 
is (contradictorily) grounded in neo-liberalism and conservatism. In turn, the role 
of OFSTED under the direction of Chris Woodhead has been strengthened. The 
important role of the School Effectiveness Movement will now be documented and 
is] the overall arbitrariness of the 10-level framework (1995: 67). 
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criticised for its methodological individualism, which (contingently) complements 
and buttresses the neo-liberal restructuring of education. The managerial co-option 
of leading UK academics will also be highlighted, underscoring the ways in which 
their critiques of "Primaryspeak" and progressivism complement the neo-liberal 
education project. Whilst not publicly aligned with OFSTED and School 
Effectiveness, Robin Alexander's co-authorship of Curriculunt Organisation and 
Classroont Practice in Prinzary Schools with Woodhead is instructive. 
In sum, then, the picture looks somewhat bleak. The substantive question to 
be answered now is how two schools, one deemed 'failing' by OFSTED and the 
other deemed as giving 'value for money', mediate the contradictions and pressures 
embodied in the new conditioning cycles. 
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PREFACE TO PART THREE 
OFSTED and School Effectiveness 
Part and parcel of the New Managerialist restructuring of the education system 
(which incorporates and expands upon the core principles of Taylorism) is the 
inspection system designed and managed by OFSTED. Quintessenti ally, 
effectiveness and efficiency underpin the OFSTED rationale - technical matters 
about how best to improve 'standards'. The TQM approach is its managerial 
mainstay. The Education (Schools) Act 1992 established the arrangements for 
independent inspections (on a four-yearly basis) by registered inspectors to be 
trained by, and responsible to, OFSTED. Teams of inspectors, which include lay 
inspectors, are designed to provide 'regular and rigorous inspection under the 
watchful eye of the new and powerful Chief Inspector for Schools' (DFE 1992). 
The arrangements for the conduct of inspections are detailed in the Handbookfor 
the Inspection of Schools. The 'Framework' contained therein and the 1992 Act 
have established a public set of criteria about effectiveness. Whilst I accept 
Butterfield's point that the criteria go beyond the issue of 'standards', the 
Framework embodied in the Handbook is underpinned by the achievement of 
'procedural objectivity' (Eisner 1991), which is designed to eliminate the scope for 
personal judgement. Indeed, the managerialist rationale means not simply that we 
cannot measure, for example, whether 'quality of life' has improved, but that any 
consideration of 'quality of life' per se is disavowed. Such issues are consistently 
played down by OFSTED (despite nebulous references to pupils' spiritual 
development and school ethos). In short, why-questions are consistently eschewed. 
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As discussed in Chapter 2, qua performance indicators, SATs grossly distort reality 
because of their reductionism, by-passing the cognitive processes by which children 
learn. To recapitulate Ball's (1990) point, the parameters of OFSTED operate 
within the input-output logic of the commodity form and thus displace and exclude 
other criteria of judgement. 
OFSTED's rationale and policy prescriptions are intimately connected with, 
and derived from, a large and particularly influential section of the academic 
research community in England and Wales. In fact, this research community forms 
part of an international School Effectiveness Movement. Research on 'school 
effectiveness' has become a major international industry. School effectiveness 
research has now had a major impact on policy-making at the national, local and 
school level. The DES 
established a School Effectiveness Division in 1994 which has become 
increasingly influential in the years since then. It has sought explicitly to learn 
from the research... and to apply its lessons to policy on, for example, failing 
schools... The revival of local educational authorities in recent years has been 
built around the same body of research. Indeed, it would be only a slight 
exaggeration to say that it saved them from extinction (Barber and White 
1997: 1). 
The quasi-marketisation of education and the concomitant idealised drive for 
efficiency have been aided by the factorial prescriptions designed to ameliorate 
6average' or 'failing' schools, which have emanated from the school effectiveness 
research. Many critics (Angus 1993; Ball 1990,1995; Chitty 1997; Elliot 1996; 
Hamilton 1998) have convincingly demonstrated that such research is being used to 
lend spurious support to neo-liberal policy because of its promotion of an approach 
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in which it is assumed that 'educational problems' can be fixed by technical means 
and that inequality is an intra-school affair - to be managed within the classroom. 
The focus on the classroom/school level logically re-directs attention away 
from the wider socio-economic context. Thus critics have arraigned school 
effectiveness researchers on the charge of 'ideological commitment'. This has 
prompted indignation. Thus, to Mortimore and Sammons, for example, 'How can 
anyone who understands research methodology... make such an affair accusation? 
We reject - utterly and completely - this accusation and challenge its makers to 
provide evidence for the statement or to withdraw it' (1997: 185). Recently, I have 
taken up the gauntlet (Willmott 1999c), transcendentally upholding the charge of 
ideological commitment. Specifically, I focused on the ontological secretions of 
the school effectiveness movement's methodology. The positivist methodology 
employed by school effectiveness researchers secretes an atomised social ontology. 
My argument is that it is in social practice that the ontological presuppositions of 
positivism become ideological. It is not the 'theoretical' presuppositions per se that 
are ideological, but the social uses to which they are knowingly or unknowingly 
put. In brief, there is a contingent compatibility between the neo-liberal (Hayekian) 
inflection of the New Right corpus and the secreted social ontology of positivist 
research methodology; such contingent compatibility cannot be wished away. 
The OFSTED framework implicitly disavows the stratified nature of 
social reality. Its focus thus remains at the level of observable events and cannot 
theorise about the generative mechanisms that underlie them. In a nutshell, 
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relatively enduring socio-cultural emergent properties are erased by positivism. For 
Hamilton, school effectiveness research is bundled within an overall national 
efficiency package. 
It comes bundled with master's degrees in business , 
administration (MBAs)... 
the centralization of teacher training... and the segregated, management training 
of promoted teachers... All of these innovations have been part of a new right- 
inspired and centrally funded exercise to transfer - by fiat - drive systems from 
one sector of the economy to another (1998: 18). 
He also points to the ecological fallacy intrinsic to the aggregate measures 
undertaken by effectiveness research (whereby aggregate measures are invalidly 
extrapolated to the performance of individuals) and the privileging of the 
productivity of schools over the performance of individuals, in turn creating 
tensions at the school level. However, more important is his recognition of 
OFSTED's model of causality (which is embedded in positivism). The overriding 
concern of the school effectiveness -research is on that which can be observed and 
measured. This is basic to any positivist research methodology. Positivism 
maintains that there are no real or necessary connections between, say, A and B. 
Instead of A caused B, we have A occurred followed by B. Yet to say that A 
caused B is to say that the occurrence of A is a necessary and/or sufficient 
condition for the occurrence of B. Therefore, as Layder (1990) rightly argues, the 
positivist notion of causality as expressed in the notion of observable, regular 
conjunctions of events is not an adequate conception at all. 
That the OFSTED framework implicitly denies the sui generis reality of 
enduring socio-cultural emergent properties is not therefore surprising given that 
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necessity is disavowed by positivism. In other words, the internal and necessary sui 
generis social relations that are constitutive of a school and its systemic anchorage 
do not exist and thus cannot have causal efficacy. We can thus account for the 
arguments of Chris Woodhead that there are no limits to improvement, since the 
notion that the (dehumanised) child who, being nothing, can be filled up with 
anything - without limits - necessarily results from a secreted atomised social 
ontology and the New Managerialism. However, to return now to the OFSTED 
model. Key Characteristics of Effective Schools (Sammons, Hillman and 
Mortimore 1995) is a review of the school effectiveness research commissioned in 
1994 by OFSTED. The authors are based at the International School Effectiveness 
and Improvement Centre of the London University Institute of Education. Their 
task was to summarise current knowledge about school effectiveness and to provide 
OFSTED with an analysis of the key determinants of school effectiveness in 
secondary and primary schools. Hamilton suggests that the reviewers were 
reluctant to focus unilaterally on causality and, moreover, that they and OFSTED 
did not share the same view of causality. One can discern a straightforward, linear 
model of causality underpinning the OFSTED model. As Hamilton puts it: 
In linear systems, a straightforward cause leads to a straightforward effect. In 
non-linear systems the outcome is so sensitive to initial conditions that a 
minuscule change in the situation at the beginning of the process may result in a 
large difference at the end. OFSTED assumes that... outcomes can be linked 
directly and unambiguously to inputs. OFSTED believes, in effect, that it is 
possible to predict the final resting-place of a set of billiard balls on the basis of 
the prior cue stroke (1998: 15). 
Hamilton points out that the Institute's reviewers shared a more elaborate view of 
causality. They openly acknowledge such problems of interpretation and 
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prediction, yet in the next breath disregard their own caveats. 'Key determinants' 
are replaced by 'key factors' and the preamble to the table of eleven factors denotes 
them as 'correlates of effectiveness'. The focus on correlates exemplifies the 
positivist anchorage. Consequently, Hamilton argues that social engineering 
assumptions are smuggled back into the analysis. I would want to add further that 
the use of mathematical modelling by school effectiveness researchers again points 
up its positivist nature. For mathematics is quintessentially an acausal language. 
As Sayer puts it, mathematics 'lacks the categories of "producing", "generatine' or 
"forcing" which we take to indicate causality. Mathematics functions such as y= 
ftx) say nothing about what makes y or x... ' (1992: 179). At best, mathematics 
records the effects of underlying generative mechanisms and by its very nature 
cannot provide an explanation of such effects. Such effects are extracted at the 
level of observable events; hence the use of mathematical modelling since the 
identification of internal or external relations is logically impossible. The inability 
of mathematics to distinguish necessary from external or contingent relations 
invites the positing of spurious correlations. This is not to suggest that mathematics 
per se presupposes an actualist social ontology, but rather a positivist methodology 
of which mathematical modelling is an integral yet contingent part. One can easily 
quantify such phenomena as levels of truancy, examination results differentiated 
according to sex, and so on. But this is only part of the story: causal mechanisms 
(in the form of irreducible structural and cultural properties) need to be brought in 
to explain the latter (Willmott 1999c). 
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Hamilton argues that the tacit OFSTED assumption seems to be that causal 
factors are independent, universal and additive; i. e. they do not interfere with each 
other and are uninfluenced by their contexts. The OFSTED reviewers, in return, 
'fully acknowledge that these conditions rarely apply in the multivariate world of 
education. Yet, as before, they appear disinclined to confront OFSTED's innocent 
assumptions... The[ir] aspiration to simplify - in the interests of packaging and 
marketing - becomes self-defeating' (idern. ). Hence the privileged explanatory 
role accorded to school ethos in the effectiveness/OFSTED literature, since the 
issue of overcoming socio-economic disadvantage is effectively neutralised. 
Indeed, school 'climate' or 'ethos' is frequently used to explain away processes that 
might alternatively be seen as the result of what Thrupp (1999) calls 'school mix' 
(i. e. the social class composition of pupil intake). Whilst socio-economic factors 
have now been belatedly acknowledged, commitment to the positivist paradigm has 
led to mere statistical incorporation of the latter. The reality of structured 
inequality is transformed into a statistical variable that more complex mathematical 
models somehow 'take into account'. This explains the repeated denial that school 
effectiveness research is ideological. Yet, to reiterate, structured inequalities 
presuppose a relational (or 'depth') social ontology, which positivism disavows. 
The quasi-umbilical link with OFSTED remains, as does the charge of ideological 
commitment. 
The managerial co-option ofAlexander and others 
Finally, I want briefly to discuss Galton and Alexander, for, whilst not specifically 
within the school effectiveness camp, their critiques of progressivism complement 
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the managerialist project. Professor Robin Alexander, now at Warwick University, 
is well known for his co-authorship of the DES discussion paper, Curriculum 
Organisation and Classroom Practice in Primary Schools (1992). The remaining 
co-authors were Chris Woodhead (extant Head of OFSTED) and J. Rose. Equally 
influential is Maurice Galton. Silcock notes that whilst warning against a return to 
wholly didactic teaching, Galton 'promotes 'factory models' of leaming (designing 
techniques which guarantee outcomes, such as 'direct instruction') as well as, rather 
more cautiously, recommending the leamer-centred, negotiated curricular 
models... ' (1996: 199). Logically, Galton cannot have it both ways. The very use 
of the factory analogy enjoins a non-negotiated curriculum. There is an obvious 
congruence between the OFSTED model of linear causality and Galton's proposal: 
factors that may (and often do) intervene to prevent 'direct instruction' are not 
countenanced. As I have argued, the managerialist ontology secretes a factory 
model. Thus Galton is treading a thin line between unleashing a constraining, as 
opposed to a competitive, contradiction. Galton would firmly deny that he is 
erasing children qua children from the learning process. However, his factory 
approach is quintessentially concerned with the product - like the egg hatched by 
the factory chicken - and not the process. Indeed, the straightforward, linear causal 
process of instruction 4 outcome implicitly denies the varied cognitive capacities 
and needs of children. Like the school effectiveness researchers, I submit that 
Galton (and Alexander) is also culpable of 'ideological commitment' for their 
proposals are ultimately managerialist rather than educational. 
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Galton's ORACLE studies (Galton et al. 1990) bolstered Alexander's 
influential attack on child-centred rhetoric (Alexander 1992; Alexander et al. 1992) 
and Alexander's own promotion of pragmatism. Both critiques give public 
credibility to the death of Plowden progressivism, justifying scapegoating speeches 
made by politicians (e. g. Kenneth Clarke 1991; John Major 1991). The generic 
emphasis now is on pragmatism, which, tied to a social constructivism, is close to 
social determinism. As Silcock puts it: 
If classroom problems are only resolved 'in situ' (pragmatism), and children 
learn, in any case, what cultures prepare them to learn (social constructivism), 
then successful education will follow from a firm control by teachers over what 
pupils do, and an associated firm control, by governments, over what teachers do 
(1996: 201). 
Alexander's pragmatism resonates well with OFSTED's school-level emphasis, 
which disavows the importance of extra-school factors. At its strongest, social 
constructivist theory views rational thought as impossible outside structures 
internalised from social intercourse (e. g. Hamlyn 1978). In its slightly weaker form 
(Vygotskian), it maintains that non-social cognitive elements are either displaced or 
transformed by the social so that little long-term account need be taken of them. 
The Vygotskian view that the mind is structured by the social rather than vice versa 
neatly complements the managerialist restructuring of education. For in playing 
down the role of children in their own cognitive development, teachers qua 
technicians can get on with the business of instructing. Such instruction is largely 
unimpeded, enabling swift improvement in standards. It should be recalled that 
Vygotsky is not denying the child's innate capacity for reflective cognitive 
development. However far he attenuates the extent of children's innate reflective 
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capacities, nevertheless he maintains that children's development occurs inside the 
child, but only after social intercourse: 'Every function in the child's cultural 
development appears twice... first between people (interpsychological) and then 
inside the child (intrapsychological)' (1978: 57). 
This is in contradistinction to the Piagetian approach, which convincingly 
demonstrates that non-social cognition gained through interaction with objects 
provides a structural ground for social perspective-taking, rather than vice versa. 
Our first grasp on reality is derived from what Piaget calls 'reflexive abstraction'; 
whereby infants become 'operative', that is, 'reflect' upon the objects they handle 
in order to develop sense-motor skills. Thus, to Silcock, 
The reflexivity of practical thinking is unlike reflection on internalised symbols 
in that the latter, being reliant on social perspective-taking, introduces shared 
meanings into consciousness and is creative of 'mind' as the arena for 
constructivism. It is, of course, an immensely important development. Until 
individuals identify other social objects as individuals, they cannot recognise 
themselves as individuals, or know their own humanness... The actions of an 
infant reaching for an object are structured by a combination of learned control 
and spatio-temporal parameters - no one has to 'tell' a child how to reach, or 
suggest it might be a good thing to do so (though such suggestions are not 
precluded - the point is that the learning proceeds on individual not social 
volition)... (1996: 206). 
Indeed, as he rightly points out, it is simply not credible that we gain the rich 
quality of tacit meanings underwriting our grasp of the physical world simply 
through linguistically mediated social influence. Galton's critique of child-centred 
philosophy and practice draws upon Simon's advice that diverse curricula, as 
related to individual needs, are too difficult to manage. Simon draws upon the 
findings of the ORACLE project, arguing that '... primary classroom practice, 
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based loosely on Plowden, creates an 'excessively complex' classroom 
management situation which presents, overall, an almost impossible task to the 
teacher. Exaggerated individualism as I argued earlier, presents the main problem' 
(1994: 154). It goes without saying, of course, that even a residual form of 
individualism would be anathema to the dehumanising thrust of the New 
Managerialism. Here we reach the main problem with the academics' critique of 
child-centred practice. For whilst young children of mixed ability cannot 
realistically be taught en masse at the same time a high degree of curricular 
differentiation is unavoidable. As Silcock argues, the question is not whether there 
should be differentiation, but how the inevitable diversity should be managed. An 
approach that attends to individuals' needs logically undermines Galton's 'factory 
model'. 
Furthermore, Alexander's pragmatism is simply about how to manage the 
National Curriculum: the focus is managerial rather than educational. Instead of 
questioning the increasing numbers of children per class, the validity and reliability 
of SATs and the generic de-professionalisation of teachers, we are told about the 
need to combine didactic or whole-class teaching with an individualised approach 
plus high-level questioning by teachers. Alexander's disparaging reference to 
primary discourse as "Primaryspeak" resonates well with the managerialist critique. 
For here the emphasis is on know-how, whereas managerialism necessitates neat, 
tidy packages of codified prescriptions for practice. 
The dilemma here is that though a vivid account of a particular, live classroom 
experience is much more arresting to an audience than abstract analytical 
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framework, to extract general principles from such an account for teachers and 
children working in different contexts is a considerably more difficult enterprise. 
That leaves ideological language... so much so that we might term it 
'Primaryspeak'. Primaryspeak is about assertion rather than argument... It is 
peppered with ... slogans and buzzwords: flexibility, freedom, spontaneity, start 
with the child ... (1990: 71). 
The one-hundred year difficulty of articulating the conceptual framework of know- 
how practices was revealed in Chapter 2. That teachers rely almost exclusively on 
practical classroom experience as the main source of their professional knowledge 
is hardly grounds for disparaging censure. Whatever the reasons underlying 
Alexander's critique of "Primaryspeak", the demand for generalised abstract 
principles lends itself to appropriation by OFSTED and school effectiveness 
research. For (a) know-that procedures are the only valid forms of knowledge 
within the New Managerialism since they provide the technicist basis for 'teaching' 
and (b) Alexander's emphasis on generalisable procedures equally neglects 
contextual factors (see above discussion on accountability and de/contexualised 
approaches). Such "Primaryspeak" shibboleths as 'start with the child' are not 
slogans but transcendental states of affairs that are prior to teaching. 
Finally, Alexander has replied that the "Three Wise Men" discussion paper 
was not an unprincipled invitation to pragmatism. Instead, '... good practice... can 
never be singular, fixed or absolute, a specification handed down or imposed from 
above... Good practice is plural, provisional and dynamic: there are thus as many 
versions of good practice as there are good teachers striving to attain it' (1996: 71). 
Yet 'good practice' for child-centred teachers is transcendentally grounded in the 
nature of children qua children. What is 'fixed' is the eternal nature of children and 
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their psychological development. Different practices and activities simply reflect 
the different needs and socio-cultural backgrounds of children. If 'good practice' 
can never be fixed, one wonders what Alexander is identifying by the term! 
However, the assertion that there are as many versions of good practice as there are 
teachers hardly provides a watertight case against the 'anything goes' of 
pragmatism! 
Background to 'Southside' and 'Westside' 
The above provides the backdrop to my year-long period of participant observation 
in two primary schools, i. e. the proximate interface between where the structural 
and cultural contradictions shape everyday situations and how agents cope with 
them on the ground. Southside is situated in the southern region of a prosperous 
city in the south of England. Its children come primarily from socio-economically 
deprived backgrounds. As will be discussed in Chapter Six, its catchment area has 
mainly local authority housing and high levels of economic deprivation. It is a 
Church of England (CofE) primary school, with the local reverend chair of the 
governing body. Historically, the school has never performed well in terms of 
achieving high levels of literacy and numeracy. The retiring head pointed this out 
during interview. However, this was deemed unacceptable by an OFSTED team of 
inspectors in 1996, which concluded that the school was not providing 'value for 
money'. On the whole, facilities are good. There is a full complement of staff and 
an additional special needs teacher was employed at the time of my research. 
However, a recurring problem at Southside was the high turnover of staff. Two 
newly qualified teachers joined the staff-, both left within two years. 
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'Westside', in contrast, is located in the western region of the city. This 
region is rather prosperous. The majority of children here come from relatively 
wealthy socio-economic backgrounds. Historically, the school is well known for its 
academic success. In particular, teacher and parents (both past and present) 
underscore its 'strong', traditional Catholic education for children. It is a voluntary- 
aided Roman Catholic primary school, with the local priest chair of the governing 
body. Unlike Southside, however, the school was housed in what used to be a 
nunnery and consequently pupils had to climb many stairs to get to their 
classrooms. This was deemed to be particularly unacceptable for the infants by 
OFSTED (1996). Furthermore, because of severe financial constraints, there was 
no caretaker and only part-time secretarial assistance. The level of cleanliness was 
relatively poor. Children had to provide their own stationery; art material was in 
short supply; and parents had to pay insurance costs each time the children left the 
premises to attend mass, visit the local sports centre for swimming and engage in 
outdoor activities. Unlike Southside, the playground was smaller and inadequate 
for the number of children on roll. However, Westside did not receive a poor 
OFSTED report. 
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Part Three: 'At the Managerial Chalk Face': 
Sonthside and Westside 
6 Southside: New Managerialism to the Rescue 
The failing' school: background and research methodology 
The OFSTED inspection was carried out in July 1996 over a period of 5 days. At 
the time the school had 206 boys and girls on roll aged 7-11. As the OFSTED 
report mentioned, the catchment area has mainly local authority housing and 'high 
levels of economic and social deprivation: 54.4% of pupils receive free school 
meals and 18% live in overcrowded conditions, nearly twice the national average' 
(OFSTED 1996: 6). The 'key indicators' in the report focused on results at Key 
Stage 2, and then looked at levels of attendance, number of exclusions and 
'teaching quality'. Southside came bottom of the league table in its area, with 38% 
of children achieving Level 4 or above in English, 14% achieving Level 4 or above 
in mathematics and 44% achieving Level 4 or above in science. The main findings 
of the report are as follows: 
Most aspects of the management of the school are sound, although there are 
some weaknesses... The management responsibilities of staff are not always 
appropriate and in some cases do not match their expertise. Staff development 
lacks rigour and some staff feel they lack support. There is insufficient 
monitoring of both teaching and the progress of individual pupils, other than 
those with SEN [special educational needs] ... Pupils enter the school with low levels of attainment and generally make progress in acquiring basic skills. 
However, there is a high proportion of unsatisfactory teaching and more able 
pupils do not progress to the higher levels of attainment. When these facts are 
linked to the generous level of funding, the school gives unsatisfactory valuefor 
money (OFSTED 1996: 4-5; emphasis added). 
Following this Report, an Action Plan was drawn up under the supervision of an 
LEA advisory team and was evaluated by the team in June 1997.1 spent 3 weeks 
in Southside almost immediately after the LEA advisors had conducted their 
OFSTED-style evaluation of the implementation of the Action Plan (see Willmott 
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1999b). This LEA evaluation was initially flagged up as an infonnal affair, but in 
the event was OFSTED in style and content, much to the disbelief of the staff. 
However, the three weeks spent in June were an experiential prelude to a 
whole term's period of participant observation, which was completed in the autumn 
terrn of 1997. The head announced his intention to take early retirement and 
informed staff that a temporary replacement would be found. Towards the end of 
the three-week period, a senior member of staff became aware of the identity of the 
temporary head (a position which became permanent half-way through the term) 
and spent much time informing a small clique of staff about the 'trouble-shooting' 
status of the incoming head, a woman who, it was alleged, 'got rid of 6 staff' within 
the first term of arriving at a similar, 'failing' school. The hearsay talk about the 
temporary appointment palpably unnerved all staff, many of whom were, according 
to a senior member of staff, used to 'doing their own thing'. As one senior teacher 
remarked, '[the head] never came in to see what we were doing ... that was the 
problem! '. The outgoing head commented during interview that that one of the 
LEA advisors recommended that he treat his staff 'like children': 
... one of the advisors she said to me teachers are like children ... You've got to 
treat them like children. Well, I'm afraid I just can't ... You see, there's no way 
that I'm going to change to be like that. So that's one of the reasons I took the 
decision I did [i. e. to take early retirement] ... 
Indeed, for the outgoing head the new managerialist programme was anathema. 
For the incoming head, however, such a programme was enthusiastically endorsed 
and undertaken with a strongly personalised imprint. Pseudonyms are used 
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throughout and analysis draws upon interview transcripts and fieldnotes of 
observations and discussions with staff. 
The new head arrives: "we're not social workers! " 
During my short time spent in Southside in the summer term, all staff were aware 
that the school faced the real threat of closure because of the relatively poor SATs 
results and below average OFSTED report. (However, the threat of closure was not 
made public. ) In essence, the LEA brief of the incoming head was to respond to 
the weaknesses outlined in the OFSTED report, but more crucially to improve the 
SATs results. Undoubtedly some of the weaknesses identified in the OFSTED 
report were reasonable and accepted by staff. But they were reasonable from a 
non-managerialist perspective. The pressing problems of pupil behaviour and lack 
of direction provided by the outgoing head were issues that no child-centred teacher 
could deny. Indeed, what makes the issue of school effectiveness such a Catch-22 
situation for child-centred teachers is that some 'failing' schools are such for the 
very reasons that are not considered by managerialism. The considerable 
improvement in behaviour that quickly followed the appointment of the 'trouble- 
shooting' head was welcomed. However, the analytical concern here is whether 
such improvement was enacted for educational and/or managerial reasons. The 
New Managerialism enjoins well-behaved pupils in the quest for 'excellence' and 
'total quality'; such pupils 'learn' what is delivered to them in order to perform 
well in SATs. Yet, on the other hand, child-centred practice enjoins that we respect 
the fact that children are not empty vessels, have needs that are shaped by such 
factors as socio-economic background and that they behave well in order to 
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maintain and enhance collective well being. 5 1 The head was openly in favour of 
managerialist 'solutions' to improving SATs and her beliefs and actions were 
compatible with the deliumanised ontology of managerialism. We have here a 
fundamental contradiction between the child-centred (humanist) concern for 
behaviour and self-esteem and the manipulation of managerialism, which itself 
denies the very humanistic path that facilitates (potentially) success in SATs. 
Yet some of the changes introduced by the head were grounded in child- 
centred philosophy and practice, but used for explicitly managerial aims. For one 
senior member of staff, the head was held to view children solely as targets. This is 
the inexorable logic of the New Managerialism. From day one, the managerialist 
restructuring of the school was explicitly made top priority by the head. In the first 
morning of the autumn term, an INSET session was provided for both teaching and 
non-teaching staff, during which the staff was asked to talk about what they wanted 
from children. One of the key issues emphasised by the head at the start was that 
4we are not social workers'. This was a leitmotif throughout my time in Southside 
and sat rather uncomfortably with the relatively high number of children on the 'at- 
risk' register: every weekly staff meeting and every morning briefing dealt with the 
issue of 'children requiring positive praise' for reasons stemming from home 
51 As Abbott (1996: 117) rightly notes, OFSTED and government publications ignore the complexity of 
classroom interaction: 'teaching and learning are not part of a simple input-output model. This is to take 
the "empty vessel" view of children's learning, seeing pupils as passive receivers of knowledge, poured 
into them by the teacher'. However, to recapitulate it is my contention that the "empty vessel" approach is 
an unavoidable practical (S-C level) secretion of managerialism rather than an ontological presupposition. 
In other words, at the CS level managerialism dehumanises children yet transcendentally cannot avoid 
some recognition of the human element (however that human element is conceived). Hence my contention 
that we are dealing with a constraining, rather than competitive, contradiction. This is an objective state of 
affairs: whether the constraining contradiction is recognised by advocates of managerialism. or advocates 
are forced to recognise it is a contingent (S-C) affair. 
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problems. What the head meant by 'social work' was never spelled out from my 
observations and from my infon-nal conversations with staff it was clear that they 
never asked for clarification. Here, we can discern a consistent managerialist 
response: dealing with 'social work' issues is an encumbrance. 
Pugh (1998) has documented the conflict between care and the curriculum 
in the context of a residential school for EBD (Emotionally and Behaviourally 
Disturbed) pupils aged 11-16. Like the new head here he also took on the 
(temporary) role of 'trouble-shooter' for this school in December 1993. Pugh 
concedes that to fail an EBD school was generally held unfair because many of the 
pupils were too emotionally disturbed (the pupils required therapy and 
understanding rather than a daily diet of the National Curriculum) and because 
EBD schools are places that only manage to operate through a careful balancing 
act, thus too complex to be understood via the OFSTED 'snapshot' approach. As 
with the new head at Southside, Pugh began by developing a vision of what the 
school should look like. Such a vision had to embody a full National Curriculum. 
Yet given the 'difficult' nature of the pupils, many of the teachers were contracted 
to perfonri additional duties. These duties involved working alongside the full-time 
residential care assistants. It was hardly surprising, then, that staff had little time 
for lesson preparation, let alone developing new schemes of work. Pugh candidly 
writes that 
By late February, about three months since I had assumed the acting headship, I 
began to lose my nerve. I felt that I had achieved nothing beyond a few room 
changes and an arbitrary extension to teaching time which had done no more 
than enrage pupils and further tire staff. I had an overwhelming sense that I was 
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failing both staff and pupils and daily adding another nail to the coffin of what 
was once quite a promising career (1998: 109-110). 
Pugh oversaw the establishment of a scheme of work for every subject and, as with 
Southside, each pupil was tested for reading ability, and clear schemes developed 
for marking, recording and assessment. 'Vandalism remained a significant 
problem... [and] aggression between pupils was unacceptably high and the school 
still projected an atmosphere of unpredictability and tension' (1998: 111). Pugh 
was aware that whilst staff were never openly hostile, a number felt that the 
curriculum-based approach to working with emotionally and behaviourally 
disturbed pupils was wrong. This was evident during my time at Southside. In 
conversations with many staff, fundamental concerns were aired about the changes 
that were being imposed by the head but which were not aired at either staff 
meetings or privately with the head. It was not always possible to elicit the reasons 
for the lack of such opposition. However, the threat of closure, combined with 
deep-seated resentments among some staff, precluded the possibility of a united 
front. This is not to suggest that staff could have remained wedded to previous 
practices. Like the head at Southside, Pugh established weekly briefings and 
refined the good behaviour system. 
Moreover, Pugh, on the one hand, is aware of the seriously disrupted 
educational histories of the pupils yet, on the other hand, does not rule out success 
as a possibility. Here we reach the flaw of the OFSTED model and, indeed, past 
Conservative and present 'New' Labour policy - namely the fallacy that all 
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schools, given the correct dose of management and concomitant 'cultural change' 
should 'succeed'. Instructively, Pugh concludes that 
I am sure that many would argue that reference to a conflict between care and 
curriculum is an unnecessary polarization; that it is more appropriate to assert 
that EBD pupils cannot live on the bread of education alone, and emotional 
needs which cannot be reached through the curriculum must also be nourished. 
While I would not take issue with the sentiment, the compromise position is 
ultimately unsustainable because the resources to do both are not available. The 
conflict is not about caring or not caring, or educating or not educating, but 
where the line is drawn in deciding when as much as possible has been done 
within existing resources. The staff at Brookside accepted the view that 
educational objectives are more attainable, more measurable and, most 
ininiediately, more inspectable. I would not say that this acceptance means that 
they have ceased to offer a caring environment to pupils. The object of caring 
has become the need to ensure that every individual is able to take advantage of 
the education offered. In this sense, the school has defined itselffirmly within an 
educational context rather than as an auxiliary branch of social services or the 
Health Authority... The purpose of the school is to educate, and without that 
clear direction and purpose, caring too easily becomes an object in itself and 
then a law unto itself (1998: 115-116; emphasis added). 
The head at Southside quite conceivably could have said the above. Yet the point 
here is that there is a contradiction between care and the managerialist nature of the 
National Curriculum and attendant testing arrangements. Children are not growing 
human beings but targets, numbers that can be tabulated in competitive league 
tables. Moreover, socio-economic factors are erased at a stroke. Indeed, I have 
quoted Pugh at length here because it underscores (a) the dehumanising thrust of 
the New Managerialism; (b) the fact that schools do not operate in a vacuum but are 
necessarily responsive to factors determined elsewhere. It also provides a neat 
example of how agents live syncretically with contradiction. 
The head at Southside emphasised on numerous occasions during staff 
meetings and briefings that 'we are not social workers' and, like Pugh, would have 
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maintained that the school was not an auxiliary branch of social services. However, 
the familial and socio-economic backgrounds of many of the children meant that 
staff had to be a quasi-auxiliary branch of local social services. One particularly 
poignant example will suffice. A year 6 pupil attempted suicide because of familial 
problems. Considerable time was taken up during one meeting during which we 
were told what to do in the event of the boY's father turning up at school 
(essentially not to confront him and to contact the police). The point here is that 
such 'social work" (or 'caring') issues are fundamentally anathema to 
managerialism - put simply they get in the way of pupils becoming 'independent 
learners' in order to perform well in their SATs. Indeed, Pugh traces through the 
managerialist logic when lie notes that the care of his pupils is acceptable in the end 
given that it facilitates successful implementation of the National Curriculum. The 
contradiction is palpable: on the one hand, as educators the staff at Brookside view 
caring as integral to their daily work with pupils yet, on the other hand, caring is 
(oddly) elevated into an object that becomes a law unto itself Such mental 
contortions are the result of the constraining contradiction - children because they 
are children must be cared for yet the New Managerialism erases children qua 
young human beings. Hence the playing down of caring and the simultaneous 
recognition on Pugh's part of the need to care. This is the force of the constraining 
contradiction - for managerialism denies the reality of children qua human beings 
yet cannot avoid some basic metaphysical propositions about children qua children 
in order for SATs to be taken, successfully or otherwise. 
280 
Pugh talks of the acceptance of the view that educational objectives are 
more attainable, more measurable and more inspectable. It would be interesting to 
know whether such acceptance was more apparent than real. The majority of staff 
at Southside nodded in agreement during staff meetings but their actions and 
conversations with me belied this. However, it is not educational objectives that 
are more attainable, but managerial ones. To suggest that something is more 
measurable is specious - either something is intrinsically tractable to measurement 
or it is not. As we have already seen, proxies are used by OFSTED as part and 
parcel of the managerialist drive towards 'educational efficiency' (value for money) 
because such capacities as reading ability cannot be directly measured. Jeffrey and 
Woods (1999) have documented the dehumanisation engendered by the 
managerialist nature of the inspection process. The teachers in their study 'could 
not accept the OFSTED definition of knowledge... the managerialist approach to 
assessment, the distancing of themselves from colleagues and pupils and the culture 
of blame and failure' (1999: 83). Jeffrey and Woods' research paints a picture of 
teachers as being very much on the defensive: 
Their time and space have been colonized, their sense of reality disturbed, and 
they have experienced feelings of deprofessionalization. But... teachers are very 
resilient. In previous studies we have remarked on their powers of adaptation 
and resistance... To some extent, this reaction has been facilitated by the 
'implementation gap'... Part of the rationale in establishing OFSTED was to 
decrease this gap... and to close down resistance. This is a comparatively new 
kind of constraint on teachers... We found teacher responses here to be 
complex, and in some respects contradictory... On the one hand teachers 
distanced themselves from the OFSTED process in order to maintain their selves 
and professional identity. At the same time, they engaged extensively with the 
process in order to satisfy the corporate pressures... (ibid.: 14 1). 
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I would take issue with their contention that teacher responses are contradictory. 
Instead, there is a contradiction at the structural and cultural levels. Namely, 
between the previous role requirements and the new form of government 
imposition and between child-centred philosophy and the secreted anti-humanism 
of managerialism. The simultaneous distancing and engagement referred to by 
Jeffrey and Woods is an agential response to contradiction rather than a 
contradictory response. As the authors rightly emphasise, the OFSTED regime 
constitutes an additional constraint for child-centred teachers, with which they must 
contend. In other words, we need a specification of the stringency of constraints 
versus degrees of freedom - in this case, the 1988 Act and subsequent inspection 
mechanisms stringently condition teachers' responses. Indeed, teachers are 
resilient, but such resilience does not eradicate the 'corporate pressures' of the 
OFSTED regime, as they put it. Whitty et al. (1998: 59) refer to Raab et al'. s 
(1997) study in which variation in headteachers' responses depended on the degree 
of LEA decentralisation and marketisation. In the areas where schools remained 
relatively protected from the latter, there was less conflict between educational 
values and new managerialist practices. Whitty et al. thus suggest that the 
strategies adopted by headteachers are to some extent determined by local context 
rather than personally held values. Further-more, the research by Gewirtz et al. 
(1995) suggests that 'if schools are particularly 'buoyant' in the market, 
headteachers may be able to retain elements of 'professional' management. 
However, headteachers with fragile market positions [such as Southside] have little 
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choice but to engage with the business ethics of new managerialism' (Whitty et al. 
1998: 59; emphasis added). 
I would not dispute the need for heads of schools with fragile market 
positions to engage with the business ethics of the new managerialism. (The 
recognition of this was one of the key reasons that led the previous head to take 
early retirement. ) However, my research at Southside provides an example of a 
head that positively welcomed reorienting the school along new managerialist lines. 
For her, teachers are now 'managers' and pupils are 'customers'. In interview, she 
described Soutliside as '... obviously dysfunctional; otherwise I wouldn't have 
been brought in here'. In order to get the 'dysfunctional' organisational. back on 
track, she talked of the need for strong leadership and for changing the system 'that 
people did well out of. In brief, then, we need to distinguish between anterior 
socio-cultural conditioning at the macro, school and individual levels. In other 
words, the head entered a complex set of anterior cycles in September 1997 - 
notably the school history mediated by local socio-economic context and the 
(macro) OFSTED regime. That any new head had to improve SATs at Southside 
is indisputable. Whitty et al. are right to emphasise the stringent nature of the 
OFSTED regime and assessment procedures that confront schools in relatively poor 
socio-economic areas. Indeed, the 'creaming off' of ten or so pupils to a rival 
school evidenced the precarious market position of Southside. 52 However, the new 
52 One of the pupils returned to Southside because, according to his mother, he missed his friends and was 
unhappy. The school that accepted the extra pupils was in turn over-subscribed, causing problems for staff 
there. Whilst the school obtained more money, the extra cash was insufficient to deal with the problem of 
over-subscription. Bringing back or stemming the exodus was a key concern for the head. This is the 
reality of the education 'market place' and clearly any exodus from 'failing' schools means that such 
schools run the serious risk of entering a vicious cycle, ultimately resulting in closure. 
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head not only recognised the harsh reality of the need to improve SATs but that the 
only solution was managerialist, as we shall see. We are not dealing here with a 
reluctant head, whose deeply held educational values are at variance with the New 
Managerialism. On the contrary, her unrelenting drive towards improving SATs 
was firmly grounded in the school effectiveness literature and the new 
managerialist nostrums for achieving 'success' 
School effectiveness, organisational culture and autocratic management 
The afternoon INSET session for teaching staff only, focused on how to improve 
the school, with specific reference to SATs scores. During this session staff were 
asked to write on a flip chart what they expected of her and what 'enthuses 
children'. The head made explicit that 'there were going to be some battles', that 
some 'I'll lose and staff will lose some'. More important, however, is the extensive 
use she made of the school effectiveness research. She issued each member of staff 
with a handout documenting the key findings of the effectiveness research. She 
listed the key determinants of successful schools as follows: 
" Professional leadership 
" Shared vision and goals 
"A learning environment 
" Concentration on teaching and learning 
" Purposeful teaching 
" High expectations 
Positive reinforcement 
Monitoring progress 
Pupil rights and responsibilities 
Home-school partnership 
A learning organisation 
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The reference for this list was Sammons et al. (1995) Key Characteristics of 
Effective Schools, which has been criticised in the Preface to Part Three. The 
factors listed above provided the springboard for restructuring what the head 
referred to as the 'organisational culture' of the school throughout the term. One of 
the documents draws upon Fullan (1990), in which assumptions about change vis- 
ti-vis school improvement were listed, with the final bullet point emphasising that 
'the real agenda is changing institutional culture'. The issue of organisational 
culture qua managerialist tool was addressed in Chapter 5. The 'cultural' issue of 
shared vision and goals (one of the OFSTED so-called Eleven Factors) is crucial 
for the success of any managerialist regime. (The bullet point heading of 'Shared 
vision and goals' was also part of a further list, referred to as 'Cultural Norms 
which Underpin School Improvement'). As was argued in Chapter 5, corporate 
culture's key feature is to promote employee (i. e. teacher) 'commitment' to a 
monolithic structure of feeling and thought in the name of empowerment or 
'expanded autonomy'. It was pointed out that programmes of corporate culturism. 
seem to promote a corporate ethos that demands loyalty from employees as it 
excludes, silences or punishes those who question its creed. Indeed, the so-called 
'strength' of culture is tied to the extent to which contradictory or 'rival' values are 
absent (at the S-C level). In other words, S-C unification is sought. Finally, it was 
mentioned that insofar as employees are drawn to the allure of 'technocratic 
informalism', employees come to discipline themselves with feelings of anxiety, 
shame and guilt that are aroused when they sense or judge themselves to fall short 
of the shared values of the organisation. 
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The substantive focus of this part of the thesis is on how teachers mediate 
the contradiction between child-centred practice and the managerialist impulse. 
More specifically, we are interested in the extent of S-C uniformity and the reasons 
behind it. At Southside it was very much a case of S-C imposition of the OFSTED- 
cum-School-Effectiveness framework. The key factor that facilitated the successful 
use of power was of course the somewhat precarious position of the school. 
However, because schools, like all organisations, are operative in an open system, 
the managerialist style of the head and the generic lack of resistance could not have 
been predicted. What we can say, however, is that even if the 'trouble-shooting' 
head had been child-centred, stringent costs would have attached to a half-hearted 
adoption of the OFSTED framework. The fact that the head was determined to 
exercise autocratic control certainly aided 'improvement', as we shall see in a 
moment, but counterfactuals are not the issue here. The issue is to explicate why 
things were so and not otherwise. In this school, the threat of closure, internal 
schisms exacerbated by personality differences, and so on, buttressed the de jure 
power of the new head. Again, however, whilst 
the discourse [CS level] of quality management anticipates and celebrates a 
radical process of attitudinal and behavioural restructuring... it has to confront 
[at the S-C level] the everyday realities of shop-floor and office politics that 
sculpt the 'contested terrains' on which control struggles are fought and 
decided. Self-subordination to the ideological and operational demands of 
quality management regimes is likely to be extremely imperfect, and to be 
mediated through the power struggles which actually shape organizational 
outcomes. Puts, in practice, the organizational reality of TQM will fall far 
short of the totalizing and universalizing ideals to which it aspires (Reed 
1995: 53-54; emphasis added). 
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Indeed, it was precisely because the new head was employed initially on an acting 
basis that she adopted a more 'softly, softly' approach at the beginning. During a 
conversation in the staff room one morning, the head said that for the time being 
she was constrained to take a 'softly, polite approach' to two senior members of 
staff. In essence, she felt she could be more 'assertive' if she got the headship (in 
the event, she did). Tile head used the analogy of handing 'these people as much 
rope as they like - the trick is to yank it in at the right moment' and candidly stated 
that she was 'biding her time'. However, this was a strategic reading of the 
situation, whose objective potentialities have to be transacted: at the end of the day 
the head was objectively more powerful, given the precarious position of the 
school, but raw bargaining power has to be converted into negotiating strength. 
Negotiating strength is by definition relational and its outcome has no exact price 
that can be read off the headteachers' equivalent of an OFSTED shopping list. 
Whilst throughout the term staff generally undertook the tasks set by the head 
(often referred to pejoratively as 'directives' by staff) other changes were subject to 
negotiation and compromise. Ultimately, of course, compromise for the head 
entailed facing the reality of the pupil intake itself. As one staff member 
commented in interview: 
Lynne I'm slightly worried about some aspects of it [programme for 'independent 
learning'], but we'll I think it's a wait-and-see. In terms of umm, obviously I'm 
preoccupied with standards of reading, but she seems to have made a compromise 
with that because this isn't a school where children can write poetry all day, 
everyday and be artistically creative at all the language arts and all of the rest of it. 
Lynne then went on to comment that 
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She might say that is a prejudiced statement, but I'd never dare inake it in front of 
her. But they need a balance of the two really (emphasis added). 
Before analysing in more depth the 'improvement' programme introduced by the 
head, I want to focus on autocratic management. In fact, in many ways this head 
personified, with amazing consistency, the central organisational tenets of the New 
Managerialism. As we have seen above, the New Managerialism enjoins a shared 
culture. The very notion of a shared culture, whilst empirically refutable, implies a 
sense of arrived-at agreement. Managerialism, however, is quintessentially 
concerned with the imposition of values. It's not so much that there is no time for 
agreement. The whole point of the (contradictory) nature of managerialism is that 
because human agency is ontologically erased, critical reflection simply does not 
figure in the equation (despite the fact that cultural ideas and their attempted 
imposition presuppose reflective human beings). Although child-centred 
philosophy never reached the mythical heights of generic S-C uniformity often 
depicted during the 1960s, disagreements were nonetheless permitted and divergent 
practices prevailed. In respect of Reed's point that the totalizing - or totalitarian 
(H. Willmott) - nature of the New Managerialism will fall far short, research here 
overwhelmingly confirms the opposite. 
As Ball (1998) rightly notes, managerialism objectifies humans - they are 
simply to be managed. More importantly, he points to what he calls the 'discourse 
of right' that attempts to legitimate the exercise of power. 
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Its primary instrument is a hierarchy of continuous and functional surveillance. 
Effectiveness research can be seen to have played a crucial role in laying the 
groundwork for the reconceptualization of the school within which management 
discourse operates and has played its part in providing a technology of 
organizational measurement and surveillance (Ball 1998: 74). 
The importance accorded to organizational measurement was discussed in Chapter 
5 and will be fleshed out later. The 'discourse of right' was one to which the head 
subscribed. Her approach was autocratic and often confrontational. This is not to 
suggest that she operated in an untrammelled fashion. Even after securing the post 
on a permanent basis, she had to work with and support the deputy head as well as 
supporting some staff with whom she privately disagreed. (Although on many 
occasions the deputy head talked about her rudeness and subsequent apologies). 
The head would ring her almost every evening to assess the staff's response to the 
ever-increasing array of effectiveness initiatives that she introduced. Fergusson 
(1994) points out that it is by no means unusual that managers generally exploit 
their special accountability for budgetary matters in order to justify autocratic 
behaviour. Information is almost invariably kept secret on the grounds that sole 
possession of expert knowledge yields advantage. 'By these means managers often 
by-pass or truncate normal processes of consultation, or take executive action 
against advice or without resolving conflicting views, or allowing financial 
considerations to prevail over educational... ' (Fergusson 1994: 101). Whilst this is 
in the context of school financial management, it is applicable to the overall 
management of Southside. We can now return to the comment above in which the 
member of staff conceded that she would never engage in a potentially conflict- 
ridden situation. Her comment that she would not dare to contradict or question the 
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head's requests evinces the anxiety that a full-blown endorsement of New 
Managerialist nostrums engenders. Of course, as Reed rightly notes, such anxiety 
is not a foregone conclusion and is, inter alia, explicable in terms of personal 
psychology. 
This member of staff went on to comment that 
Lynne ... I think I am in a 
fortunate position that I'm not resistant to this 
particular load of change. If I was, I would be very, very scared because she is not 
going to let go. She is going to have what she wants. And umm she's going to play 
mean. I don't think she'd play dirty, but she'd play mean. I mean, she's put me 
down a few times in front of the class. 
A few sentences later, Lynne commented that 
She's cleverly autocratic. You don't mess with her. She tells you what she wants 
on that list and you put up your hand and say it... so, she's an autocrat, but she's a 
clever one, you can't have tier on it... 
Another senior member of staff remarked that 
Louise I think she is more a figure of authority, I think, and I do think she has a 
sense of direction and she has a vision of the school. 
The senior dinner assistant mentioned that every time she questioned the changes 
introduced (such as seating arrangements; putting out of knives and forks before 
children sat down to eat their lunches ... ) 'she tells you what to do but if not clear or 
you wish to challenge, she keeps throwing up in your face 'have you got a problem 
with thaff A good example of 'clever autocracy' centred on the use of teachers' 
desks in the classroom. Briefly, during one weekly staff meeting, the head 
requested that all staff look at 'Managing and organising classroom to enable and 
empower'. She said that 'there should be no queue' - instead 'there should be 
swathes of children finding out for themselves and finding out from each other'. 
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She said that cupboard doors need to be removed and, more controversially, that 
teacher' desks should be removed. One staff member replied that 
Hilary I need a base where children can dump down whatever they need me to 
see later 
Whereupon the head retorted that 'They [desks] take up so much space and get 
smothered... Trays for completed maths and locker units... '. 
The deputy head commented that she did not have a desk and used a bright 
coloured box. The head immediately added that 'desks make a wonderful display 
areaP. Hilary then posed the problem of where staff can work without desks. 
Louise replied that she used hers for marking. The head then replied that 
I hear what you say. But I personally don't think they waste space. There are 
other means of putting things away... tables somewhere else for teachers... I do 
think that if you get behind a desk you get stuck there - children start coming 
out... It's all about you looking in your room and saying, Right! Get the skip in! 
... The time 
is to do it now - not during the holidays. If you're more organised, 
they're [i. e. children] are better at their learning. We'll get lovely coloured 
containers... pencils go into at the end of the day... 
What was 'clever' about the head's autocratic approach is that she allows staff 
critically to contribute to weekly staff meetings yet will not brook any real 
opposition to the direction in which she alone wanted the school to go. Staff 
meetings and early morning briefings were contrived - indeed, in this instance the 
dialogue between the head and her deputy had been prearranged in the head's 
office. Whilst this underscores the 'cleverly' autocratic approach, equally it 
underscores her dependence upon the deputy. Essentially, the democratic approach 
to meetings was more apparent than real. At the end of September the head 
announced a set of ground rules for staff meetings as follows: 
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1. Keep to the point 
2. Don't interrupt 
3. Start/end - keep to time 
4. No side-tracking 
5. Put no. 4 on separate agenda 
6. "Thinking time" before meeting 
7. Listen to each other 
8. No moaning 
9. Problem-solving attitude 
10. One meeting in progress 
After announcing these rules, she asked rhetorically 'All in agreementT and 
immediately requested that there be 'no grizzling if from time to time I have to 
remind staff of the rules'. These rules were imposed without consultation. Part of 
the Improvement Plan for Southside involved the production of a mission statement 
and logo. Tile head often invoked 'Working together for the best' when she issued 
'directives'. At the start of one November morning briefing, for example, she said 
'Today we have to work together for the best... block capitals underlined 24 
million timesP This was said in the context of the absence of the teacher in charge 
of the Unit; the comment was intended to deflect any possible 'grizzling' about the 
need for staff to take on extra children. The meeting was interrupted by a Learning 
Support Assistant who informed the head of a woman waiting outside wishing to 
speak to her about 2 new children, whereupon Hilary said 'If year 5 then we're 
stuffed! ' The head retorted that 'Well, if year 5 then year 5... E1000 per child. 
Would we all like to keep our jobsT Here the morphogenetic approach 
underscores the analytical utility of distinguishing between degrees of freedom 
versus stringency of constraints. Whilst on the one hand children had left to go to a 
more 'successful' junior school because of the 'failing' status of Southside, on the 
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other hand, an over-subscribed year 5 meant that stringent costs would necessarily 
attach to a decision to accept the 2 new pupils. Instead of concurring with the 
pressures evident in Hilary's comment, the head consistently embodied the New 
Managerialist philosophy in attempting to stifle any agential reflection and/or 
distress. During interview, the head openly remarked that 
... there is definitely a 
feeling of Yes we want change, but then people, by and 
large, don't like change or they resist it... people do well in the existing system, 
they're the ones who don't like change. I think it comes as a shock to some 
people as to what you actually have to do in order for those things to be able to 
work. Some people don't like it because they're now instructed... (emphasis 
added) 
I suggested that she was adopting an autocratic style of leadership: 
Robert ... in a way you 
have to tell people this is how it's got to be 
Jill Oil yes 
In talking about the following term, she stated that 
... and if there's a common agenda ... and 
I see everybody first half of next term 
and we talk about what that means ... The definitions of statements that were 
made - both parties [lower and upper school] need to be clear about what they 
need and I need to let them k7ioiv my interpretation (emphasis added). 
Furthermore, she talked about her 'openness' towards staff- 
Now, openness has an upside and a downside, doesn't it? You can't ask for 
openness, get it and not like what you hear, can you? It's like I got 
questionnaires and then not like the answers. You've got to talk about the 
answers so that you are quite clear... 
Such 'openness', however, was solely in relation to a questionnaire she had given 
all staff halfway through December about her management skills and style. The 
questionnaire was developed by Belbin Associates @ and asks assessors (in this 
case staff) to tick the words from List A that are descriptive of the person being 
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assessed. Assessors are also asked to tick the words from List B that are at least 
partly applicable. In brief, the head was annoyed that some of the staff had ticked 
the 'erratic' box (she would not divulge anymore information about what else - 
critical or otherwise - had been ticked). Vis-A-vis the questionnaire, she remarked 
that 
Chances are that... that their definition and their understanding of the words to 
delegate are not mine so therefore... so the only way you can find out if things 
are different is by having a piece of paper... which ... maybe you weren't clear, I 
mean I know what my agenda is and its ... people will often put things down but 
actually haven't thought about what they are writing down. Like the one from 
that course I went on about [which provided the Belbin questionnaire] ... the 
management course commented about... like erratic or I'm forgetful 
Robert Are you erratic? 
Jill I don't know... What I have to do is respond to situations. Yesterday 
morning I was erratic and bad-tempered because I had 'erraticism' - if there is such 
a word - and 'bad temperedness' forced upon me by staff who haven't got good 
organisational practice, so we were buzzing in the office like 3 bees... 
Clearly, here we witness one of the substantive contradictions of the New 
Managerialist project. On the one hand its nature is to deny, if not erase, conflict, 
yet it cannot be avoided - hence the management course and the differing 
approaches to 'conflict management' the head was taught. Her reaction vis-a-vis 
staff criticism neatly highlights the contradiction: permit criticism (whose agenda 
was imposed by the head) yet deny its validity. Here we are dealing with two 
complementary levels: the secreted quasi-totalitarian nature of the New 
Managerialism and the psychological characteristics of the head herself. Such 
autocratic management characterised the 'improvement programme' of the head. 
This is an apposite juncture at which to discuss the adoption of the 'improvement 
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programme', geared towards substantially increasing SATs scores. The programme 
drew explicitly from the school effectiveness findings and policy prescriptions. 
Contra child-centredness: The tyraimy of measurement 
Central to the 'improvement programme' at Southside was the pressing problem of 
low self-esteem for many of the children. The contradiction here is between the 
child-centred underpinning of any esteem-building progranune and the new 
managerialist ends: children are mere means to a managerialist end. Thus to return 
to the issue of the removal or repositioning of teacher desks, the arguments for the 
latter were compelling and congruent with a child-centred approach. In fact, one 
member of staff took 'sick leave' at the head's request during which her classroom 
was completely reorganised. Notwithstanding the head's worries about the legality 
of her emptying this teacher's cupboards and so on, such changes as the location of 
the desk and the placing of names, rather than numbers, on children's work trays 
made a palpable difference to the ways in which children related to each other and 
to the stand-in teacher. 53 Essentially, there was a substantial reduction in the level 
of aggressiveness; children remained on task and generally evinced contentment. 
Yet, of course, the reasoning behind the head's insistence stemmed from the need 
for children to improve in SATs. To reiterate, SATs are managerialist and negate 
the child-centred reasons for reordering a classroom in order to provide a caring 
environment conducive to learning. Staff meetings centred on fostering 
independent learning, which all staff concurred is a crucial goal of primary 
education. But again the very rationale behind SATs is to make teachers 
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accountable. Hence the focus on the products of independent learning and not the 
processes, which of course are implicitly disavowed. 
The self-esteem programme included, inter alia, the use of stickers, 
'special days' and extended circle time. There was a considerable improvement in 
behaviour throughout tile school. For example, one recently appointed teacher 
highlighted lining up at lunchtime. 
Nick-y That's a change and that's a lot more strict; it's very well monitored - all 
the classes lining up and the playground procedure for blowing the whistle. At 
playtime as well as lunchtime, with children 'freezing' and then lining up. It's very 
orderly. The atmosphere in the school has changed, with quiet in the corridors and 
that's being policed by all staff, but [the head] is at the head of it - policing 
corridors and checking for quiet. 
During interview, the deputy head mentioned that in order for children to reach 
their full potential, they have to be happy. But she also pointed to the contradiction 
embodied in the New Managerialism: 
First of all you can't get good SATs results without the children being happy... 
because without being happy they won't work to their full potential. So, the first 
thing, I think, when [the head] came here, particularly the staff meetings... were 
based on building up self-esteem... so we did all that so we've got all that in 
place and then it's 'Right, how are we going to meet targetsT So we're looking 
from year 3 right through to year 6 at targets to raise their standards. We're 
doing that for the children but we're also doing that for public image. And to 
make sure that the school stays open because we're getting good SATs results 
and the children want to come to this school. 
Most primary teachers would not dispute the need for happy children and an 
orderly - or better still caring - atmosphere. But how far are we away here from 
'social work' concerns? The head repeatedly exhorted that 'we're not social 
53 At Westside, one Year 6 teacher had her desk positioned next to the wall and used it as a work-base for 
herself and the children. 
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workers' yet spent E200 on stickers as part of the self-esteem programme. A 
'Positive Praise List' dominated almost every early morning briefing. Here we 
reach the contradiction: children have transcendental needs to be happy (and how 
they then perform in any form of assessment is a separate matter) yet the 
managerialist nature of SATs negates this. In other words, let them be happy as 
long as they perform well in tests. At Southside, managerialist practices were not 
reluctantly adopted but enthusiastically embraced (or rather imposed) by the 
trouble-shooting head. 
It is worth quoting one senior staff member: 
Lynne What she's interested in... she's got a very clear idea of the end result... 
What she's got is fairly dictatorial views of the how that should be attained and I 
think, you know, she is well trained and well educated and has been an advisor. I 
think she's right and she sees SATs as something you have to do. 
54 
Andyou do them 
in afairly cynical way, you train the children (emphasis added). 
54 What's interesting to note here is that this teacher is against the SATs philosophy and concomitant 
teaching practice yet ends up contradicting herself in agreeing that children should be 'cynically trained'. I 
did not proceed to point out the contradiction, since it may be that she feared disagreeing on tape with the 
head. However, during interview I asked whether there is a contradiction between SATs and child centred 
philosophy, to which she replied: 
Lynne Well, she [the head] calls it independent learning 
Robert Right, independent learning... 
Lynne That's probably a better term than child-centred 
A few minutes later on: 
Robert Yes (laughs) so, I was just saying, you know, has SATs altered this commitment to child-centred 
learning? 
Lynne Yes, but you'd better change child-centred 
Robert To independent 
Lynne It's umm it would be called Independent Skills Based, it's the emphasis on the skills 
I would suggest that Lynne is embroiling herself in the throes of a constraining contradiction. Such re- 
definitional manoeuvres are the (logical) outcome - and reflected the head's approach - but were surprising 
since Lynne is committed to child-centred philosophy and practice. One can only speculate as to why she 
engaged in corrective rcpair-work (unlike the Head, whose reply to my question about the contradiction 
will be discussed later). 
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We have already touched upon the autocratic style of the head . 
55 'You train the 
children' is crucial here. For this is the (S-C) corollary of the New Managerialist 
ontology: it dellumanises yet needs humans as a transcendental prerequisite. The 
head at Soutliside is not only aware of the contradiction: she actively endorsed the 
managerialist approach. The 'factory' approach evident in the above is ineluctable 
yet contradicts the recognition that children have the quintessentially huniall 
capacity for self-worth, which in this school needed building up and reinforcing. In 
talking about the comprehension work required by SATs, Lynne commented that 
... there's these ridiculous things when you get these passages and then you get 
these answers in the same order as the passage, you haven't got to understand 
anything: all you've got to understand was, you know, you read the first 
question and then you find the key words in the first sentence and copy them 
out. Well, that's a technique... I've got nothing against teaching children the 
technique to do something that we need to do. You know, there's no escaping it. 
The part-time special needs teacher echoed this: 
I mean things that they're doing, you know they're doing, because they have to 
do a comprehension test in SATs and they'll spend, you know, year 6 children 
and all other school children will spend a lot of time doing quite boring 
comprehension, which really isn't reading for meaning. 
I also suggested that the catchment area further problematises the move away from 
child-centred practice. 
... cos these children need lots of practical experience which they don't get now. These children find it difficult, you know, as soon as you say right, pencil-and- 
paper tasks, I mean that's the trouble in the class [teacher who was 'advised' to 
stay off work for health reasons by the head] The children that can't write, what 
do they do? Wien you say right, you are going to write a story, you're going to 
write a comprehension test, they can't do it... 
55 It is further instructive to note that upon being formally appointed, she informed staff that in relation to 
her vision for 2001, 'If this is not your view we need to talk about it'. 
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At the end of the tenn, I engaged in a lengthy conversation with the Unit LSA (who 
declined the offer of a taped interview). She mentioned that a few years' ago 
cookery, for example, played a prominent role: 'We call it 'Basic Life Skills' and 
sometimes children would come back in the following day and ask for the recipe 
for inum'. She talked at length about the urgency accorded to SATs by the head. 
Thing here is that being told to prepare for SATs from Year 3- ticking forms 
with children... yet children haven't been taught properly and don't understand 
what they're ticking... SATs and the National Curriculum just don't take into 
account differences between children... For example, Richard [a pupil] would 
come in grumpy and nloody because dad at work and because Richard has to get 
some children dressed. Dad came in and agreed... then we received a letter 
from mother the following day saying things like 'My husband agrees with you 
that Im a bad mother - it's none of your fucking business! ' 
She went oil to question an approach that likens children to cars in a factory. 
However, the resonance with Pugh's predicament (see above) is palpable. As we 
saw, the context of a residential school for EBD pupils underscored the wholesale 
inappropriateness of the OFSTED regime. Indeed, in such schools as Southside, 
the generic low levels of attainment means that core subjects of the National 
Curriculum ultimately receive little, if any, attention. As Janc commented: 
... you know, a lot of interesting work that you might want to do you can no longer do. It's gone... classroom teaching. It's what parents want, it's what 
schools want, it's what everyone wants really - isn't it? To see schools at the 
top of the league tables. I think you are forced down that road unless you're 
very, very strong and say 'we're not doing that', which some schools I think 
have resisted, but have now had to succumb. What do you do? 
This neatly encapsulates the stringent constraints that schools like Southside come 
up against. It also highlights one of the morphogenetic approach's key propositions 
- namely that stringency of constraints does not entail determinism. As Jane points 
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out, strength of resolve can (and does) lead some to say, 'we're not doing that' (c. f. 
the head in this school), but on the other hand because of the especially stringent 
nature of the constraints at Southside, many have had to succumb. This I would not 
dispute. What has occurred at Southside is manifestly in contradistinction to 'we're 
not doing that'. Indeed, at the beginning of the interview, the head maintained that 
,... we can be in tile top 5% of schools... '. Clearly, then, the drive towards 
reaching that goal was bound to engender almost impossible work requirements on 
the part of both staff and pupils alike. It was hardly surprising that the head herself 
was absent for sometimes 3 successive days in tile weeks towards the latter half of 
the term. (Her deputy told me that she suffered from 'bum-out. ) Other members of 
staff were absent because of stress-related illnesses and I witnessed deterioration in 
the health of the deputy during the last few weeks of the autumn term. Without 
digressing into a speculative account about the exact causes of the overall rise in 
the incidence of ill health among staff, instructively the head gave me a copy of a 
substantial document she prepared on managing stress at her previous school 
(where she was also employed on a 'trouble-shooting' basis). Thus one can infer 
that the head was aware of the likely impact of managerialist restructuring - namely 
the (oft-reported) increase in 'bum-out. 
As the OFSTED report mentioned, many children enter the school with 
low levels of reading attainment. Thus what exacerbates matters in a school such as 
Southside in particular is that low levels of attainment are by no means remedied by 
managerialist nostrums. Yet the homogenising nature of the 1988 Education 
Reform Act enjoins the latter. And, of course, the head at Southside took up the 
300 
managerialist gauntlet. As she said during interview, 'What I'm doing is just 
getting the pickaxe and just starting to pick away at the concrete'. Whilst this was 
said in the context of staff management, it is equally applicable to the children: the 
pickaxe used was that of measurement, and the concrete children. During the 
second week of the term, the head announced that she had met with County 
officials, who told her that she had to be proactive in measuring 'added value': 
We've got to have targets and measures. [Southside] is to produce figures... We 
need to make some prognosis about the children so that parents can see we're 
making professional judgements... We need some data now! 
And data she god Over the subsequent two weeks SAT-style tests for Year 6 were 
carried out and for the rest of the school. Now, this in itself increased the teachers' 
workload. However, concurrently they were requested to devise ways of how they 
could plan children's work in order to assess outcomes; devise ways of monitoring 
outcomes and how to improve monitoring processes; devise strategies to engage 
children in reading; complete annotation slips for children to enable them to 
monitor their own progress 56 and so on. The results were tabulated quickly and a 
56 I'lie annotation sheets were issued to all staff and were designed with pupil completion in mind, namely 
how they would improve their work, if necessary. For examble, year 3 work on the human body - 
specifically knowing the bones of the body - resulted in differing degrees of success. I helped an LSA 
attached to this year in completing the annotation slicets; with pupils. In a nutshell, most of the children had 
problems not only in understanding why they were filling in the form but also writing on it! 'ne teacher 
suggested that both the LSA and I tell pupils with particular writing difficulties what to write. In fact, I 
wrote down comments for one child. Here the managcrialist programme is reaching into the very hearts 
and minds of the children. Whilst on the one hand there is nothing anti-educational about children 
reflecting upon their work, the 'need' for quantifiable evidence overrode the needs of the children - in this 
case the ability to writcl When discussing the use of such slogans as 'I am a good ambassador', one newly 
qualified member of staff commented thus: 
All those slogans - 'I'm a good ambassador for [Soutliside] United' or whatever. Yet it's all to 
make the children feel part of the school. They've got something to be part of for them to realise 
that the discipline, that it should be a self-discipline that they know that the only person who can do 
something about the way they are behaving is themselves. They are in charge of their doings... 
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subsequent staff meeting was geared to an analysis of them. The framework for 
analysis was anchored in the effectiveness research and also the Investors in People 
(lil)) quality improvement programme. 
In brief, lil) concentrates on training and development. Brown and Taylor 
(1994) claim that schools are the fastest growing sector of the take-up of IiP. 
Roberts (1996) argues that its philosophy is congruent with the central purpose of 
education: 
... there is a tangible pay-off as it can assist a school ineet the requirements of OFSTED insI)ections... [lil"] clearly can be linked to change management as 
well as quality; it has the potential to address the problem of persistent 
resistance to change... The liP exercise in quality assurance provides a model 
for the clicnt-centred culture demanded by quality management (1996: 6, 
emphasis added). 
Roberts points out that that liP promotes reassessment and fine-tuning of business 
plans and objectives to create an operational framework for contintious professional 
development. Of course, one would question Roberts's assertion that liP is 
congruent with the central purpose of education! However, the cards are firmly on 
the table: liP is a neat accompaniment to the OFSTED regime and addresses the 
'problem' of resistance. At the end of September the head chose a goal in IiP terms 
- nainely a confident and competent reader. A session was devoted to this and staff 
In the context of a school where self-esteem was problematic, imposing a system whereby such pupils 
should become aware of the need to exert self-discipline is not only unfair but also unrealistic. At 
Wcstsidc, self-discipline and independent learning went hand in hand for children in years 5&6. (The 
reasons for this will be discussed in Chapter 7. ) Again, we encounter the vexing issue of whether such 
discipline is deemed necessary or educational or managerial reasons or both. Eight weeks into the term, the 
head held an assembly where site asked all the children why they were in school. She told them that they 
should know more than they did at nine o'clock and know more at 3 o'clock. She asked whosejob it is to 
ensure that work gets done, to which one boy commented 'us! '. The head then emphasised that children 
need to specify targets and try to meet them: when filling in their 'Golden Goal' books, 'you need to think 
about goals more and whether they are being met'. 
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was required to specify the main indicators. Such indicators were held to underpin 
'quality characteristics'. Staff were asked to draw up reading strategies in terms of 
the EP framework. The following week the meeting addressed such strategies and 
the OFSTED 'Strategic Diamond'. 
The head argued that outcomes must be delineated first, i. e. before any 
discussion of provision. In turn 'we will get better at identifying indicators the 
more you do it'. She suggested targeting the top two English sets - 'we can 
measure on the way throughout'. She informed staff that IiP 'always talks in terms 
of one hundred percent'. She also suggested that staff have the strategic diamond at 
hand whilst plotting indicators of performance. The confident and competent 
reader example was referred to as an 'operational target'. The sheets for such goals 
were sectioned and included such headings as 'Plotting Indicators of Performance', 
'Identifying actual Indicators using the Strategic Diamond'; 'Setting Indicators' and 
lastly 'Targets'. Now, designing strategies for improving reading on its own is an 
educational aim and many of the ideas proffered by staff and the head were varied 
and useful (e. g. collaborative reading). The head often emphasised the need for 
children at Southside to become independent learners (also at Westside). She 
talked about the need to foster independence of thought. But fostering 
independence of thought in the context of Southside was not something that could 
be done overnight. The head said that once the children became independent they 
would 'not have the time to be naughty'. Yet children are, to varying degrees, 
naughty - but particularly so at Southside. The OFSTED regime, because of its 
secreted atomistic social ontology, demands success here and now. Hence the 
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impatience that characterised many a staff meeting and events where naughtiness 
prevailed. However, it must be remembered that at Southside such strategies were 
more managerial than educational, designed specifically with SATs in mind. Let's 
take the reading tests carried out during Test Week. They were seen by many as 
not measuring what they purported to measure. Indeed, the type of test purchased 
by the head was done so for reasons of temporal expediency. The issue of 'quality' 
thus becomes marked, but was not openly criticised by staff. During interview, 
however, Jane commented that 
But if you're just churning out stuff for SATs I think it's very poor quality as 
well. You don't get anything... 
The deputy gave an example of a boy in her class who whilst she felt would never 
reach level 3 was nevertheless talented artistically. But because of the priority 
accorded to improving SATs scores, she was unable to provide work outside 
Maths, English and Science. The head at the outset told staff that for the time being 
she was permitting them to concentrate on the latter foundation subjects. The 
deputy maintained that if I conducted the same interview in five years' time 'this 
wouldn't be happening'. Whilst this is a contingent possibility, the point is that 
educationally (and morally) is the continuous quality programme warranted? And 
even if the school reached the coveted top 5% - at what cost? Specifically, does 
not a school like Southside pay most, since whilst schools such as Westside 
contend with the OFSTED regime, their catchment area permits more time for 
child-centred and religious (Catholic) education. Sarah pointed out during 
interview that less time is devoted simply to play (the bane of anti-child centred 
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approaches), which she felt was wrong because children in the Southside area did 
not have the same opportunities for play. Indeed, Christine also mentioned that she 
spent more of her lunchtime painting with children because the SATs-driven 
timetables precluded such activities. Sarah admitted that some of the changes 
engendered by the 1988 Education Act were useful - providing direction in 
particular - yet at the same time 
You've got to always be climbing; you've always got to be being the best. I 
don't... there's nothing wrong with having high expectations with yourself and 
high aims for yourself, but people are happy with different, with different things 
in life... We don't all have to have the same aim. 
There are two points to be made here. Firstly, not only does the mountain never 
end (Jack's beanstalk, if you like) not all schools start at ground level and with the 
same climbing equipment. Secondly, climbers do not climb in exactly the same 
way. In other words, the 1988 Act enjoins unfair competition (which entails 
winners and losers) at the same time erasing local needs and differences. 
However, the following week, the head launched the weekly staff meeting 
with 'Targets - going to have to meet them! It's as simple as that! Standards 
funding (renamed)... got to meet the targets or no money! ' She referred to the 
Local Authority Directors' meeting that she attended: 'The way now moving 
forward is absolutely the way we are moving forward. The Authority has to insist 
that we do that! Some Heads mumbled... but we've already started itV 
Fundamentally, the head's overriding concern was to provide written evidence of 
improvement. Thus upper/lower school meetings were to be documented in formal 
minutes, creating yet more work for staff. Levels of truancy and graffiti, for 
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example, were discussed. I brought up the issue one morning whilst photocopying 
in the staff room. I asked her whether she felt the improvement in behaviour was 
attributable to her stronger personality (vis-A-vis the former head) or the 
increasingly religious accent that she placed on assemblies and class circle time. 
Her response was: 'it isn't important', whereupon she retracted her statement and 
affirmed that I had asked an important question. I'do not wish to delineate the 
remainder of the conversation. Simply, her comment that it was not important is 
consistent with the New Managerialism. Her reasons for her retracting need not 
detain us. The salient point here is that reasons for providing statistics on levels of 
truancy and graffiti get irretrievably lost in the managerialist-cum-OFSTED flux. 
Even if Southside were able to show a 100% decrease in the level of truancy, why 
is this important? That pupils turn up to school does not tell us whether they are 
happy, learning or alienated. As I argued in Chapter 5, why-questions are 
consistently eschewed. As White sums up: 'We are left in ignorance of how 
effective schools are in bringing about outcomes of a non-measurable sort... This is 
a central difficulty with the SER [school effectiveness] programme and cannot be 
emphasised too much' (1997: 5 1) 
Following the parents' evening in mid-November, the head requested the 
percentage of parental turn out. Approximately, there was a 60% turn out. The 
figure was discussed at the staff meeting. The head commented thus: 
Parents whom haven't seen are the ones with the biggest problems. Do a trawl. 
See what that brings and then back to the drawing board... So, if no response 
from the trawl - the next stage... Say, letters go out tomorrow - could they? 
First letter - then what? Give them a week. 
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The crucial question here is in what sense are such parents a 'problem'? I would 
suggest they were problematic largely in terms of the managerialist project. Again, 
we enter the ever-familiar realm of contradiction. On the one hand, all teachers 
would wish to see all parents in order to discuss their child/ren's progress. On the 
other hand, the managerialist drive towards 100% rates negates the latter. 
Essentially, a concatenation of contradictions permeated the 'improvement' 
process. Following the discussion of the parents' evening, the head responded to 
staff concerns about their workload: 
Can't do everything at once - Right. But next term - Year 3- weekly table tests 
against the clock... whole school - marked in the same way. Literally parrot- 
fashion... need to see more 'word banks' on the walls... need to keep seeing 
them... 
This hardly sits with the need for staff to ensure that children develop into 
'independent learners'. In fact, during the same meeting she brought up the issue 
(again) about the need for pupils not to use rubbers: 'If they [the children] didn't 
keep rubbing out, output would increase immeasurably! 157 (1 do not know how the 
use of rubbers inhibits children's learning. ) However, the point is that we are back 
in the managerialist input/output mentality. The head paid for all staff (including 
myself) to attend a session on understanding and using Bloom's Taxonomy, which 
was followed by a staff meeting. The example used at both sessions was the topic 
of the Tudors. In essence, the school effectiveness movement and OFSTED value 
Bloom's taxonomy for demonstrating that 'learning can be managed' (Shipman 
1990: 102, cited in Butterfield 1995). As Butterfield (1995: 163) points out, 
307 
particular educational practices (such as Bloom's) are preferred because they are 
overtly managerial and not because they represent best educational practice. In 
other words, such books as Shipman's The Management of Learning overlook 
&very influential constructivist and interactionist theories of learning, and chooses 
rather to support its case by examples from psychologists who more readily fit the 
technical view of management' (idenz. ). In relation to the GCSE, Bloom's 
taxonomy is used for the selection of items rather than for evaluation of the quality 
of the response (see Chapter 5 and the Preface to Part Three for the critical 
discussion of the TGAT model and the influence of Alexander et al. ). This applied 
equally to the ways in which staff used the taxonomy in relation to the Tudors 
topic. 
However, to return to the reading strategies undertaken by staff. The 
collaborative reading approach had varying degrees of success and commanded 
assent by most staff. I was present during a year 3 collaborative venture, which on 
the whole was successful - it animated the children and resulted in excellent work. 
Yet the success of the approach depended upon the initial intake of the class and the 
style adopted by the teacher. I want therefore to return to the issue of causality, 
since the intake of the pupils (Thrupp 1999) is causally held in abeyance by school 
effectiveness research. The numerous teaching strategies required preparation, 
planning, action and review. The causal processes were held to be linear. The 
argument underpinning the improvement strategy of the head is that careful 
planning, execution and monitoring will result in success. Hence the argument by 
57 This 'directive' was ignored by three-quarters of staff, some of whom kept a rubber to erase children's 
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the head in interview that a dose of the 'right' cultural programme (mixture of 
OFSTED and school effectiveness nostrums) will lead to success. As already 
discussed in the Preface, the OFSTED-cum-school effectiveness methodology is 
positivist and mathematically models school processes. Mathematical modelling 
assumes the existence of a closed system. In brief, a closed system exists only 
when two conditions for closure are met. The first condition has been termed by 
Bliaskar the 'intrinsic condition for closure. Here there must be no change or 
qualitative variation in the object possessing the causal powers if the mechanisms 
are to operate consistently. The second condition for closure - 'the extrinsic 
condition' - requires a constancy of relationship between the causal mechanism and 
those of its environment if the outcome is to be regular. Yet, as Bhaskar (1997: 33) 
points out, closed systems must be experimentally established. 
Thus, given the Humean underpinning of positivism, it is hardly surprising 
that, until very recently, school effectiveness research focused on school factors 
alone. The (belated) statistical incorporation is attributable to the indubitable 
significance of socio-economic background and the commitment to positivist 
methodology. In other words, the reality of class cannot be (rationally) ignored yet 
at the same time positivist methodology forecloses an analysis of social class as sui 
generis reality, whose properties cannot be modelled mathematically. Instead of 
recognising that society is an open system given its human constitution, social class 
is reduced to a statistical variable that ostensibly can be controlled for. In fact, I 
would suggest that whilst the extrinsic condition for closure is clearly making 
work, others permitted children to use them on their own initiative. 
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school effectiveness researchers uneasy, the intrinsic condition is implicitly 
presupposed. This is evidenced by the head's adoption of teaching strategies that 
assume causal linearity. Indeed, the assumption remains (and underpins New 
Labour policy) that 'failing' schools will succeed because of factors at the school 
level alone. However, this entails the empirically somewhat dubious assumption 
that the structure of the school remains the same (constant and invariant) and thus 
effectively expunges human agency. Yet the very raison d'&re of school 
effectiveness belies this: is not the aim of the research to document and assess 
structural (and cultural) change and its implications for 'efficiency' and 
'effectiveness'? 
Finally... the contradiction 
The contradiction between child-centred philosophy and the New Managerialism 
embodied in SATs, teaching strategies and leadership directed the taped interview 
with the head. All staff concurred that the contradiction was real and, moreover, 
found it constraining. (The degree of stringency depended on the extent to which 
the changes diverged from their understanding of child-centred philosophy. ) 
During interview, I asked the part-time special needs teacher whether she thought 
that in view of the specific catchment area her work is even more problematic given 
the move away from the child. She replied that 
Yes, cos these children really need lots of practical experience which they don't 
get now. These children find it difficult, you know, as soon as you say, right, 
pencil and paper tasks, I mean, that's the trouble in that class. The children that 
can't write, what do they do? When you say right, you are going to write a 
story, you're going to write a comprehension test - they can't do it. 
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Instructively she commented about the literacy hour as follows: 
Like I said about the literacy hour, it is very restrictive because when I did my 
training, I mean, you would, you know, if children were really engrossed in what 
they were doing and they would, you know, learning something practical, you 
wouldn't say 'right, stop now! ' You know, you would let them carry on. 
For Nicky, child-centred practice is about a mixture of teaching styles: 
So, sometimes if you're doing a investigate lesson, it will work very well. The 
children are, yes, this is for you, you need to find this out, let them, you know, 
develop their own experiment or something like that, learning by touching and 
feeling. Occasionally it's appropriate, but sometimes is not. So, really, a 
mixture of all the different teaching styles. 
In terms of the SATs' negation of child-centredness, Sarah commented thus: 
... SATs is saying 
by level to get to level 4 they have got to know this, this and 
this, which would be good if every child left knowing all of those things and 
maybe more to get level 5 or 6. But there are some children who will never get 
to there and we seem to be teaching at a higher level because they know that the 
children need to know this whereas they have not actually looking at what do the 
children know already... 
Rose, a year 6 teacher, confirms this: 
Robert Were you at any point in your career committed to child-ccntred learning? 
Rose Child-centred learning is the dodgiest thing, I think! It depends on the 
way you define it. Child-centred learning could be - are you ready for this? 
Robert Go on then 
Rose It could be umm start with where the child is at 
Robert Right 
Rose Now, if that is the case then yes, then there is this massive sort of airy 
fairy bit... that says, you know, the child should discover... meditate or let them 
talk about it and they'll discover how to deal with multiplication. You know, and 
maybe it would, but then again, there is the old saying of umm, you know, what is 
it about monkeys and Shakespeare? Given them long enough, but they haven't got 
long enough. You know, give them the strategy to start with. 
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Robert Would you say that SATs has altered this at all in any way, shape or fonn? 
Rose Yes. They no longer have time to stimulate knowledge; they no longer 
have the chance to return to something. When I was on, when I was training, you 
could go into a classroom on your teaching practice and you could teach something 
and you would go all round the houses and you would explain it forty different 
ways and the child would look at you blank. You come back to it a week later and 
it would have sunk in to the extent that they knew what you were on about. And 
they knew, oh, that's it then. Now, there's no opportunity to do that anymore. 
Particularly in year 6 because you have to cover the whole curriculum again 
(emphasis added). 
However, the head's comments are more interesting given her specific role in the 
school and the ways in which she personalised it. Already we have seen how her 
style was autocratic, which is congruent with the New Managerialist project. I put 
the question to the head: 
Robert Would you say... is there a contradiction between child-centred learning 
and SATO 
Jill Well, it's like... there is a contradiction between child-centred learning 
and the national curriculum, you know, it's a continuation of that argument. It 
depends on how you see, whether you see coming to school as an education 
person... is a broad, holistic, complete person, aren't they? 
Robert Yes 
Jill Or whether you see it as coming in to produce robots for technology, say, I 
see it as the more rounded and there is room for all of that. So there doesn't have to 
be all... you can't get through the national curriculum anyway so why try, that's 
my general view. Is that what you were asking about the tension between 
Robert Uh SATs, sorry, is there a contradiction between child-centred learning 
and SATs? It's very 
Jill You see... You.... There needn't be. Teachers make it a contradiction 
because they have SATs in their head rather than children becoming competent and 
confident learners. Now, if you are about children becoming and having all the 
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skills that make them independent about being able to learn and social ability and 
those things then there is no problem with SATs because what you are doing is you 
just say sort of... what do you mean by child-centred learning? 
Robert I don't know 
Jill If you mean all that claptrap about children playing until they feel the 
readiness to learn, then, yes, but I never did see... like that anyway. That's where 
Robert OK. Thanks. 
Jill it all started to go pear-shaped... in the 60s you've got to learn through 
play. Of course children ]cam through their fingertips, we all learn through our 
fingertips, but for a lot of primary teachers it was to throw everything else out they 
began to play all day and discover by themselves and wait for... readiness to drop 
out of the sky. You know, you've got to make children ready. What it did, or 
should have done, is to release you to be able to put children in problem-solving 
situations. Because I was doing problem solving in 1960, you know. Children 
were in the sandpit and they had tasks to do. 
The above provides a fascinating insight into how one particular cultural agent lives 
with contradiction. In particular, equivocation and tension (S-C matters) 
characterise her response. That there 'needn't be a contradiction' is (ontologically) 
independent of whether there is. Teachers may indeed perceive contradiction or be 
manipulated into misperception, but this is analytically distinct from, and 
irreducible to, the objective existence of contradiction (at the CS level). The head 
commented that teachers make the contradiction. The difficulty for any researcher 
is whether to intervene to point out inconsistencies. However, the rest of the 
sentence indicates that the head was unsure about her argument. She talked about 
children becoming and having skills that facilitate independence, yet the point at 
which she asked, 'what do you mean by child-centred learning? ' suggests 
recognition that SATs negates this. Reasonable inference aside, however, her 
caricature of child-centred practices during the 1960s as 'claptrap' did not engage 
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with the psychological theories discussed briefly in Chapter 5. Her comment that 
she 'did not see it like that anyway' evinces at best impatience with the notion of 
readiness. The notion of readiness was discussed in Part Two. Unfortunately I did 
not ask if she rejected the notion altogether. But she accepted that children leam 
through their fingers yet immediately maintained that you've got to make children 
ready. One of the key precepts of child-centred philosophy is that you cannot 
enforce readiness. As we saw in Part Two, the notion that children played all day is 
a media-fuelled myth. As Lynne pointed out in interview, child-centred teaching is 
fundamentally hard work! 
Tile final sentence is crucial. The head stated that 'children were in the 
sandpit and they had tasks to do'. This resonates well with the New Managerialist 
education regime, for quite simply cognitive stages of development are temporally 
conflated with the emergent capacity for problem solving. Whilst the head was 
right in stating that 'readiness' does not drop out of the sky, nevertheless it cannot 
be enforced. Indeed, what makes 'enforcement' especially problematic at 
Soutliside is that many children needed to engage in such activities as cookery 
before they could even begin literacy and numeracy skills because of specific 
familial and other contingent factors. During interview with one of the year 3 
teachers following the LEA 'inspection' during the preceding summer term, I asked 
the following: 
Robert Umm. Did you feel that they asked you yourself any umm relevant 
questions or was itjust a question of, you know, I'm coming in to look at you. 
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Louise They didn't ask umm one of them asked what levels I think the children 
were at and lie did comment it was a science lesson and there was the first lesson 
they'd done on floating and sinking so they ... were two children... you can imagine which two! I was just letting them play with a bowl of water and he said 
what level are those children, flow are you extending them? You know... and what 
is the purpose of that activity. He obviously didn't like it at all and I said well, my 
view is that before children can actually carry out the science experiments they 
have to be allowed to see through play... about the properties of water. I said I 
think that's a very valuable tiling because, you know, he had his hand up like that 
and was just watching the water go like that and then he was keeping his hands 
together and seeing if it would come through... 
The point is that we get back to the constraining contradiction at the practical level: 
managerialism erases its human subjects yet require them so that they can be 
'managed'. Thus if we take the above example of children learning about the 
properties of water through play, this presupposes fundamental cognitive processes 
yet the SAT denies them but cannot do without them. Hence the rush for success - 
since the time taken for children to develop cognitively is implicitly denied. 
Crucially, it is being argued here that the constraining contradiction generates 
practical problems that do not simply encompass the thrust and counter-thrust of 
ideational debate in academic books and journals. Those who engage in some form 
of New Managerialist restructuring are conditioned to engage in some form of 
practical syncretism, since the reality of flesh-and-blood children enjoins that they 
be taken into account. 
To conclude, the arrival of the head highlighted the contradictions 
immanent in the OFSTED regime. Of particular interest was how the objective 
contradiction shaped agential activity. It was argued in Chapter 2 that the 
contradiction between child-centred philosophy and SATs is constraining rather 
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than competitive. Without wishing untenably to impute mental processes, the 
above discussion exemplifies the mental contortions engendered by the 
constraining contradiction. This was not explicitly stated to the head. But her 
thinking evinces mental anguish and uncertainty. The causal powers that inhere 
between CS logical properties are only operative through agency and thus even if I 
had been more explicit, it does not follow that the head would have engaged in a 
near-linear process of corrective repair. Indeed, all data showed how at the S-C 
level agents do not operate in robot-like fashion, pinpointing objective 
contradictions and comp] ementari ties and acting in strict accordance with their 
actionable logic. However, Southside is clearly a case of A <- B correction (where, 
to recapitulate, A= New Managerialism; B= child-centredness). Indeed, the head 
bought the whole New Managerialist package (A) and thus endeavoured to mould 
children (B) to fit the package (e. g. her 'smiley' badges and stickers, and the 
4affirmation' sessions at Assembly for children who played ball with her). In other 
words, she did not just treat children as commodities, but their commodiflication is a 
very active process. That she could not make such commodification stick derives 
from the 'school mix', which means that most children just are not amenable to 
being processed into SATs fodder. Furthermore, it underscores the constraining 
nature of the contradiction since children qua reflective young human beings 
cannot be expunged. The extent of any commodification depends upon a variety of 
factors that cannot be determined a priori. In short, then, syncretism generically 
took the form of A <- B correction, as evidenced both empirically and in interview 
with the head. 
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7 You can run, but you can't hide! New Managerialism and National 
Targets 
Westside: background 
The OFSTED inspection was carried out at the beginning of 1996 over a period of 
5 days. At the time the school had 364 boys and girls on roll aged 5-11. Westside 
is a Roman Catholic voluntary-aided primary school serving four Roman Catholic 
parishes. Approximately IS per cent of the pupils came from non-Catholic homes. 
The Report noted that 
Forty-three pupils [12%] are on the school's register of special educational 
needs. The pupils are predominantly from white, ethnic backgrounds. Ten per 
cent of pupils are from dual heritage homes. The pupils come from a wide range 
of social backgrounds. Thirty-eight [10%] are eligible for free school meals. 
The school occupies two sites, two and a half miles apart. The main site is in a 
relatively prosperous area in the [city] centre... and the annex is in a residential 
suburb [equally relatively prosperous] [ ... ] The deputy head is based on the 
main site and there is a teacher-in-charge at the annex. The school's mission 
statement emphasises the purpose of Catholic education. The school aims to 
provide an education for children by which their whole lives may be inspired by 
the spirit of Christ and which develops the pupils' knowledge of God, the world 
and themselves (OFSTED 1996: 5). 
At Key Stage 1, the percentage of pupils achieving Level 2 or above in 1995 was 
greater than the national average in reading and writing. Based on teacher 
assessments and tests, the percentage of pupils attaining Level 2 or above was 
'broadly in line with national expectations'. In science, on the basis of teacher 
assessment only, the percentage again was 'broadly in line with national 
expectations'. In assessments at Key Stage 2, the percentage of pupils reaching 
Level 4 (the level to be expected for pupils of this age) or above, on the basis of 
teacher assessments and tests was 'well above the national average' in English and 
mathematics. In science, on the basis of teacher assessment and tests, it was 
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'broadly in line with national expectations'. The Report went on to comment that 
pupils under five 'are attaining good standards in reading and writing' but 
'attainnient through structured play is underdeveloped in both classes' (P. 9, 
emphasis added). The Report noted further that 
... the information technology curriculum 
is not fully developed. In music, 
pupils attain satisfactory standards overall but the standard of singing in both 
key stages is unsatisfactory. In physical education, attainment is in line with 
national expectations in Key Stage I and at Key Stage 2 it is good; there is 
variation between the two sites and this is due to resources and provision. Pupils 
with special educational needs meet the targets set for them and are working to 
their potential (idem. ). 
As expected, there are sections on attitudes, behaviour and personal development 
and attendance, but unlike Southside use was made of a parental questionnaire. 
The Report commented thus: 
Attitudes are satisfactory overall and those of older pupils are good... Behaviour 
in and around the school is generally good. Pupils are courteous, trustworthy 
and show respect for property. However, individual lapses in good behaviour do 
occur from time to time. Occasionally, self-discipline lapses part way through a 
lesson and time is lost while the teacher re-establishes a working atmosphere 
[ ... ] Attendance 
is satisfactory overall, reaching above the 90% benchmark. 
However, the 92.3% for 1995-6 is lower than the rate which is achieved in the 
majority of primary schools. The number of unauthorised absences last year 
was 1.6%. This is higher than rates achieved in the majority of primary schools. 
The punctuality of the majority of pupils is good. However, a number of pupils 
are late and this affects standards. Pupils who travel on the bus provided 
through local authority contract frequently arrive late, and because of the bus 
schedules, habitually need to leave school early. The bus timetables are 
unsatisfactory (ibid.: 10). 
The 'quality of teaching' was found to be 'satisfactory or better' in 77% of lessons, 
was 'good or better' in 38% of lessons and was 'very good or better' in 5% of 
lessons. The quality of teaching was 'unsatisfactory or worse' in 23% of lessons 
and 'poor or worse' in 5% of lessons. 108 lessons in whole or part were observed 
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during the inspection and form the basis of the latter. However, it was maintained 
that whilst there is a systematic, whole-school approach to planning for teaching 
and learning, 'learning outcomes are not always clearly identified. 77zis nzeans that 
teachers do not always have a clear basisfor evaluating their own effectiveness 
and efficiency' (ibid.: 11, emphasis added). In terms of behaviour management, it 
was stated that a 'unified, whole-school classroom behaviour management strategy 
is needed which must be clear and straightforward so that it can be readily 
understood by pupils and so that teachers can implement it efficiently' (ibid.: 12, 
emphasis added). 
Like Southside, animosities existed (the inconsistent and hearsay reasons 
for which need not detain us). Such animosities are important insofar as they 
impinged upon, and shaped the response to, the OFSTED report. However, unlike 
Southside both the extent and degree of animosity was somewhat attenuated. 
(Whether such attenuation was in part due to the more 'manageable' intake is a 
matter for conjecture. ) The head at Westside, like the outgoing head at Southside, 
was not in favour of the majority of changes engendered by the education reforms. 
In particular, the devolution of budgetary control and the tying of the budget to 
'market forces' (that is, pupil intake). At the beginning of my term spent in 
Westside, the head announced that she was to take early retirement. The reasons 
for this decision will become evident. Her response to the OFSTED Report and 
LMS evince the importance of the need to distinguish between agency and the 
personal beliefs and proclivities of the actor. For her personal response was in 
diametric opposition to that of the trouble-shooting head delineated in Chapter 6. 
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Yet this is not to underplay the fact that both had to contend with structural and 
cultural changes that were not of their making and which conditioned their 
responses. We saw in Southside that such changes were congruent with the head's 
personal beliefs. For the head at Westside, however, such changes were 
incongruent with her deeply held beliefs and convictions, which were underpinned 
by her Catholic faith. Thus we must not lose sight of the fact that objective socio- 
cultural properties may or may not gel with agency and even if they do not gel, 
their stringent nature may nevertheless enjoin varying degrees of compliance. 
Back to the tyranny of measurement: assessment, causal linearity and the 
disavowal of contingency 
The OFSTED inspection process occurs over a five-day period, at the end of which 
comments are made, in particular, about teaching quality and value for money. 
Both are not spelled out for teachers and both are quintessenti ally contestable. We 
saw in Chapter 5 that the OFSTED framework is underpinned by 'procedural 
objectivity', which is designed to eliminate the scope for personal judgement. Yet 
tile Registered Inspector, a female academic, designed and distributed a parental 
questionnaire. This is inconsistent with the homogenising rationale of the 
inspection process. Moreover, whilst the use of parental questionnaire provides 
sustenance for the number-crunching managerialist monster, the limitations of the 
questionnaire were not discussed. In fact, both the methodology and rationale were 
not spelled out. The 'parental survey' was attached at the end of the Report, under 
the heading of 'Data and Indicators'. The percentage return rate was 27.47%. At 
best, a warning as to the unreliability of the data should have been included. 
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However, the Report does not proffer any discussion of the validity of (a) 
the use of questionnaire and (b) its design. The staff were not involved in the 
process of questionnaire design nor were they permitted to comment upon its 
findings. As was argued in Chapter 5, this is not at all surprising, since the 
effectiveness literature not only evades why-questions but also is inextricably 
bound up with accountability. To reiterate, such accountability is external, that is, 
it is not concerned with pupils -a teacher's work is judged in relation to his or her 
peers, which in turns determines who wins (and loses) in the educational market 
place. In terms of the Report's comments on attainment in science, we are not told 
what are 'national expectations' and, moreover, why they are such in the first place. 
As we sliall see, targets imposed by the LEA (via the DfEE) are not accompanied 
by an educational rationale. The Inspectors did not tell staff what 'satisfactory 
teaching' entails. Unlike Soutliside, reference here is made to the 90% national 
benchmark for attendance. Again, why 90% and not 65%? The issue here is (a) 
why attendance is accorded such prominence and (b) why should schools in 
particular areas be penalised for failing to achieve such benchmark(s)? Most 
teachers would welcome a full complement of pupils and therefore the (complex) 
question of why this is not the case for all schools necessarily arises. But precisely 
because the OFSTED model is decontextualist (an intra-school affair), such 
questions would be deemed inappropriate at the outset. 
In relation to attendance, it was pointed out that the 92.3% for 1995-6 is 
lower than the rate that is achieved by the majority of primary schools. This is 
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instructive (a) for its implicit disavowal of the reality of contingency and (b) for its 
elevation of a facet of primary school life that is secondary. Instead of assessing 
the likely impact of socio-economic background on attendance figures and the more 
pressing issue of whether schools are organised in ways that take this into account, 
OFSTED erases this at a stroke, reproving those schools that do not achieve the 
shifting numerical sands of national benclimarking. The disavowal of the reality of 
contingency at all levels (classroom, school, systemic, local ... ) is clear from 
Westside's OFSTED Report. Such disavowal is an unavoidable concomitant of the 
New Managerialist underpinning of the OFSTED framework. This is because 
whilst children are ontologically erased qua children, ineluctably they resurface to 
disrupt teaching. It was noted that 'individual lapses in good behaviour do occur 
from time to time. Occasionally, self-discipline lapses... and time is lost while the 
teacher re-establislies a working relationship'. Given that the OFSTED report is 
designed with improvement in mind, it can be reasonably inferred that this state of 
affairs is meant to be ameliorated (hence the recommendation for a school-wide 
policy on discipline). 
Yet, without chaining pupils to desks and/or gagging them, this state of 
affairs cannot be erased. The very nature of young children qua reflexive beings 
validates this transcendental axiom. Certainly, attempts can be made to attenuate 
the frequency and severity of misbehaviour, but again children qua children, socio- 
economic and familial background and the teacher combine to make things 
unhelpfully complex (or 'messy') for OFSTED. Even interruptions by the head 
are regular events in primary schools. More crucially, even if all pupils behave all 
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of the time, it cannot be assumed, contra OFSTED, that what is taught will be 
understood. At the level of observable events, an orderly classroom, populated by 
'courteous and trustworthy pupils' does not mean that learning and understanding 
will concurrently occur. That children behave well is efficient in terms of cost and 
indeed may be effective in terms of examination results. Yet are we talking about 
educational effectiveness? The argument throughout this thesis is in the negative. 
SATs are not concerned with understanding but with accountability: rendering 
teachers accountable for the inadequate level of money paid to them via 
examinations that test effective knowledge imposition rather than understanding 
and application. The issue of bussing and lateness - again indicators of 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness - are (contingent) factors that are beyond the 
control of the school. They are contingent in two senses - structurally the school 
does not require pupils at specific start/end times for it to be a school and whilst the 
school could contract with any bus firm, the local authority provided the cheapest 
deal. 
In recommending that a classroom behaviour management strategy be 
'clear and straightforward' so that pupils can readily understand it, there is no 
acknowledgement that it does not follow that pupils will understand it or accept it. 
The various strategies employed by the head at Southside were readily 
understandable but extraneous factors often intervened to preclude success. Hence 
her frustration at pupil misbehaviour inside and outside the classroom. 'Difficult' 
children cannot be rendered 'well behaved' overnight (or possibly ever). 
Moreover, all strategies for behaviour modification are not immune from ethical 
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considerations. Yet such ethical considerations are not discussed by OFSTED. 
The focus on identification and measurement of learning outcomes exemplifies the 
denial of contingency. For as we saw in the Preface, the model of causality is 
linear, whereby a straightforward cause leads to a straightforward effect. OFSTED 
assumes that learning outcomes can be linked directly and unambiguously to inputs 
(viz. teaching). Indeed, it was argued that the tacit OFSTED assumption is that 
causal factors are independent, universal and additive; that is, they do not interfere 
with each other and are uninfluenced by their contexts. Hence the frustration with 
even minor pupil misdemeanours that impede the flow of teaching 4 identifiable 
learning outcomes. But even the best teaching cannot guarantee success. 
Moreover, learning outcomes are (now) proxies, which as we have seen distort 
reality since they cannot measure what they purport or try to measure. If we recall 
tile discussion with Louise in Chapter 6 about children playing with water, this was 
a leaming situation, which at that particular point in time can never be considered 
in terms of an identifiable leaming outcome. The whole point of the Piagetian 
approach is that specific processes have to be undergone before we can establish 
any assesment situation that may or may not be tractable to some form of 
measurement. 
Again, there is no proper consideration here that we are dealing with 
children, which in turn enjoins that we place a huge question mark over an 
assessment process that is accountability, rather than educationally, driven. During 
interview the head referred to the OFSTED report's criticism of assessment 
procedures. 
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Pat The other thing that they [OFSTED team] complained about is our 
assessment procedures, which I thought, I mean, there is no perfect way to get 
round assessment. And to be honest, I think that the teachers are doing their own 
spot assessment. They are making judgements on the children, which they file 
away without necessarily writing it down and you go in and ask any teacher about a 
child and they will be able to help you. 
Robert Did they want to see lots of paperwork? 
Pat They wanted lots of paperwork, and I kept saying to them, we don't have 
time. I said I defy you to go into any primary school and find the primary teachers 
with the time. And you must give them time, I said... I wanted her [the key 
Registered Inspector] to tell me how I was going to provide release time when I 
didn't have the money, when I didn't have the time. 
Robert What did she say? 
Pat I didn't get an answer to that... 'That's up to you to decide Mrs [ ], 
The local-authority drive towards improving SATs was discussed in relation to 
Southside, as evidenced by one particular staff meeting in which the head referred 
to the local authority Directors' meeting vis-a-vis target setting. Westside's overall 
response to this will be discussed later. However, the head referred to the 
increasingly proactive role played by the local authority: 58 
... So you see, it 
has now become a game, really and that's why, as from this 
year, the children in this school will be doing assessment tests. Year 2, uh year 
1, sorry, Year 2 at the end of Key Stage 1, that's mandatory, in years 3,4 and 5 
it is optional, but we are doing them... and in year 6. By the time they get to 
year 6, doing tests ivill become second nature (emphasis added). 
Doing tests until they become second nature is certainly a familiar phenomenon for 
those preparing for 16+ examinations. Notwithstanding their demerits, should 
children as young as 5 be 'doing tests until they become second nature'? This is 
not to suggest that teachers should never assess their children from young age. 
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Indeed, the whole argument at tile primary level is that teachers are assessing all the 
time: what matters is the process and context of assessment. The Report noted that 
Pupil profiles are maintained within the school and they provide a good guide to 
pupils' progress... Statutory assessment is undertaken as appropriate. Base-line 
assessment is undertaken when pupils enter the school... However, there is no 
overarching system throughout the school for assessing and recording pupils' 
progress and attainment, which can be used systematically to inform future 
planning for learning (1996: 13). 
One of the Key Stage One teachers proffered the following about assessment and 
OFSTED: 
Penny Well, they are obsessed at the moment with assessing children [in fact, 
base-line assessment was relatively recent]. We're supposed to assess children all 
the way through. Each piece of work they do you are supposed to assess. You're 
supposed to assess this, you're supposed to assess that. You're supposed to keep 
records. 
Robert You were doing that when I came 
Penny Yes, that was actually for SATs 
Robert Oli, right. 
Penny But four years' ago we used to have to produce our assessments of the 
children... I used to keep cupboards full of it. Nobody does that now. When it 
came to my doing my teacher assessment for the children for SATs, I knew what 
my children could do [ ... ] Well, I, one of those cupboards there used to be full of 
all the things I kept for the children to show what, so that if an auditor came in ... 
Robert Yes 
Penny They could look at it. Nobody every does and that's it. And so nowadays 
I spend my time teaching. I'm preparing the things for the children, and when it 
comes to, um, and audit I'll take some of their ordinary work and I will then say 
"Right, OK. Well, I think this child is at a Level 2"and I'll then take a piece of their 
work and then prove that it is a Level 2. But I don't waste hours and hours of my 
time doing... 
Robert Yes. 
58 As we have seen, such proactivity is unavoidable if local authorities do not wish to face extinction. 
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Penny I mean, I give my children homework every week. They each get 
different homework. I go, I sit down and I spend a whole morning on Saturday 
going through the books and going through what they have done thinking about 
what they need to do next. But I don't do it based on endless pieces of paper... I 
used to keep mountains of it - it was stupid (emphasis added). 
At Southside the head ordered proof of 'improvement' in the form of vastly 
increased amounts of paperwork. Such proof of 'improvement' ranged from 
annotation sheets to minutes of all meetings. But all the paperwork in the world is 
not ail indicator of educational improvement. Penny's point, as echoed by the 
majority of primary teachers, is not only that such assessment is educationally 
flawed, but also most assessment is continuous and resides in the teacher's head. 
Furthermore, as was argued in Chapter 5, much knowledge of children's ability and 
extent of understanding is quasi-propositional; teachers have an intuitive 'feel' for a 
child's understanding. That such knowledge cannot lend itself to speedy formal 
codification and measurement is problematic for the New Managerialism. This 
accounts for the impatience that characterised the advisors' approach to children 
playing with water. The managerialist nature of accountability has led to a situation 
of work over-load and concomitant lack of teaching time. The decision greatly to 
reduce the amount of paperwork, which the OFSTED team ignored, attests to the 
reflective nature of agency. Of course, the relative SAT's 'success' provided the 
correct interpretative leverage. As Sally put it: 
And they [children] are under pressure from the moment they start school. They 
are tested on entry at school. They are tested at 7 and 11 and we make 
judgements about those children based on those tests as well as our own 
continual observations... 
Indeed, the infants' teacher at the main school commented that 
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Helen [ ... ] When they come into school we have baseline assessment. They've 
got certain tasks that we have to test them on. Urn, can they take a message, can 
they remember instructions, you know, do they recognise any letter of the alphabet, 
things like that. So I think there is pressure on them from the first day they come 
into school. 
Robert Do you think that is good? 
Helen No. I can honestly say that I don't think it serves much purpose because 
we always had our own baseline assessment here in that we always devised 
something: do they know three colours; can they recognise their name; can they sit 
and listen to a story. All tile things that ive thought were important. [ ... I What the baseline assessment has done... is we go through various stages, it's quite intense 
and it lasts through the whole half term - it's got be completed within the first half 
term. But You usually find that brighter children who come into school hold back 
because they think they can't do it. They know, or when you try to do it in a play 
situation, they know that they is something different and they have clicked on to the 
fact that you are actually questioning them. So therefore, for example, if you say to 
them "Can you say a nursery rhyme? " the brighter ones will go 'NoP because they 
don't know why you want them to do a nursery rhyme, or shy ones will say "No" 
because they don't know me very well at that point. The ones who maybe aren't so 
bright can't see anything beyond it and say 'Well, OK. Yes. ' And away they go. 
And if you ask them to letter, for example, one of the tasks is that they have to see 
if they can write letters, write messages and what have you. Basically, it's to see 
whether they hold a pencil properly and they can write something down. The 
brighter ones will say 'No. I can't. I can't write'. The not-so-bright ones will say 
'Oh, write. OK. Yeah'. So you actually, the bright ones are scoring quite badly. 
Robert Yes. 
Helen And the not-so-bright ones are actually scoring really well. 
Robert So, it doesn't help you at all really? 
Helen I mean, I know that I am meant to look at these baseline assessment results 
all through the year, but I actually, they have no bearing on my teaching 
whatsoever. 
In echoing Penny's point about unnecessary paper work and work overload, Helen 
commented thus: 
The National Curriculum I think personally was a complete and utter waste of 
time. It wasn't thought out. We were presented with ten folders, we were 
expected to take up and do it. To go, it was just, we didn't have the any time to 
get to know the children - it was just this race to tick off boxes. All the paper 
work that came with it and nobody would actually listen to us that it was wrong. 
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Now they have agreed it's wrong [hence the Dearing Review discussed in 
Chapter 5] And all the little folders and files have gone (laughter) So it has cost 
the taxpayer a lot of money (emphasis added). 
The irony is palpable. Part of OFSTED's raison d'etre is to establish whether 
schools provide 'value for money'. Basically, this translates into more (SATs 
results) for less (cash) via technicist-cum-managerialist measures. Yet the 
unfeasibility of the (initial) National Curriculum folder onslaught and attendant box 
ticking was costly. The money could have been spent on adequate funding for all 
primary schools. Indeed, it was pointed out in Chapter 5 that establishing and 
maintaining quasi-market mechanisms in education has been (and remains) equally 
costly. Whilst Westside has undertaken to eschew the timely, costly and 
educationally unsound practice of box ticking and generic form filling, Southside 
undertook the opposite. However, the reasons for the agential eschewal of such 
time-consuming practices is largely attributable to the high league table position, 
which itself may be attributed to the 'middle-class' intake. In other words, such 
staff could be confident that such eschewal would not lead to a damning OFSTED 
report in view of the success in SATs, among other things. And the reason for 
success at SATs may be attributed to the particular socio-economic intake. In this 
case, Thrupp's (1999) focus on 'school mix' is crucial, since it underscores the fact 
that schools (a) have to work with whatever intake they are given and that (b) such 
intake may either facilitate, expedite or vastly inhibit examination success. 
It is interesting to note that Westside's OFSTED Report did not engage 
nearly to the same degree as Southside's vis-ý-vis socio-economic intake. We are 
told that the main site is in a relatively prosperous area in the city centre and that 
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pupils 'come from a wide range of social backgrounds'. This indicates the lack of 
consistency between different OFSTED teams and thus throws a question mark 
over the putative 'procedural objectivity' that is held to underpin the inspection 
process. However, whether intentional or not, the Report is not explicit in detailing 
the socio-economic background of pupils. The number of children receiving free 
school meals is provided. In comparison with Southside, the figure is considerably 
lower: one in every ten compared to one in every two pupils at Southside. Despite 
the obvious sociological problems attaching to the use of eligibility for free school 
meals as a proxy for 'social class', the obvious difference should not be played 
down. In fact, the Westside Report does not indicate the considerable extent to 
which the majority of pupils were from particularly affluent backgrounds. The 
Soutliside Report, in contrast, did convey the generic relatively poor background of 
the majority of pupils. 
That the OFSTED team played down the relatively prosperous nature of 
Westside's intake is to be expected given OFSTED's focus on the school level 
alone. Yet the prosperous background of the pupils is a facilitating factor vis-a-vis 
'effectiveness'. Of course, it cannot be assumed a priori that relative prosperity 
equates to parental interest in, and concern for, the welfare and educational success 
of their children. However, the sheer visibility of parental interest was striking at 
Westside. Many of the complaints that dominated lunchtime staff discussions were 
not about the pupils but about the 'interference' of parents (compare Southside). 
The one or two pupil 'troublemakers' at Westside would have been regarded as 
relatively well behaved at Southside, as I remarked to staff (and such remarks were 
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met with unqualified agreement). In both schools, I spent time reading with all 
pupils, noting the number of pages read and the quality of the reading in a pocket 
reading notebook. At Westside, all the infants' parents read at least 5 nights per 
week, with many parents taking the time to write educationally informative notes 
59 for the infant teacher. The key impedimenta to 'effectiveness' at Westside were 
not pupil oriented but market and, to a lesser degree, parent based. 
Beyond macro conditioning: Catholicism and the importance of (local) 
context 
But you see, my personal feeling, Robert, is that we are fast approaching the 
stage in this country where we can no longer be described as a Christian country. 
I really do feel that... I find it very sad and I think it's an uphill struggle at time 
to keep those Christian beliefs... (headteacher) 
Despite the explicit Christian (Church of England) ethos of Southside's educational 
rationale, Christian beliefs and practices did not play any significant role. At 
Westside, in contrast, Catholic beliefs and practices permeated throughout. Formal 
class prayers are conducted both at the beginning and at the end of the school day. 
Parents are invited to class and whole-school mass, both of which are attended by 
the majority of parents. Religious - specifically Catholic - education is accorded a 
prominent role in the curriculum. The majority of parents are practising Catholics 
and the school admits a minority of pupils whose parents are non-believers. Here, 
we need to emphasise (a) the importance of local mediation and (b) the over- 
determining role of Catholic faith as one of the non-quantifi able factors that 
account for success at SATs. Firstly, then, as I have already mentioned, macro 
factors do not operate in hydraulic fashion but are mediated locally - 'on the 
'9 in fact, one parent wrote two pages of notes suggesting a specific reading strategy for her son! This 
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ground'. In tile case of Southside, anterior morphogenetic cycles and socio-cultural 
factors at a number of levels and sites (i. e. both intra- and extra-school) conditioned 
the response to the quasi -marketi sation of education. Two of the key conditioning 
factors at Southside were, of course, the poor examination success and 'school 
mix'. The involvement of the (clerical) chair of the Governing Body was, in 
contrast to Westside, low-key. The priest - who was chair of the Governing body - 
was often seen in the school. 
Whilst tile head's deep sense of frustration and anger engendered by LMS 
and tile publication of League Tables does not enjoin Catholic (ideational) 
underpinning, the nature of Catholic beliefs can only exacerbate such feelings. For 
now we come to my second point about the over-determining nature of the Catholic 
(Westside) context. In Chapter 1,1 discussed how the structural 'upper hand' of the 
teacher may be reinforced or counteracted by the familial structure, whereby the 
mediation of the parental request to behave well in class buttresses the power of the 
teacher. This is conceptualised as over-determining the position of the teacher 
because of its reinforcing effects. This also applies to the response of the head and 
her staff and to the parents and pupils. Again, whilst parental concern and 
encouragement do not ideationally imply a specifically Catholic rationale, the 
practising Catholics that are the majority of parents at Westside over-determined 
the chances of success, since Catholic beliefs celebrate education and its role in the 
wider community. No exact measure can be placed on the relative efficacy of such 
factors and processes. However, Westside has a long history of educational success 
would not be regarded as abnormal at Westside. 
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- specifically 'traditional' teaching methods - and Catholic values and practices 
that marked it out from its local counterparts. Its known success ensured a steady 
supply of largely Catholic pupils. 
The stringenc), of constraints: LMS, inark-et values and lived contradiction 
As Pring (1993) rightly argues, the philosophy of the education reforms is 
incompatible with the Catholic idea of the nature and purpose of schools. The 
primacy accorded to 'the market' and individual self-interest contradicts Catholic 
educational values that emphasise the importance of community and of concern for 
tile common good. Thus, to Pring, the market model 'leads not to an improvement 
of the general good but only to an improvement of the positional good of some vis- 
A-vis other competitors and also to a deterioration of the overall situation' (1993: 8). 
However, as Grace notes, prior to the 1988 Education Reform Act, Catholic schools 
were insulated to a large extent from market forces by state and Diocesan funding, 
'by the historical loyalty of large Catholic communities, and by large pupil 
enrolments; resulting from large Catholic families... ' (1995: 174). Such autonomy 
enabled Catholic school leaders to articulate a distinctive mission and set of 
Catholic values independently of market nostrums. Grace's research found that a 
minority of headteachers took the view that the spiritual and moral resources of 
Catholic schooling were strong enough to resist possible corruption by market 
values. At the same time, lie notes with irony that such moral resources were being 
recontexualised as potent market assets in the competitive appeal for parental 
choice of schools in a wider constituency. But such assets do not depend upon 
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market values for their efficacy. The point now is that they must be vigorously 
marketed and manipulated for purposes antithetical to Catholic educational values. 
Whilst at Southside the flow of cash was relatively generous because of 
the socio-economic status of the majority of its pupils (see OFSTED Report 1996), 
Westside had to contend with a steadily declining role and debilitating financial 
contingencies. Spiritual and moral resources simply exacerbated the painful 
process of how to deal with an impending financial crisis at Westside. It is worth 
tracing through some of the discussion among staff about the impending crisis and 
the painful propositions that were proffered by committed Catholic teachers. Prior 
to this discussion, during mid-February 1998 the issues of finance and the 
impending budgetary deficit were raised at the statutory Governors' Meeting with 
Parents. The previous year witnessed a surplus of E19,504. One of the PTA 
(Parent-Teacliers' Association) asked why they were being implored to fund-raise 
in view of this surplus. The head replied as follows: 
Formula funding... Definite decision made by the Governors that would not 
spend full amount. However, every child would not go without... Therefore 
managed to save... Under the law, we can save 5% of the budget and we 
amassed quite a sum a few years' ago... Classrooms at the Annexe with this 
money... But it [the surplus] has been spent. Supply cover: E2,760 actually rose 
to E7,897; E8,300 repairs back to [local council] - 'a retrospective adjustment'; 
E1,300 on chairs; E2,000 on stationery, but at the moment that figure is now 
E4,500; secretarial and GA [General Assistant] time: E1,000. So, E19,000 been 
spent or will be spent. 
The Vice-Chair of the Governors, the recently appointed Parish Priest, added that 
The reality is that schools spend more than allocated... would mean cutting of a 
teacher to carry over money... 
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Whereupon one Governor, himself a secondary school teacher, talked about 
formula funding and what he called 'Business Practices' in his secondary school 
where a E60,000 contingency was recommended. He described this a 'good 
business practice, which cushions fluctuations'. A parent remarked that it would 
have been prudent to set aside E2,000 for supply cover, whereupon the head 
interjected with the point that it would be unlawful to set a deficit budget. In 
contrast to Soutliside, where the unremitting pressures were attributable to the 
managerialist drive to improve SATs, here such pressures stemmed from 
inadequate funding (that could not be attributed to mismanagement) and the threat 
of redundancy. Pupils had to provide stationery during my time at Westside and 
each parent had to provide II pence each time her child left the premises (to visit 
the nearby Church for mass/confession or swimming) to cover insurance. This was 
raised at the meeting by one of the parents. The head could only reiterate that the 
school did not have the funds. Extra responsibilities that statutorily attracted 
additional money were offered to staff but not matched by any increment. One 
year 6 teacher admitted to taking on the role of information technology co-ordinator 
in order to enhance her curriculum vitae, knowing that she would not receive an 
additional increment. Staff complained about the head's hostility to them when off 
sick, but accepted that this was due to the expense incurred. Furthermore, the 
school secretary had her hours reduced to 30 per week, which meant that every 
afternoon an electronic answer phone became her replacement. Finally, there was 
no caretaker. 
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Ironically, what is particularly interesting about Westside vis-h-vis 
Southside is that the particular 'school mix' (generally well behaved and bright) 
enabled a far more child-centred approach and thus did not pose any significant 
impediment for the majority of staff. As we shall see, the Senior Management 
Team - one of the New Managerialism's educational showpieces - was paid lip 
service by staff. However, the inevitable could not be postponed for much longer 
and a staff meeting was convened mid-March to discuss the school's precarious 
financial position. As with Soutliside, all notes of staff meetings are verbatim. The 
following underscores the fact that stringent structural constraints are mediated 
processually: agents thus stringently confronted do not react in robot-like manner 
but critically reflect upon their conditions of action, strategically making the best of 
an inauspicious situation. In this instance, the LMS aspect, rather than specifically 
SATs, undermined the capacity of staff to provide a child-centred environment. 
ptit A lot to get through... Umm can we get started, please as a lot to get 
through? [Prayer) Thank you Philippa and Claire for coming. I want to start with 
the budget. Provisional formula allocation is E480,000. Final allocation when get 
it -I expect only addition to be inflation contingency; and that money based on a 
school (September) roll of 356... I estimate 363 - allowing for people returning and 
going. Out of E480,000, about 80% taken up to pay staffing salaries. I've done a 
provisional budget... obviously you're going to be bombarded with figures. Can be 
summed up in one sentence: not good! Supply (teaching) budget put at E1,000. 
Equivalent of 10 days supply cover for the whole school! Supply cover budget for 
last year was E2,760 and at the end of March (this month) will be in excess of 
E10,000. For things like stationery, books I have budgeted E2,000. There is a 
shortfall. Added to all this is 'clawback' - estimate of E8,300 because of number of 
children lost last year. So, all in all things do not look very good. There are things 
that can't be cut - for instance, cleaning time can no longer be reduced; admin time, 
too. So, the Governors have to sit and make decisions to make savings - April 
1998 to April 1999 - and remain solvent: impossibility. Literally means that they 
are going to have to look at everything. Our budget has been cut like everybody 
else... usually a surplus each year. [ ... ] Governors don't have a choice - got to 
make savings. Sorry to be the bearer of bad tidings... Isn't a shortfall yet. Last 
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year surplus of E19,500 - virtually gone. Will have spent up to E1,800 on the 
appointment of the new head... 
Claire A teacher's salary? 
Pat I don't know, Claire 
Diana At St. Helen's [Westside feeder for this Catholic secondary school] each 
parent pays; C5 
Penny But can't have a crisis situation every year! 
Pat Well, I've set a provisional budget that actually balances - but totally, 
completely unrealistic; can't set a deficit budget - it's illegal... will literally be 
'austerity rules! ' for everyone... I feel really badly about it. 
Claire Swimming: do we have to do it? 
(Here a member of staff asked why this was asked, whereupon Claire remarked that 
would make savings. However, it was pointed out that swimming is part of the 
National Curriculum. ) 
Katie Would more pupils make a difference? 
Pat Yes, but not a lot. 
Claire How much is each child worth? 
Pat Between El, 100 for infant to E900 for a junior. 
Claire Hiring out premises? 
Pat But might need a caretaker - either we have a caretaker or a cleaning 
contractor. 
At this point the head discussed her contact with the manager of the adjacent sports 
centre. She mentioned that lie wished to discuss the feasibility of using the 
playground as a spillover car park, from which the school could earn EIOO per 
week. The head mentioned that a while ago the Governors turned down the offer 
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without discussion. She referred to the problem of oil on the playground and who 
would be responsible. She also mentioned that a meeting was scheduled for after 
Easter. 
Claire Used to be aerobics in the school hall 
Liz But the caretaker used to close 
Paida Parents would massively object [to car park proposal]... it's a pity... 
Pat Well, I sliall know more after this man has been to see me. I don't think 
there's a choice. 
Penny Parents will take their children away. 
Andy But so many schools do it. 
Claire We ought to go to the Governors... advertise fact. We need to act quickly, 
don't we? 
(Silence) 
Pat Does anybody want to ask me anything else? 
Sally We need marketing! 
Pat Governors got to do something... Can't do nothing... 
Paula Tell them we're prepared to bite the bullet - have the car park. 
Andy Do you know when the Governors are going to discuss this? 
Pat 25h March... but I may be mistaken. I ... ) Dinner ladies cost us E13,500 
Andy Get rid of dinner ladies. We can have 'glorified' break time duty on a rota 
basis. 
Sue Can I say? I have a friend [at another school] and each class teacher has 
dinner in the classroom [with her pupils] 
Andy Yes. Rota system - each teacher does lunchtime duty. Only one of us 
each lunch time. 
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Pat Depends on everybody. 
Andy Of course it does! 
Pat Well, can I just ask: anybody who does not want to do dinner duty? 
I am not aware of the outcome of the Governors' subsequent deliberations. 
However, the above attests to the morphogenetic proposition that structural 
properties have to be mediated: they do not force in hydraulic fashion. Certainly 
such constraints may be (and are) experienced as such by agency. Yet whilst 
subjective manque de choix feelings are, of course, no guarantor of objective room 
for manoeuvre, the crucial theoretical point here, contra Giddens, is that there was 
no possibility 'to do otherwise'. Clearly, there were such possibilities as letting the 
playground to the local sports centre or making the dinner ladies redundant. But 
this was in response to an objective situation that (a) was not of the staff s making 
and, moreover, (b) could not be agentially willed away. In other words, all the 
collective praying, sense of dismay, lengthy discussion and analysis could not 
eradicate the fiscal predicament that was due to contingencies not covered by LMS 
but which could not be ignored (for much longer). The very structurationist 
proposition of 'can do otherwise' erases such temporally prior (stringent) 
conditioning at a stroke. Giddens would reply that letting the playground or 
sacking the dinner ladies is 'doing otherwise'. But this is to miss the point, namely 
that in letting the playground and/or dismissing the dinner ladies the constraint is 
not erased. Indeed, the dismissal of the dinner ladies would have exacerbated, not 
alleviated, matters. Finally, what if such possibilities did not exist? As I argued in 
Chapter One, the can-do-otherwise dictum is implicitly voluntarist, erasing prior 
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material conditioning. The fiscal crisis constitutes a new cycle, whose mediated 
conditioning effects are temporally posterior. Thus agents at any given point in 
time contend with a number of conditioning cycles at various levels (DfEE, 
school ... ). Such cyclical conditioning may complement, contradict or cancel out 
the influence of other cycles. Thus, to take an example, the cycle engendered by 
the SMT may, unintentionally, contradict the conditioning cycle engendered by a 
dejure working party on the role of the literacy hour. 
However, how can Westside now provide 'value for money' when such 
money does not exist? When one shops in Tesco Stores for own brand tinned 
foods, one receives 'value for money' because of the quality of the goods in 
relation to the relatively higher price tag placed on similar quality goods at, say, 
Sainsbury's. But 'value for money' provided by Tesco presupposes a sustainable 
degree of projit. The OFSTED report pointed to the poor quality of toilet facilities 
and the unsafe nature of the stairs leading to the infant classrooms, yet commented 
that the school provides 'satisfactory value for money'. But what is the OFSTED 
team 'buying' in order to make comments about 'value for money'? Clearly, not 
children's safety. Of course, this would be denied yet the fact remains that the 
value for money was nevertheless satisfactory. Devolving blame for such matters 
as infants' safety to the Governors is not unfair but immoral. B ack to 
managerialism. The irony of the fiscal crisis is that blame could neither be 
attributed to mismanagement or to poor teaching. Here, then, is a fundamental flaw 
in the market rationale of the education reforms. For failing schools are such 
because of either poor teaching and/or mismanagement and as such should be 
340 
penalised via market rationality. But how can Westside remain successful if unable 
to avert a severe fiscal crisis that could lead to closure? Essentially, it cannot. The 
case of Westside evinces the who]IY inadequate levels of (educational) funding, 
whose unequal distribution is exacerbated by expensive, contradictory quasi-market 
meclianisms. 
Back to inanagerialisin: the senior management team and targets 
On the one hand, the quasi-marketisation of the education system constitutes 
recognition of its open nature, since competition necessarily presupposes varying 
degrees of uncertainty (depending on starting position). On the other hand, 
OFSTED's secreted social ontology disavows not only that educational reality is 
structured but also operative within an open system. Thus the implicit assumption 
is that successful schools will remain so until such a time that intra-school factors 
may disrupt such success. But this does not fit well with the assumption that the 
intrinsic condition for closure is also presupposed by OFSTED research 
methodology (Willmott 1999c). It is therefore not surprising that the OFSTED 
report was content with Westside's School Development Plan that covered four 
years. It was noted that 
Financial planning is satisfactory in that the budget allocation is broadly related 
to the school's needs... The school development plan would benefit from further 
development to facilitate its use to support financial planning and evaluation of 
its effectiveness. At the moment it covers four years. The plan does not have 
any introductory statement setting out the school's objectives for the year ahead 
and its vision for the future [ ... ] The school is operating within budget. Income 
and expenditure per pupil are close to the national average. Budget reserves are 
rather more than five percent of annual expenditure but provide a sensible level 
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of contingency in view of the need to implement the forthcoming action plan 
(1996: 17, emphasis added). 
Here, an OFSTED team recognises the propriety of reserving money. Yet what 
happens when contingencies lead to crisis point? To what extent do crisis-level 
contingencies (that are not due to mismanagement) become the responsibility of the 
local authority or central government? This we are not told. Finally, to what extent 
can one plan for the unforeseen? Quite simply, OFSTED-imposed planning within 
an open system that is grossly underfunded is a recipe for stress, overwork and the 
attenuation of educational priorities. Prior to 1988, local authority planning meant 
that schools could get on with teaching. Now, the degree of systemic openness 
engendered by the quasi-market reforms means that uncertainty becomes not just 
the property of individual schools but is exacerbated. Hitherto local authority 
funding would have cushioned unexpected drops in pupil intake. As we have seen, 
the unforeseen expenditure created serious exigencies for staff at Westside. At the 
same time, the Government's unremitting pressure resulted in a series of targets 
that schools have to meet by 2002. This created further exigencies. However, 
before delineating the response, briefly I wish to discuss the SMT in order to show 
not only how agency responded both before and after the OFSTED report but also 
how the degrees of freedom afforded by Westside's market position facilitated an 
(initially) apathetic approach. 
The Report commented that the 
senior management team has a restricted influence. The role of the deputy head 
is unsatisfactory both as part of the senior management team and in the daily 
running of the school. This role should be more clearly defined to enable the 
senior management team to share much of the responsibility, which is presently 
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carried by the head alone... The involvement of the senior management team in 
the educational and financial planning process [re school development plan] is 
not clear and there is no defined route for its recommendations to influence 
long-term development planning (1996: 16). 
Essentially, the 'restricted influence' of the team was deliberate. In stark contrast 
to Soutliside, the head consciously avoided New Managerialist practices wherever 
possible. The disdain she had for the notion of senior management team (and, 
indeed, for such programmes as Investor in People) was evident from our numerous 
discussions about LMS and the education reforms. In response to my question 
about whether the head's style of management had changed following LMS and 
SATs, the special needs co-ordinator commented thus: 
Paida I've got say yes to that. Umm, the reason I have got to say yes is that I 
think, I think she is very tired. I think it has all been thrust on her teachers, 
particularly LMS, which I think has made very, very difficult demands on 
teachers... Particularly head teachers because they were trained quite a while ago. 
And I think that they are being asked to be money managers, which is not what they 
set out to do at all... And I think that poor Pat, it has been, she's jolly good at it I 
have to say, she is an excellent manager in terms of the money side of things ( ... I 
You know, it's not what people set out to be teachers for, is it? To manage money? 
They come because they are interested in children and they don't want to be 
dealing with, you know, all these problems of finance... 
Most of the staff remarked that the head no longer had the time to help out in 
classrooms. The head herself complained bitterly about LMS and how it greatly 
lessened time to spend, in particular, with the infants. She told me during interview 
that it took her three weeks to prepare the finance report for the OFSTED team: 
And one evening, I was at home, it was a Sunday evening and I had been 
working on it virtually all weekend and if I didn't have the double-glazing it 
would have gone through the window... 
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This encapsulates the head's sentiments about the whole OFSTED regime. Such 
sentiments account for the half-hearted commitment to the senior management 
team. When a vacancy needed to be filled during the term, she had to bargain with 
a Year 6 teacher in order to persuade her to become a member. Unlike Southside, 
staff meetings in general occurred once or twice a month. However, a minority of 
staff complained about the SMT's lack of teeth. One Year 5 teacher complained 
that no decisions were ever made. This was echoed by the special needs co- 
ordinator. What exacerbated the apathy of the team was the animosity between the 
head and her deputy, the reasons for which need not detain us. In the event, such 
animosity simply facilitated the head's decision not to take the SMT to the same 
corporate extent as her counterpart at Southside. Furthermore, such agential 
freedom is due in large part to the SATs success. Yet given that the SMT was a 
focal concern of the Report, it is interesting to note how personal factors precluded 
action. The role of the deputy was not clarified during my term at Westside. This 
did not perturb the head nor staff in general. 
Nevertheless, some days were less half hearted than others. Stringent 
constraints have a habit of catching up or suddenly rearing their head at awkward 
moments. The government-imposed targets constitute one such moment. This was 
the only occasion on which the senior management team met to deliberate and 
make school-level decisions. The meeting was convened in March 1997 to discuss 
the Government's new National Literacy Strategy and to amend the School 
Development Plan accordingly. It was only this particular meeting that I 
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experienced the sense of urgency that existed at every meeting whilst at Southside. 
The local authority target was that 86% of all 11 year olds should achieve Level 4 
or above in 2002. In 1997 69% of all 11 years olds achieved this; the national 
average was 63%. The local authority was given a target band of 84%-89%. About 
4% per annum increase to the reach the national target of 80% by 2000. The 
authority was also allocated E155,765 out of the Government's 'Standards Fund'. 
A month before the SMT meeting, a staff meeting was convened to discuss this. 
The English co-ordinator reported back on a National Literacy Strategy meeting, 
which was attended by the authority's advisor. 
Liz OK. Thanks. Main bit [of the meeting] is in there [the Hall]... National 
Literacy Strategy a couple of weeks' ago - [the head] went with me. Still doesn't 
tell you what to do - at what time during the day - that's what people want to 
know! We do know it's going to be very prescriptive... One or two sheets I think 
you need to have (I'll photocopy them tomorrow) 
Pat Can I just say something? Not the Government's intention to impose 
structure rigidly, yet [the advisor] told us otherwise on Monday... our 83% level 4 
- we're expected to improve upon that 
Liz Won't get it! 
Paida How can they? 
The last comment by the special needs co-ordinator is crucial, for it underscores the 
fact that children's varying innate cognitive capacities cannot be moulded in 
Durkheimian fashion in order to achieve ever-increasing Government targets. This 
point permeated discussion during the SMT meeting, as we shall see in a moment. 
However, the head pointed out that girls did better in general at Key Stage 2, 
adding that was part of the national trend. The teacher-in-charge at the Annexe 
replied that boys were bottom in her group in reading and described them as 'so 
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immature'. Liz asserted that 'Boys haven't got the staying power' and the deputy 
likened his boys to 'little lion cubs'. The point here is that we are not dealing with 
robots that equally digest inputs and then regurgitate them with the same degree of 
success. In other words, in this instance the salient factor of sex differences attests 
further to the untenability of the New Managerialist target-setting agenda since they 
cannot be erased, along with other factors (be they biologically and/or ideologically 
based). 
The English co-ordinator pointed out that the new teaching requirements 
were already in the school's Scheme of Work. The head informed staff that the 
E1000 is to be given to each school irrespective of size, to which the co-ordinator 
commented thus: 
It will take away a great deal of creativity out of the children. 
Sally nodded in agreement. However, the head immediately added that the local 
authority has to agree to targets and develop a strategy with schools or it will not 
receive any funding. The deputy head argued that standards at Westside would 
4plummet', whereupon Liz commented that 'We have no choice'. One of the 
Annexe teachers complained that children 'should not be seen as commodities'. 
Finally, the co-ordinator remark-ed that 
The Government has reinvented the wheel - back to class-based teaching. 
Almost payment by results... Victorian times! 
Up to this point the school, largely because of its specific 'mix' (i. e. high socio- 
economic background), was able to provide a child-centred environment. Now, 
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however, increased targets and the incoming Literacy and Numeracy hours 
represent new antithetical conditioning cycles. As we have seen, the development 
and nurturing of creativity is quintessential to child-centred philosophy and 
practice. What facilitated (minor) accommodation to SATs at Westside was 
undoubtedly the intake of the pupils, the help afforded by their parents and the 
commitment of the staff at Westside. It was precisely because of Westside's 
'school mix' that child-centred activities and practices could be sustained. One of 
the few staff meetings during thp term focused on the practical ways in which to 
foster independence in year 3 children. This would not have been possible in such 
schools as Soutliside because of the specific 'school mix'. At the same time, about 
half of the staff recognised that parents saw them as providing a 'traditional 
education' and saw themselves as providing such an education. Yet staff proffered 
child-centred reasons for their teaching approaches, maintaining the need for 
structure and class-based teaching. Indeed, memories of Tyndale were clear in the 
head's mind (as well as older members) and each equated child-centred philosophy 
with these (and subsequent) events. However, I will return to this in the final 
section of this chapter. 
As Gunter notes, education management is 
very seductive, and the promise of reprofessionalism through managerial 
competences is very tempting within a climate where private sector practices are 
valued. Certainly teachers are legally required to conform to managerial 
strategies, whether it is in formulating an OFSTED Action Plan or administering 
SATs. What is fascinating is the extent to which teachers subvert, fudge and 
resist these developments as being contrary to the teaching and learning process 
(1997: ix, emphasis added). 
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We have seen that for almost two years New Managerialist gimmicks were 
subverted. Such subversion was school-wide and reflected the Catholic and child- 
centred values adopted at Westside. It included the reduction in paper work and lip 
service paid to the senior management team. It also included a decision not to opt 
out of local authority control. Grace (1995: 171) notes that the official discourse of 
the Catholic hierarchy has made it clear that it has great reservations about the 
autonomous advantages of grant-maintained (GM) schools and perceived serious 
moral dilemmas arising from conflicts between Catholic community values and the 
values of the GMS option. He notes further that the Catholic community is as 
divided on these issues as the non-Catholic constituency. What is interesting in the 
context of Westside is that despite the fiscal crisis, the Governors voted (10-2) 
against GM status. Of course, for how long Westside can retain this moral stance 
remains to be seen. Indeed, such subversion started to break down as a result of 
both the fiscal crisis and the new literacy and numeracy targets set by the 
Government and local authority. Despite the complaints by a minority of staff that 
the SMT had no teeth, such teachers were not prepared to become members of it. 
The year 6 teacher who was cajoled by the head admitted that staff were not 
interested. However, the target issue provided a structural kick-start to the SMT 
and led to a forceful sprouting of teeth, so to speak. 
Pat ( ... ) What we have to do is specify targets by summer 1999. We will aim 
to achieve an increase of ... in Level 4 Key Stage 2. 
Andy SATs 
Pat Yes, SATs (At this moment the head handed out the local authority's 
Priniary Perfonnance Tables 1997 Key Stage Two Results]. Can we be specific? 
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I've brought little target sheets. One of the things that came up last week was one 
child at Key Stage 2 who achieved Level 4 in English and yet she got a 5... 
Paida But Pat are we going to teach to Level 6? 
Pat But we've got to provide for the more able. I'm not saying we should 
teach to level 6, but should this have not been better? 
Andy But at IIa very high standard... level 6 paper - last year many were 
floored by it... 
Paula I don't think we're going to have to teach it 
Andy I agree with Paula. Main concern is to get as many people as possible to 
goodleve14. 
Pat Right. Are you going to make that a target? 
Andy As many children get a good level 4 as possible... me and Liz were 
talking about how it's going to be difficult to get a good set of Level 4s (this current 
year 5 we're talking about now) 
Paida Concentrate on maths... 
Andy But this damn literacy hour - got to concentrate on English 
Paida But if you compare us with other schools [in the area] 
Andy Can't go through any Scheme page by page. Some schools I know use 
SPMG as a main resource - there are other Schemes. 
Pat which is what we're supposed to be doing 
Andy Well we are Pat. 
Pat But we have to say what we're going to aim for as a percentage increase. 
Aiming for at least 75%... whole point going to be reasonable 
Andy I see no reason why that shouldn't be bettered following year... working 
their socks off, you know [i. e. current year 5] Some children really can't retain... 
Retention this is the thing... 20-25% will be pleased if get a good level 3 
Pat So, 75% then is realistic? This is what we want something realistic ... pull 
the others up. 
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Pat No choice: English ought to aim for 85% Level 4 
Andy Trouble. Difficult if 
Paida Yes. When we know year not as bright... can't set same target... I don't 
think we'll get 85% with Year 5 we've got. 
Pat But can't we focus on improving knowledge of words... I think we have 
to try. 
Paida If they haven't got it you can't put it there... One boy got a3 when 
should have got a 5! 
Pat Yes, but Paula you're talking about 4 tenns' away. 
Paula I think a lot of others will get a Level 3... Lot more to teach to the papers 
Meg Yet in September can give more time to it, as don't have National 
Curriculum subjects. So, in fact could give more time. 
Paula So, flog English and maths and hope they get to a Level 4! 
Andy Aim for the sky! 
Pat I think you have to aim for it. 
Tile head at this juncture asked what the target ought to be for Key Stage 2 Science. 
She read out the figures for 1996 and 1997 (63% and 76% respectively). The 
deputy suggested an extra one-percentage point. 
Pat Wily do you say 77? 
Andy I'm very aware... it's being fair on what they can attain II 
I referred to this meeting during my tape-recorded interview with the head. It is 
interesting to note her reply. 
Pat The targets will have to be altered, you see, because the targets... I know 
that Paula and Andy kept on about targets, the children... I think right, they can 
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have their whinge and their moan and think that's it. But the targets will be raised, 
because I think if you're going to be complacent, then you are on a slippery slope 
and those targets will have to go up, to certainly by 2% at least up to 85%. Purely 
and simply because if we don't do that then it could be interpreted or construed as 
not having high enough expectations 
Robert But then 
Pat If you've got children who aren't performing as well as the previous year 
it's as... it's a challenge. 
I would suggest that the head's reluctance to spell this out during the meeting itself 
stemmed from her conviction that the meeting should be democratically run. Yet 
tile logic of the New Managerialism enjoins an autocratic approach. The head at 
Southside would not have brooked such lengthy discussion and reiterated Pat's 
point about charges of low expectations. Such reiteration would have been 
foregrounded by an autocratic demand that targets be met. The problem with Pat's 
final point is that challenges cannot always be met. The nature of children qua 
children means that the Government's targets will not be met. Yet even if they are, 
at what price? The price tag, already being paid for at Southside, was suggested 
during tile SMT meeting, namely a focus on maths and English at the expense of 
the rest of the National Curriculum. Yet this is a school that prior to the target 
mania was relatively successful. So, notwithstanding the contingent fiscal crisis, 
4successful' primary schools are undergoing a further managerialist onslaught in 
the form of national targets. This is contrary not only to child-centred philosophy 
but also to Catholic values. 
The head's unwillingness to adopt an autocratic approach was not an 
aberration. She permitted a continuum of child-centred teaching strategies. 
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Whereas the head at Southside enforced a process of standardisation whereby each 
teacher had to adopt a specific classroom layout, classroom layouts at Westside 
were distinctly different. Education management did not prove seductive. Before 
entering the staff room, the head invariably knocked the door before entering. I 
found this intriguing and asked the head why she knocked prior to entering. She 
explained that this was because of her respect for her staff and that she saw the staff 
room as a haven for them alone. The New Managerialism would deem such respect 
at best sentimental. Nevertheless, the head's comment that the target challenge 
had to be met underscores the stringency of constraints embodied in the National 
Literacy Strategy. One would expect Westside to be more cushioned than its lower 
socio-economic counterpart. Yet because of the differing year intake, such drastic 
measures as the truncation of the National Curriculum were mooted. In other 
words, it seems reasonable to maintain that just as Westside feels the bite of the 
new conditioning cycle engendered by the target setting, Southside is dealt a further 
blow. 
Andfinally... the contradiction 
The fiscal crisis and, in particular, the Govemment-cum-LEA targets signalled a 
(tentative) end to the relatively generous degrees of freedom that staff possessed 
vis-a-vis child-centred teaching practices. The fact that Westside was constrained 
to deal with a fiscal crisis which was not due to mismanagement but contingencies 
disavowed by the quasi-market reforms is not ironic: it further underscores the 
flawed rationale of the quasi-mark-et reforms. Southside, as we have seen, was 
given extra money because of its relatively poor 'school mix' (which OFSTED 
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maintained should have resulted in higher 'standards'). It is a pity that I was unable 
to spend a year or so documenting the response to the targets and the extent to 
which prior child-centred and religious practices were sustained, undermined or 
abandoned. However, apart from the deputy head at Westside, during 
conversations with me all teachers viewed themselves as child-centred; my 
observations and participation in classrooms did not on the whole belie this. 
Compared with Soutliside, the extent of independence that pupils exhibited in their 
approach to class work was astounding. This meant that considerable time was 
available for child-centred activities. Year 6 teachers spent approximately 6 weeks 
&cramming' their pupils. In fact, I noticed that tables were re-arranged in a style 
more appropriate to the late nineteenth century. As Sally pointed out, it was the 
most time-efficient, rather than educational, way of ensuring success in SATs. 
This was lamented by both year 6 teachers, but was, as they agreed, a strategic 
move in order to maintain high SATs scores. 
Except tile deputy head, all staff when asked about the contradiction 
between SATs and child-centred philosophy, accepted its objective reality but 
maintained that prior to the 1988 Act some form of structure was needed. The 
English co-ordinator was not against tests per se. 
Liz I think basically I don't see anything wrong with tests. I don't see 
anything wrong at all because it does sort of, you know, tell you where children are 
at a given time. 
Robert Sure. 
Liz But I think they can take on too much importance. 
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Robert Yes. 
Liz You know, where everybody is actually sort of teaching what's on test 
papers... and that's all wrong. That's ridiculous because that is not developing the 
whole child anymore. It's just making them sort of numerate, literate but 
Robert Yes. 
Liz Not original. 
I asked her whether on balance she felt that the reforms (LMS, etc. ) have had 
positive or negative effects on the majority of children. 
Liz Umm, that's a difficult one. Not sure about that one really. In some 
respects it's good, you know, I mean you have to test children as I said. 
Robert But do you think there is a tension then between how perhaps you used to 
teach prior to SATs? 
Liz I think you are aware of it the whole time, we don't talk about it, but it's 
always there. You think, A now I must do this really in depth because I know it 
comes up in SATs. 
The tension with regard to testing stems from the managerialist rationale 
underpinning SATs. What Liz is getting at is the need for both summative and 
formative assessment that is educational, as opposed to managerial in nature. Yet 
despite the strain SATs place on prior teaching practices, she pointed out that as a 
team, staff shared basic values about the priority of the individual and her spiritual, 
cultural and emotional needs. But one of the infant teachers felt that the school was 
not child-centred enough. There is some validity to her claims. I would suggest 
that the move away was due to the pressures of both the recently imposed targets 
and parents. Indeed, parental involvement at this level was most prominent vis-A- 
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vis other years. Helen often talked about the need to project the 'right' image for 
parents. 
Chloe I'm more interested in what the children are learning than what to produce 
at the end of the day for the parents to look at really 
Robert Yes 
Chloe I mean, but there again there is pressure on you to get that right as well. 
And it is very difficult, I think the children learn more to work in groups than in 
pairs and so on. But that's not looked upon well here because you need to have a 
very quiet classroom, you need to have wonderful outcomes. You do have to make 
a lot of compromises really. And also there'd be so much work to do because 
they'd [infants] come into my classroom not being used to working in groups... 
Robert Sure 
Chloe There would be a lot of work if we were going to do that and there is no 
point unless it is backed up through the school... and you don't know what anyone 
else is doing. 
That Chloc did not know what 'anyone else is doing' not only warns one as to the 
general validity of her comments but also shows the contrast between the two 
schools. At Southside, the managerialist totalising logic meant that such a state of 
affairs did not exist. Indeed, weekly staff meetings, regular SMT meetings and 
early morning briefings provide the stark contrast. However, I witnessed group 
work in the majority of classes as well as independent learning situations, 
particularly in years 3,5 and 6. Certainly children were quieter and more orderly 
than their Soutliside counterparts. Such orderliness was the goal of all staff at 
Southside and it would be unfair to accuse Chloe's infant colleagues as anti-child 
centred because of the extent of orderliness that prevailed. When I asked Helen 
about child-centred philosophy, traditional Catholic teaching and the negation of 
the former immanent in SATs, she commented thus: 
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Because if you start with the child when he comes to school, if you have two 
children coming through the door, one as I said who can just about do 
handstands and wonderful things and the other who really can't do anything 
umm, you can start with both of those children and work with them individually 
to bring them up, you know, to let them work at their own pace. But 1) very few 
head teachers accept that because they want results at the end of the day, and 2), 
even fewer parents accept that it doesn't matter whether a parent has given four 
years of endless time to their child so that their child can do wonderful things, is 
very confident, you know, can mix with others or that the parent has done very 
little with their child... 
Robert Yes 
Helen Both of those parents will expect the moment he or she comes to school 
that they are a) going to have a reading book; b) be reading fluently; c) do 
wonderful things 
Robert Yes 
Helen So, you start with the child but you do have to put pressure on, and even 
more so now that we are working towards SATs because umm there was a time that 
I would allow the children endless time in the sand tray with water, with paint... 
Thus parental pressure militated against child-centred practices, which in large part 
was due to the 'traditional' Catholic reputation that dates back to the early 1970s. 
Yet Helen felt she had to qualify her comments about children playing in the sand 
tray and with water: 
Now, I'm not saying it's doing nothing playing with sand and water, it's all 
discovering and they need it and it's very important but there does have to be an 
element of formal education in that. They have to learn to alphabet, they have to 
learn certain words, they have to learn to count to do maths, to do addition. All 
those things somehow in that reception year have got to be covered. But I still 
hold on to thefact that they are children and that they all need to move at their 
own level, the), are sinall children and they need sand, water and paint to play. 
So I have stuckjast and held on (emphasis added). 
it is precisely this balance that is being destroyed by SATs, LMS and national 
target setting. The Piagetian approach is not antithetical to the 'formal' teaching 
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methods outlined by Helen. The point is that the discovery learning that is playing 
in the sand tray and with water necessarily precedes them. The problem for child- 
centred primary teachers is that the 1960s popularised false dichotomy between 
child-centred = play and informality and non-child-centred = formality and denial 
of spontaneity within structure means that we encounter primary teachers who feel 
compelled to qualify or defend the need for children to play in the sand tray. It is 
interesting the OFSTED report maintained that structured play is underdeveloped. 
However, this was belied by my observations and therefore undermines the validity 
of the five-day inspection process. 
Out of all staff, the deputy head was openly anti-progressive in his 
teaching approach. What was particularly frustrating here is that both before and 
after our tape-recorded interview, contradiction permeated his analysis of SATs, 
child-centred philosophy and the New Managerialism. The problem for me 
specifically as a researcher is how far to point out objective contradictions, since 
one does not wish to be viewed as arrogant or patronising. As with the special 
needs co-ordinator at Southside, I tended to veer on the side of caution. For the 
deputy, as with the head and special needs co-ordinator at Southside, there 'did not 
have to be a contradiction between child-centred philosophy and SATs'. As I 
suggested in Chapter 6, this is an example of agential syncretism. To suggest that 
there does not have to be a contradiction is to recognise that one exists objectively. 
Ironically the deputy head commented that SATs has made his teaching slightly 
more pupil focused! 
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Robert I ... I Do you feel that your teaching has changed quite a bit since SATO 
Andy I find that my teaching has changed anyway. I think it would have 
changed with SATs, I guess I got into a rut. I have tried to be a little more 
questioning. How could I do it with this, in a different way, rather than 'just turn to 
page 10'. 
He went on to comment that 
Umm, in a funny sort of way the last, since SATs, the last few years I have been 
far more keen on saying 'Right, you know you have got to learn to work on this 
by yourself. You've got to go in and try to find out how to do yourself rather 
than this constant how do I do this'. Now whether that is child-centred learning 
I'm not sure ( ... I 
He referred to progressivism as a 'mish mash of the Seventies' and said that he 
adopted a 'more rigid formal approach' during and since then. He said that SATs 
means that he is no longer 'one hundred percent formal'. It is rather difficult to 
take at face value what the deputy said. From my own observations of his teaching, 
it was clear that lessons were overly structured and directed and that a turn-to-page- 
10 style predominated. It would be futile to guess as to the reasons for his (often) - 
contradictory comments (both ideational and practical). Interestingly, in relation to 
the targets, he commented that 
Note the Government's targets have got to be 80%. Well, that just underlines 
that totally doesn't it? It's like being on the production line. I want 55 more 
Sierras this week... 
Whilst this analysis fits well with the deputy's own approach to primary teaching 
(despite contradictory self-analysis), it encapsulates the Government's 
managerialist approach. However, when I asked the head during interview whether 
she had ever been committed to child-centred learning, she replied that she did not 
know what I meant by it. Before elaborating, she referred to the Plowden Report. 
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What I would take as child-centred learning was the... going back to the days of 
the Plowden Report of 1967... which really I think was chaos. And that's where 
things started to go wrong (emphasis added). 
This could have been said by one of the Black Paper authors. However, 
equivocality characterised the head's remarks about child-centred practice, and I 
would proffer that because of her intemalisation of the derogatory connotations 
attaching to child-centred practice during the late 1960s and 1970s, she was overly 
cautious. In fact, she played up the need for teacher direction and accepted that this 
did not negate child-centred philosophy. Her comments in relation to the OFSTED 
report and the National Curriculum dispelled any anti-child-centred beliefs that 
may be inferred from the initial part of the interview. 
Pat I think that what you are talking about, and correct me if I'm wrong, but I 
think that what you might be getting at is are we, all right, we are giving the 
children the basic skills but we are also giving them those other skills to take 
themselves forward as independent learners, that's what you're after isn't it? 
(This highlights one of the researcher's key dilemmas: viz. how far to direct an 
interview! ) 
Robert Yes. 
Pat You see, I would define that [child-centred teaching] as making provision 
or to, if you like, empower the children to direct, well not direct, to channel their 
own learning, because I think their learning should still be directed by the teacher 
(emphasis added) 
(It would have been useful to have paused at this juncture and ask whether the head 
thought that child-centred philosophy presupposed limited, if any, teacher direction. 
For I sensed both before and during the interview that she (wrongly) equated child- 
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centred philosophy with lack of structure; hence the 'chaos' she referred to as 
characteristic of the Plowden era. ) 
Robert Yes, I wouldn't want to deny that. I just wonder, do you think... and you 
may think SATs fits in very well with that 
Pat No, I don't. No I don't. I used to teach 11+ classes 
Robert Did you? 
Pat Yes. But everything was geared towards the I I+ and 1 think that now, 
everything is geared towards SATs because of the publication of League Tables, 
which don't really tell you about a school. I ... II think that SATs and the National 
Curriculum, I think that what they have really done, they have taken the joy out of 
teaching because the whole thing now has beconte so prescribed, particularly when 
you first started to do the National Curriculum... SATs, which, in their first couple 
of years, were absolutely horrendous... and the amount of time teachers had to 
spend collecting evidence of assessment, and you had to keep that evidence, so that 
if somebody and said well I want you to show me why you assessed that child... 
Yes, we've cupboards full of it... it's a fire hazard. But that, there was no time at 
all, anymore for a child bringing I've brought this back. Now you say very nice, 
but we have to get on. Whereas you could stop, all right, dear let's talk about it. 
Spontaneity went, and thejoy went (emphasis added). 
Spontaneity and joy are the hallmarks of child-centred teaching. They also occur 
within a structured context. The differentiation of children and appropriately 
structured situations are part and parcel of child-centred primary practice. That 
teachers attempt to retain an element of joy in their teaching does not eradicate the 
necessary contradiction between SATs rationale and child-centred philosophy. At 
Southside staff confused how they adapt (at the S-C level) with the objective 
contradiction itself. Hence the views (also espoused by the deputy at Westside) 
that there 'does not have to be a contradiction'. This is a practical (S-C) syncretic 
response to an objective necessary contradiction (CS level). Like her Southside 
counterpart, the head associated child-centred teaching with the rhetorical 
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(unfounded) anti-progressivism of the late 1960s and 1970s. Both heads referred to 
Plowden and Tyndale without prompting on my part. The fundamental difference 
between the two, of course, centred on a qualified acceptance of child-centred 
philosophy versus its qualified rejection. 
However, unlike the generic B <- A form of syncretism that characterised 
Southside, practical syncretism here took the form of AuB. Certainly at the 
commencement of my research staff toyed with A -> B. Basically, they wanted to 
retain their notion of an independent child (B) and continually asked themselves 
how far can A, viz. the Managerialist package, be reduced, propitiated, 
accommodated to B, which they wanted to uphold. Perhaps without the fiscal crisis 
and tile imposition of national targets they could have pursued A4B much 
further. However, this would require good parental pre-preparation and, as I argue 
in the concluding chapter, a continual supply of 'bright' children. 
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8 What about the children? Some concluding remarks 
Introduction: maintaining the needfor analytical dualism 
Gewirtz et al. (1995: 87) argue that in order to begin to conceptualise the operation 
and effect of quasi-marketisation, a multi-level analysis is needed. From the 
morphogenetic approach such levels are not heuristic (that is, observational 
ordering devices) but sid generis real. The analysis of the interplay of structure, 
culture and agency is possible because socio-cultural properties predate the agency 
that transforms or reproduces them. The realist methodological device of analytical 
dualism employed here is due to the fact that any socio-cultural change is the 
outcome of a temporal sequence, whereby such change post-dates the action that 
led to it. Such action itself was conditioned by an anterior context. The realist 
(morphogenetic) approach to theorising about the interplay of structure, culture and 
agency was elaborated and defended (in contradistinction to Giddens' structuration 
theory) in Part One, applied historically in Part Two, and contemporaneously in 
Part Three. One of the key problems of structuration theory is its 
tight binding of structure and agency to avoid structural reification [that] does 
not allow a judgement to be made about particular structures working on human 
beings in particular ways, i. e. some are more binding than others, and some act 
in a more coercive way and to different degrees. Indeed, depending on 
circumstances and context, they may not coerce at all. Conversely, the degree of 
enablement in structural properties can only be determined by empirical 
investigation of particular activities embedded in particular contexts (Scott 
2000: 30-31). 
Here Scott is underscoring (a) the fact that (fallible) knowledge of generative socio- 
cultural properties is generated through qualitative investigation; (b) socio-cultural 
emergent properties do not constrain or enable in abstract isolation; (c) the extent of 
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constraint or enablement again enjoins empirical investigation at the interface 
between the CS and S-C interaction, which itself is rooted in the structural domain. 
Equally, the current ascendancy of positivism in education disclaims the 
explanatory utility of analytical dualism because of its secreted erasure of relatively 
enduring emergent properties. Hence the use of mathematical modelling 
techniques - as opposed to qualitative ones - by school effectiveness researchers. 
Thus Scott rightly argues that the research strategies of school effectiveness 'are 
implicitly positioned within a model of schooling, which denies the existence of 
real structural properties' (2000: 67). This complements my transcendental 
argument for the charge of ideological commitment levelled against school 
effectiveness researchers, whereby the implicit denial of enduring socio-cultural 
emergent properties degenerates into voluntarism. (Willmott 1999c). In turn, this 
explains the unremitting pressures placed on heads and their staffs, particularly in 
low socio-economic catchment areas. 
Analytical dualism enables the practical researcher to examine the 
independent causal properties of structure and culture in order to examine the 
degrees of freedom or stringency of constraints they afford agency. As I have 
already argued, those who wish to misconstrue the morphogenetic approach as 
'objectivist' tend to focus on the first part of the morphogenetic cycle, namely the 
identification of socio-cultural properties without simultaneous reference to agency. 
To reiterate, the whole point of this is to examine how the socio-cultural context is 
shaped for actors in order to gain explanatory insight upon what they subsequently 
do in it or what they can do about it. In Chapter Two I outlined the objective nature 
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of the 'constraining contradiction' between child-centred philosophy and the New 
Managerialism as embodied in SATs, the publication of national league tables and 
nationally imposed targets, which exists independently of agential cognisance. It 
has been argued that the contradiction is a necessary one, which in turn directs 
agency to repair it if, and only if, agency wishes to uphold it non-dogmatically or is 
forced into recognition of its logical necessity whilst being upheld. However, this 
necessary contradiction is one that has been imposed on all primary teachers, 
irrespective of (a) their desire to defend the New Managerialism and/or (b) 
recognition of its constraining nature. In other words, those who do not wish to 
uphold the New Managerialist philosophy underpinning assessment, whilst not 
constrained to engage in ideational repair work, nevertheless have to reorient their 
teaching in order to accommodate SATs. The extent of such accommodation 
cannot be predicted or inferred from abstract socio-cultural properties but must be 
established empirically. 
The ideational constraint experienced by child-centred. primary teachers of 
the New Managerialism is conceptualised as a 'third-order' emergent property 
because its incongruence is exacerbated by incongruent structural properties (LMS, 
league tables and national targets). The extent to which incongruent second- and 
third-order emergent properties can be deflected depends on local factors. My 
research shows how the extent of accommodation is conditioned by local context, 
namely prior history and the nature of 'school mix. Such prior history consists of 
a number of conditioning cycles and factors, which range from religious 
underpinning to deep-seated personal animosities. 
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Stringent conditioning and the tendency towards isomorphism 
Whilst such accommodation is contextually mediated, as Gewirtz et al. rightly 
point out, we must not lose sight of the macro (systemic) conditioning cycles 
unleashed by the 1988 and 1993 Education Acts in particular. Prior to the 1993 Act 
and Dearing Review, Bonnett argued that: 
tile National Curriculum is not inherentlý hostile to the relationship-centred 
principle... but that the cumulative requirements of planning, teaching. 
Monitoring, and reporting such an extensive and detailed set of objectives as 
comprise the National Curriculum will pre-occupy teachers to such an extent 
that there is a real danger of the concerns of children simply disappearing from 
view (1991: 291). 
Bonnett is correct not to isolate the National Curriculum from the rest of the 
Education Reform Act. It should be recalled that the National Curriculum and the 
1988 Education Act were contradictorily underpinned by educational and 
managerial concerns. One of the central arguments of this thesis has been that the 
New Managerialism does not simply enjoin the disappearance of children but 
denies and erases them. Transcendentally, it cannot erase children, which in turn 
accounts for the constraining nature of the contradiction. However, following the 
Dearing Report, Woods and Jeffrey, writing only 4 years' ago, argued that the 
Dearing Review constituted a 'distinct swing in the direction of process and away 
from objectives and technical rationality' to the extent that 
Coherence, holism and process could well come back into favour, it would 
seem, and be less matters of strategic adaptation for teachers. On the other hand, 
Galton (1995) argues that Dearing neglected certain key issues, namely 
&entitlement'; the issue of 'broad and balanced' against excellence or depth... 
The recommendation by Dearing that there should be no more change for five 
years is seen by Golby... 'as surely a triumph of hope over experience'. The 
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National Curriculum has clearly moved into a second phase, more favourable to 
our teachers than the first, but we are still some way from a settled state... 
(1996: 143). 
The second phase here constitutes the fourth phase of compromise for Scott (1994, 
2000), which followed the reassertion of control in 1990 by Kenneth Clarke. 
Clarke wanted to reassert the power of the central authority and thus to limit and 
circumscribe the power of the teaching profession. However, it should be recalled 
that Dearing argued that there was still a need to collect and publish summative 
data about pupils and schools. The ten-level system remained intact and the revised 
assessment model remained within a standards and accountability framework. As 
we saw in Chapter 5, this framework is a decontextualised one that prioritises 
external accountability. 
Subsequent events have borne out Bonnett's assessment. Of course, Woods 
and Jeffrey could not have anticipated that the Labour victory in 1997 meant a 
consolidation of the neo-liberal restructuring of education. Even if the head at 
Soutliside has been less in favour of managerialist 'solutions' to the relative lack of 
SATs success, a narrowing of curricular focus was ineluctable (unless the school as 
a whole was prepared to pay the ultimate structural price, namely closure). At 
Westside, staff reoriented their teaching strategies to accommodate SATs at the 
earliest possible moment. Yet the relative success in SATs meant that staff had 
more room for manoeuvre, in turn permitting a continuation of child-centred 
practice. But during my time there, New Labour's managerialist drive continued 
unabated and the imposition of national targets began to attenuate Westside's room 
for manoeuvre and thus matters were becoming less of 'strategic adaptation'. As 
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we saw, Westside's staff rejected the New Managerialism, as exemplified by the 
overall attitude vis-ý-vis the senior management team and paper work. Despite 
some of the staff s self-professed claims to be 'traditional', their teaching practices 
and proffered reasons for the latter were child-centred. This underscores the 
usefulness of the morphogenetic sequences delineated in Part Two, since the impact 
of the anti-child-centred rhetoric of the late 1960s and 1970s is evident from my 
research. Equally, at Southside the majority of teachers are openly child-centred. 
The difference here is that such staff did not qualify their endorsement of child- 
centred teaching. In a nutshell, the structural upper hand lay firmly with the head, 
whose vision of the school's future success was openly managerialist. 
Now, whilst one would not wish to generalise on the basis of what may be 
two special cases and despite the inherent problems that necessarily attach to 
generalisation (see Sayer 1992), recent research confirms the trend towards 
isomorphism. Gewirtz el al. write that 
We have evidence of a decisive shift in the values informing and reflected in 
management decision-making, as educational considerations are increasingly 
accommodated to image and budget-driven ones... We are also seeing school 
management and organization increasingly geared towards realizing 
instrumental, narrowly-focused academic ends as schools respond to the national 
curriculum, OFSTED inspections and league tables. Some schools are also 
employing techniques like total quality management (TQM) and quality 
assurance (QA) to formalize, disseminate and inculcate the messages of 
performance evaluation, feedback, measurement and comparison (1995: 97). 
This analysis is depressingly familiar. I do not need to recapitulate the overly 
narrow managerialist restructuring of activities at Southside. In short, what must 
now be added to the list is the imposition of national numeracy and literacy targets, 
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which now forces open the back door in every (state) school to technicist practices. 
For whilst possible (and likely) fluctuations in SATs attainment at Westside would 
enjoin some, albeit limited, narrowing of the curriculum, the added imposition of 
targets means that Westside must now narrow the curriculum, especially when its 
Year 5 is not as collectively 'bright' as its predecessor. This was precisely the 
deputy head's point, which accounts for his target of an additional one-percentage 
point. But the head later admitted during interview that deputy's suggested target 
would invite charges of low expectations. However, it is not simply a case of 
verbal reprimand but a reduction in funding if schools do not meet such targets. 
Indeed, whilst any back door can be closed, both targets and the fiscal vicissitudes 
engendered by quasi -marketisation means that this door cannot be shut. Rather, a 
weather eye must be kept on how much is being let in. In other words, a 'brighter' 
year would signal attenuation in any technicist-cum-narrow approach to the 
curriculum, but this would be a matter of degree. 
What about the children? 
It is reasonable to argue that only those schools that not only attract a homogeneous 
and strong 'school mix' but also remain financially solvent will (potentially) remain 
immune from any serious technicisation and narrowing of the school curriculum. 
The league tables and targets, along with literacy and numeracy hours, perforce will 
affect teaching practices; whether such practices are wholly managerialist remains a 
matter for empirical investigation. Either way, the New Managerialist onslaught is 
gaining strength (via Government legitimation and funding). Indeed, a paragraph 
of the Government's 1997 White Paper maintained that 
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... we shall put in place policies which seek to avoid failure. But where failure 
occurs, we shall tackle it head on. Schools which have been found to be failing 
will have to improve, make a fresh start, or close. 7'he principle of zero 
tolerance will also apply to local education authorities ... we intend to create an 
education service in which every school is either excellent, or improving, or 
both. (DfEE 1997: 12, emphasis added). 
Ozga emphasises the overall tone of the White Paper as dirigiste and managerialist: 
Things will happen, there will be, we will have, standards will rise. It is a tone 
that is very instructive in terms of understanding how the new Labour 
administration understands policy making... it is a valuable source of 
information on the model of governance that lies behind policy. It is a highly 
centralist and managerialist model... (2000: 105, original emphasis). 
Where does this leave the educational needs of children? The answer is simple: 
they - not just their educational needs but children per se - do not matter. As 
Gewirtz el al. succinctly point out, the question now facing schools as they vie with 
one another for competitive advantage is not what schools can do for children but 
what children as coniniodities can do for schools. This state of affairs is the logical 
outcome of an ontology that denies children qua children, admits only observable 
events and measurable end products. Thus, one should not be surprised that 
commentators such as Rose rightly maintain thus: 
If we determine success primarily in terms of test scores, then we ignore the 
social, moral and aesthetic dimensions of teaching and learning - and, as well, 
we'll miss those considerable intellectual achievements which aren't easily 
quantifiable (1995: 3). 
Indeed, the very notion that schools somehow provide 'value for money' indicates 
the sheer extent of the commodification of teachers and pupils. This strikes at the 
very heart of child-centred philosophy, since no price can be put on the social, 
spiritual and psychological needs of an individual child. The argument of this 
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thesis is that the lip-service'paid by OFSTED and school effectiveness researchers 
to the spiritual, moral and emotional aspects of child development is d necessary 
concomitant of the New Managerialism. Furthermore, that such dimensions of the 
human condition cannot be ignored at the S-C level is attributable to the 
constraining contradiction that is the New Managerialism, since transcendentally 
humanity cannot be expunged, and thus resurfaces at various contradictory 
moments at the S-C level. 
I concur with Morley and Rassool (1999) that the primacy accorded to 
measurable output and target setting is resulting in organisational isomorphism. 
Furthen-nore, they rightly point out that whilst New Labour has reinserted the 
concept of disadvantage via the creation of Education Action Zones, the implicit 
assumption remains that such schools can perform independently of school 
constraints. This is consistent, of course, with the atomised social ontology of 
OFSTED and school effectiveness research and the neo-liberal inflection of the 
Education Acts. Morley and Rassool comment that 
School effectiveness has become a vast industry, legitimised through public 
policy, finance and educational research... it currently frames the language of 
school practice and management. We have attempted to fracture the discourse 
by uncovering its epistemological bases. We have aimed to open up some 
discursive space, as a counterpart to the closure and certainty embedded in 
school effectiveness. It has been an objective to uncover submerged structures 
and ideologies... We have endeavoured to interrogate what is hidden, 
contradictory, silenced and distorted and avoided in the common sense 
rhetoric... (1999: 129). 
Pace Morley and Rassool, this thesis has provided a transcendental realist argument that 
the ontological propositions secreted by OFSTED are individualist and that qua CS 
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denizens exist independently of agential awareness. Whether the constraining 
contradiction that is the New Managerialism is recognised is an epistemological 
contingency. In other words, Morley and Rassool are confusing the logical and the 
causal. Whilst as academics they have (correctly) delineated the contradictions (at both 
CS and practical S-C levels), this thesis has shown that the overall problem for the 
primary teaching profession as a corporate body is its lack of exploitation of the CS fault- 
line, prior and subsequent to the Conservative onslaught. In fact, it has been argued that 
child-centred Philosophy has never achieved S-C predominance. More 
contemporaneously, my research in both primary schools bears witness to the S-C 
confusion surrounding child-centred philosophy and the lack of full discursive 
penetration of the constraining contradiction. Thus, coupled with the New Labour 
primacy accorded to OFSTED, nationally imposed targets, literacy and numeracY hours 
and the continuing role played by school effectiveness academics, the future quiie simply 
remains bleak for children in England and Wales. 
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